

ULEMA IN POLITICS

*A study relating to the political activities of the
ulema in the South-Asian Subcontinent
from 1556 to 1947*

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الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا وَهَاجَرُوا وَجَاهَدُوا فِي سَبِيلِ
 اللَّهِ بِأَمْوَالِهِمْ وَأَنْفُسِهِمْ ۖ أَكْثَرُ دَرَجَةً
 عِنْدَ اللَّهِ ط وَأُولَٰئِكَ هُمُ الْفَائِزُونَ ○

Those who believe and suffer exile and strive with might and main in God's cause, with their goods and their persons, have the highest rank in the sight of God: they are the people who will achieve eternal success.

(Qur'an IX, 19-23)

PREFACE

The ulema hold an important position in Muslim society. Their influence has varied from time to time in accordance with the social and political conditions then prevailing. Its extent has also depended upon their own qualities of learning and piety. Great names stand out in history from their ranks. This Subcontinent has also contributed many eminent names to this role of honour. From the day Muslim rule was established on a part of this soil, men born and trained here began to gain recognition in the world of Islamic learning.

This book is concerned with the role that the ulema played in the politics of this Subcontinent. It covers a period of a little less than four centuries from 1556 to 1947. These were found to be convenient dates: the beginning of Akbar's reign to the establishment of Pakistan. No date or event is in fact a complete watershed of history; every development has its roots in the past and extends its branches into the future, hence the reader would find that references extend to a longer period than the book seeks to cover. During all this time the ulema have seldom been totally quiescent in the political field, but there have been some periods when they have dominated the scene. With a radical change in the situation after 1857, they lost the initiative but not their energy or zeal. It has been the endeavour to portray their activities faithfully and sympathetically, because otherwise it would have been impossible to understand them properly; yet history has also to be critical for a proper appraisal of the past. Wherever criticism may appear to be severe, it will be found to be based upon facts and not cavil or rancour. Similarly wherever praise is justified it has not been withheld, because history must pay its tribute to the greatness of human spirit and the endeavour that it has inspired. The author has no sectarian affiliations that could have clouded his vision. He did have definite political views in the pre-independence period but he has had sufficient training in academic discipline to keep his own prejudices under control. He has not made statements that have not been substantiated by

the evidence of facts or the processes of objective logic. If the reader still comes across any immoderate statement or any other shortcoming, he is assured that it is absolutely unintentional. So far as the author is concerned, he has made every effort to be objective, logical and faithful to recorded facts.

The author has lived through more than four decades of the period covered by the book. He had the unique advantage of enjoying as a young man the affection of some of the main characters in this story, Mawlānā Mohamed Ali, Hakim Ajmal Khān, Dr. Mukhtār Aḥmad Anṣārī and Mawlānā Shaukat Ali. For some time in their youth Mawlānā Abu-'l-A'lā Mawdūdī and he lived in the same street in Delhi and came to know each other quite well. He knew several Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind leaders personally and had opportunities of meeting them frequently. He counted several Muslim League leaders among his personal friends. All this gave him the opportunity of having first hand information on current affairs. However he has refrained from utilizing that information as evidence on any crucial problem and has almost invariably based his statements on recorded material. There are only one or two exceptions and in every instance the fact that personal information is the source of information has been specifically mentioned in the footnotes. Quite often reference to personal information has been made to throw additional light and not to clinch an argument.

The author has previously written on some of the topics necessarily included in this book. The reader who has had occasion to read these topics in the author's previous writings will find that this book provides more information and breaks new ground in interpretation and assessment. Every attempt has been made to avoid repetition or presenting a mere rehash of previous writings. The inquiry has been extended further and, to the author himself, this has been an essay in added exploration. There are topics which form entire chapters or even parts of chapters on which substantial independent works are in existence. Therefore, no attempt has been made to make this treatise exhaustive, but

it is hoped all important and significant points have been brought under discussion.

I must record my gratitude to the Ministry of Education, Government of Pakistan for a research grant which made it easier for me to undertake this work.

There are many other friends who have helped me in various ways. Mr. Muḥammad Ayyūb Qādirī, a lecturer in Urdu College, initially collected some material for me on some of the ulema who participated in the Jihād Movement. Mr. Qādirī is a competent scholar and is familiar with the history of various religious and political movements in the Subcontinent. There are many others, too many to be mentioned, who have helped me in various ways. In particular I must mention the management of my publishers, Messrs Ma'aref Ltd., for their cooperation and patience. The index has been prepared by Mr. Shamsher Khan under the expert guidance of Dr. Anis Khurshid. Even though the book has been written after my retirement from the University of Karachi, I was enabled by the authorities to avail myself of its library resources. Similarly I had full access to the library of the Pakistan Historical Society. My friend, Mr. Hilal Ahmad Zubairi, and, former student, Mr. Salman Javed, have helped me with the proofs. The former has also made useful suggestions from time to time. He possesses a rich store of recollections and background information, having been the editor of important newspapers before his retirement from journalism in 1949.

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I. H. QUEESHI

22 August, 1972.

NOTE ON SECOND EDITION

I am grateful to several friends who pointed out some errors that had crept into the first edition. Part of the book was printed during my absence from Pakistan. Such errors, I hope, have now been eliminated.

I am under an obligation to Professor Saiyid Muḥammad Salīm who pointed out to me the possible relationship between Miḥrāb Shāh's enthusiasm for *jihād* and the fight that the *faqirs* of Shāh Madār's order gave to the British after the Battle of Plassey. A reference to this has now been included.

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2 June 1974.

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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

The following system has been used:—

bh	بھ	q	ق	r	ر-ڑ	a	ا
ph	پھ	k	ک	z	ز	b	ب
th	تھ	l	ل	s	س	p	پ
jh	جھ	m	م	<u>sh</u>	ش	t	ٹ
chh	چھ	n	ن	ṣ	ص	<u>th</u>	ث
dh	دھ	w	و	ḍ	ض	j	ج
kh	کھ	h	ہ	ṭ	ط	ch	چ
gh	گھ	'	ء	ẓ	ظ	ḥ	ح
		i	ی	‘	ع	<u>kh</u>	خ
		e	ے	<u>gh</u>	غ	d	ڈ
				f	ف	<u>dh</u>	ذ

The short vowels have been transcribed as a, i, u; the long vowels as ā, ī, ū.

Words which have found their way into the English dictionary have not been transliterated.

Names of places have been transliterated in the manner in which they are familiar to the students of history and geography of the Subcontinent. Unfamiliar names have been transliterated. Uniformity has not been observed in the transliteration of the names of persons who wrote them in English, e.g., Mohamed Ali for Muḥammad ‘Alī, etc.

NOTE ON REFERENCES

Where a reference occurs for the first time, full available details have been given. In case of repetitions only the main part of the name has been given, e.g., Mihr for Ghulām Rasūl Mihr; where more than one work of the same author has been cited the name of the book also is repeated. This has also been done where two authors have identical names. Where the main name is common to more than one person, the given name also has been repeated. To keep the bibliography manageable, only the works cited have been included. The authors have been listed in alphabetical order on the basis of the surnames.

CHAPTER I

The position of the Ulema in the Muslim Society

The status and the functions of the ulema in the Muslim community have seldom been properly understood by non-Muslim scholars. Superficial observers have thought that the ulema correspond to priests in other religions. It is difficult for them to think of a religion without a church; hence they consider the presence of a priesthood in Islam inevitable. The ulema are venerated for their learning and piety, hence also they are taken to be priests.

Islam, however, does not possess a church, nor a priesthood. What are the ulema, then, if they are not priests? This question looks even more difficult to answer if it is remembered that Hinduism has no organized church; indeed it does not have even congregational prayers; yet it has a priesthood. Islam lays great emphasis on congregational prayers; it has large mosques dedicated for the purpose; one sees more slender minarets of mosques in a Muslim city than spires of churches in Christian cities; the muezzin's call summoning the faithful to prayers is

heard more frequently in the world of Islam than the chimes of church bells in Christendom. The religious obligations of Islam need organized community effort. How is this effort organized without a priesthood or a church? The great pilgrimage of *haj* involves hundreds of thousands of persons from practically the entire world of Islam. How is it possible to manage these large functions without a church? There is no community apart from monastic orders, where life is so centred in religion as among the Muslims and yet they lack an ecclesiastical organization completely. This seeming contradiction confuses non-Muslims unless they study closely the working of the Muslim community in the discharge of its religious duties.

Before we proceed with the discussion further, it would be better if we try to answer some of the questions that we have asked so that the position of the ulema may become a little more clear. In the beginning of Islamic history, the state managed all the affairs of the community. It organized the congregational prayers, made arrangements for the management of mosques and organized the *haj*, the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. The tradition continued and though the ulema were associated with the organization of the mosques, yet the main responsibility devolved upon the state. The *haj* has always been and is still organized by the government that administers Hejaz, the land of the pilgrimage. When in many countries, either because the political power ceased to be in the hands of the Muslims, or for some other reason, the state lost interest in administering the mosques, the local communities took upon themselves their management. A mosque generally has a small staff headed by an *imām*, who is entrusted with the duty of organizing the congregational prayers at the prescribed times and leading them. The larger mosques may have *khaṭibs* for preaching the sermons. Almost every mosque has a muezzin, who makes the prescribed call to prayers. He is assigned some other minor duties as well. There may be a person to keep the premises clean and perform other menial duties. The leading persons in the community, acting as an informal board, appoint the staff and find the money to pay it. They also look after other routine matters or even alterations and additions to the buildings. If the mosque is

endowed by a single person, there may be a *mutawallī* or a guardian who may function either singly or with a board of some senior members of the congregation.

It may be mentioned that none of these persons is ordained or is a priest in any sense. The prayers can be led by any one and outside the mosques they are generally led by a person who is more pious or learned than the others, even though he may not be an *‘ālim*. Marriages are civil contracts in theory, even though they may be celebrated by an *‘ālim*, yet again any layman can do so. There is no rite that can be performed only by an *‘ālim*. Thus ulema do not, in any way, monopolize any function in any rites that non-Muslims would consider exclusively religious. And, furthermore, even learning is not a prerequisite for performing any of these functions: only the limited knowledge adequate for the purpose is needed.

Let us now discuss the main function of the ulema for which learning of a specialized nature is essential.

For this purpose it is essential to understand a characteristic of Islam which is not found in other religions. Islam does not distinguish between the religious and the profane. There being no *ecclesia*, its counterpart the *saeculum* becomes redundant. In a sense Islam is a secular religion, because it has no church. The Muslims form a community of laymen organized for a basically religious purpose: that of enabling them to order their lives in accordance with the tenets of Islam. These tenets embrace the entire life of a Muslim. He is as much engaged in performing his duties as a Muslim when he is occupied in a lawful pursuit to sustain himself and his family as when he prays or fasts or when he performs any functions relating to the maintenance of the community as a live and active organization discharging its corporate duties. Thus many activities classified as profane by other communities become religious in Islam provided they are lawful and conducive to a healthy personal or communal life. As a logical sequence, therefore, religion in Islam embraces the entire spectrum of human life, which should be lived in a full consciousness of human responsibility to God and man alike. There is no demarcation in Islam between the duties to God and those to Caesar.

With this philosophy of a religious life, there arises no need for the spiritual guardianship of the people by a priesthood. Therefore, Islam did not create one. Yet it recognized the need of guidance and interpretation. The very concept of a Prophet who was a man and servant of God inspired by Him to guide the erring humanity, transmitting knowledge bestowed by God to him to humanity for leading it on the right path is a positive recognition of the fact that man needs guidance and cannot discover all truth through his own efforts. This was provided by God through prophets, of whom Muḥammad was the last. As the prophetic chain was broken, guidance could be provided to the community only through men of learning and understanding. Hence comes the need for the ulema.

It is widely, though erroneously, believed that the Prophet said, "The learned persons (ulema) among my people are like the prophets of Israel".¹ This alleged saying does not seek to compare the ulema with the prophets of the Judaic tradition, indeed all Muslims recognize the fact that the prophets are a brotherhood unto themselves which permits no comparison, because they were vouchsafed direct, unambiguous, clear and definitive revelation (*wahī*) so that they could guide the peoples to whom they were sent. The Muslims do not discriminate between one prophet and another, so far as respect for their personalities and revelation is concerned, and consider no other person comparable to any prophet, whatever might be that person's spiritual stature. The only point of comparison is the function of either. When an Israelite prophet died and the people tended to forget his teachings or became confused in its interpretation, God sent another messenger to bring them back to the right path. This could not happen after the death of Muḥammad, because he was to be followed by no more prophets. Who would then guide his people after his death? The Prophet carefully got the entire revelation received by him recorded and laid the foundation of the tradition of the verbal sanctity of the Qur'ān to ensure

¹ This alleged saying of the Prophet is quoted widely but it is not authentic. Sakhāwī, *Al-Maqāṣid-u'l-ḥasanah*, (Cairo, 1956), p. 286. The other version, "The learned are the successors of the Prophets" is more in keeping with Muslim religious thought and is found in Tirmidhī, Abū Dā'ūd and Aḥmad, *ibid.*

the preservation of its text. The Muslims point with pride to the purity of the text of the Qur'ān, which has remained unaltered throughout the centuries. It has also been transmitted verbally by hundreds of *ḥuffāz* who know it by heart.

The Qur'ān has always held the central position in Islamic thinking. Indeed it holds a position even higher than that of the Prophet, because the Prophet was as much bound by its injunctions as any believer. It is the word of God and lays down the basic tenets of Islam, its philosophy and its code of life. It covers all spheres of human activities in their multifarious aspects. And it is not detailed. Indeed when the early Muslims sometimes asked questions to elicit rules on details of human obligations and duties, they were admonished not to do so,² because such details would naturally be restrictive and leave the freedom of choice crippled for the believers. The purpose of Islam is not to make men prisoners of doctrines and injunctions, but to guide them in a manner that under the guidance and discipline of Islam, they find a richness of life through the exercise of their reason and other faculties. The intention of Islam is not to enslave the mind and the heart but to awaken the latent capabilities of human reason and emotions for constructive purposes and to remove the disabilities inspired by superstition and the baser instincts and urges. It does not impose an impossible code of conduct that would cripple human urges and create psychological and moral difficulties. It does not look upon human nature as evil and vicious and nurtures legitimate and beneficial outlets for it. This being the aim, the exercise of human reason plays an important role in Islam. An incident in the early history of Islam illustrates this idea rather aptly.

It is well known that some of the followers and supporters of 'Alī, the fourth caliph, turned against him and established the *Khārījī* tradition. The early *Khārījī* leaders were fundamentalists and were not willing to apply the principles of Islam to human problems in a rational manner. Soon after 'Alī's election, they pressed upon him the need of applying the Qur'ān as they understood it to the situation arising out of the politics of the day.

² *Qur'ān*, Chapter v, 104, 105.

"Let the Qur'ān speak", they insisted vehemently. 'Ali brought a copy of the Qur'ān in an assembly and said, "Here is the Qur'ān between the two boards (of its binding). How will it speak?"³ What 'Ali wanted to impress upon these unreasonable fundamentalists—and history bears witness to the fact that many of them were men of deep piety, used to spending their nights in prayers and of exemplary character—was that the teachings of the Qur'ān were to be understood and applied rationally.⁴ And he was right, because the Prophet himself had always encouraged an intelligent understanding as well as application of the principles enunciated in the Qur'ān.

As the Qur'ān has always been the basis on which the Muslims have tried to order their relations with other men, merely a private understanding or interpretation of its verses would not only be totally inadequate but also confusing. Indeed in some situations, like the one that developed between the highly individualistic pious, yet misguided, *Khārijīs* and 'Ali, any tendency to enforce interpretations that had not received a consensus of acceptance could be highly dangerous because it could become a source of conflict and destructive of the Islamic society. Hence it was necessary to lay down canons of interpretation and application that would be widely acceptable because of their fairness, logic and wisdom.

The first of these was that the word and deed of the Prophet offered the best basis of agreement. The Qur'ān was revealed to the Prophet and Allah had vouchsafed to him a wisdom and an insight that none else could claim. This idea was inherent in the Qur'ān calling the Prophet the Most Excellent Exemplar.⁵ Indeed his freedom from error in his prophetic mission made his life the best interpretation of the Quranic injunctions and philosophy. Therefore, the *sunnah* or the tradition of the Prophet

³ 'Ali said, "And this is Qur'ān, written in straight lines, between the two boards (of its binding). It does not speak with a tongue, it needs interpreters, and interpreters are (properly qualified) men"—*Nahj-i'l-balāghah* (Lahore, 1963) p. 247.

⁴ This is obvious from above. The *Qur'ān* itself says: "and none will grasp the message except men of understanding", Chapter iii, 7 (Translation by Abdullah Yusuf Ali).

⁵ *Qur'ān*, Chapter xxxiii, 21.

came to hold a most important position, not only in its own right as embodying a true criterion of the Islamic principles, but also as the foremost guide in seeking the true meaning of the Qur'ān. In either capacity it became a fundamental element of the Islamic tenets, second and inferior to the Qur'ān alone.

On these two rocks has been constructed the entire edifice of the Islamic doctrine and law. The two other elements are human reason applied to the preceding two, the Qur'ān and the *sunnah*, resulting in the deduction of a ruling applicable to a particular situation. This is *ijtihād*, the effort of the human mind to find the truth or deduce a principle in the light of and from the Qur'ān and the *sunnah*. When the result of such an effort by those capable of making it and trained for that purpose finds acceptance among those similarly qualified, it becomes the consensus or the *ijmā'*. This, in a nutshell, is the process which has built up the details of the Islamic law, the *shari'ah*, and the Islamic code of life.

Non-Muslim scholars are struck by the fact that the *shari'ah* holds such a dominant position in Islamic thinking and exercises such a fundamental role in the life of the Muslims. The reason is that it emanates from the Qur'ān and the *sunnah*, both of which are immutable, and the former is, being the word of God, infallible and the latter, when finally established as authentic and genuine, nearly so. The deductions from the two being based in them enjoy the prestige that all such deductions would. The authority of the sources being above question, the only doubt would be whether the deductions have been properly arrived at. This doubt is laid at rest by the knowledge that the exercise was made by honest and capable men, fully trained for the purpose and deeply versed in the lore that they interpreted and represented. This thought finds confirmation in the fact of wide acceptance by similarly qualified and equipped persons. The need for a revision in widely held beliefs relating to the authenticity or correctness of certain deductions arises only if some people find that there are parallel deductions arrived at by other men of equal calibre, following a different line of argument or when conditions have changed to an extent that a particular ruling arrived at in totally different

circumstances has lost its relevance. This explains why the shari'ah is held in such high esteem by the Muslims.

It still remains to explain why law, morality and doctrine are so strongly entwined in Islam that one cannot be separated from the other. It is true that there are legal, definitive, justiciable and enforceable parts of the shari'ah which are comparable with the law in other societies and cultures. The morality in Islam does not consist only in meeting the definitive requirements of the shari'ah, just as elsewhere morality goes beyond law and is more comprehensive because it possesses a dimension that law cannot possess, but because, in Islam, moral ideas come from the same source of the Qur'ān and the *sunnah* as have given birth to the shari'ah, hence there is no dichotomy between the two. A law that is based in the shari'ah cannot be branded as unjust by a Muslim. The details of the ritual in worship and religious performances have always been derived from the same sources. Hence the shari'ah embraces these as well.

It would thus be seen that men who interpret the Qur'ān and the *sunnah* or the established volume of accepted shari'ah hold an important place in Muslim society. For, in spite of the simplicity of the Islamic fundamental beliefs, their detailed application to life is not such a simple matter. Despite the fact that there are standard, well known and comprehensive books of *fiqh* giving detailed rulings on many matters of common occurrence, the layman has little inclination to consult them. Even if he were so inclined, no collection of such books would suffice, because the complexity of life is such that no one can foresee all the situations to which the shari'ah would have to be applied. Hence the average Muslim turns to one who, in his opinion, is likely to know. The position of every scholar in Islamic *fiqh* is that of an expert who may be consulted, but, however deep his knowledge may be, he cannot claim infallibility and, therefore, that advice is weighed, compared and evaluated by those who have no special competence in the matter and then accepted or rejected. But it is a matter of common experience that mostly it is accepted. Just as the health of a people depends, among other factors, upon the competence of its physicians and surgeons, the moral and religious well-being of a Muslim people is greatly affected by the quality of its ulema.

This is even truer of the less educated but religious minded sectors of the society.

This would make it clear that the ulema do not possess any authority beyond that of preaching their doctrines and advising whoever cares to consult them. They are scholars and experts and their influence primarily rests on the quality of their scholarship and their piety, for they are religious men and are expected to act upon their own preaching. Indeed there is a strong tradition of piety among them because of their own convictions. In addition they react to what the people expect of them. Even today they are respected and though their conservatism and narrow specialization in their lore, without an insight into the affairs of the world in which they and their followers must necessarily live and to which they must continuously be adjusting themselves, have lost them the leadership in the matters of the world so far as the sophisticated classes of society educated in modern disciplines are concerned, yet upon the religious minded masses who are not educated on modern lines their influence is considerable even in fields where the knowledge of the Muslim traditional sciences is not too helpful.

The conservatism of the ulema can be explained easily. Their training is that of lawyers and jurists. They look for authority and precedents. They seek light for the present and the future from the past. Law generally tends to conserve mores and institutions. Where it changes, it generally, though not invariably, seeks to conform to opinion that has already crystallized into convictions. The most progressive law, therefore, lags behind opinion as well as behaviour. It is the constant, almost imperceptible yet steady change in outlook and circumstances that forces changes first in public opinion and only later in law. This is true when law has no sanctions other than its own and public opinion. But when law is based on authority which is held to be immutable and above amendment, it tends to be even more conservative. This does not mean that it cannot be progressive or must necessarily get out of touch with ever growing human needs and their complexity, but it needs men of cultivated sensitivity and foresight for the expansion of its interpretation and application to keep it abreast of the needs of the day and to

anticipate, so far as it is possible, the requirements of the future. And even then it is a difficult and precarious undertaking because there is the danger of the moorings of the authority being lost in the process. Even the forward looking ulema would be wary in such an exercise.

This only explains the conservatism of the ulema, but not their estrangement from the progress of the modern knowledge and the affairs of the world. The latter is gradually and slowly being broken by the various organs of information, among which the newspapers are the foremost. Yet the more sophisticated literature of careful situation analyses being mostly in European languages is not available to them. But when it comes to deeper intimacy with modern knowledge, their ignorance is even more reprehensible. One can perhaps ignore their attitude towards natural sciences, which they tend to dismiss as irrelevant to their task; but how can they seek to guide men when they are so indifferent to the social sciences of today? A thorough grounding in economics, psychology, sociology, political science and international relations is necessary to understand the world in which we live today. No interpretation or application of the fundamentals of Islam can find relevance in contemporary society unless it takes cognizance of all the forces at work within it. It would be erroneous to hold that the principles of Islam have already taken cognizance of human nature, hence the basic principles of the social sciences are inherent in the very fundamentals of the Islamic faith and consequently need not be enlisted as aids in the task of new interpretation. To the extent the ignorance of modern knowledge is betrayed by the ulema, their influence shrinks in public affairs and among the educated elite of the society.

There is no justification for the present attitude of the ulema so far as the doctrine of Islam is concerned. Indeed the Qur'ān again and again demands the exercise of human reason and observation of natural phenomena and environment alike, because it holds that reason and observation add to faith as well as wisdom. The great Persian Poet Sa'di was speaking in the spirit of the Islamic tradition when he observed that "it is impossible to understand God without knowledge".⁶ The term

⁶ "کہ بے علم نتوان خدارا شناخت" has become almost a common proverb.

'knowledge' has always been used in a liberal and comprehensive sense. When the Prophet said. "Acquire knowledge even though you may have to go to China for it", he obviously was not referring to theology or the exegesis of the Qur'ān. The Arab proverb, erroneously considered by some to be a saying of the Prophet, "Knowledge has two branches, the knowledge of religions and the knowledge of material objects", refers to the need of studying science. There is an incident in the life of the Prophet which illustrates this point. Bukhārī has narrated on the evidence of Ibn 'Abbās that as a small boy he once was seized with a passionate desire to see the Prophet engaged in his nightly devotions. This was comparatively easy because the Prophet's wife Maimūnah was his aunt. So one night he went to his aunt Maimūnah's house to sleep there. When the Prophet came he saw the child apparently asleep. When around midnight, the Prophet got up, Ibn 'Abbās also got out of his bed and like the Prophet, he made his ablutions preparatory to prayers. Before praying, however, the Prophet went outdoors, looked at the stars meditatively and recited the following verses from the Qur'ān:

"Verily in the creation of the heavens and the Earth and the changing of the day and the night, there are signs for persons of understanding,

For those who remember God while standing or sitting or (lying) on their sides, and meditate on the creation of the heavens and the Earth (and say) "Our Lord, Thou hast not created these in vain".⁷

On another occasion—and this time the narrator is 'Ā'ishah, the Prophet's wife—after reciting the above, the Prophet was moved to remark, "Unfortunate are those who chew (repeat) these (verses) and do not ponder on them."⁸

⁷ Qur'ān, Chapter iii, 190. Ibn 'Abbās is reported to have narrated this incident in Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, (Meerut 1328 A.H.) v. i., p. 21, v. i, p. 97; v. i, p. 135; v. ii, p. 657, 'Alī also reports that when the Prophet got up for *tahajjud* prayers, he would recite the above verse, A'r-Rāzi, *Tafsir-u'l-kabir* (Cairo, n.d.) v. iii, p. 171.

⁸ Zamakhsharī, *Kashshāf* (Cairo, 1946), v. i, p. 452; Ibn Kathīr, *Tafsir* (Cairo, n.d.) v. iii, p. 171.

This incident would show that in the opinion of the Prophet the verses relating to natural phenomena were intended not only as an argument to establish the existence of God, but also as incentives to understanding the miracle of creation more intensively. Such involvement in it should lead, and in the early days of Islam, did lead to a study of nature and science. It is, therefore, surprising that today the ulema do not show the slightest interest in such studies. Some even betray hostility to them.

What greater phenomena could be there, besides the interplay of natural forces, than the human society itself? To a jurist its study is essential, because no law, and for that matter, no religion can prove effective if it ignores social change, its causes and effects. As will be mentioned later, even the medieval ulema were conscious of its importance. In modern times, an *Ikhwān* writer, Saiyyid Muḥamad Quṭb, who was a learned *‘ālim*, found it necessary to write on economics and society.⁹ Similarly, the leader of the Jamā‘at-i-Islāmī in Pakistan, Saiyyid Abu-’l-A‘lā Mawdūdī has written on constitutional issues.¹⁰ But these are exceptions which prove the general rule that the ulema as a class concentrate on jurisprudence and other traditional sciences based upon authority (*manqūl*) to the exclusion of modern rational sciences (*ma‘qūl*). What little of the rational sciences they do learn is outdated and comparatively useless.

However it was not like this always. It would be interesting to relate the story of the deterioration in the qualities of the ulema and to analyse some of its causes.

It has already been mentioned that the Prophet used the word *‘ilm* in the general sense of ‘knowledge’. For several centuries after him, the word knowledge was used in its comprehensive sense and the word *‘ālim* also was used in its literal sense of a learned man. A specialist in a strictly religious discipline was considered to be learned along with others, but he was also distinguished as an exegete (*mufassir*), a jurist (*faqih*) or a traditionist

⁹ Saiyyid Muḥammad Quṭb, *Islam, The Misunderstood Religion*, (English translation from original in Arabic), (Dacca, 1969).

¹⁰ e.g., Abu-’l-A‘lā Mawdūdī, *Islamic Law and Constitution*, (translated into English and edited by Khurshid Ahmad) (Lahore, 1955).

(*muḥaddith*). It is obvious that the authority of these experts in their special fields was much greater than that of others who went into the religious field for performing certain functions as *imāms*, judges (*qāḍis*) or preachers. It must, however, be noted that the basic education before specialization was the same for all and it included, according to the medieval classification, the basic religious as well as profane sciences. Indeed the curricula followed even today in the seminaries where religious disciplines are taught contain a very high proportion of the non-religious sciences, but the contents are old fashioned and out of date. They are curious remnants of an old system of education. Upto the middle of the eighteenth century, they were imparting instruction which was relevant and useful. Then two great changes overtook the world. The West started on a spectacular career of political domination of the world on the one hand and of intellectual achievement and progress on the other. Both had a tremendous impact on the Muslim world.

Because a good deal of the expansion of the political power of the West was at the expense of the Muslim world, it excited a hostility towards the West which was understandable. Political defeats did not, all at once, bring the conviction that it had stolen a march in the intellectual field as well. And then it seemed that the only way to ward off total surrender was to preserve the Islamic faith and the Islamic way of life including the culture and knowledge that Islam had created. Political defeat did not convince the Muslims that their culture was inferior. Of course, so long as they were Muslims, they could not but believe that their religion was superior. Could they preserve their faith and culture after accepting Western education? If it is taken into consideration that education, at least in those days, was highly subjective, this was no idle question to ask. And despite the tremendous changes leading to objectivity in the natural and social sciences today, it will have to be conceded that the latter are even now coloured by social convictions and ideologies. Today the Muslims are painfully aware of the need for catching up with the scientific and technological progress of the West, but this was not so at least in the beginning of the eighteenth century. At that time it seemed necessary merely to learn and adopt a number of

techniques of war and of the manufacture of arms and ammunition to wipe out military deficiencies of their states.

However it was not such a simple matter. The military strength of the West was not an isolated factor. It was an expression of a general upsurge of the spirit of adventure and inquiry that had revived the West after a long period of inertia and backwardness. The Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century had destroyed so much in the Eastern lands of Islam that they were exhausted and prostrate. Material prosperity had gone because of the large scale destruction of the irrigation works, which had been carefully constructed over a long period. As large areas of the devastated lands were arid, the disappearance of the irrigation facilities was a great disaster. The educational institutions and the centres of learning were annihilated, scholars dispersed and books destroyed, thus drying up the sources of Muslim intellectual activity. In short when the West started on its career of progress, the Muslim East began to sink in inertia. The old curiosity, the mother of all intellectual progress, was gone. Thus, even if there had been no psychological barriers, there would have been little inclination to take a good look at Western sciences and then to participate once again in the grand activity of broadening the horizons of human knowledge. The impact of the West could have acted as a catalyst if the Muslim intellectual circles had been wide awake and not dormant. As a matter of fact, the tendency to ignore Western learning was as much the result of intellectual lethargy as of false pride. For when individuals and societies decide that they know enough, they start on the path of decay.

The attitude of the Muslim scholars of those days resulted in the then existing educational institutions to go on with their old methods and static learning without taking any cognizance of the new additions to human knowledge. Hence, instead of participating in the intellectual development of the world, they became museum pieces peddling knowledge that ceased to be of any use in the affairs of the world. However, because they alone imparted instruction in Islamic religious sciences, they continued to serve a purpose and found support among the religious minded and the pious sections of the community. This resulted in grave

consequences for the Muslim peoples, which are a matter of common knowledge and should only be recapitulated briefly.

The first consequence was that the Muslim peoples of the world could not resign themselves to a state of backwardness for all time to come and therefore there was a demand for the new upto date knowledge. Hence new educational institutions came into existence. Some of these were purely secular established by alien rulers and others were Christianity oriented founded by missionaries. A good example of the former can be found in the educational institutions of British India, which after the rebellion of 1857, carried religious neutrality to the extreme of excluding all moral instruction and the most successful of the missionary institutions was and still is the American University of Beirut. In either case a certain amount of alienation of the pupils from their religion and culture was inevitable and it grew in volume as generations of men and women graduated so that the cumulative effect has been tremendous.

The second consequence was the separation of religious knowledge from secular sciences, the former the monopoly of the old fashioned seminaries living in the unreal ivory tower of hurt pride and self righteousness. There can be no doubt about the devotion, the sacrifice and the sincerity of those who subjected themselves to the glaring disadvantages of practically renouncing the world. And all honour to them for what they suffered for their convictions. There had been centuries when the highest offices in the state were open to the graduates of such institutions which they had filled with distinction; now the highest worldly rewards were poorly paid professorships in similar institutions or the much poorer positions in mosques. But unwittingly they brought about a state of affairs totally alien to the philosophy and doctrine of Islam, which endeavours to cater for the totality of life and does not approve of its segmentation into matters mundane and spiritual. The abolition of the division of human affairs into secular and ecclesiastical has been sought by Islam; the bifurcation of the Muslim educational system again tended to introduce this division. More and more life would be lived in two worlds resulting in a deep schizophrenia where belief and action would find it difficult to live in accord.

The third consequence was a polarization between the Western educated elite and the masses: the latter, being unaware of the progress of Western science and its relevance to life, were confused with the dichotomy of what was preached by old fashioned preachers in the mosque and the life that was lived by the more prosperous classes around them. They continued to give their allegiance to the ulema, but because the worldly gains were all elsewhere, this allegiance became weaker and weaker and because there was little communication between them and men of Western education, they felt dissatisfied and a potential source of danger to established society. They are the backbone of the following of irresponsible and selfish demagogues and the main support of charismatic leaderships which arouse their emotions but seldom try to develop their understanding of the problems facing them. Indeed Islam had frowned upon monasticism and discarded priesthood. The self imposed poverty and abnegation of the rewards of a good education gave a touch of monasticism to the inmates of the seminaries and the ulema, who, because of the restrictions on their activities imposed by their impractical education, tended to function more and more like priests, only much less favoured, because they do not have the advantage of belonging to a well knit and powerful organization like the church. It is because of this situation that has been created by the separation of religious education from the general stream that non-Muslims are led to believe that Islam also has a body of priests.

And finally because the ulema today have no knowledge of contemporary sciences, natural or social, they are no match even as religious personages to the better educated Christian clergymen or the Jewish rabbis whose understanding of the world and the society is wider and deeper. Quite often the intellectual capabilities of the ulema are spent in hair-splitting and they tend to give much greater importance to insignificant details and, in their exaggerated zeal for them, create dissensions among themselves and their followers. This loses for them a good deal of respect of the well meaning, better balanced and more sophisticated classes.

It is obvious that the gap between modern knowledge and the knowledge of the ulema has increased as time has gone by. In the eighteenth century it was almost inconsiderable because the

study of the social sciences started gaining importance and depth much later. The scientific discoveries had not seriously encroached upon the religious convictions of the Muslims, because no real conflict seemed to exist between scientific observation and revealed truth. The few statements regarding natural phenomena, especially astronomical facts and the creation of Adam and Eve found in the Qur'ān were not difficult to interpret in the light of the new well established astronomical and biological observations. Those educated in modern disciplines found the interpretations of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan helpful and convincing. The tragedy was that some ulema took no cognizance of even the widely accepted facts about the shape of the earth—though the Muslim scientists had known that it was round even before the acceptance of this truth by the West—its rotation on its own axis and the movement in the orbit round the sun. In itself this indifference was insignificant, because the changed understanding of the phenomena of day and night and changes in the seasons did not affect human life, but it was important as an attitude of mind. Formerly when the Muslim men of learning came across any new facts or theories, they did not dismiss them as irrelevant, because they were aware of the truth that no knowledge is without significance.

The attitude of the Christian West was different. When it was confronted with new facts that went counter to well held notions, it reacted strongly. Galileo's support to the Copernican theory regarding the solar system drew upon him the wrath of the church. Darwin's theories were bomb shells. All reaction was not constructive. There was not only condemnation but also persecution. In certain states in America the teaching of the theory of evolution was prohibited until quite recently. But there was no indifference. It is true that the Bible and the Christian churches were extremely dogmatic on the notions that were challenged and the new discoveries demolished strongly held beliefs, whereas this was not so in Islam. No doctrine or belief of Islam as such was affected. All that was to be discarded or changed was the literal interpretation of certain verses which were quite rationally and convincingly capable of new interpretation as well. This is the reason why the Muslims have been spared the tortures inflicted upon European belief as the result of

a conflict between religion and science. This advantage was, however, thrown away by the ulema who gradually lost all influence over the educated sectors of the community. They also failed to realize that in course of time they would be isolated from the masses as well, because the people rightly expect religion to be not only a means of salvation in the other world but also a guide in this life as well.

We should now revert to the gap between modern knowledge and that imparted in the seminaries which train the ulema. To start with, in the eighteenth century, the Muslim system of education was well entrenched in logic and philosophy. These disciplines were based in the Greek tradition and the thinking of the great Muslim philosophers whose works were as much respected in the West as in the Muslim world. These were well known to the ulema. Hence the thinking of the ulema had an intellectual appeal for the best educated minds of the day. Educated visitors from the West found it edifying to converse with their Muslim counterparts in the Subcontinent.¹¹ But gradually Muslim learning began to be left behind and to the extent that the volume of European learning increased, Muslim learning became outdated. However, this took some time and a man like Shāh Wali-u'llah was able to make sterling contributions to the content of Muslim thought through his learning and erudition.¹²

No learning becomes totally irrelevant as the human mind is capable of grasping certain everlasting principles which do not lose their validity through the passage of time. Plato and Socrates, more ancient than the Muslim scholars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, are still read with profit in the West. The classical Deductive and Inductive logic even now has a strong appeal to rational men. Indeed the ulema need not scuttle all their learning even in the profane sciences, but they must modify it and bring it upto date. In their own fields of specialization, in which their erudition cannot be challenged, they have to take cognizance of the more complex problems of the society in which

¹¹ Sleeman, *Rambles and Recollections* (London, 1884), v. ii, p. 53.

¹² I. H. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent*, 'S-Gravenhage, 1962, pp. 186-192.

their knowledge can seek relevance only through a more scientific assessment of the factors of change in it. The acquisition of this knowledge is not too difficult. Perhaps the easiest method of achieving the goal of producing ulema who understand the mechanics and scope of social and economic change is to demand a good university degree in social sciences before permitting specialization in the Islamic religious lore. Only those religious leaders will find an audience among the educated elite who can speak their language. Almost upto the middle of the nineteenth century this lack of communication did not exist, hence the ulema were successful as political leaders, social reformers and propagators of religious movements. As is well known to the historians of Islam in the Subcontinent this phase came to an end with the martyrdom of Saiyid Ahmad Shahid and the virtual termination of the first and the most significant phase of the Jihād Movement.¹³

The political and social work of the ulema continued but their role became either subsidiary and subordinate to that of the different leadership that rose from amongst the newly educated classes. They no longer emerged as the leaders of movements based on their academic reactions to the prevailing conditions. The only exception in the Subcontinent during this period is Mawlānā Abu-'l-A'lā Mawdūdī, but then his work has yet to develop a mass appeal. The Mawlānā himself is familiar with many aspects of Western thinking on the questions that have come under his purview and he is assisted by a small number of modern educated men.¹⁴ The significant fact, however, has been that wherever the ulema have not acted in cooperation with the new leadership, they have not been able to carry the masses with them despite their grass root contacts with the people through the mosques. In other words, they have been able to strengthen the hands of leaders who have understood the desires and sentiments of the people, but on their own the ulema have not assessed even the cross currents of popular feelings correctly. Such failures could be expected

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 202, 205.

¹⁴ The more outstanding among these are an economist, Khurshid Ahmad, and Kaukab Siddiq, a university lecturer in English and Maryam Jameela, an American woman scholar (converted to Islam).

from men who do not come into contact with the people, but not from the ulema who could utilize the mosques for feeling the pulse of popular sentiment.

This has not been possible because, along with the indifference to the principles of the social sciences and mostly because of this, they have not utilized the mosques for building up contacts and influence. In the first place, many *imāms* are not educated beyond a superficial smattering which helps them in leading prayers and performing a few common rites. They do not possess the standing, the knowledge or the desire to influence those who come to the mosques for prayers and many do not come either because of lethargy or indifference or because they are not enabled to reap the deeper fruits of prayers. Then, even if the *imāms* were better educated and more strongly motivated, there is no forum where they could discuss their problems and difficulties and plan future course of action. Lastly there is no heirarchy. This eliminates the possibility of guidance from a better educated and more enlightened leadership. This is not to say that Islam should organize a church, but there is no reason why religious activity and guidance should not be better organized. Indeed leaving the religious education of the masses in the hands of semi-literate, ill paid, badly treated *imāms* abandoned to their own devices without any guidance or direction is criminal negligence. Its fatal consequences were not felt during the centuries when the dichotomy between religious and general education was unknown. In the earlier days of the bifurcation of the two educational systems as well, the effects of their negligence did not make themselves felt because the layers of feeling and devotion built up in the bygone periods of history were still impregnable and besides there was a good deal of traditionally handed down understanding of religion. But these barriers could not function for all time to come, and certainly not when the growth of mass media of information left no nook or corner unaffected.

The ulema have not always been insensitive to the need of organization. There have been several attempts at finding a forum for themselves, but these efforts have never succeeded fully. The Jami'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind came in the wake of the Khilāfat Move-

ment and it did succeed in doing some good work in the political field, but it never diverted its attention to the task of building up a viable organization of the *imāms*. It did try to create an *imārat-i-sharī'ah* to be headed by an '*ālim* of recognized erudition, but the effort came to grief because of mutual jealousies and differences and the unwillingness of a large number of ulema to subject themselves to such a discipline.¹⁵ A provincial *imārat* was set up in Bihar, but it did not function properly because it could not muster support from other ulema.¹⁶ The only field where the Jamī'at functioned was political, but there also, except during the time that it cooperated with the leaders of the *Khilāfat* Movement, it failed to have a real voice in the politics of the community.

One difficulty with the ulema has been that they have invariably found it difficult to avoid sectarian controversy. The nearest to success in this matter came *Shāh* Walī-u'llah who deliberately set himself the task of resolving differences. Quite often movements were based on certain doctrinal opinions which were not accepted by some strong sector of the ulema, for instance the Jihād Movement faced many avoidable difficulties because, despite the moderating influence of Saiyyid Aḥmad *Shahīd*, some of its leaders attached too much importance to some doctrinal details unacceptable to the people whose support was crucial. Many a time in the history of Islam this has prevented the Muslims from offering a united front to their opponents.

Despite the shortcomings in their training, organization and outlook, the ulema have played a significant role in our history. They have helped in preserving our heritage. Their conservatism has been irksome in many fields, yet without them our people would have been total converts to alien ways of life. The fact that the Hindus have adhered more to their customs and institutions should not lead us into believing that we also would have done the same anyhow, because the Muslims are not conservative by nature or in outlook. They are more prone to change because

¹⁵ The intention was to get Mawlānā Abu'l-kalām Āzād, the well known Indian Muslim, who rose to be a minister in Jawahar Lal Nehru's cabinet, elected.

¹⁶ The headquarters were at Phulwari Sharif in Bihar. Mawlānā Badr-u'd-dīn first was the *amir* and Mawlānā Abu'l-muḥāsīn Muḥammad Sajjād the *nā'ib amir*. The *imārat* was never fully effective.

they do not look upon every alien institution as un-Islamic and it does happen sometimes that they do not discriminate too well. The ulema made their conservatism convincing by their sacrifice, because they stood aloof from the advantages that would have accrued to them if they had forsaken their inhibitions against foreign concepts and education. They were able to sustain themselves because of their devotion to Islam and what it had built up. This devotion was passionate and overwhelming. If they had not treated principles and details, the roots and the branches alike, this sincere, passionate and uncompromising devotion would have urged them to more positive efforts and they would not have been the advocates of merely negative reaction.

The great concern for the preservation of the details also was not the result of any selfishness. It arose out of a total loyalty to Islam which refused to compromise even in the matter of the smallest idea that had emerged from the earlier interpretation, whether direct or otherwise, of the teachings of their faith. And then the entire body of literature, of social customs, the mores and the institutions, whether of Islamic origin or not, but which had become associated with Islam came to be identified in their minds with their faith and evoked emotional responses in their hearts.

So far as their attachment to Islam is concerned, it has been deep and strong. Whenever there has been a challenge to it and they have understood the danger correctly, many of them have been willing to make sacrifices. True there have been black sheep as well among them, but this is only to say that some of them have not been above human failings. Despite all their shortcomings they have tried to preserve the purity of the doctrine and have often proved doughty warriors in the defence of Islam.

CHAPTER II

Darkening Clouds

The Muslim Empire in the Subcontinent was sustained by comparatively a small Muslim population. In the beginning the Muslims were nowhere in a majority. The Muslim majorities in the lands now constituting West and East Pakistan were built up slowly.¹ Despite the success of missionary work that sometimes preceded and invariably came in the wake of Muslim conquest, no area in the entire Subcontinent possessed a substantial Muslim population. The distances were vast; the local population was by no means docile and was reconciled to Muslim rule only slowly.² Even the primary task of maintaining the lines of communication needed constant vigilance and effort.³ Almost every Muslim had to be disciplined and trained to defend

¹ Sir Thomas W. Arnold, *The Preaching of Islam* (Lahore, 1956) gives a good idea of Muslim missionary work in the Subcontinent. Also, I.H. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent*, op. cit., chapters II and III.

² I.H. Qureshi, *The Administration of the Sultanate of Dehli*, (Karachi, 1958), p. 52.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 213, 214.

his home and hearth in case of rebellion or war.⁴ His morale had to be high and he had to be loyal to the community of Islam and its ideals. If the Muslims had to survive as a group, they had to understand its *raison d'être*. In the public mind it was identified with the preservation of Islam. The Muslim community was to live and maintain its strength, because otherwise Islam would cease to exist in the Subcontinent.

The ulema played an important role in the creation and strengthening of this conviction. In those days the mosques were full of worshippers and the ulema were not unmindful of social, political and cultural problems. They were fully cognizant of the fact that a small minority, when it is exposed to the subtle cultural and social influences of a majority well entrenched in its religion, traditions and social and individual patterns of behaviour and convictions, the minority runs the risk of losing its individuality and gradual absorption into the majority. Hence they were extremely sensitive to any dilution of the orthodox Islamic doctrine with alien philosophies and beliefs. They worked consistently for the three cognate goals of maintaining the purity of the teachings of Islam, the preservation of the entity of the Muslim community and the strengthening of the Muslim Empire. For they knew that if the Empire languished, the Muslim community would lose its sense of direction and a purposeless bewildered group could not adhere to a religion which demanded unity and cohesion within the ranks of its followers. Under such circumstances the purity of the doctrines of the faith also could not be sustained, because the Muslim community would lose its morale and the pride in its traditions. Therefore, if Islam and non-Islam were to become equally valid in the popular mind, eclecticism and heterodoxy would find a fertile soil for growth.

This, however, did not result in any blind support to the monarch. Indeed there emerged a balance of power between the administration and the ulema. Conflict was avoided by both the sides. Whenever the monarch went beyond the limits of the

⁴ I.H. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent op. cit.*, pp. 87-88.

interests of orthodoxy, he was corrected. And this was possible because the ulema exercised great influence over the army as well as the administrative officers and the rank and file of both. It is true that there were ulema who held extremist views and demanded of the sultan the exemplary behaviour and policies of an Abū Bakr or 'Umar.⁵ However, it was generally recognized that the circumstances in the Subcontinent were considerably restrictive because of the Muslims being such a small minority in the midst of a large population.⁶ That left the sultans with considerable freedom in moulding their policies. The power of the ulema was also an inhibiting factor in the development of tyranny or interference in the rights of the people. And it was not only the Muslims who were the beneficiaries of this power. The rights of the Hindus as well were protected, because the ulema did not like any open violation of the *shari'ah*. An anecdote will illustrate this point. Sikandar Lodī was once so carried away by his zeal that he wanted to destroy an old temple in Kurukshetra and stop Hindu pilgrims from bathing in the water of a pond held sacred by them. Malik-u'l-'ulamā 'Abd-u'llah Ajodhanī proclaimed boldly that the Sultan could not do so under the law. This displeased the Sultan, but he had to forego his intention.⁷

Whenever the *dhimmīs* did some thing that incensed the Muslim public, even the ulema were not able to help them. For instance, once a Brahmin annoyed the Muslims by not only converting a Muslim woman to idol worship but also inducing her to denounce Islam openly.⁸ His earlier success in converting Muslim men to his faith also must have been unpopular, but it seems that it was recognized that he was within his rights to preach his doctrines; but when a Muslim woman was not only induced to leave the fold of Islam but also to denounce it publicly,

⁵ E.G. Diyā-u'd-dīn Baranī, *Tārīkh-i-Firūzshāhī*, (Calcutta 1862), pp. 293-297 giving Qāḍī Mughlīth's conversation with 'Alā-u'd-dīn Muḥammad Khajī. For comments, vide I.H. Qureshi, *The Administration of the Sultanate of Delhi*, op. cit., pp. 45, 46.

⁶ Diyā-u'd-dīn Baranī, *Tārīkh-i-Firūzshāhī*, op. cit., pp. 216, 291; Also Diyā-u'd-dīn Baranī, *Fatāwā-i-jahāndārī* (Indian Office Library, ms. 1149) ff. 119 a, b.

⁷ 'Abd-u'llah, *Tārīkh-i-Dā'adī* (British Museum ms. or. 197), f. 19.

⁸ Shams-i-Sirāj 'Afīf, *Tārīkh-i-Firūzshāhī* (Calcutta, 1870), pp. 379-382.

the patience of the Muslims was exhausted and the Brahmin was punished savagely.⁹ Incidentally this is the sole example in the history of Muslim rule in the Subcontinent of a non-Muslim being executed or punished for enticing away Muslims from their faith. This incident illustrates the helplessness of the ulema as well as the sultan in the face of public anger.

The fact that in the fifteenth century Muslims could be persuaded to apostatize from Islam invites a discussion of such a phenomenon that is germane to our theme, because it indicates both the weakening of the conviction that there could be no compeer of Islam and the loosening of the bonds of loyalty to the Muslim community. The growth of such feelings would necessarily weaken the Muslim Empire. And we find that the fifteenth century saw a decline of the Muslim power in the Subcontinent which was surpassed only in and after the eighteenth century. The delineation and analysis of the forces that carried the assault into the citadel of Muslim might would help us in understanding a little better the relationship between doctrine and politics in a Muslim society and between its health and the quality as well as the endeavour of the ulema.

The efforts of the ulema were supplemented by the work of the sufis in building up springs of spiritual fervour that deepened religious consciousness and loyalty to Islam. Indeed initiation into the sufi discipline became almost an integral part of a good Muslim education and many ulema added a new dimension to their understanding of their faith by seeking guidance from some eminent sufi and practising the exercises prescribed by him. The vogue of Sufism, however, opened the way to many abuses.

It is comparatively easy to find out the quality and the depth of a scholar's learning. A student who sits at the feet of a scholar soon discovers whether he is making any progress. But it is difficult to assess a spiritual guide's genuineness and stature. When Sufism came into vogue, along with men of great attainments, it also bred many charlatans and pretenders. Those who were in search of spiritual knowledge went to those who were willing

⁹ *Ibid.*

to take them as apprentices like students seeking academic knowledge from teachers. They did not take long to discover whether they were being guided properly. Even they ran the risk of taking the means to be the ends, because the sufi uses certain methods to induce a state of receptivity which increase concentration through the withdrawal of external senses. Through further efforts a deep emotional condition is produced which borders on ecstasy, but it still is not gnosis, much less the higher achievement of the beatific vision. And the supreme consummation of union with God lies even further. In these processes the neophyte passes through many critical phases. All sufis experienced ecstasy, which they termed as intoxication, but though this condition was highly pleasurable, yet it was not the goal, nor what was witnessed in that condition was necessarily true. When the road is so long and so difficult, full of so many pitfalls, it is not surprising that many of the travellers never reached the goal, and yet they were capable of leading others to the stages they had traversed or reached and in such a state of affairs raw experience and misleading notions find almost unlimited currency. The charlatan thrives on such ideas, because he can glibly talk about ecstasies that he has never experienced and truths that he has never witnessed. Loose talk about mystic truths can be subversive of true faith, because it loses all touch with reality and is only theoretical.

The common man had little conception of sufi doctrines. He was more concerned with the benefits he could draw from the supernatural powers that he associated with men of spiritual stature. Though all sufis strictly forbade miracle mongering as mere trickery, yet the common man's yardstick of measuring spiritual greatness was the capacity of "the saint" to perform supernatural feats. And when requests were addressed to some one for worldly benefits through supernatural assistance, some were likely to find fulfilment through the mere working of the law of averages. Those who were disappointed thought that they had failed in securing the goodwill of "the saint" and became more assiduous in paying court to him and those who gained what they had desired became louder in singing his praises. This made charlatanism a thriving business and created great misunderstand-

ings in the popular mind about the true mission and achievements of sufism. The true sufi ran away from such crowds because their misplaced adulation would seriously hamper his search. The charlatans were not prepared to submit themselves to discipline and sometimes openly violated the moral code of Islam, and yet it was necessary to keep on their cloak of hypocritical holiness and therefore they coined a philosophy which enabled them to do whatever they liked without incurring censure.¹⁰

The sufis valued the mystic experience of the followers of other faiths as well. They were interested in their techniques and results. They held discussion with Hindu yogis and Jain anchorites. They firmly held to the doctrine that the highest mystic progress was possible only by accepting the truth of Islam and following its teachings, yet they did not reject the validity of the experience of non-Muslim mystics.¹¹ The dialogue between the Hindu yogis and the sufis was useful in creating greater understanding between the Hindus and the Muslims in general. A large number of Muslim beliefs and ideas began to find general acceptance among Hindu religious circles.¹² Islam has a well defined creed and one who does not believe in it, is not a Muslim. Islam can seek no compromise with notions which come into conflict with its beliefs. However, this is not true of Hinduism, because Hinduism insists upon conformity with its social customs and traditions and adherence to its social structure, but it leaves the individual free in the matter of doctrine and belief.¹³ One can be a Hindu whether one believes in God or not; if one questions the justice of the Hindu social structure; and whether one believes

¹⁰ They argued that worship was for bringing the worshipper into contact with God: once the state of union with God had been obtained, worship became superfluous. Some argued that people are so attracted to those possessing spiritual greatness that one is disturbed in the ecstasy of the beatific vision, and the only way to keep the crowds away is to indulge in practices abhorrent to them, hence they were called *malāmā-tiyahs*, persons who incur censure. This was a heretical and an extremist sect. A's-sulami "*Risālat-u'l-Malāmātiyya*", *Der Islam*, Berlin, 1918, pp. 157-203.

¹¹ I.H. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent*, op. cit., p. 131. quoting Ibn-u'l-'Arabi in A. Nicholson, *Mashāriq-u'l-anwār*, p. vi.

¹² I.H. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent*, op. cit., Chapter v.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 121.

or rejects the truth of any other religion, so long as one does not leave the fold completely and joins another community through conversion. If a sufficiently large number of persons form a subgroup and create a new caste, they can remain Hindus, because Hinduism is a multicellular organism. Therefore, the acceptance of Muslim belief became common among the groups who, through their contact with Islam, had been awakened to a new religious consciousness and feeling.¹⁴ Their facility for endorsing attractive ideas which might intrinsically be even opposed to Hindu fundamental principles acted as a leavening for the development of monotheistic ideas as well as a sense of human equality.¹⁵ The common Hindu thought was ploytheistic and the Hindu social structure was essentially based in the inequality of the castes. The remarkable spiritual and cultural upsurge known as the Bhakti Movement was a great tribute to the influence of the Muslim ideas on the Hindu mind. It brought many Hindus into prominence as spiritual leaders of repute who founded orders and cults and produced poetry of great beauty and depth of theistic and spiritual feeling.¹⁶

However, this development had some serious repercussions for Islam. It inhibited the growth of the Muslim population through conversions. If the benefits of Islamic beliefs could be obtained without having to take the painful decisions of leaving the fold of one's paternal faith and cutting oneself adrift from one's family, relations and old associates, where was the need for conversion? One could approximate as closely as one desired to Islamic belief and spiritual effort, so it must have been argued by many a mind, without officially becoming a Muslim, leaving, for the sake of old ties, merely the question of nomenclature. This was a matter of no small consequence to a missionary religion like Islam which lays as much emphasis on the membership of the Muslim society as on its basic justification, a belief in its doctrines and a declared adherence to them. It was also important for a non-missionary religion like Hinduism, because through this process it was saved from losing its sheep to another faith. The

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 110-120. Also Tara Chand, *The Influence of Islam on Indian Culture*, (Allahabad, 1946).

Bhakti saints preached the doctrine that there was no difference between the Muslims and the Hindus because what really mattered was spiritual development and not adherence to a tenet or a community. A general propagation of this idea could not leave the Muslim mind totally unaffected, especially when it was put forward by men of spiritual stature in all sincerity and with a genuine desire for building up bridges between the two communities. After all, the sufis also had tried to break the barriers of hostility between the conquerors and the conquered. And their response which was so overwhelming could not be rejected outright either by sufis or by the common man. Its effects on the Muslim psychology could not be assessed in the earlier stages.

Yet another outcome was also the result of sufi initiative. The sufis had admitted to their circles not only yogis but also common men who felt attracted to them because of their wisdom and the other worldliness of their lives. Though the orthodox sufis would not admit to their order any non-Muslim, they did not grudge their non-Muslim admirers any knowledge. This established a tradition of mystic teachers catering for the moral and spiritual welfare of men and women irrespective of their caste and creed. The sufis had hoped that the non-Muslims would be so attracted to Islam as to accept it, but they did not always insist upon it. With the emergence of Hindu spiritual teachers, the process continued and Hindus and Muslims thronged to them. Some of the Hindu teachers even admitted Muslims as disciples.¹⁷ Thus a curious phenomenon of the divorce of religious belief from spiritual development came into existence.

This last development was potentially most dangerous for the Muslims. In certain instances it resulted in conversion from Islam to Hinduism. One example of Firūz Shāh's reign has been cited. Chaitānya is reported to have converted some Turks to his faith, which would show that it was not only a half baked newly converted Hindu who could not resist the temptation of relapsing into Hinduism, but even some persons born of Muslim

¹⁷ I.H. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent*, op. cit., p. 133.

parents also renegaded.¹⁸ However, perhaps the apostasy of a few Muslims was not such a grave matter as the acceptance of the view by numerous Muslims that they could seek guidance from non-Muslims in spiritual matters. This essentially was the gradual obliteration of the difference between Islam and Hinduism, because if one could achieve the same end by following either, it did not matter which of the two was chosen.

It has been mentioned above that Hinduism is a multicellular organization. Because of this, even though it is not a missionary religion, it has absorbed into its fold diverse groups of native or foreign origin. There is only one method of entering the grand federation of castes which is the creation of a new sub-caste. Every main caste in Hinduism has a number of sub-castes which have, at some time, for social or other reasons, either emerged from an older caste, having to separate from it for some violation of its taboos or been created by the merging of an alien group into Hinduism and the defining of its status according to its social and economic position and predilection. Thus if the Muslims were to play the ancient role of other migrants, they would be absorbed into the Hindu milieu through a process of fragmentation and assignment to every group its place in the caste structure. Here it may be pointed out that it is difficult for individuals to find a place in the caste system if they want to become Hindus, but groups do not find any such difficulty and can enter the fold if they accept the status assigned to them, over a long period, by Hindu society. This is an inevitable process if the will to resist absorption becomes weak, because the social and economic needs of small groups can be met only if they integrate with the society. The Muslims could maintain their existence only through constant vigilance to ensure that they did not lose the conviction of the uniqueness of Islam and the need to emphasize and maintain their separate entity.

The destruction of Muslim central authority started towards the middle of the fourteenth century. Muḥammad bin Tughluq's

¹⁸ T. C. Das Gupta, *Aspects of old Bengali Society from old Bengali Literature* (Calcutta, 1935), p. 99., Also Krishna Dās Kavirāj Madhya Līlā, *Chaitānya-charitamrita*, translated into English by Sir Jadunath Sarkar, (Calcutta 1913), pp. 225-229. It is possible that the word 'Turk' has been used in the general sense of any Muslim common in those days.

(1325-1351) difficulties arose because of two factors. The Empire had expanded to an extent that it became difficult to control it from Delhi. Secondly his harshness alienated two great pillars of authority—the officials and the ulema. Some of the Sultan's measures were excellent in theory but difficult to execute and his wrath fell upon the officials who were confused at first and then turned hostile.¹⁹ He forced some of the leading ulema and sufis to migrate to Devāgiri, now converted into a parallel seat of authority and named Daulatabad, so that they could carry the torch of Islam into an overwhelmingly Hindu area where the Muslim population was so scant that it was difficult to maintain Muslim authority.²⁰ If the Sultan had not been so hasty, perhaps there would have developed a process of migration because of the need. And government inducement and the creation of facilities would have achieved good results, at the worst a little more slowly; but the Sultan was not endowed with the graces of moderation and patience. To add to the Sultan's difficulties, the Doab which served as the granary of Delhi and the surrounding areas was afflicted with a severe famine. Discontent and rebellious feelings became common, and, because a large number of ulema did not feel motivated to appeal to the Muslims for cooperation with the Sultan, the situation soon went out of control. The Sultan sought recognition from the Abbasid Caliph in Cairo, al-Mustakfi-billah, and received letters patent from him in 1344.²¹ This did not help the Sultan because the Deccan, Gujrat and Sind broke into open revolt soon after.²²

The establishment of the Bahmani Sultanate in the South and Firūz Shāh's accession to the throne, however, restored authority to a considerable degree. The former was not able to extend its authority to the extreme south. Firūz Shāh saw the wisdom of being content with a smaller empire.²³ He failed in keeping Bengal and had to recognize its independence.²⁴ Within the limits of the smaller dominion, Firūz Shāh was able to restore order and

¹⁹ *Cambridge History of Islam*, v. ii, (Cambridge, 1970), p. 14.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 14, 15.

²¹ Diyā-u'd-dīn Baranī, *Tārīkh-i-Firūzshāhī*, op. cit., pp. 492, 493.

²² *Cambridge History of Islam*, v. ii, op. cit., pp. 17, 18.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 21, 22.

good government with the help of those very elements whose hostility had brought about the dissolution, because he conceded many privileges to the officials as well as the ulema.²⁵ The civil administration was entrusted to the *wazīr*, Khān Jahān Maqbūl.²⁶ The ulema held great power and were able to dictate policies to a cooperative Firūz Shāh. The Bahmanī kingdom also received the support of these two classes and was able to stabilize itself very early.

Firūz Shāh's total incapacitation towards the end of his long reign led to intrigue and civil war, which brought about the collapse of the central authority completely. This led to the emergence of Hindu local influence to an extent that even the collection of land revenue became dependent upon the success of military action against insurgent local chieftains. Timūr's invasion added to the confusion and it seemed that Delhi would never again be able to restore its authority. The establishment of the Sharqī kingdom and the rise of Afghan influence in the Panjab reduced Delhi to a state that it was popularly said about the Saiyid ruler Shāh 'Ālam (1445-1451) that "the rule of the king of the world extended from Delhi to Pālam".²⁷ The Lodīs succeeded in restoring authority and expanding their territories to the greater portion of North India.²⁸ As a matter of fact the Muslim Empire in the northern areas of the Subcontinent did not recover its equilibrium and stability until Akbar established the Mughul Empire firmly through his conquests and administrative reforms. In the meanwhile, the position of Islam in the Subcontinent had been undermined in other ways.

By the time Akbar came to the throne, the situation had greatly worsened for Islam. During Firūz Shāh's reign the ulema had gained the upper hand, it is true, but they seemed to have

²⁵ Diya-u'd-din Barani, *Tārīkh-i-Firūzshāhī*, op. cit., p. 460, Shams-i-Sirāj 'Afif, *Tārīkh-i-Firūzshāhī*, op. cit., pp. 296, 298-301.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 394-399.

²⁷ Even earlier, on the eve of Timūr's invasion, there were two sultans, one in Delhi and the other in Firūzābād a suburb of the city about six miles away, Yahyā bin Ahmad bin 'Abd-u'llah a's-Saharindī, *Tārīkh-i-Mubārakshāhī*, (Calcutta 1931), p. 160, Shāh 'Ālam literally means "King of the World." Pālam in those days was a few miles away from Delhi.

²⁸ 'Abd-u'llah, *Tārīkh-i-Dā'ūdī*, op. cit., f. 7 b.

realized that the previous reign had created so much dislocation that the resumption of authority might not yield the expected results if extraordinary measures were not adopted. Thus we find the Sultan trying to root out the activities of those groups which were corrupting society.²⁹ One of these were the Ibāḥatīyahs who, under the influence of Vāmamārgī philosophies indulged in sexual orgies and looked upon them as worship.³⁰ The influence of this school of Hinduism, despite Firūz Shāh's efforts, did not come to an end. Indeed there is evidence to believe that underground and hidden groups of the followers of this sect still exist among the Hindus of India. Illicit sexual relations and even perversions have not always been condemned by Hindu philosophy and religious circles. This attitude originally arose from the basic conception of looking upon creation itself as the result of a sexual act, hence phallic worship has been widespread, especially in the South. The transition from essentially a philosophic idea to the exaltation of sex to an act of worship is not strange for popular religion. The temples of Orissa and Udaipur State among others bear remarkable testimony to this fact in their sculptures where copulation between man and woman and even male and male are fully depicted.

The Vāmamārgī sect had existed even before Firūz Shāh and Muslim rulers had seen no reason to interfere with religious practices of their non-Muslim subjects, however distasteful to them those practices might have been. It seems that some Muslims were attracted to these practices. Indeed some texts would seem to imply that a Muslim sect had adopted these rites.³¹ Similarly the punishment meted out to the Brahmin who committed the offence of converting Muslims to Hinduism and persuading a woman convert to denounce Islam openly was deliberately deterrent. There would have been no other justification for awarding a punishment that violated the code of Islam in its harshness. In the same manner Firūz Shāh's anxiety to prohibit practices that had come to be looked upon as religious and which, in fact,

²⁹ Firūz Shāh, *Futūḥāt-i-Firūzshāhi*, *Muslim University Journal* (Aligarh, 1943), p. 2.

³⁰ I.H. Qureshi, *The Administration of the Sultanate of Delhi*, op. cit., pp. 254-257.

³¹ *Ibid.*

violated the letter and the spirit of the *shari'ah* would show that the rise of unhealthy tendencies among the Muslims was causing anxiety. During the period of anarchy that followed Firūz Shāh's death, the restraining hand of authority was almost totally incapacitated.³²

In any case the attempt of Firūz Shāh and his ulema to correct the situation was more an indication of the malady than its cure, because disruptive tendencies in the sphere of religion can seldom be controlled through political action after they gain a certain amount of strength. Even the ulema were ill equipped for the struggle. The influences at work against the purity of the Islamic doctrine as well as the discipline of the Muslim masses were too subtle for them to understand fully. They were not equipped to assess how these forces were at work and, even if some ulema could understand their nature and impact, they had no organization to combat them fully. They had only their books, their mosques and their schools and colleges, but the heterodox trends did not come through them. The ulema had long ceased to be the sole custodians of Islamic teachings. Far greater influence was exerted by the sufis who had close ties with the people and their methods and philosophy had greater attraction for the masses. It has already been mentioned that charlatans and miracle mongers exerted greater influence upon the ignorant and the superstitious.

Even among some of the less worldly minded sufis, ideas absolutely foreign and even contradictory to Islam had found general acceptance. Through earlier association of some sects with Manichaeans, Mazdakis, Nestorians, Zoroastrians and Buddhists, the less wary had accepted the ideas of metempsychosis, immanence, incarnation and pantheism.³³ The orthodox sufis decried such notions, but were not able to suppress them. The heterodox sufis naturally developed greater contacts with the Hindus and found common ground with them in some aspects of Vedantic monism as well as the ideas like metempsychosis and incarnation, which are common to all forms of Hinduism. These

³² The central authority broke down because of internecine warfare and administration came almost to a standstill, I.H. Qureshi, *The Administration of the Sultanate of Dehli*, op. cit., pp. 617.

³³ I.H. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent*, op. cit., p. 127.

sufis were perhaps more instrumental in kindling the flame of the Bhakti movement, though it must be admitted that many of the Bhakti saints discarded these ideas and came closer to Islam.

Those Muslims who were too simple to understand the niceties of philosophical concepts found little difference between the orthodox sufis, the heterodox mystics and the Bhakti saints. The ulema were already out of court, because the heterodox sufis condemned them outright and there existed no unanimity of views between the orthodox sufis and the ulema on many points.³⁴ A tradition had grown up of depicting the *shari'ah* and the *tariqah*, as antithetical, or at least to say that the former was merely the shell and the latter the kernel of religion.³⁵ This hostility was considerably softened in the more educated and better informed circles by the realization that the two could be complementary. Indeed alarmed by the incursions of un-Islamic ideas into their ranks, many of the sufis preferred men with a good knowledge of the *shari'ah* to join their ranks and many theologians joined some *silsilah* to receive training in sufism so that they could enrich their understanding of Islam through greater illumination of their hearts.³⁶

Nevertheless all differences were not wiped off; the ulema looked askance at some of sufi ideas and practices and some sufis were irritated with what they considered to be ill informed criticism.³⁷ And in such controversies it is usual to select the more extreme examples for criticism. Besides it had become fashionable in poetry to castigate ulema as worshippers of mere forms and sometimes even as hypocrites. How could they bring the erring back to the path of rectitude and true belief in such an atmosphere?

The situation grew so desperate that many minds must have watched it with agony. It happens in such circumstances that the

³⁴ Felix M. Pareja, *Islamologia*, Tomo II, (Madrid 1952-1954), pp. 652-653.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ The instances are too many to quote here. Indeed it sometimes became difficult to classify a person as a sufi or a scholar; *Shaikh* Ahmad of Sahrind is looked upon as a sufi though his mastery over the theological sciences was well established and *Shah* Wali-u'llah is looked upon as a scholar, though he was also a great sufi. *Shaikh* 'Abd-ul-Haqq of Delhi was a great *muḥaddith* and a sufi of great attainments.

³⁷ Felix M. Pareja, *Islamologia*, op. cit., pp. 652, 653.

desire to do some thing is kindled in many hearts but it finds no practical outlet because the task seems too formidable for any single person. The magnitude of the problem dampens many spirits. But then some one who is equipped with the qualities of leadership comes on the scene and builds up a movement of considerable strength. One such man at this time was a learned professor in the university city of Jaunpur, Saiyid Muḥammad, who was universally respected for his erudition and piety.³⁸ He seems to have worried intensely about the prevailing malaise and given deep thought to the possibility of redeeming the situation. Perhaps he kept nightly vigils and sought Divine help. One night he thought that he heard a voice say to him, "Thou art the Mahdī". Though it is not based in the teachings of the Qur'ān and many orthodox thinkers have questioned its authenticity and justification, yet a messianic expectation is deep rooted in many hearts. Partly it is Ithnā-'asharite in origin, partly it emerges from some alleged sayings of the prophet. It has motivated many groups in different parts of the world at different times when the situation has demanded concentrated and special effort. And every time orthodoxy has opposed the claim. If Saiyid Muḥammad had taken the word *mahdī* in its literal sense of a guide or a leader there would have been no trouble, but he took it to mean the promised leader who would restore the glory of Islam and make it the religion of the world. Hence orthodoxy not only rejected his claim, but turned against him. This conflict also had serious repercussions on the position of Islam in the Subcontinent which will be discussed later.

Saiyid Muḥammad was soon able to collect around himself a growing group of many earnest minded men who carried his message to various parts of the Subcontinent. Apart from his claim to be the Mahdī, there was nothing in his teachings to which orthodoxy could take exception. He demanded a more rigorous adherence to the code of Islam. His followers and missionaries led exemplary lives and some of them were sufis of standing. Such men created a great impact upon the popular

³⁸ For a history of the Mahdawi Movement, vide W.A. Erskine, *A History of India under the First two Sovereigns of the House of Taimur*, v. ii, (London 1854), pp. 475 et seq. Also 'Abd-u'l-Qādir Bādā'ūnī, *Muntakhab-u'l-tawārīkh*, v. iii, (Calcutta, 1869), pp. 394-409.

mind. Indeed their activities resulted in a curious anomaly. Those who were strict in the observance of their faith were suspected of being Mahdawis, the followers of Saiyid Muḥammad. Many men hid their adherence to the new sect because they did not want to come into conflict with the government or the orthodox ulema. The reason for the hostility of the latter was obvious, to them Mahdawism was a heresy, hence there could be no compromise with it. The opposition of the former was due to the attitude of the ulema and also because those who were active and militant Mahdawis took upon themselves the enforcement of the *shari'ah* upon the populace. They did not only preach and admonish but also used force. This naturally brought them into conflict with the government, the enforcement of law was rightly considered to be whose monopoly. In religious matters *hisbah*, the maintenance of public decorum and observance of religious duties, was strictly controlled within well defined limits. Authority, therefore, could not brook interference with matters which fell within its jurisdiction, specially when that jurisdiction was in fact in the hands of orthodox ulema.

The crisis came in the reign of Islām Shāh Sūr. He made every effort to stave action, but this was impossible because orthodox ulema considered it necessary to crush the movement. Saiyid Muḥammad himself had left the Sultan's dominion to spread his message in other parts of the Muslim world and the two stalwarts of the movement were Shaikh 'Abd-u'llah Niyāzī and Shaikh 'Alā'i. It was the latter who through his zeal and activities provided a handle to the *Ṣadr-u's-ṣudūr*, the highest religious dignitary in the state, Makhdūm-u'l-mulk, against the Mahdawis. Shaikh 'Alā'i was an eloquent speaker and debater. He was able to convert large crowds to Mahdawism because his sincerity and eloquence carried conviction. With the same facility he defended his creed and confounded his orthodox adversaries. The Sultan was reluctant to award severe punishment to such a man, specially because he was so excellent a preacher and defender of Islamic teachings. The Sultan offered the Shaikh the post of the chief *muhtasib* in his empire, so that he could do in an official capacity what he was doing without governmental authority, but the Shaikh was not willing to perform a religious duty for the state

which, in his view, should be discharged only for the sake of God.

At last the Sultan consented to take the pleadings of Makhdūm-u'l-mulk more seriously. The reason seems to have been the fact that the political situation had deteriorated because of the rebellion of the Niyāzī tribe of the Afghans in the Panjab. It was difficult to assess the repercussions of not taking the *Ṣadr-u's-ṣudūr's* representations seriously. On his way to the Panjab, while the Sultan camped at Biyāna, near Gwalior, Shaiḵh 'Abd-u'llah Niyāzī was summoned, questioned and flogged until he fainted and the floggers thought he was dead. He was taken away by his followers and nursed back to recovery. After his return from the Panjab the Sultan again took up Shaiḵh 'Alā'i's case. He tried to persuade Shaiḵh 'Alā'i to retract his belief in Mahdawism even in a whisper in the sultan's ear, but the Shaiḵh was made of the stuff of which martyrs are made. He was too weak and emaciated because of long travels, constant fasting, poor food and lack of rest and he died on the third stroke while being flogged.

It had been represented to the Sultan that the Mahdawi movement had grave political implications. According to popular belief the Mahdī will not be merely a religious preacher but would also be a ruler and wield political and military power. If Saiyid Muḥammad could be established as Mahdī there would be only a single political authority and the Sultan would be eliminated. Shaiḵh 'Alā'i's followers had taken a vow to lead a life of poverty. They were a semi-starved motley crowd in rags. They shared all their meagre worldly belongings which were reduced to the barest minimum for satisfying their humble needs. Some of them worked in turns to earn their daily coarse food which was shared by the entire crowd. This rabble used to follow Shaiḵh 'Alā'i wherever he went. It was by no means equipped as a fighting force, because it was too poor to afford proper arms and horses, but its enthusiasm and devotion would be unmatched and if the movement became popular, the where-withal would not be impossible to collect. It was also not unnatural to suspect that Shaiḵh 'Abd-u'llah Niyāzī had inspired the revolt of the Niyāzīs or at least could be in constant touch with them. However, as

subsequent events proved, the movement was purely religious and its adherents had no political backing. It does not appear to have had a political programme at all. Even as a religious movement it soon lost its importance. It was reported that Saiyid Muḥammad had realised his error and had earnestly advised his followers to abjure the belief that he was the Mahdī at the time of his death at Farrah in 1505. Many of his followers refused to accept the report as true. ‘Abd-u’llah Niyāzī also recanted later.³⁹ Saiyid Muḥammad must have realized towards the end of his life that he had not been able to achieve even a tithe of what the Mahdī was expected to accomplish. He was a pious man and must have been anxious to convey to his followers this realization and many of them would think the same way. The only remnants of the community are two centres, one in the Deccan and the other in Gujrat.

It was a tragedy for Islam in the Subcontinent that a reformist movement of great potentialities should, because it transgressed orthodox belief regarding the emergence of the Mahdī for the renaissance of the Faith, have incurred the hostility of, the ulema in power, and yet the conflict was inevitable. If Saiyid Muḥammad had assessed his mystic experience of hearing the voice saying “Thou art Mahdī” a little more carefully before embarking upon his mission, perhaps he would have been able to do his work more adequately. There were learned ulema, no less orthodox than Makhḍūm-u’l-mulk, who took a more liberal view of Saiyid Muḥammad’s mission.⁴⁰ Many other men of learning felt inclined to accept his teachings, if not his claim. Indeed belief in the appearance of a Mahdī is not a part of Islam and Saiyid Muḥammad could not be accused of transgressing any doctrine, much less any fundamental belief, when he claimed to be the Mahdī. The net result, however, was the creation of a small insignificant sect of Islam about which one does not hear much either in the religious or the political sphere.

The immediate political repercussions, however, were of grave

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p.45.

⁴⁰ The historian Badā’ūnī adds the words “May God sanctify his soul” after Saiyid Muḥammad’s name, *ibid.* But then he was obviously tinged with Mahdawism.

consequences for the authority of Islam in the affairs of the Mughul Empire.

It is obvious that a religious movement based on deep loyalty and convictions cannot be suppressed by the execution of one of its exponents. If Mahdawism was to be suppressed, it would have appeared obvious to Makhdām-u'l-mulk that the net must be made wider and more leaders must be punished. But no outstanding leaders were left active in the field. The rabble of the followers could be dispersed easily. But then the movement had tinged a number of important scholars and leaders of religious thought. It seemed necessary to correct them to root out the doctrine. This could have been done by argument, but it would have generated a general debate which obviously could create fresh problems. It could even be instrumental in spreading the Mahdawi beliefs. The main argument used by the Mahdawīs—that laxity and erroneous views had corroded the faith of the Muslims—was incontrovertible. Makhdām-u'l-mulk had enjoyed unchallenged political authority for so long that his imperious nature could think of no method but that of suppression. And because no leaders were left who could be easily identified, he had to embark upon a witch hunt that created many enemies for him without winning any friends.⁴¹ To him the issues were simple and the consequent actions logical. Mahdawism was an excrescence, morbid and dangerous, hence a heresy and as such it must be suppressed with all the resources at his command. It never occurred to him that the movement was in response to a dangerous situation that had developed in the life of the Muslim community and that its energy could be harnessed for constructive purposes,

The malady was much deeper. The leadership of Islam at this time was in the hands of men who do not seem to have been at all sensitive to the forces arrayed against them. It was perhaps beyond them to understand what was happening. They still adopted the methods that could prove efficacious in correcting

⁴¹ Shaiikh Mubārak's family was among those who suffered at the hands of the upholders of orthodoxy and later the father and the sons played an important part in turning Akbar against Islam and orthodox ulema, Abu-'l-Faḍl, *A'in-i-Akbari*, English translation by Blochmann and Jarrett, (Calcutta 1873-1894), v. i., Abu-'l-Faḍl's biography by Blochmann,, contains a description of the difficulties faced by the family.

individual error, even rebellion. The training of jurists is not calculated to impart any insight into the genesis of movements, much less the training to deal with them adequately. Makhdūm-u'l-mulk had so long been associated with the central government that he should have understood the nature of the political changes that were already building up and the new factors that were being introduced in the body politic. The witch hunt continued in the earlier part of Akbar's reign and by then all the forces that could and later did change the political situation had come into existence and could be expected to combine against orthodoxy whenever the opportune movement came their way. It was by no means difficult to identify them. The rise of politically motivated forces with their own ends and goals was even a more grave portent from the point of view of orthodoxy than the prevalence of laxity and indifference, so far as the immediate future was concerned, because the latter could not break out in the form of active political opposition, though it would provide an excellent environment for dethroning orthodoxy from the seat of power.

When Bābur associated himself with Shāh Ismā'il Ṣafawī as a dependent ally to establish himself in Samarqand, he came into contact with Shī'ah ulema and nobles and thus lost in his own person the hostility towards the Shī'ah doctrine which was a traditional characteristic of Māwarā-u'n-nahr. Indeed when he had to leave Samarqand, some nobles of Turkish origin but belonging to the Shī'ah sect joined him in Kabul. One of them was Yār Beg, who was accompanied by his son Saif 'Alī. The latter was the father of the famous Bairam Khān, who was sixteen years old, when he entered Humāyūn's service.⁴² The relations between Humāyūn and Bairam Khān were cordial throughout. It was because of the latter's undoubted loyalty that he was in a position to assume Akbar's tutelage when Humāyūn died in 1556. He remained virtually the ruler of the Empire upto his dismissal in 1560. Bairam Khān adhered to Shī'ah belief, though outwardly he conformed to Sunni rites. He appointed as *ṣadr-u'ṣ-ṣudūr* Shaiḫ Gadā'i, who also was suspected of being a Shī'ah because of his strong leanings towards that sect.

⁴² Nawāb Ṣamsām-u'd-dawlah Shāh Nawāz Khān, *Ma'āthir-u'l-umarā'* (Calcutta 1888-1894), v. i, pp. 371-384 contain a good biography.

During the period of his exile in Iran, Humāyūn came into touch with a number of Irani nobles and others whom he invited to join him if he succeeded in recovering his lost dominions and quite a number did. This opened the way for the migration of talented Iranians to the Mughul Court, which, because of its larger resources, was able to pay higher salaries. It suited both Humāyūn and Akbar to encourage this migration, because a total dependence upon Turkish officials had created grave difficulties in the early days of the dynasty. The constant internecine warfare among Timurid princes before they were wiped off by the rise of the Iranian and Uzbek Empires gave an unlimited scope to intrigue and change of allegiance. The habits formed then were not discarded even after the Timurids had finally lost foothold in their traditional homelands. It had needed all ingenuity on Bābur's part to keep his nobles on the path of rectitude and he did not succeed with every one. Humāyūn's difficulties were the result of the kaleidoscopic changes in the loyalties of his nobles. For these reasons it was in the interest of the dynasty to introduce other elements into their armies and administration to maintain some balance of power among the different groups.

In the beginning the employment of odd individuals not belonging to any group was also useful because, lacking the support of any coterie, they would naturally be entirely dependent on the sovereign. The Mughuls failed to see that the internecine quarrels of the Timurid nobles could fade into insignificance in their consequences if the balance that they were building up in their armed forces turned into rivalry and clash of interests. They do not seem to have been impressed by the success of the two neighbouring empires—the Safavid and the Uzbek—in building up their power on the monolithic support of their own people, the Qizilbashes and the Uzbeks respectively. Later the Mughuls paid the penalty when the army was divided into two hostile camps of the Irānī and Tūrānī parties.⁴³ After 1707 the dynasty eked out the days of its miserable existence for a century and a half, but the Muslims whom they deliberately set out to divide into factions fell into the depths of misery much earlier.

⁴³ *A History of the Freedom Movement*, (Karachi, 1957-), v. i, pp. 88-90.

The Hindus had accumulated considerable power in the period of the anarchy following Firūz Shāh's reign and during the rule of the Saiyids and the Lodis. They had established themselves in Malwa and Rajputana under the leadership of Rānā Sangrām Singh, commonly called Sāngā. No Muslim ruler among his neighbours was in a position to break his power. He had hoped that Bābur would break the power of the Lodis and then would retire to Kabul leaving the field open to him and then Sāngā would revive the Hindu empire in the whole of North India by conquering the Sultanate of Delhi.⁴⁴ Bābur, however, inflicted a crushing defeat upon him and, for the time, the dream of a Hindu empire was dead.⁴⁵ When the Sūrs fell to fighting amongst themselves, 'Ādil Shāh's minister and general Hemū wielded almost supreme authority and when he marched against Akbar, he assumed the title of Vikramaditya and hoped to establish a Hindu empire. He too was defeated badly.⁴⁶ In 1561 Akbar married a Rajput princess and gradually developed a new policy of taking the Rajputs almost into partnership for strengthening the empire.⁴⁷

Shaikh Mubārak had been suspected of Mahdawī leanings and had suffered from the policies of Makhdūm-u'l-mulk. He and his two sons, Abu-'l-Faḍl and Faiḍi joined hands in humbling the orthodox ulema. The historian Badā'ūnī also, who is generally considered to have been a pillar of orthodoxy was in fact strongly tinged with Mahdawism and was no less opposed to the two leaders of the orthodox group, Makhdūm-u'l-mulk and Shaikh 'Abd-u'n-Nabī. He joined the attack in the beginning but later was aghast at the extreme positions taken up by the attackers.

Thus diverse interests and groups opposed to orthodoxy came to occupy vantage points. The stage was now set for the great combat. It was clear how the various groups would behave when the battle was joined. And in the situation as it had developed, it was obvious that orthodoxy would be on the defensive and

⁴⁴ Vincent A. Smith, *The Oxford History of India*, Third Edition, edited by Percival Spear (Oxford, 1958), p. 322.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ Badā'ūnī, v. ii, op. cit., pp. 15-17.

⁴⁷ Abu-'l-Faḍl, *Akbarnāmāh* (Calcutta 1886) v. ii, pp. 157, 158, 358, 359.

isolated. And those who sought to destroy the authority of orthodoxy would be emboldened with their successes. Would they show some restraint or stop at nothing? And could orthodoxy be totally destroyed without weakening the entire fabric of the Empire?

Of all those groups, potentially the most dangerous was that of Shaikh Mubārak and his two sons, Abu-'l-Faḍl and Faiḍī. Shaikh Mubārak was a learned man and his learning was matched only by his antagonism to the orthodox ulema in power. It is possible that the driving force behind his machinations was not just personal vendetta, and if a generous view is taken of the main source of his motivation, he might have considered himself the avenger of the sufferings of the Mahdawīs with whom he was suspected of being in sympathy. But if he really had been a Mahdawī, he would not have prostituted his learning for damaging the cause of Islam itself. Actually he had given up all pretensions of sympathy with the Mahdawīs after their suppression and called himself a Naqshbandī to please some powerful Central Asian nobles and when Shi'ah nobles seemed to be gaining ground, he advocated the Shi'ah point of view.⁴⁸

It would be an insult to his intelligence to think even for a moment that he would not know what he was doing. His son Abu-'l-Faḍl was also very learned. The reputation of Shaikh Mubārak's learning has come to us only through the testimony of his contemporaries, but Abu-'l-Faḍl has left behind him voluminous testimony to his ability and knowledge through his writings. He was equally capable of presenting an exegesis of a verse of Qur'ān to Akbar when he thought that such a gift would gratify the monarch⁴⁹ and impressing upon his mind that the Qur'ān had been written by the Prophet and was not inspired.⁵⁰ In his lifetime some called him an infidel, others said that he was an arch heretic and yet it is reported that Prince Salim found in the course of an unannounced visit that forty scribes were preparing copies of the Qur'ān in his house.⁵¹ Either he was willing to sell his

⁴⁸ Badā'ūnī, op. cit., v. iii, pp. 73, 74.

⁴⁹ Shāh Nawāz Khān, op. cit., v. ii, p. 609.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 617.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 610.

convictions for worldly gains or he had none at all. A man so learned and so unscrupulous was extremely dangerous when he had an untutored mind like Akbar's to work upon. His elder brother Faiḍī was a good poet, well educated and learned, but not so profound as Abu-'l-Faḍl. He also was capable of writing an exegesis of the Qur'ān without using a single letter with a dot or dots—an extremely exacting task—and praising Akbar for venerating the Sun.⁵² The father and his two sons were cast in the same mould.

⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 588, 589.

CHAPTER III

The Storm

When Akbar ascended the throne in 1556 he was only thirteen years old. At that time it was still doubtful whether the Mughul Empire would really be re-established on a secure basis. The Sūrs were divided but still formidable. The young monarch was with his father's trusted friend and general Bairam Khān. Some officers were of the opinion that the odds against the Mughuls were too great and it would be advisable to withdraw to Kabul, consolidate their position and then attempt to reconquer Hindustan. The doughty Bairam Khān, who constituted himself with the consent of the monarch his protector and regent, ruled otherwise and decided to fight it out while the Afghan forces were still divided and confused. Hemū marched on Delhi which was held by Tardī Beg. Delhi fell to Hemū and Tardī Beg retreated to Sarhind to join the main body of the Mughul forces under Bairam Khān. Akbar was away on a hunt and Bairam Khān executed Tardī Beg and informed Akbar when he came back. This was irregular, because no one could be awarded capital punishment without the emperor's consent. Bairam Khān put

forward the excuse that it was necessary to take action because Tardī Beg had failed in his duty at a critical time and it was necessary to award this punishment to stop other officers behaving in the same manner.¹

Akbar had to accept this excuse, though he must have known that Bairam Khān's motives were not unmixed. When Humāyūn had died, Tardī Beg had immediately sent up the imperial insignia and a likely candidate to the throne, Akbar's cousin and Mirzā Kāmran's son. Thus Akbar was well disposed towards Tardī Beg and could use him in case Bairam Khān tried to exceed the limits of his legitimate authority. He, therefore, could not wait for Akbar to come back and lose this golden opportunity of removing a potentially strong rival. In addition, and this is relevant from the point of view of this book, religious bias also played its part. Tardī Beg came from Turkistan and was a Sunnī. It is true that his record of service under Humāyūn had not been of single minded loyalty like Bairam Khān's, but this was true of many Turkistani nobles.² Tardī Beg's execution demonstrated to the nobles the great power that Bairam Khān wielded and also that the days of the ascendancy of men from Bābur's original homeland were over. The Mughul Empire in the Subcontinent, it was demonstrated, would not rely upon the sole support of Tardī Beg's compatriots. It was also clear that orthodoxy was no longer a criterion for advancement. Indeed Bairam Khān was so emboldened that he got Shaiikh Gadā'i, who was suspected of holding Shi'ah views, appointed as *ṣadr-u's-ṣudūr*. This was extremely unpopular, yet Bairam Khān was so powerful that nothing could be done by the large number of persons who were opposed to such an appointment. Shaiikh Gadā'i continued to exert great influence upon Bairam Khān upto his fall.³ Bairam Khān's success in restoring Mughul authority after Humāyūn's death and his unlimited authority during Akbar's minority paved the way for more serious developments later.

¹ Abdu'l-Faḍl, *Akbarnāmah*, op. cit., v. ii, pp. 32-33. Badā'ūnī, *Muntakhab-u'l-tawārikh*, op. cit., v. ii; p. 14. Badā'ūnī says "some sort of a permission" had been obtained, but this is not borne out by other authorities, e.g., Shāhnawāz Khān, *Ma'āthir-u'l-umarā'* op. cit., v. i, p. 47.

² Ibid, pp. 466-470.

³ Badā'ūnī, op. cit., v.ii, pp. 29-30.

Despite these political developments, Akbar, under the influence of his mother, was deeply religious and orthodox. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the causes of the tremendous change in his beliefs. Shaikh Mubārak's family played an important role in this process. However the causes were much more complex than the influence of a group of unscrupulous self-seekers. Faiḍī was presented at the court in September 1567 and Badā'unī and Abu-'l-Faḍl in 1574; but it is interesting to note that certain measures had been adopted by the Emperor when he was still reported to be under the influence of orthodoxy. In 1563 he abolished the tax on Hindu pilgrims visiting their sacred places. Next year *jizyah* was abolished. The pilgrim tax has not been prescribed by the *shari'ah*, but it is rather strange that the abolition of *jizyah* did not invite any criticism. The relations with the Rajputs also began to grow closer before 1574. It was in the month of January in 1562 that he married the daughter of Raja Bhārā Mal of Jaipur and Raja Mān Singh, an adopted son of Raja Bhagwān Dās, who was Raja Bhārā Mal's heir, was introduced at court and taken into service.

In 1570 Akbar married princesses of Bikaner and Jaisalmer.⁴ All Rajput maidens were formally converted to Islam but their relations, who were treated as princes of the blood, remained Hindu. Their influence in the affairs of the Empire was remarkable and gradually, as we shall see, they did not hesitate in siding openly with the forces, arrayed against Islam or at least orthodoxy. Islam sat rather lightly on the minds of the Rajput consorts of the Emperor. They recognized the necessity of their children being brought up as Muslims. They themselves changed little, because their conversion to Islam was not the result of any change in their convictions but a political and social necessity. Their loyalties to their mores and the Hindu community remained unchanged, even though they were behind none in personal loyalty to the Emperor. Badā'unī has recorded that pigs were kept in the palace and in its vicinity "because it was considered an act of worship to see them every morning and the Hindus,

⁴ Abu-'l-Faḍl, *Akbarnāmah*, op. cit. v. ii, p. 157 for marriage with Rāja Bhārā Mal's daughter; for marriage with other princesses, *ibid*, pp. 358-359.

who belive in incarnation, created the conviction that the pig is one of the ten forms in which God incarnated Himself".⁵ Akbar's Hindu consorts must have persuaded their husband to keep pigs to enable them to pay their respect to these creatures, because they are believed to be one of the incarnations of Shiva, whose worship is even today common in Rajputana. Bir Bal, a Brahmin, and Raja Todar Mal also achieved great eminence, the former as a pleasant companion and the latter as an able administrator and general.⁶ These facts have been mentioned to show that various forces were already at work when Abu-'l-Faḍl joined the court. If he had found Akbar a strong supporter of orthodoxy, his talent would have been exercised to strengthen it. But now the road to promotion lay through a different terrain and therefore he and his brother had to traverse it.

Orthodoxy was represented at the court by two scholars. One of these Mullā 'Abd-u'llah Anṣārī established a roaring reputation as a scholar in the previous reigns and soon earned the respect of the emperors of Delhi: Humāyūn took to him kindly; Sher Shāh bestowed upon him the title of Shaiḫ-u'l-Islām; Islām Shāh held him in high esteem.⁷ One day Islām Shāh and the Mullā were riding together when they saw a mad elephant coming from the opposite direction. The Mullā wanted to shield the Sultan by riding faster towards the elephant, saying "Sultan, let me go ahead, because nothing will happen if I die, but if you are killed, the Empire will be disrupted and calamity will stalk the land". "On the contrary", said the Sultan, "I must ride ahead, because if I am killed, there are nine hundred thousand Afghans to replace me and to save the people from calamities, but if you are killed, this land may not see another scholar of your merit for a long time to come".⁸ The Sultan showed such consideration in spite of the fact that he thought that the Mullā was favourably inclined towards the Mughuls.

⁵ Badā'ūnī, op. cit. v. ii, p. 305.

⁶ For their biographies vide Shāhnawāz Khān, op. cit. v. ii, pp. 118-129.

⁷ Ibid, v. iii, p. 252.

⁸ Muḥammad Kabīr, *Afsānah-i-shāhān* (British Museum ms. Add. 24409) f. 150b.

One day as he saw the Mullā approach, he said to a noble, Sarmast Khān, "Bābur Pādshāh had five sons; four have gone, but this one has stayed behind". Sarmast Khān asked, "Why do you nurture such a potential source of mischief?" The Sultan replied, "I have no option; I do not find any one better than him". And when the Mullā arrived, the Sultan seated him on a throne and presented a string of pearls worth twenty thousand rupees to him.⁹ The Mullā's partiality to the Mughuls must have been known to Bairam Khān, because when Akbar ascended the throne, he was honoured with the title of Makhdūm-u'l-mulk and was assigned the pargana of Tāngwālā with a revenue of a hundred thousand rupees per annum. "In this manner", observes the *Ma'āthir-u'l-umarā*, "his position surpassed that of all great (scholars) and he was included among the greatest nobles of the Empire".¹⁰

It seems that Makhdūm-u'l-mulk's was far from a versatile genius. He had all the short-comings of a narrow specialist. His learning, however deep it might have been, was incapable of offering defence against invective or even, sometimes, against rational objections or dissent. He certainly was not a good judge of men, nor did he understand the trends of his times. He was easily rattled and then he became even more vulnerable to attack. His was an imperious temper brooking no difference of opinion. His academic convictions were strong, impervious to suggestion, intolerant of dissent, and contemptuous of hostile opinion. Such a man could not meet the challenge posed by the developments that had been taking place around him. He was not equipped even to assess the nature or the strength of the forces that were gaining ground every day. On the top of these deficiencies he was fond of wealth, even though all the stories that were obviously circulated against him by his enemies may not be true. Why should a doctor of Islam amass the huge wealth that he possessed? Monarchs had shown him respect; if he had cultivated the humility of a scholar and a true Muslim, he should not have considered such respect his due. And the manner in

⁹ Shāhnawāz Khān, op. cit., v. iii, pp. 252, 253.

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 255.

which he had handled the Mahdawi Movement was perhaps the greatest testimony to his short sightedness and incompetence. His loyalty to Islam and orthodoxy cannot be questioned, but both suffered greatly because of his gross ineptitude and lack of tact. Makhdūm-u'l-mulk had been so pampered by monarchs that he failed to understand that they could as easily be annoyed and turn against him.

The other scholar of repute was Shaikh 'Abd-u'n-Nabi who was a grandson of Shaikh 'Abd-u'l-Quddūs of Gangoh. Along with formal education, he also took training as a mystic in the Chishtiyah silsilah and completed his training as a theologian in Mecca and Medina. Then he fully adopted the views of the muḥaddithīn and discarded such sufi practices as were disliked by them like listening to music. He was appointed ṣadr-u'ṣ-ṣudūr in 1565, the tenth regnal year. He exerted great influence upon the monarch in the beginning and the Muslim ladies of the court seem to have respected him even after his fall in 1580. Shaikh 'Abd-u'n-Nabi was even more tactless than Makhdūm-u'l-mulk. Akbar, in the beginning of his reign, was a pious youth and so religious minded that he considered it an act of piety even to sweep the floor of a mosque to show his humility.¹¹ One day he appeared in a dress on which saffron water had been sprinkled to mark his birthday. The Shaikh was so irritated that he not only scolded Akbar but forgot himself to an extent that he struck the skirt of the Emperor with his staff and it was torn. Akbar controlled himself and thus showed greater restraint despite his youth than the Shaikh who should have known better. Throughout his life the Shaikh was known for his bad manners and short temper. Akbar was naturally resentful and when he went into the palace, he mentioned the incident to his mother, adding, "the Shaikh could have admonished me in private". She counselled him to take it in good grace, "because posterity shall repeat the story that a near destitute mullā behaved in such an atrocious manner with the monarch of the realm and he was so good as to bear it patiently. This", she said, "will bring its reward in the hereafter".¹²

¹¹ Ibid, v. ii, p. 561.

¹² Ibid.

Akbar was but human. The immoderate action of the Shaikh left a scar. The monarch was now determined to get the bubble of the Shaikh's vanity pricked. When Abu-'l-Faḍl came to know the Emperor's feelings, he assured Akbar that the Shaikh's learning was not all that formidable and that Abu-'l-Faḍl would undertake to expose the Shaikh gladly because his own learning was far more profound than that of the Shaikh.¹³ The battle started with a combat of wit and knowledge. Makhḍūm-u'l-mulk and 'Abd-u'n-Nabī both were educated in a tradition in which the citation of a widely accepted authority was considered to be sufficient for supporting a statement or a ruling. But both Abu-'l-Faḍl and Badā'ūnī, who was introduced at court at about the same time as the former and had been his class fellow, were younger scholars who were well read and possessed a good fund of knowledge. They combined with their erudition a natural capacity for argument and debate. They possessed the desire of crossing swords with senior scholars, partly to establish their own reputation and partly to satisfy their iconoclastic tendencies at the expense of men held in veneration for their reputed scholarship.¹⁴ It is not difficult to do so, because all that is needed is to discover the gaps in the knowledge of the victim—and nobody possesses total knowledge in any subject—and then to pierce the chinks in the armour of the adversary with questions and supplying the necessary information. Both Badā'ūnī and Abu-'l-Faḍl seem to have been good at this game. It must be remembered that when Badā'ūnī joined the court, Akbar thought that he would be useful in combating the influence of the orthodox ulema.¹⁵ Akbar's estimate proved to be true because Badā'ūnī almost gleefully joined the game, but he desisted when he saw what harm he had done. He was a Muslim and when he understood that not only the power and prestige of two men, Makhḍūm-u'l-mulk and 'Abd-u'n-Nabī were under assault, but Islam itself, he changed his attitude and lost favour.¹⁶ Abu-'l-Faḍl went further and further and prospered. The comparative ability of Badā'ūnī and Abu-'l-Faḍl would have created a gap between their final worldly

¹³ Ibid, p. 562.

¹⁴ e.g., Badā'ūnī, op. cit., v. ii, pp. 70-72, also v. ii, p. 208, 209.

¹⁵ Ibid, v. ii, pp. 172, 173.

¹⁶ Ibid, v. iii, p. 82.

achievements anyhow, because there is little doubt that Badā'ūnī, despite his learning and brilliance was no match to Abu-'l-Faḍl and his brother Faiḍī, but it need not have been so great.

It was only a few months after Abu-'l-Faḍl and Badā'ūnī had joined the court that Akbar ordered the construction of the 'Ibādat-khānah, the famous House of Worship, in January 1575.¹⁷ The purpose, to start with, was to bring together Muslim men of learning, mystics and nobles interested in religious matters for discussion and enlightenment.¹⁸ And Akbar seems to have been sincere at that time. However, the doors of debate and criticism having been opened, there was no method left to stop interested persons using it for their own ends. Having made up his mind to disgrace Shaiḥ 'Abd-u'n-Nabī and Makhdūm-u'l-mulk, Akbar was not interested in keeping the discussions limited to topics relevant to the ostensible objective of a greater understanding of Islam. He not only permitted but actually encouraged personal attacks and was inclined to believe hostile statements which even today appear to be tendentious fabrications for character assassination. It was difficult for any one to clear himself of such charges, specially when the monarch was anxious that the mud should stick. As these calumnies have been repeated so often, they have gained general credence. Both Makhdūm-u'l-mulk and Shaiḥ 'Abd-u'n-Nabī had many failings, but these were limited to their lack of imagination in dealing with public matters of grave importance. The other accusations seem to be baseless and malicious. For instance it was alleged that Makhdūm-u'l-mulk used to transfer his entire property to his wife towards the end of the year and get it transferred back to himself by her before she had been in possession of it for an entire year, so that neither of them having legally possessed the property for an entire year would be required to pay the *zakāt*.¹⁹ This particular incident forms part of

¹⁷ Ibid, v. ii, pp. 200, 201.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid, p. 203. Makhdūm-u'l-mulk has been roundly accused of avarice. This story is part of that accusation; otherwise accumulation of wealth is not prohibited if *zakāt* is paid regularly. It is also alleged that he kept gold bricks in a false grave in his family cemetery. If true, this was a precaution in the days of constant warfare after 1525. All wealthy men buried their wealth in unsuspected places.

Kitāb-u'l-ḥīyal written long long before Akbar.²⁰ Such alleged tricks were the brain children of some jurists who have invented fanciful situations which have never been taken seriously and could be attributed to any one. How could such a matter come to the knowledge of the person who made the allegation against *Makhdūm-u'l-mulk*? Similarly 'Azīz Kokah is reported to have alleged that *Shāikh* 'Abd-u'n-Nabī who had lectured on *ḥadīth* for years made an obvious mistake in reading a word all the years that he lectured, "a mistake which even a school boy would not commit".²¹ Who, except those intent upon believing almost anything because of personal animosity would believe that a man who had studied *ḥadīth* in Arabia at the feet of Arab teachers, who had made several journeys to the Muslim holy land and who had lectured to advanced students on the subject for years would go on making the same silly mistake without any student pointing it out or even respectfully asking for a clarification which would clear the error?²²

It would, thus, seem that Akbar himself was responsible for permitting the Hall of Worship being used for malicious ends. Even *Badā'ūnī*, in spite of his deep belief in Islam, began to lose interest in this merry game of Mulla baiting only when he felt that he could not go to the extent others willingly went to please their master. Among these *Abu-'l-Faḍl* was doubly motivated: he had a personal grievance that he had nursed so long and his performance opened up promising avenues of rapid advancement. So far as *Shāikh* 'Abd-u'n-Nabī was concerned, he was cut out to make enemies and court unpopularity, because he was overbearing, insolent, short tempered and vain. But it was not only because of his personal failings that he incurred Akbar's displeasure.

The incident that led to his downfall merits a brief mention.

²⁰ The *Kitāb-u'l-ḥīyal* originated in fanciful conundrums intended to test the sharpness of the intellect of students of law (*fiqh*). The author was *Abū Bakr Khaṣṣāf*.

²¹ It was alleged that he read *kharm* (خرم) for the correct *hazm* (حزم). The former is meaningless in the context. The *ḥadīth* is *الحزم سواء الظن*. *Badā'ūnī*, op. cit., v. ii, p. 204.

²² Obviously generations of students would not go on accepting such an obvious error from any teacher.

The *Qāḍī* of Mathra collected material for constructing a mosque. A Brahmin forcibly took it away and utilised it in the construction of an idol temple. When the *Qāḍī* reported the matter to *Shaiikh* 'Abd-u'n-Nabī in his capacity as the *Ṣadr-u'ṣ-ṣūdūr*, he summoned the Brahmin who refused to come. Akbar sent Abu-'l-Faḍl and Bir Bal who brought him. Abu-'l-Faḍl made inquiries in Mathra and reported to the Emperor that the charge against the Brahmin of publicly reviling the Prophet was true. The ulema were divided regarding the punishment to be awarded to the Brahmin, some but not all, advocating execution. Those who dissented relied on the Ḥanafī ruling that a *dhimmi* does not incur capital punishment if he is guilty of abusing the Prophet. *Shaiikh* 'Abd-u'n-Nabī held strongly that the death penalty should be inflicted, but no capital punishment was permitted in the Mughul Empire without the emperor's assent. *Shaiikh* 'Abd-u'n-Nabī referred the case to Akbar, who let the matter stand. The *Shaiikh* after repeated reminders, received the reply that the matter was left to his discretion as he understood matters relating to Religious Law better. The *Shaiikh* got the Brahmin executed. Akbar was deeply annoyed and expressed his annoyance openly.²³ The Hindu ladies of the court had been advocating the Brahmin's release all this time, and, being deeply disappointed, appealed to Akbar's vanity saying that the mullās should not be permitted to disregard the Emperor's wishes so openly.²⁴ Some Muslims also joined in the attack. They pointed out that the *Shaiikh* was a Ḥanafī, and, therefore should have acted upon the Ḥanafī ruling. Badā'ūnī, who by now seems to have come to see the issues in their proper perspective, when questioned by Akbar, incurred his displeasure by pointing out that when the judge finds a ruling in another school relevant to the occasion, he can adopt it in preference to the one of his own school, if he thinks the interests of the state so demand. This only angered Akbar, whose attitude throughout, was most unfair.²⁵ He could have given his ruling against execution if he had so desired. But he did not want to take the responsibility for a decision which obviously would have

²³ The entire anecdote is described at length in Badā'ūnī, op. cit., v. iii, pp. 80-83.

²⁴ Ibid, p. 81

²⁵ Ibid, p. 82.

been unpopular among his Muslim subjects, a responsibility which was even more difficult for a Muslim theologian to bear. Besides, the Shaiikh must have thought that if Islam came to be treated with such open contempt by powerful Hindus, it would create grave problems for the Muslims living in the Mughul Empire. He could not have failed to notice how all influential Hindus had ganged up in the Brahmin's favour. He must also have gauged Akbar's real desire and the risks involved to himself in not acting subserviently to it. This proves that whatever other short-comings might have marred his character, he was not guilty of caring more for his own well-being than for the interests of Islam. This much cannot be said about his many detractors like Abu'l-Faḍl and his father, Shaiikh Mubārak.

As we have noted earlier, Akbar had been irked by the Shaiikh's insolence when he had rudely admonished the Emperor against wearing saffron sprinkled clothes. At that time he was still under the influence of his mother who was a pious Muslim; besides he himself had the conviction that Muslim monarchs should show respect to men of learning and piety. He demonstrated this conviction by occasionally putting slippers straight for the Shaiikh when he used to leave after his lectures on *ḥadīth*. But now, and the Shaiikh must have known this, he had to deal with a different Akbar, who had left his boyish simplicity behind him and was a successful warrior and a well established powerful monarch, surrounded by men of different faiths and sects and others who were ostensibly of the same persuasion but watchful of any opening for advancing their interests by hook or crook. The humility shown by Akbar in his relations with the Shaiikh was quite unusual for princes and monarchs and was the result of a pious mother's influence. Now the same Akbar could brook no diminution in his authority. And a Muslim monarch's authority, so long as he respects Islam, is necessarily limited by law and the interpretation of that law is in the hands of the jurists and the judges. The head of these in the realm was the *Ṣadr-u'ṣ-ṣudūr*. When the Brahmin had been executed, Akbar smarted under the disappointment that the *Ṣadr-u'ṣ-ṣudūr*, Shaiikh 'Abd-ul'-n-Nabi, had not respected his feelings. Akbar was not reconciled by the thought, which must have been present in his mind all this time, that

the Shaikh had, after all, done what he must have considered to be his legal duty.

Akbar's reaction, to start with, was somehow to convince himself not only that the Shaikh's action was insolent, but also illegal, so that he could establish in his mind the Shaikh's malafides. There were quite a few persons with the knowledge of the law at hand to help Akbar. It was pointed out, as has been already mentioned, that the Shaikh had transgressed the Ḥanafī ruling that a dhimmi could not be punished with death for reviling the Prophet. Akbar was armed with another argument that must have been suggested to him earlier by some one. He asked Badā'ūnī, "Have you also heard that if there are ninety-nine rulings demanding execution and one can become a basis for release, the jurists should prefer the one that does not support punishment?" Badā'ūnī confirmed the statement. "Why did the Shaikh, then, execute the Brahmin?", asked Akbar. When Badā'ūnī explained that in such circumstances it was lawful to take broader interests into consideration, Akbar was annoyed and Badā'ūnī was not only snubbed but also lost favour for ever. Henceforth Badā'ūnī was useless to the Emperor because Akbar could see that Badā'ūnī was willing to expose the short-comings in the knowledge of senior scholars but would not go to the extent of misinterpreting the law.²⁶

Akbar, however, was not content with the feeling that Shaikh 'Abd-u'n-Nabī could have found a good enough legal justification if he had been desirous of pleasing Akbar. Even if the legality of the decision could be seriously questioned, it did not help Akbar. If the decision could be proved to have been legally invalid, there was only one remedy open to the Emperor. He could prosecute 'Abd-u'n-Nabī for breach of his duty and that would entail quarrel with other jurists. Could any jurist entertain the accusation seriously and come out with a recommendation that the *Ṣadr-u'ṣ-ṣudūr*'s action had been malafide? And even if such a body of jurists could be brought together and Akbar had thought it fit to sentence the Shaikh, it might have created some political difficulties without any accretion to Akbar's legal

²⁶ Ibid. pp. 81-82.

authority. The court of *maẓālim* was the only legal body for the prosecution of public servants and though it was presided over by the monarch, yet the legal arguments and recommendations were the province of the jurists who were present at the trial. The power of the jurists, then, could not be broken so easily. The *Ṣadr-u'ṣ-ṣudūr* was not an ordinary official. He was the chief executive for religious affairs in the realm. Even if Shaiikh 'Abd-u'n-Nabī could be removed through the processes of law, his removal would be unpopular. And it would not solve Akbar's problem. Another *ṣadr-u'ṣ-ṣudūr* would have to be appointed and however pliant his conscience might be, there would always be the fear that he might not go far enough when Akbar wanted a decision in accordance with his wishes. Was there no possibility of removing the Emperor's dependence upon a jurist?

Akbar must have posed that question to persons who, in his view, were likely to go along with him in this endeavour. The most fertile brain was that of Abu-'l-Faḍl, who perhaps thought it prudent to engage the support of his father, Shaiikh Mubārak who came and suggested a thesis that seemed to fit Akbar's purpose admirably. Shaiikh Mubārak wanted to twist a well known principle of Islamic jurisprudence and constitutional practice to serve Akbar's designs. There is no church in Islam, hence no person or organisation can give a ruling which may have the force of law. A *qāḍī's* ruling is binding on the litigants but it can be altered by a superior court in appeal. For this reason it became necessary, in course of time, to have a body of rulings, the validity of which is not questioned. This was the main reason for the emergence of the four schools of jurisprudence. The subsequent rulings were to be of a subsidiary nature: this is the meaning of the term *ijtihādu muqaiyad*, limited interpretation. The interpretation under this system is expected not to transgress the limits of the existing body of interpretations accepted by the School. The *qāḍī* however, has the liberty, if circumstances so demand, to accept or enforce a ruling of another school. This is what was done by Shaiikh 'Abd-u'n-Nabī in the case of the Brahmin. But whatever the circumstances, there can always arise differences of opinion among the jurists and, in the affairs of the state, the sultan has to enforce some interpretation. It was

realized that the technical decision of preferring one legal opinion to another needed legal acumen and expertise. The sultans did not possess that much knowledge of the intricacies of the law, hence they appointed a man with a reputation for learning and piety as *ṣadr-u'ṣ-ṣudūr*, not only for administering justice and religious affairs, but also for deciding which opinion should be officially accepted and enforced by the state. These decisions were generally arrived at through discussion and consensus, but the *ṣadr-u'ṣ-ṣudūr* had to make the final recommendation, which in fact was almost a decision. This was the situation that Akbar sought to change. Shaiḫ Mubārak's remedy was preposterous, but not too original. It is obvious that if the sultān is motivated sincerely and he also possesses the necessary expertise, he need not depend on any one person to recommend to him which opinion he should accept.

Shaiḫ Mubārak drew up a document in the form of a *maḥḍar*, a statement to be issued on behalf of those present and affixing their signatures to it. The text of this document has been preserved by Badā'ūnī.²⁷ It has been wrongly called a decree of infallibility by some European authors. They have failed to understand its true import. It does not seek to give unlimited authority to Akbar. Indeed in general argument and recommendation it conforms with Islamic legal thinking. If the premises laid down were correct regarding Akbar, the document would have been innocuous, perhaps even beneficial. In case the ruler is just, wise and learned, he should most certainly perform the duty of choosing the best opinion available as a part of his duty of enforcing the law, which is his main function accordance to the *sharī'ah*. The ruler can also legislate measures for the benefit of the state and the people provided a measure so legislated does not violate any injunction of the Qur'ān. This has been universally conceded by Muslim jurists. It is also a fact that the authority of such a sultan is greater than that of any jurist for the simple reason that the monarch has been entrusted with the duty of enforcing the law, whereas a jurist, howsoever learned, can only express an opinion.

²⁷ Ibid, pp. 271, 272. Vincent Smith, *Akbar, the Great Mogul*, second edition, Indian reprint, (Delhi 1958) gives the English translation based on Lowe's translation of Badā'ūnī, pp. 128-129.

that the centrifugal tendencies had exhausted themselves in Northern India and the stage was set for the restoration of the central authority does not detract from his achievement. But it can be seriously contended if he possessed wisdom of the highest order. If he had, he would not have sought to weaken Islam and the Muslim community in the Subcontinent. At least he would have refrained from interfering with the established principles of Islam. Even Vincent Smith, who narrates Akbar's aberrations from Islam with relish, concludes that "the whole scheme was the outcome of ridiculous vanity, a monstrous growth of unrestrained autocracy.... The Divine Faith was a monument of Akbar's folly, not of his wisdom."²⁹ How can it then be asserted that Akbar possessed wisdom in the highest degree? No wise man, whatever be the extent of his conformity or rebellion could contribute to some of the ridiculous opinions held by him.

And, finally, could Akbar be described by any stretch of imagination as possessing learning in its highest degree? Akbar was hardly literate. He had not displayed any interest in formal education and had shown remarkable ingenuity in frustrating the attempts of his successive tutors to teach him the three Rs. Thus he remained practically illiterate throughout his life. Some historians have argued that he educated himself through his ears by listening to the debates and discussions held in his presence, by talking to men of learning, and by having the classics read out to him. All this is true, but this kind of education remains indisciplined and unsystematic. It leads to the accumulation of fragments of knowledge which remain unassimilated and unintegrated. That is the reason of so many contradictions in Akbar's character as well as thought. Learning in the context of the *maḥḍar* implies legal knowledge which is so logical and systematic that it cannot be acquired in a disorganized and unsystematized manner.

Thus Shaikh Mubārak, if questioned, would have found it impossible to justify the use of these adjectives even in their dictionary sense. If confronted with their meanings in the jargon of *fiqh*, he would have been confounded even more easily. And

²⁹ Ibid, pp. 159, 160.

he was too learned not to know the truth. But he was not the man to be troubled by considerations of conscience or even academic responsibility. Besides, he was aware that no one would risk his life by questioning the legality or propriety of the document.

After the *maḥḍar* had been written out by Shāikh Mubārak, Maḥdūm-u'l-mulk, Shāikh 'Abd-u'n-Nabī, Qāḍī Jalāl-u'd-dīn Multānī, Ṣadr Jahān and Shāikh Mubārak affixed their seals. Badā'ūnī tells us that all except Shāikh Mubārak subscribed to the document against their will and that, too, not without a long discussion.³⁰ They were all important persons. The first two and the last have been introduced earlier; Qāḍī Jalāl-u'd-dīn Multānī was *qāḍī-u'l-quḍāt* (chief judge) and Ṣadr Jahān was the *mufīṭ-i-kul* (jurisconsult) of the Empire. Despite its length, the debate could not have been full, because it was dangerous to be frank about the personal qualities and qualifications of the Emperor. It is surprising that no one had the courage to refuse to sign such an infamous document. Maḥdūm-u'l-mulk and 'Abd-u'n-Nabī lost their positions, their wealth and even their lives ultimately. They would have earned immortality if they had willingly put all three at stake and refused to bend to save their skins. They forgot that the edifice of faith is soundly built only when it is cemented with the blood of martyrs. Mubārak knew the men he had to deal with, otherwise he would have been somewhat more cautious. Badā'ūnī holds the view that the consequences of this *maḥḍar* were disastrous. "After (the Emperor) obtained a *futwā* (a legal pronouncement), the road to *ijtihād* (interpretation) was opened for him and it was established that the *imām* (the ruler) possessed superior wisdom. No obstacle was left (in his way). (The difference between things) lawful and unlawful was abolished. The superiority of the wisdom of the *imām* prevailed over the *shar'* (the law of Islam) and he now called Islam (blind) acceptance (of tradition)".³¹

Badā'ūnī has exaggerated the outcome of the *maḥḍar*. So far as Akbar's own views were concerned, they were rapidly changing

³⁰ Badā'ūnī. op. cit., v. iii p. 272.

³¹ Ibid.

under extraneous influences and the promptings of men who sought one advantage or the other from his alienation from orthodoxy. Some of them believed that the weakening of the hold of orthodoxy over the policies of the Empire would be advantageous to their community; some like the Christian missionaries even hoped to convert Akbar to their faith, and some merely pandered to his inordinate vanity to gain power and promotion by suggesting to him all the time that he was not only a great monarch but also a spiritual leader possessing mystic attainments, religious insight and superior wisdom. The *mahḍar* was the outcome of Akbar's alienation from orthodox Islam, not its cause. Abu-'l-Faḍl and men like him had discovered these tendencies in Akbar which had encouraged them to serve their own ends. The *mahḍar* was merely a formal record of what they had been suggesting to Akbar all the time: that he was the wisest of men. Indeed Abu-'l-Faḍl developed a political theory that came nearest to the doctrine of the divine right of kings, universally held in Christendom. He called kingship "a light emanating from God", which "is communicated by God to kings without the intermediate assistance of anyone" and "no dignity is higher in the eyes of God than royalty". It did not suit Abu-'l-Faḍl's purpose or his master's pride that all kings should be deemed entitled to receive special favours of God, hence it was laid down that only true kings were the beneficiaries. Selfish kings might possess all the outward requisites and paraphernalia of monarchy, but they were not real kings. The sole manifest criterion of judging whether a monarch was a true king was whether he had achieved success, because false kings soon lose their power and possessions.³² Thus the *mahḍar* may justifiably be considered to be the first step in building up his confidence so that Akbar might embark upon his adventures in proving his spiritual and intellectual greatness. And it was a faulty step so far as Akbar's prospects of complete autocracy were concerned, because it still limited his power within the fundamentals of Islam. This would again have thrown Akbar into the arms of some Muslim divines. That is the reason why the *mahḍar* does not find mention in Abu-'l-Faḍl's presentation of Akbar as the embodiment of the

³² Abu-'l-Faḍl, *Ā'in-i-Akbarī*, English Translation by Blochmann, Bib. Indica (Calcutta, 1894), v. i, p. 213.

ideal king endowed by God Himself with superior wisdom. The real aim was to remove those restrictions which Islam places on autocratic power by making it subservient to law. Akbar and his associates did not want any limitations.

Even though the *maḥḍar* had been signed, it did not impress the orthodox ulema. Perhaps both *Makhdūm-u'l-mulk* and 'Abd-u'n-Nabī had such qualms of conscience at having affixed their seals to such a palpably false and mischievous document, or they earned so much opprobrium that they retired from public life into their mosques and started telling all and sundry that their signatures had been obtained under duress and that its contents were illegal.³³ When reports of their behaviour were carried to Akbar, he decided to banish both of them to Mecca. So much discontent had spread among the ulema that the continued presence of the two divines was considered dangerous. The two were not left undisturbed for long in the capital before their exile; the *maḥḍar* was signed in September, 1579 and they were banished to Mecca early in 1580.³⁴ To allay public resentment as well as to mollify the orthodox ladies of the palace, they were ostensibly entrusted with the mission of carrying gifts to important scholars in the Hejaz.³⁵ The charges of ignorance levelled against these two eminent jurists are belied by the reception they were accorded in the intellectual circles of Arabia. No less a scholar than Ibn Hījr Makki came out to receive *Makhdūm-u'l-mulk*, whose works were not unknown in Arabia.³⁶ While in Mecca, the two acquainted the scholars there of Akbar's aberrations and the reports reached Akbar who was further enraged.³⁷

It would be better to complete the story of the two jurists before proceeding further. A few months after their banishment, as the result of seething discontent with Akbar's religious aberrations a rebellion broke out in Bengal and Akbar's brother Mirzā Muḥammad Ḥakīm, who was in charge of Kabul, marched

³³ *Shāhnawāz Khān*, op. cit., v. ii, p. 563.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Ibid.*, v. iii, p. 256.

³⁷ Muḥammad Ḥusain Āzād, *Darbār-i-Akbarī*, (Lahore, 1898), p. 327.

against Akbar in January 1581.³⁸ Even Akbar took the threat seriously, but the news must have reached Mecca in a much exaggerated form. Both Makhḍūm-u'l-mulk and Shaiḵh 'Abd-u'n-Nabī decided to return to India hoping that Akbar would face difficulties in dealing with the rebellion. Badā'ūnī who might have been expected to be somewhat sympathetic towards them has never a good word in their favour. He accuses them of being motivated by avarice and the desire of recapturing their authority,³⁹ but this just could not be true. The presumption that they were completely foreign to higher purposes does not hold water in view of historical evidence. They were motivated by the thought that they should help the cause of true Islam and rescue it from the tyranny of a monarch who had been led astray. However they were not able to achieve anything. Akbar did not like their coming back because of their unhidden hostility towards him. Reports continuously reached him that they openly spread discontent. He therefore got Makhḍūm-u'l-mulk poisoned.⁴⁰ The body was taken surreptitiously to Sultanpur, his home town, and buried there. He was not executed openly, because he still was respected by many and specially the pious ladies of the royal family. Akbar was not satisfied and all his property was confiscated. His sons were repeatedly tortured and his family was reduced to such penury that, in the words of Badā'ūnī "they did not have a cat's meal to satisfy their hunger."⁴¹ If Makhḍūm-u'l-mulk had come back because of the desire to recapture lost power, he would not have indulged in anti-Akbar activities, because the Emperor had crushed all opposition by the time the two theologians reached India and it was obviously suicidal to say anything against him.

Shaiḵh 'Abd-u'n-Nabī's fate was even more tragic. Exile and royal displeasure did not break his spirit. He went to the capital and had a private audience with Akbar. The Shaiḵh spoke harshly to the Emperor who was so enraged that he gave 'Abd-u'n-Nabī's face a hard blow with his fist. The Shaiḵh said,

³⁸ Abu-'l-Faḍl, *Akbarnāmah*, op. cit., v. iii, pp. 344-345.

³⁹ Badā'ūnī, op. cit., v. ii, p. 311.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

"why do you not hit me with a dagger?" He was handed over to Todar Mal to render account of the sum of seventy thousand rupees that had been entrusted to him for disbursing it in Mecca.⁴² Even Abu-'l-Faḍl condemns Todar Mal for his religious intolerance,⁴³ hence the Shaiikh was further humiliated and imprisoned. It seems that no defalcation could be proved, because he was not formally punished. One night a group of men murdered him in the prison; his body was thrown in the Square of Minarets where it lay for several hours.⁴⁴ If the Shaiikh had not been a man of strong convictions; why should he have spoken harshly to the Emperor knowing full well his antipathy towards himself?

It is obvious that history has been unfair to both Makhdūm-u'l-mulk and Shaiikh 'Abd-u'n-Nabī and there should be a fairer assessment of their characters. If they were so worthless, why did their contemporaries thought of them so well that they could not be executed openly even when Akbar had no opposition to fear? No historian has recorded any incident in which either Makhdūm-u'l-mulk or Shaiikh 'Abd-u'n-Nabī ever said a word against their convictions to Akbar to please him except permitting themselves to be coerced into signing the *maḥḍar* and for this lapse, they made ample amends before they were executed. The virtue of speaking out the truth shines even more brightly when the atmosphere is thick with subservience, flattery and sycophancy.⁴⁵

The banishment of these two theologians in 1580 was in fact the beginning of a large scale persecution of orthodox ulema who were not willing to toe the official line. Akbar first victimized the more prominent ulema by suspending all grants of five hundred bigas or more. None of these grants could be restored without an inquiry by the Emperor himself,⁴⁶ which only meant that he had to satisfy himself if the grantee was willing to cooperate

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Abu-'l-Faḍl, *Akbarnāmah*, op. cit., v. iii, p. 158.

⁴⁴ Badā'ūnī, op. cit., v. ii, pp. 311, 312.

⁴⁵ The two theologians must have been aware of the famous tradition of the Prophet, "The best *jihād* is to speak truth before a tyrant". (Ibn Mājah).

⁴⁶ Badā'ūnī, op. cit., v. ii, p. 278.

with him in the furtherance of his heterodox beliefs. As the ulema did not seem to be in a mood to compromise their conscience, Akbar resumed two-thirds of all the grants of one hundred bighas and above.⁴⁷ This also did not break the spirit of the orthodox ulema, therefore Akbar dismissed all the *qādis* appointed before the time of Sulṭān *Kh*wājah, a member of Akbar's Dīn-i-Ilāhī.⁴⁸ The families of orthodox ulema suffered great hardships but they bore this persecution with patience. It seems that the subsequent *ṣadrs*, all professing belief in Dīn-i-Ilāhī had precious little left to take away. In any case Akbar was not satisfied with their performance in ulema baiting and a further purge was carried out under the Emperor's orders by another follower of Akbar, Ṣadr Jahān, under the supervision of Abu-'l-Faḍl who enjoyed the Emperor's confidence.⁴⁹ More ulema were deprived of even what had been left and more families were ruined, their only fault being that "the practices of these grant holders did not come up to the wise counsels of His Majesty."⁵⁰ In other words all these men were deprived of their livelihood because they were not willing to abjure their beliefs and accept Akbar's ridiculous claims as a spiritual leader and religious teacher. The office of the *ṣadr-u's-ṣudūr* lost its significance and importance, not because Akbar wanted to down-grade it, but because his department was left without much work. The lands earmarked for grants ran waste.⁵¹ This is a good indication of the failure of the policy of the persecution of the ulema to force them to become Akbar's missionaries.

The resumption of the grants of the orthodox ulema was not the only method of persecution adopted by Akbar. Many leading ulema were banished from their houses and sent into exile either to Mecca or to distant places within the Empire.⁵² Mullā Muḥammad Yazdī had, after arrival from Yazd, been taken into favour because of his *Shi'*ite hostility to the first three

⁴⁷ Abu-'l-Faḍl, *Ā'in-i-Akbarī*, Book ii, op. cit., Ā'in 19.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Badā'ūnī, op. cit., v. ii, p. 343.

⁵² Ibid, p. 274, 277.

caliphs and was appointed the *qāḍī* of Jaunpur.⁵³ He did not relish Akbar's views and measures that went contrary to the very fundamentals of Islam and, therefore, he issued a *fatwā* that Akbar was an apostate, hence it was lawful to rebel against him. He was summoned to the capital and Akbar got Yazdī's boat sunk in the Jumna, so that he perished.⁵⁴ This might perhaps be justified because Mullā Muḥammad Yazdī's *fatwā* was an act of treason against the monarch; but several leading ulema were secretly put to death merely on the suspicion that they had fomented discontent or were disloyal.⁵⁵

It is not necessary to examine in any detail all the changes that took place in Akbar's own beliefs. His close association with Rajput families because of matrimonial alliances and specially the views expressed by his Hindu wives seem to have created in his mind a desire to find out the comparative merits of Islamic and Hindu ideas. He was not sufficiently educated to undertake a study of comparative religion. Hence it could be expected that his conclusions would be illogical as well as unsystematic. Seeing his interest in such matters, men of different religions suggested new ideas or arranged meetings with well known leaders of their own persuasions.⁵⁶ Akbar conversed with all of them and because his own intellectual calibre was no match to the ability of men with better training, he was easily persuaded to accept many assertions and beliefs. He was somewhat of an eclectic turn of mind and had been persuaded to think of himself as an eminently wise man capable of weighing every notion in the scales of reason. But his capacity for applying any logical or rational criteria was almost as limited as that of any man with no academic training and a victim of his own prejudices. Otherwise how could any sensible person believe that a beard draws its sustenance from the testicles and therefore, weakens male virility?⁵⁷ or be led to make an experiment by isolating

⁵³ Ibid, p. 211.

⁵⁴ Ibid, p. 277.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Jains, Hindus, Zoroastrians, Christians, all were consulted and tried to convince Akbar of the truth of their religion, e.g. Ibid, pp. 255, 256, 257, 260, 261, 299 etc., etc.

⁵⁷ Ibid, p. 303.

infants from all communion with human beings to find out the natural language of humanity?⁵⁸

Some European authors have gone much beyond reasonable conclusions in assessing the extent of Akbar's deviation from Islam. Most of them have asserted that Akbar formally rejected Islam and that his rejection was total.⁵⁹ This opinion is not sustained by the available evidence. The statements of Catholic missionaries from Portugal are not reliable. They indulged in wishful thinking and hoped that Akbar would even accept Christianity. They were neither fully aware of the facts nor capable of understanding Akbar's psychology. If we are to believe their statements, we shall have to accept the palpably wrong report that Akbar, having come to believe in the Catholic injunction of monogamy, divorced all his wives except one.⁶⁰ And whereas the Christian fathers do take the view that Akbar had ceased to believe in Islam, they had no special information in the matter beyond what was generally talked about in the bazars with all the embellishments and exaggerations of such gossip. Badā'ūnī is highly critical of Akbar's religious views but he generally stops short of saying that Akbar formally rejected Islam. When he speaks of Akbar's claim to prophethood, he takes care to say clearly that it was not made formally.⁶¹ Similarly where European authors speak of Jānī Beg of Thatta giving in writing at the time of his initiation as a disciple that he was renouncing Islam, they leave out the words "formal and traditional," which qualify the word Islam in the original.⁶²

⁵⁸ Ibid, p. 288.

⁵⁹ e.g. Vincent Smith, op. cit., pp. 154, 155.

⁶⁰ *Du Jarrie's account of the Jesuit missions to the court of Akbar*, English Translation by C.H. Payne, *Akbar and the Jesuits*, (London, 1926), pp. 44, 45.

⁶¹ Badā'ūnī, op. cit., v. ii, p. 287.

⁶² Badā'ūnī (op. cit., v. ii, p. 304) has given the text of the declaration made by Jānī Beg of Thatta at the time of his joining Dīn-i-Ilāhī which has been translated by Blochmann (op. cit. v. i, p. 203) as follows:—"I, such a one, son of such a one, have willingly and cheerfully renounced and rejected the Islam in all its phases, whether low or high, as I have witnessed it in my ancestors, and have joined the Divine Faith of Shah Akbar, and declare myself willing to sacrifice to him my property and life, my honour and religion." W.H. Lowe (Calcutta, 1884) has a similar translation in his translation of Badā'ūnī, which has been reproduced by Vincent Smith op.

(Continued on p. 71)

A more balanced judgment would be that Akbar did not reject Islam formally. Indeed he is on record saying even after the news of his alleged apostasy had spread to other countries that it was a calumny that he had ceased to be a Muslim.⁶³ He seems to have believed that the true interpretation of Islam could not be found in the rulings of the jurists but in the mystic experience of the sufis. But Akbar understood sufism as imperfectly as he was able to comprehend the intricacies of jurisprudence or the subtleties of philosophy. His conception of monism was so crude that he was led to the veneration of the sun as the supreme embodiment of God's effulgence in the material world. Indeed he gradually built up such a hotch potch of rationalism and pantheism, of eclecticism and innovation without any effort at synthesis that it would be ridiculous to take his views seriously as a viable or even transiently systematic basis for building up a religious brotherhood of disciples. Being indisciplined in his ways of thinking, he was incapable of discerning the obvious fallacies and contradictions of his basic assumptions. He once thought that he had some mystic experience,⁶⁴ perhaps the result of constant auto-suggestion and the flattery of men

(Continued from p. 70)

cit., pp. 154, 155. It reads as follows: — "I, who am so and so, son of so and so, do voluntarily and with sincere predilection and inclination, utterly and entirely renounce and repudiate the religion of Islam which I have seen and heard of my fathers and do embrace the 'Divine Religion' of Akbar Shāh, and do accept the four grades of entire devotion, viz., sacrifice of Property, Life, Honour and Faith." The Persian text is:

من که فلان ابن فلان باشم بطوع و رغبت و شوق قلبی از دین اسلام مجازی و تقلیدی که از پدران دیده و شنیده بودم ابرا و تبرا نمودم و در دین الهی اکبر شاهی در آمدن و مراتب چهارگانه اخلاص که ترک سال و جان و ناموس و دین باشد قبول کردم

It is useless to point out some of the unimportant verbal inaccuracies because they do not affect the argument. However, Lowe completely ignores the phrase مجازی و تقلیدی and Blochmann translates it as "in all its phases, whether low or high". The correct translation is "superficial and traditional". This changes the entire meaning. To elaborate this point further it may be mentioned that the *Ghiyāth-u'l-lughāt* defines مجاز as the opposite of حقیقت and J. Richardson's *A dictionary (of) Persian, Arabic and English* (v. i) published around 1870 translates مجاز as "Feigned, Political, Worldly, Superficial, Profane". The omission of the phrase is very serious and it is not surprising that all authors who could or did not consult the Persian original went astray.

⁶³ Abu-'l-Faḍl, *Akbarnāmah*, op. cit., v. iii, pp. 498, 499.

⁶⁴ Ibid, pp. 241, 242, 245, 260, 261.

who were presented to him as embodiments of spiritual greatness. Even though he never perhaps thought of rejecting Islam, his attitudes and beliefs were far removed from Islam, and were essentially even its antithesis. His religious ideas lacked the positive precision, clarity and logic of Islam. There is little doubt that he did stray away from Islam, though perhaps unwittingly. In any case it is an idle question to raise or discuss. We need not be interested in the reactions of an uneducated mind to the constant promptings of earnest members of other faiths and persuasions or subtle suggestions of clever self seekers and sycophants. The facts of the persecution of Muslim religious leaders and scholars and the steps taken to weaken the hold of the ulema upon the Muslim masses are the proper grist for our mill. There is no doubt that Akbar was responsible for both. As the policy to destroy the influence of orthodoxy was conscious, deliberate and single minded, it is necessary to find Akbar's main motive in furthering it with such consistency.

The Safawī monarchs of Iran had succeeded in expanding their power through devoted followers who thought nothing of sacrificing their lives at their bidding. But then this discipleship was based on a recognition of the fact that the monarch and the disciple both were ardent followers not only of Islam but of the same school of thought in it. The family had enjoyed a reputation of spiritual eminence for several centuries before it came to power. Indeed the emergence of the Safavid Empire was a sequel of a religious revolution.⁶⁵ Akbar's *Dīn-i-Ilāhī* tried to achieve for the monarch the same degree of loyalty from his disciples as the Safavid emperors received from their followers. The oath at the time of the initiation demanded a fourfold promise implying total surrender of the right of independent conviction and acceptance of Akbar's guidance as a spiritual teacher as well as the willingness to sacrifice property, life, honour and religion at his bidding.⁶⁶ The purpose thus was to create a body of men so devoted to Akbar as to carry out all his behests and permit neither interest nor conviction to inhibit them in the execution of his orders. The irony of the situation that the loyalty of the natural

⁶⁵ For details vide, *Cambridge History of Islam*, op. cit., v. i, pp. 241, 242.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, op. cit., v. ii, p. 304.

supporters of the Empire was sacrificed to build up a limited body of disciples, possessing no natural springs of affection or devotion and passing no test except their willingness to court unpopularity among men of principles for the sake of currying favour with the Emperor, was never realized by Akbar.

CHAPTER IV

The Development of Resistance

Akbar's persecution of orthodox Islam could not go unnoticed. It was not simply a question of loose talk or irreverent and blasphemous discussions within the precincts of the palace, which also, when reports reached the people, would create disaffection. The tales were carried by the participants in the discussions themselves and gradually percolated into outer circles, sometimes in a highly exaggerated form. Indeed on many points the student is still confronted with contrary evidence. The *Ma'āthir-u'l-umarā'* seems to be correct when it accepts the main fact of Akbar's aberration but asserts that it is not true that he claimed divinity or prophethood and in this context complains that all kinds of misstatements and rumours were deliberately given currency by the Emperor's adversaries.¹ Even if authentic reports only had gone into circulation, they would have been found to be disturbing enough for the Muslim population as a whole, specially for the orthodox, who had every reason to be perturbed, because

¹ *Shāhnawāz Khān*, op. cit., v. i, p. 692.

hitherto the Muslim Empire in the Subcontinent had been a citadel of orthodoxy which was being subverted by hostile elements at the instigation and with the active support of the head of the State, who, in their minds, as well as legally, was expected to be the protector of the purity of the doctrine.² Akbar himself never realized that the Empire was not his personal property and that he had legal and moral responsibilities towards orthodoxy. The rebellion of Mullā Muḥammad Yazdī and his fate must have demonstrated even to the non-Sunni Muslims that Akbar had gone too far. Badā'ūnī's attitude may be taken to be an index to the feelings of the Muslim opponents of orthodoxy. He enlisted himself gladly, like Mullā Muḥammad Yazdī, to demolish orthodoxy but he could not stomach Akbar's attacks on the fundamentals of Islam. This similarity between the attitudes of Badā'ūnī, a Maḥdawī and Mullā Muḥammad Yazdī, a Shi'ah is significant.

The first manifestation of discontent was the rebellion in Bengal. It is true that the revolt started because of the severity of the central government in enforcing the regulations regarding the branding of the horses of the troops of the nobles and too close a scrutiny into their entitlement of the *jāgirs* assigned to them.³ Nevertheless Mullā Muḥammad Yazdī's *fatwā* and the reports regarding Akbar's aberrations added fuel to the fire. The presence of Todar Mal as Akbar's general to suppress the rebellion must also have been resented. One of the rebels, Ma'sūm Khān of Kabul had contacts with Akbar's half brother, Mirzā Muḥammad Ḥakīm and was able to persuade him to invade the Panjab.⁴ He was nominally the governor of Kabul but in fact was almost independent. Akbar felt that the combination of the revolt in Bengal and the invasion from the north-west was formidable and took special steps to face the situation. His measures show that he was aware of the dangerous consequences of his reputation for heterodoxy and hostility towards Islam. He sent two of his most orthodox generals, Mirzā 'Azīz Kokah

² Faḍl bin Rūzbahān al-Iṣfahānī, *Sulūk-u'l-mulūk*, (British Museum ms. or 253) f. 19a. The monarch is expected to protect the faith as defined by *ijmā'*.

³ Abu-'l-Faḍl, *Akbarnāmah*, op. cit., v. iii, pp. 284, 285, 290, 291.

⁴ Ibid., p. 330; Badā'ūnī, op. cit., v. ii, p. 291.

and Shahbāz Khān Kanbū against the insurgents. Later, when the revolt was suppressed,⁵ Mullā Muḥammad Yazdī and the Qāḍī of Bengal along with several ulema, who were suspected of having propagated that rebellion against Akbar was lawful because of his aberration from true Islam, were murdered under Akbar's orders without a trial.⁶ The revolt started in 1580, the year of the *maḥḍar* proclaiming Akbar as *imām-i-'ādil* and the banishment of Makhdūm-u'l-mulk and 'Abd-u'n-Nabī to Mecca and was not fully suppressed until 1584. The rebels had no outstanding leader capable of organizing a successful assault on the capital. Mirzā Muḥammad Ḥakīm was a worthless prince. His incapacity was so notorious that Akbar did not think it worth his while to remove the prince from his governorship after leading an expedition to and capturing Kabul.⁷ The Muslim officers would have behaved otherwise if they had possessed an alternative to Akbar.

Being free from any danger of rebellion, Akbar went further and further in his persecution of Islam. And the outward manifestations of his hostility were increasing. The *Akbarnāmah* and the *A'in-i-Akbarī* have neither the *bismi'llah* nor the homage to the Prophet which was customary for all Muslim authors to write in the beginning of their books. The large number of ulema uprooted from their homes and dismissed from their offices could not remain silent. They apprised the Muslims of what was happening.⁸ News reached other Muslim courts which were scandalized at what they heard. 'Abd-u'llah Khān Uzbek, the Emperor of Transoxiana, wrote a letter to him expressing his concern at the news he had heard about him. In his reply, written in 1586, Akbar protested his adherence to Islam and characterized the reports as mere calumnies.⁹ Akbar was perhaps sincere, but his statements rang hollow in the ears

⁵ Badā'ūnī, op. cit., v. ii, p. 285.

⁶ Ibid, p. 287.

⁷ Father Anthony Monserrate, *Mongolicae Legationis Commentarius*, Memoirs of the Asiatic Society of Bengal (Calcutta, 1914), v. iii, no. 9, pp. 604-608.

⁸ Shāhnawāz Khān, op. cit., v. i, p. 692. Also Badā'ūnī, op. cit., v. ii, pp. 274, 278, 279.

⁹ Abu-'l-Faḍl, *Akbarnāmah*, op. cit., v. iii, pp. 498, 499.

of those who had watched his deliberate attempts to uproot orthodoxy and even belief in some fundamental Islamic injunctions. For instance, once he tried to prevent the pious Shahbāz Khān Kanbū from offering his prayers and when the Khān physically wrenched himself away from the Emperor's grip, Akbar went on molesting him while he was praying.¹⁰ Unfortunately Akbar was not above indulging in hypocrisy for political ends. In 1579 when he was still fearful about public reactions to his religious waywardness, he went on a pilgrimage to Ajmer¹¹ and on his way back he ordered that a large pavilion be pitched every day for public prayers which he joined meticulously. The pilgrimage was made in Abu-'l-Faḍl's words for "calming the public and enhancing the submission of the recalcitrants."¹² A little later one Mīr Abū Turāb brought from Mecca a stone said to bear an impression of the Prophet's foot. Akbar knew that the alleged relic was not genuine, but elaborate arrangements were made to receive it and Akbar himself went out to meet it. He even helped to carry the stone for a few paces on his shoulder. Abu-'l-Faḍl tells us that all this was done to put to shame "all the vain thinkers and ill-conditioned ones who had been agitated on account of the inquiries into the proofs of prophecy."¹³ It was difficult, therefore, to take Akbar's reply to 'Abd-u'llah Khān Uzbek as a sincere expression of Akbar's views.

As has been mentioned earlier, Akbar was not confronted with a general revolt because an armed rebellion was beyond the organizing capacity and resources of the Muslim nobles. The failure of the Bengal rebellion had demonstrated the difficulties in the way of insurrection. And then the issues were complex. The Afghan dissensions after Sher Shāh had shown that the Muslim Empire could collapse completely if it was exposed to an armed conflict of grave intensity. This war, if provoked, would be quite different in nature from the war of succession in Shāh Jahān's reign. Indeed the wars for the throne after the death of 'Ālamgir I were a major factor in the destruction of Muslim

¹⁰ Shāhnawāz Khān, v. ii, p. 599.

¹¹ Abu-'l-Faḍl, *Akbarnāmah*, op. cit., v. iii, p. 276.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid, p. 281.

rule in the Subcontinent. In any case, war could produce another period of anarchy and therefore could not be undertaken lightly. Therefore, even the orthodox nobles who would have been desirous of dethroning Akbar were reluctant to push matters to the extreme. Then, it was almost certain that the Hindu and Shi'āh nobles would not join hands with the orthodox simply to instal orthodoxy once again in the seat of power. Quite a number of orthodox nobles were tied to the dynasty and Akbar with bonds of personal loyalty through friendship, blood or gratitude. And then for a man of position, authority and wealth, any dislocation in the political set up opens up possibilities of complete deprivation. Hence discontent had no potent method of eruption.

There was no dearth of outspoken men. Mirzā 'Aziz Kokah had a reputation for bluntness.¹⁴ Shahbāz Khān Kanbū could not be won over by any blandishments and was outspoken in defence of his convictions.¹⁵ We have seen how the much abused Shaiikh 'Abd-u'n-Nabi could not be cowed down by physical violence or certainty of death. Even the Rajput rajas were not convinced of the soundness of Akbar's attempts at recruiting disciples.¹⁶ But it was quite a different matter to oppose him in a manner that would weaken his authority. It seems that Akbar himself was convinced later that his teachings were not accepted sincerely by any one. His disillusionment at the report that his friend and supporter in his pranks, Abu-'l-Faḍl, was himself engaged in practices that revealed his basic loyalty to Islam must have shaken him considerably.¹⁷ The fact that his trusted officer Todar Mal was steeped in religious intolerance and the Emperor's failure in securing any important Hindu adherents to his *Din-i-Ilāhī* should have demonstrated to him that the very people for reconciling whom the order had been founded were not amenable to this approach. Political conciliation was possible without securing adherence to his spiritual philosophy.

¹⁴ Shāhnawāz Khān, v. i, pp. 683, 684.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, v. ii, p. 599.

¹⁶ Badā'ūnī, op. cit., v. ii, pp. 313, 363, 364.

¹⁷ Shāhnawāz Khān, op. cit., v. ii, p. 610. The bearer of the report with proofs was Prince Salīm.

And so far as the Muslims were concerned, the gain of a few disciples at the cost of general disaffection was politically much too expensive. There is no record of the change in Akbar's thinking except the negative one of the stoppage of religious discussions, inquiries into the beliefs of other sects and faiths and any other activity that would demonstrate his continued interest in these matters towards the end of his reign, specially after 1597. It is difficult to find out whether there were any changes in his personal beliefs, any sorting out of the contradictions that he had accumulated in his mind, any synthesis of his eclectic views, any further hardening of his hostility to orthodoxy or any turning away from his waywardness in religious matters. There is a report that he repented at the time of his death, but its authenticity has been questioned.¹⁸ Even if established, it would hardly be relevant for our purposes, beyond confirming what has already been concluded from other evidence, that towards the end of his reign he had grown indifferent to religious inquiry and innovation.

The disastrous results of Akbar's persecution of orthodoxy were so obvious that the ulema had to take note of the happenings and seek some remedy.

A great scholar of this period was Shaikh 'Abd-u'l-Ḥaqq Muḥaddith of Delhi.¹⁹ He was born in a family noted for its

¹⁸ Price in his translation of *Tuzuk-i-Jahāngirī* as *Memoirs of the Emperor Jahangir, written by himself, and translated by Major David Price* (London, 1829) says that Akbar repented at his death-bed and died a Muslim. The statement is supported by Father Botelho [E.D. MacLagan, 'The Jesuit Missions to the Emperor Akbar', *Journal of Asiatic Society of Bengal*, part i, v. lxx (Calcutta, 1896), p. 107] and Sir Thomas Roe [William Foster, *The Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe to the Court of the Great Mogul, 1615-1619, as narrated in his journal and correspondence* (Hakluyt Society, 1899), p. 107]. If Badā'ūnī had survived Akbar, he might have thrown some light. Other Muslim historians have preferred to remain silent on Akbar's religious vagaries and some have gone to the extent of roundly saying that Badā'ūnī should not have written on the subject. Abu'l-Faḍl also died before the event. It is not impossible that the statement in the manuscript used by Price was removed later from the official text because Jahāngir did not want to give the impression that Akbar had strayed away from Islam seriously. But then all Muslims seek forgiveness for their sins at the time of their death and in spite of its special significance in Akbar's case, a record that he also did that would not have been objectionable.

Perhaps the greatest irony is that Hindus ripped open his grave, took out his bones and burnt them. (Vincent Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 237).

¹⁹ For his life and works, see Khaliq Ahmad Nizāmi, *Ḥayāt-i-Shaikh 'Abd-u'l-Ḥaqq Muḥaddith Dehlawi* (Delhi, 1953).

piety and learning.²⁰ His father took a special interest in his education.²¹ The Shaikh proved to be a keen and assiduous student. After having finished his formal studies, he, for a time, started teaching. Then he went to Hejaz, where he became a pupil of the famous scholar, Shaikh 'Abd-u'l-Wahhāb Muttaqī.²² Shaikh 'Abd-u'l-Haqq matured considerably under such able tutelage. He acquired the broadminded tolerance of his teacher, who held that Muslims should not be branded as heretics and unbelievers because of even seemingly serious errors. He himself adopted an attitude of neutrality in the matter of *wahdat-u'l-wujūd* (monism). He neither taught it nor criticized it. His lectures emphasized the *sunna* upon which he patterned his own life but he also cultivated *taṣawwuf*. His influence on Shaikh 'Abd-u'l-Haqq was profound. He taught him not only *ḥadīth* but, after he had acquired proficiency in it, Shaikh Muttaqī gave him books on *taṣawwuf* to read and then prescribed suitable exercises.²³ While in the Hejaz Shaikh 'Abd-u'l-Haqq felt inclined to accept the Shāfi'ī school of jurisprudence but Shaikh Muttaqī effectively persuaded him to stick to the Ḥanafī school, which Shaikh Muttaqī believed to be better.²⁴ Perhaps he was also motivated by the fact that the Muslims of the Mughul Empire were solidly Ḥanafīs and that Shaikh 'Abd-u'l-Haqq would be able to work better for their religious guidance if he himself did not belong to a different school of jurisprudence.

Shaikh 'Abd-u'l-Haqq showed considerable reluctance in coming back to India because he found it difficult to wrench himself from the holy places.²⁵ His teacher, however, was firm and wanted him to return as expeditiously as possible.²⁶ He obeyed and reached Delhi in 1592 after having spent three years under the fostering care of Shaikh 'Abd-u'l-Wahhāb Muttaqī.²⁷ Here

²⁰ Ibid, pp. 73, 51-62.

²¹ Ibid, p. 76.

²² Ibid, p. 108.

²³ Ibid, pp. 134, 136.

²⁴ Ibid, p. 111.

²⁵ Ibid, pp. 119-121.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid, p. 123.

he started teaching the exegesis of the Qur'ān and *ḥadīth*.²⁸ The other scholars, as is customary with the theological seminaries even today, devoted most of their time to jurisprudence for two reasons. The graduates of these seminaries were mostly employed as *qādis* and *muftis* and were required to be well grounded in *fiqh*. Besides the general populace was more concerned with problems of *fiqh* alike in the performance of religious rites and dealings with others. They, therefore, expected every person educated in the religious sciences to give them guidance in the field of *fiqh*. They were not so much concerned with the fundamentals in which they believed implicitly. Shaikh 'Abd-u'l-Ḥaqq adopted a different course because he felt rightly that the ulema needed a better grounding in the fundamentals. We have seen how the jurists in Akbar's court found themselves at a disadvantage when they were confronted with issues that lay outside *fiqh*. Besides the opinions expressed by some of the half-baked or heterodox sufis and Bhaktī saints had created confusion in the minds of the believers and therefore an emphasis on the fundamentals was necessary. The Shaikh had a mission. He wanted to extricate Islam and the Muslims from the mess that had been created all around and of which the disastrous aberrations of Akbar were an indication.

Despite his reputation as a *muḥaddith*, Shaikh 'Abd-u'l-Ḥaqq was a sufi of great eminence.²⁹ He had been initiated by his own father Saif-u'd-dīn Turk who had later put him under the discipleship of Saiyid Musā Gilānī.³⁰ It has already been mentioned that his teacher in Hejaz, Shaikh 'Abd-u'l-Wahhāb Muttaqī, asked him to read books on *taṣawwuf* and also guided him in its practices. Shaikh 'Abd-u'l-Ḥaqq had taken his training in the Qādiriyyah order and his emotional attachment to his spiritual preceptors as well as the founder of the *silṣilah*, Shaikh 'Abd-u'l-Qādir Jilānī was deep.³¹ In Delhi, it is said, that he was instructed by the spirit of Shaikh 'Abd-u'l-Qādir Jilānī himself to enter the discipleship of Khwājah Bāqī-bi'llah, who

²⁸ Ibid, p. 125.

²⁹ Bad'ūnī, op. cit., v. iii, p. 113.

³⁰ Khaliq Ahmad Nizāmī, op. cit., p. 130.

³¹ Ibid, p. 143.

was a renowned sufi of the Naqshbandī order.³² This was of considerable importance, because, as we shall see later, the Khwājah was to play an important role in the renaissance of Islam in the Subcontinent. Shaikh 'Abd-u'l-Ḥaqq did not loosen his ties with the Qādirīyah *silsilah*, but added a new dimension to his spiritual accomplishments through the influence and instruction of Khwājah Bāqī-bi'llah. Indeed the Naqshbandī discipline provided a better balance for the intellectual and mystic trends which were equally strong in the Shaikh's mind. Badā'ūnī goes so far as to assert that the Shaikh adopted teaching and scholarship to divert popular attention from his spiritual greatness.³³ It is of great significance that Shaikh 'Abd-u'l-Ḥaqq not only did not turn away from sufism as Shaikh 'Abd-u'n-Nabī had done after receiving his training in *ḥadīth* in Hejaz, but actually strengthened his interest in it. This was due partly to his own inclinations developed fairly early in his life and partly to the influence of his teacher Shaikh 'Abd-u'l-Wahhāb Muttaqī. There was an excellent reason for this. Both the teacher and the disciple were aware of the conditions prevailing in the Subcontinent. Reform demanded not only learning but also depth of sincerity and devotion to the cause of rescuing Islam from its plight. Sufism sharpens the urge and creates a fund of emotional and spiritual stamina to undertake difficult missions and to face opposition. If sufism had been misused by ignorant and spiritually inadequate men, this tendency had to be curbed, but mysticism was not to be scuttled, because it was a great force in building up spiritual strength and emotional reservoirs of loyalty to Islam. Without this great and intense loyalty, little could be achieved. Nevertheless Shaikh 'Abd-u'l-Ḥaqq's approach to his task was mainly scholarly. His great ability soon came to be recognized, even by men of quite different dispositions. For instance the poet Faiḍī was an ardent admirer of the Shaikh.³⁴ It was no mean achievement to earn such high approbation of men of antagonistic beliefs and characters like Faiḍī and Badā'ūnī.

³² Ibid, p. 137.

³³ Badā'ūnī, op. cit., v. iii, p. 114.

³⁴ Ibid, pp. 116-117.

Shaikh 'Abd-u'l-Wahhāb had told his disciple that missionary work also resulted in attainment of nearness to God. He had also impressed upon him that it was necessary in such effort to bear persecution cheerfully and not to lose courage even if the results seemed disproportionately meagre. In any case the situation in one's own country had to be faced and it would solve no problem if Shaikh 'Abd-u'l-Ḥaqq migrated to some other place in his disappointment.³⁵ Thus Badā'ūnī was wrong when he thought that the Shaikh had adopted teaching and academic work to hide his qualities as a mystic. Indeed this work was to help him in his efforts to get nearer God. It was as much an ingredient in his progress as a sufi as his prayers, meditation and other aids. This invested his writings with a spiritual quality that is seldom the characteristic of merely academic work. He developed his strategy after considerable thought. It was in accord with his character, of which assiduity, self-abnegation, sincerity and devotion were the main qualities. Before going to Hejaz he was on friendly terms with some prominent members of the Imperial court, though he never entertained the idea of joining it or of seeking worldly advancement.³⁶ When he came back, he broke the relations with persons whom every one knew to be involved in anti-Islamic activities.³⁷ He was a prolific writer and was the author of books and treatises on the exegesis of the Qur'ān, the principles of reciting it correctly, *ḥadīth*, *fiqh*, *taṣawwuf*, ethics, philosophy, logic, history, biographies and grammar.³⁸ His books were widely read and his contribution in *ḥadīth* was so important that he earned the title of *muḥaddith*, an authority on *ḥadīth*. Such voluminous literature, so varied in its scope, of such high quality and produced over such a long period could not fail to produce significant results. He was blessed with longevity and lived for fifty two lunar years after his return from Hejaz.³⁹ And he was active upto his death. The Shaikh wrote a letter to Shaikh Farīd, better known as Murtaḍā Khān, who was known for his enthusiasm for Islam, on the occasion of Akbar's death with the re-

³⁵ Khaliq Aḥmad Nizāmī, op. cit., p. 136.

³⁶ Ibid, p. 92.

³⁷ Ibid, pp. 144, 145.

³⁸ Ibid, pp. 160-206.

³⁹ Ibid, p. 150.

quest that it be placed before Jahāngīr. This letter was couched in polite and academic language, because no useful purpose would have been served by annoying the new monarch, but it does not leave out any point that the Shaikh wanted Jahāngīr to keep in mind.⁴⁰

Shaikh 'Abd-u'l-Haqq's contribution to the improvement of the position of Islam in the Mughul Empire would have been known better if it had not been eclipsed by the effort and success of his great contemporary, Shaikh Aḥmad of Sarhind, better known as the Mujaddid-i-alf-i-thānī. But before we discuss his methods and work, it is necessary to give some information about the Naqshbandī *silsilah* and its leader in the Subcontinent, Khwājah Bāqī-bi'llah. The *silsilah* was founded by Khwājah Bahā-u'd-dīn Naqshband in Bukhara in 1389.⁴¹ Khwājah Bāqī-bi'llah was born in Kabul in 1564. He studied *ḥadīth* and *fiqh* and then his mind turned to mysticism and he joined the Naqshbandī *silsilah*. He was directed to go to Delhi where he attained high reputation as a sufi and a spiritual guide of great attainments.⁴² We have seen how Shaikh 'Abd-u'l-Haqq who was a great scholar and already an accomplished sufi himself entered Khwājah Bāqī-bi'llah's discipleship and, according to his own assessment, benefitted greatly from this relationship.⁴³ Khwājah Bāqī-bi'llah established the Naqshbandī *silsilah* in the Subcontinent and it prospered partly because of his spiritual greatness and partly because it was strongly tied to the basic teachings of Islam and discouraged heretical ideas and practices, which were based in some of the mistaken views of the extremists in some other *silsilahs*. As these ideas had greatly distorted the real import of the sufi notions regarding God and His creation as well as the responsibility of the individual in the matters of belief and action, it was necessary to correct them through sufism itself and the Naqshbandī *silsilah* was better equipped to play this role. Besides its discipline was less harsh and ascetic and yet it was second to none in achieving the goals

⁴⁰ Ibid, pp. 378-385.

⁴¹ Pareja, op. cit., Tomo ii, p. 673.

⁴² Khalīq Aḥmad Nizāmī, op. cit., p. 137.

⁴³ Ibid, pp. 137, 138.

of sufism.⁴⁴

A family tracing its genealogy to the Caliph 'Umar had settled down in Sarhind which had already established a reputation as a centre of religious and academic activity before the foundation of the Mughul Empire. Shaikh 'Abd-u'l-Aḥad was a scion of this family and was a reputed scholar and sufi.⁴⁵ A few months after but in the same year in which Khawājah Bāqī-bi'llah was born in Kabul, the Shaikh was blessed with a son, who was named Aḥmad. He was introduced to his studies early in life and made rapid progress.⁴⁶ He also was trained first in Chishtiyah and later in the Qādiriyyah and Kubrawīyah silsilahs and proved to be as proficient in sufism as he did in formal theological learning.⁴⁷ When he was thirty-six years old, he found himself in Delhi where a friend spoke to him of Khawājah Bāqī-bi'llah. Shaikh Aḥmad at once developed a keen desire to meet him. Perhaps he himself had felt attracted to the Naqshbandiyah silsilah and the knowledge that it had such an eminent representative in Delhi made him ever so keen to meet him. When the two met, there was a mutual recognition of the worth of each other. Shaikh Aḥmad felt that he had reached the right guide to initiate and then train him in the Naqshbandiyah silsilah and Khawājah Bāqī-bi'llah formed the opinion that he had met the most promising neophyte of his life.⁴⁸ Shaikh Aḥmad who was not new to sufi discipline made remarkable progress and soon reached the sublime heights of experience and beatific vision. In a state of deep ecstasy he wrote a letter to the Khawājah, in which he expressed the view that the acceptance of the formal institutions and doctrines of Islam without mystic insight was only blindness.⁴⁹ It is quite true that religion without intense God consciousness and a constant effort to create an intimate relationship with Him is not fully rewarding, but to characterize

⁴⁴ Shaikh Aḥmad Sarhindī, *Maktūbāt-i-Imām-i-Rabbānī*, (Lucknow, 1913), v. i, pp. 230, 231, Epistle 221; Ibid, pp. 453-455, Epistle 313.

⁴⁵ Saiyid Muḥammad Miẓān, *'Ulamā'-i-Hind Kā Shāndār Mādī*, v. i, (Delhi, 1963), pp. 2, 3.

⁴⁶ Ibid, pp. 4, 5.

⁴⁷ Ibid, p. 5.

⁴⁸ Ibid, p. 7.

⁴⁹ Sarhindī, op. cit., v. i, p. 41, Epistle 31.

it as blindness was dangerous because those who were not fully aware of the sentiments underlying such expressions were likely to be misled into thinking that all that mattered in religion was mystic experience. It is a tribute to Khawājah Bāqī-bi'llah that he corrected such tendencies in his disciple, which were partly the outcome of Shaiikh Aḥmad's earlier training in other *silsilahs* and partly the result of an intensity of feeling that had not been channelized into the exacting discipline of a mission. The Khawājah had discerned in Shaiikh Aḥmad great potentialities for undertaking a revolutionary programme of action.⁵⁰ But these had to be further developed before Shaiikh Aḥmad could launch himself into the great venture. He was familiar with the basic and even the advanced techniques of mystic exercises. All that was necessary was to help him to higher achievements. This he did and Shaiikh Aḥmad was able to transcend the summum bonum of most mystic experience, the realization of union with God, the feeling of *waḥdat-u'l-wujūd*.⁵¹ This experience was revolutionary and Shaiikh Aḥmad had to fight many battles with eminent sufis of other *silsilahs* who still held fast to the doctrine of *waḥdat-u'l-wujūd*.

Shaiikh Aḥmad did not base his conclusions on philosophy. To him as well as to other sufis philosophy was mere speculation. To them mystic experience is more valid than logic or philosophy because it is a fact, not an assumption or deduction. Shaiikh Aḥmad claimed that his experience was higher than that of monism because he had earlier experienced *waḥdat-u'l-wujūd* and had left it behind. He held that *waḥdat-u'l-wujūd* was only a sensation. He called that condition *waḥdat-u'sh-shuhūd*, that is monism in experience, not in fact.⁵² If monism, despite its intense realization by the most accomplished sufis was not the reality, how could it be argued that Shaiikh Aḥmad's own experience was the reality? In particular when at three different stages of the development of his mystic sensitivity he had had three realizations, all with the same intensity. Was it progress that he had made? Or, was it falling off from the pinnacle to a position where his own

⁵⁰ Muḥammad Miyān, op. cit., pp. 6, 7.

⁵¹ Sarhindī, op. cit., v. i, pp. 4, 5, Epistles 2, 3.

⁵² Ibid, v. i, pp. 57-60, Epistle 43.

self stood in the way of his complete absorption into the Being of God? This question worried Shaiikh Aḥmad, though not in this form. He never seems to have doubted that he had been rising and not falling in the scale of mystic excellence. But the loss of the feeling of absorption into the Supreme Being to the extent of establishing complete identity with Him could not but create a sense of deprivation. It must be remembered that the sole spring of all motivation in the efforts of all sufis is the burning love of God that seeks solace and fulfilment in complete union. Therefore, it was torture to an ardent sufi like Shaiikh Aḥmad to feel deprived of the sensation of complete union.

Solace did come to him through an understanding of what in fact had happened to him. The feeling of monism had been achieved in a state of intoxication and as mystic realization was gradually separated from intoxication, the knowledge that gnosis of the reality was now being vouchsafed to him in sobriety restored his confidence.⁵³ As intoxication began to wane, he began to realize that he was not in God but a shadow of His Being and when sobriety was restored, he realized that he himself did exist separately, even though his existence was transient depending entirely upon God's will.⁵⁴ This was the state of *'ubūdiyyat*, of total dependence upon and subservience to God.⁵⁵ Man could lose himself through an intense love for God in a desire for and even a feeling of complete union with Him, but could not, in fact, become identical with Him in any sense. And what was true about himself was true about other men and also about the universe. They had their separate existence into which they had been brought through the will of God. This created a difficulty for the Shaiikh as a monotheist. He could not aver that anything other than God existed in the same sense as God. His existence was absolute; it was independent, outside time and space; it was the only true existence. This Existence was One, unique and peerless. It was so Absolute that even God's attributes did not form part of it. Outside this Existence, in fact, there was

⁵³ Ibid, p. 42, Epistle 31 describes his sense of deprivation; the feeling of solace finds mention in Ibid, p. 230, Epistle 220. Intoxication in this context, it must be emphasized, means a state of mystic ecstasy.

⁵⁴ Ibid, v. ii, pp. 7, 8. Epistle 1; ibid, p. 21, Epistle 11.

⁵⁵ Ibid, v. i, p. 39, Epistle 31.

mere non-existence. Hitherto the argument would seem to favour monism. But Shaiikh Aḥmad argued that God did create a transitory existence by willing that some attribute of His should cast its reflection on a corresponding aspect of non-existence, and this brought about a transitory existence lasting only so long as the reflection was permitted to continue.⁵⁶ This was a philosophic interpretation of God's attribute and act of creation. In other words the act of creation was an act of will and not a mere emanation, indeed not emanation at all.⁵⁷ For it should be remembered that the reflection mentioned by Shaiikh Aḥmad is a reflection of an attribute, not the Essence. This explanation offered by the Shaiikh, is in complete accord with orthodox Islamic conceptions of ontology. A philosophic interpretation of the Shaiikh's concepts in this regard was necessary because the validity of his own mystic experience might be questioned by those holding different views as he had rejected the experience of others as proofs of the reality of monism.

Philosophic arguments, however, were not enough, because as has been mentioned earlier, philosophy was suspect as mere speculation and after all the criterion could only be experience, which at least was a fact, whatever its limitations. The Shaiikh, therefore, had to meet the challenge from this angle as well. He, therefore, was impelled to provide a better referee than philosophy. This obviously was the experience of the Prophet who had a different relationship with God.⁵⁸ What the Prophet learned of reality was neither through logical or philosophic deduction nor through an emotional striving for unity with God. The highest proximity to God that was possible for man had been vouchsafed to him. This, one may suggest, is the true meaning of *mi'rāj*, his ascension. He was in communion with God not through mystic intoxication but revelation. Hence the Prophet's experience and revelation possessed the ultimate validity. The criterion of the soundness of any truth learned through mystic exaltation was mainly that it should not, in any way, come into conflict with

⁵⁶ Ibid, v. ii, pp. 2-8, Epistle 1.

⁵⁷ Ibid, v. i, p. 39, Epistle 31, Ibid, v. ii, p. 5, Epistle 1.

⁵⁸ Ibid, v. i, p. 6, Epistle 4; Ibid, p. 29, Epistle 21, Ibid, p. 80, Epistle 63; v. i, pp. 266-267, Epistle 248, v. ii, pp. 19-21, Epistle 10 etc.

revelation or the *sunnah*, the two bases of the *shari'ah*.⁵⁹ Thus there should, indeed can, exist no conflict between *shari'ah* and *tarīqah*, between the exoteric and esoteric aspects of Islam. The conflict grew because of the experience of some mystics in a state of intoxication when they could not judge its worth or significance properly. Hence only that mystic experience had some validity as had occurred in a condition of sobriety and was in accord with the Prophet's revelation and teachings.⁶⁰

The Shaiikh's progress in the mystic realization of the truth was a preparation for his historic mission. Without the clarification of ideas relating to monism and the validity of mystic experience, the Shaiikh could not have developed that clarity of vision that he shows in his analysis of the ills that had weakened Islam in the Subcontinent. In the first instance it was imparted by his preceptor, Khawājah Bāqī-bi'llah who had discerned in the Shaiikh the potentialities that later helped him in bringing about profound changes in sufi thinking in general and the Muslim religious thought of the Subcontinent in particular.⁶¹ The Shaiikh had a vision of his station among Muslim saints which built up his confidence.⁶² He realized that he was not being exalted merely for his own sake but he was being entrusted with the colossal tasks of restoring the purity of doctrine which had been sullied by the views of heterodox sufis and rescuing Islam from the humiliation of political deprivation as the result of Akbar's misguided and vindictive policies.⁶³ The publication of this vision created grave misgivings in the minds of some sufis and others and invited the wrath of the monarch Jahāngīr. The Shaiikh had plausible explanations to offer which were accepted by those who had no cause for hostility. It is significant that

⁵⁹ Ibid, v. i, pp. 18, 19, Epistle 12, ibid, p. 108, Epistle 84, p. 40, Epistle 30, ibid, p. 131, Epistle 108.

⁶⁰ Ibid, v. i, pp. 4, 5, Epistle 3; ibid, p. 50, Epistle 36; ibid, p. 56, Epistle 42; ibid, p. 130, Epistle 107. Sobriety in this context is the condition when the mind is free from ecstasy.

⁶¹ Sarhindi, op. cit., has letters addressed to disciples and sufis in many countries; Mawlānā Wakīl Aḥmad Sikandarābādī *Al-kalām-u'l-munji*, (Delhi, 1315 A. H.) p. 4, has given a list of prominent disciples. They belong to practically the entire Muslim world.

⁶² Sarhindi, op. cit., v. i, pp. 14-18, Epistle 11.

⁶³ Ibid, v. ii, Epistle 6.

his enemies went to the extent of circulating a garbled text of a collection of his letters which created great mischief.⁶⁴ However, the misunderstandings were removed when the Shaiikh came out with the authentic text. But the Shaiikh never denied the contents of the letter relating to the vision in which he had been given an indication of his importance.⁶⁵ The Shaiikh had been granted a proximity to God in attaining which he had transcended the usual stations of even the Caliphs 'Umar and Abū Bakr Ṣiddīq. It was this claim that had created considerable misunderstanding, but the Shaiikh explained that his permanent status was not above them. He, as it were, in making his journey, had been shown their stations, or, as he put it while explaining the vision to Jahāngīr, "If you summon some inferior servant of yours near you to speak to him, momentarily he is nearer you than your greatest nobles, but that does not mean that he is greater than them or permanently occupies a station in closer proximity to you."⁶⁶ This seems to be a fair statement and does absolve the Shaiikh of the charge of making exaggerated and improper claims about his position.

It has been necessary to mention this vision and the explanation given by the Shaiikh because it played an important role in the Shaiikh's life. It was the ostensible reason for his incarceration. It was also the cause of a temporary misunderstanding in the mind of Shaiikh 'Abd-u'l-Ḥaqq; however, his misapprehension was soon removed.⁶⁷ But its greatest result was that the Shaiikh was able to undertake his mission with con-

⁶⁴ Mawlānā Wakīl Aḥmad Naqshbandī, *Hadiyyah-i-Mujaddidiyyah*, (Delhi, 1312 A. H.), p. 104.

⁶⁵ This is obvious from the fact that he defended his vision in what he said to Jahāngīr, *infra*.

⁶⁶ Saiyid Muḥammad Miyān, *op. cit.*, pp. 226, 227. The Shaiikh in another context says that smoke carries particles of matter with it upwards and after rising quite high, these particles return to their original level on the earth. During the time they ascend they may go higher than lighter substances, but their temporary ascent does not change their normal level, which is lower, Sarhindī, *op. cit.*, v. I, pp. 206-208, Epistle 208.

⁶⁷ Shaiikh 'Abd-u'l-Ḥaqq Muḥaddith Dehlawī in a letter to Khwājah Husām-u'd-dīn, *Khalifah* of Khwājah Bāqī-bi'llah expresses his deep devotion to the Mujaddid and thanks God, "the great Changer of hearts" for it; reproduced by the Editor in a supplement to Shaiikh 'Abd-u'l-Ḥaqq', *Akḥbār-u'l-akḥyār fī asrārī-l-abrār*, edited by Mawlawī 'Abd-u'l-Aḥad, (Delhi, A.H. 1309).

fidence in himself and assurance of his success. Indeed this vision was a culmination of the process that had started with his association with Khwājah Bāqī-bi'llah. It must be remembered that the latter himself had been sent at a critical time for this purpose.⁶⁸ There is nothing incredible in this even for those who are sceptical about the soundness and validity of mystic experience and insight. The leading sufis kept themselves well informed about the religious conditions in various areas and sent specially trained disciples to places where the specific situation demanded special effort. The conditions in the Subcontinent did invite such endeavour.

Shaikh Aḥmad had been deeply distressed at the political humiliation of Islam. He had also assessed the situation correctly when he came to the decision that the political malaise was the result of a general deterioration in the religious consciousness of the Muslims who were unable to distinguish between true Islam and its distortions. His discipleship of Khwājah Bāqī-bi'llah proved to be the turning point in his thinking. The Shaikh himself bears witness to the rapid progress that he made under Khwājah Bāqī-bi'llah.⁶⁹ Without the clarification of his ideas on important issues like monism and the validity of mystic vision, his mission would not have been a success and he would have been known to history as one of the many men of piety and feeling who put up effort to bring people to realize their religious responsibilities. The question of monism was of the utmost importance in the context of the situation. From an experience in the life of trained mystics it had passed into religious philosophy, poetry and, what was much worse, into popular religion. Irresponsible mystics had created grave misconceptions in the popular mind. It developed a false philosophy of necessity. If the individual's existence was a mere illusion, were his actions any better? Did he possess a will? For how can a person with no real substance possess a will? And if there was no will, where lay the responsibility for one's actions? How could a person without a will be a

⁶⁸ Khalīq Aḥmad Nizāmī, *op. cit.*, p. 138, Muḥammad Miyyān, *op. cit.*, pp. 6, 7, 8.

⁶⁹ Sarhindī, *op. cit.*, v. i, pp. 1-23, Epistles 1-17.

sinner at all?⁷⁰ If he could not be a sinner, could he cultivate, of his free will, any virtue? Such philosophy saps all energy and capacity for work. That is the reason why many sufis were merely quietists and escapists. And this surely was the complete anti-thesis of the dynamism of Islam.

The general acceptance of such ideas in itself was a sure path to decay and even irresponsibility, but the situation in the Subcontinent was even more depressing and complex. A by-product of monism among the Hindus was polytheism. God could be worshipped through many of His manifestations, of which there could be no end. Akbar's veneration of the Sun and fire was a crude application of monism. And the common ground between sufism and Vedanta was provided by monism. An attack upon monism was, therefore, an attack upon the infiltration of Hindu ideas into Islam. Therefore, it was bitterly resisted by those who were consciously working for the integration of Islam and Hinduism. From now onwards the supporters of monism gave it the misleading name of *tawḥīd*, which the Muslims use for strict and unadulterated monotheism.⁷¹ Monists called themselves *muwāḥḥids*, monotheists. Both the words were misused deliberately to create confusion. The Shaiḥ aptly pointed out that the Muslims were enjoined to believe that there is no god except Allah, not that nothing exists except

⁷⁰ Compare Ḥāfiẓ:

گناه گرچه نبود اختیار ماحا فظ تو در طریق ادب کوش و گو گناه من است
[Though sin was not within our competence, Ḥāfiẓ, (even then) you try to tread the path of reverence and say, "Sin is mine"]

⁷¹ *Tawḥīd*, literally means 'unity' and is universally used for monotheism. When used with *wujūd*, (*tawḥīd-i-wujūdī*) it can legitimately mean monism, but to use it without any qualification in the sense of monotheism is doing violence to its meaning. Dārā Shikūh in his preface to *Sirr-i-Akbar*, his translation of fifty-two *upanishads*, condemns those who did not believe in monism and worked against it in the following words: "The ignorant people of this age, who call themselves learned, indulge in polemics and want to persecute gnostics and *monotheists*, contradict the truth of *monotheism* which is apparent from the Holy Qur'ān and the true authentic traditions of the Prophet and thus constitute themselves highwaymen in the path of God", Bikramajit Hasrat, *Dara Shikoh, Life and Works*, (Santiniketan, 1935), pp. 261, 262. Italics are mine. The words are used for monists and monism. Monism is not based in the Qur'ān or the Prophet's traditions, of course monotheism is. Sarhindī, op. cit., v. i, pp. 340-351, Epistle 272 has a detailed discussion of this question and refutes the argument that monism is based in the Qur'ān or the *ḥadīth*.

Allah.⁷² If Islam was to retain its uniqueness in the Subcontinent, monism had to be demolished.

Similarly all mystic experience could not be held to be religiously valid. Surely no Muslim can believe that Ḥallāj was revealing the absolute verity when he called out in ecstasy, "I am the Truth", meaning thereby that he was God.⁷³ The criteria prescribed by the Shaiḥ were reasonable and convincing. He said that any experience in a state of ecstasy could not be held to be necessarily true. Only that experience was reliable which was vouchsafed in a condition of sobriety to an accomplished sufi.⁷⁴ In any case any notion imprinted upon the mind of even advanced sufis that militated against the Qur'ān and the *sunnah* must be dismissed as false. Thus no mystic had any authority to speak or act against the well accepted and orthodox beliefs of the Muslims.⁷⁵ The enunciation of this principle cleared the decks for the propagation of the call to discard heterodox notions and return to the well defined tenets of the orthodox faith. If these ideas had been enunciated by theologians and jurists, they would not have been accepted by a mysticism oriented people, but coming from one who had traversed the path of the sufis and excelled them in his attainments, they invited examination and reflection. But for this purpose, the Shaiḥ might not have considered worth his while to take the uninitiated into confidence regarding the realms of mystic experience that he had traversed.

Thus armed with the antidote to the prevailing laxity and erroneous beliefs and his own sense of mission the Shaiḥ started work in right earnest. He did not act like other sufis in the matter of accumulation of disciples for the purpose of their spiritual training. He repeatedly told his sons and others closely

⁷² Ibid, p. 133, Epistle 111.

⁷³ Ḥallāj seems to have uttered this in a state of ecstasy. Intellectually he was not an extreme monist because he believed that God and His manifestations were not one. For his views vide L. Massignon, *La Passion d'al-Hosayn-Ibn Mansour-al-Hallaj* (Paris, 1922). There is also a short but informative note in Felix M. Pareja, *Islamogica*, (Madrid 1922-54), Tomo ii, pp. 647, 648. The fact of his utterance "I am the Truth" is universally known and finds mention in Massignon, op. cit., v. i, p. xi.

⁷⁴ Sarhindī, op. cit., v. i, p. 5, Epistle 2.

⁷⁵ Ibid, also v. i, p. 108, Epistle 84.

associated with him that he had been entrusted with a different kind of a mission.⁷⁶ He spread his organization as widely as he could and appointed men in different areas and cities to further the cause of reform.⁷⁷ Indeed the organization became so strong that it attracted the attention of the royal court. It was represented to Jahāngīr that Shaikh Aḥmad was winning over the loyalties of large numbers of men. Jahāngīr summoned him to the court. He records in his *Tuzuk* that it was reported to him that "an impostor, bearing the name Shaikh Aḥmad, had spread the net of hypocrisy and deception, had brought into his influence many persons who worship the apparent and ignore the reality, had sent to every city and every region one of his disciples who knows window dressing and gnosis pandering better than others as his caliph and had compiled a book of the nonsense that he has written to his disciples and admirers which he has named *Maktūbāt*."⁷⁸ Then Jahāngīr gives the gist of the vision that has been mentioned above. Then he continues, "Hence I ordered that he should be produced in (my) justice dispensing court. He was not able to give convincing replies to my questions and even though he possesses neither wisdom nor knowledge, he proved to be extremely proud and self-centred. I felt that he should be imprisoned for some time so that he may be reformed and the excitement in his temperament and the confusion of his mind may settle down a little. For this reason he was handed over to Sangdilan for keeping him in custody in the fort of Gwaliyār."⁷⁹

This entry in Jahāngīr's *Tuzuk* has been quoted for its importance. In the first instance it bears testimony to Shaikh Aḥmad's success in organizing his work. By now, in 1619, less than fourteen years after Akbar's death, the movement had gathered sufficient momentum to attract the attention of the government. Even though Jahāngīr had come to the throne with the help of the orthodox nobles, the other party was sufficiently strong to prevent them from having everything their

⁷⁶ Ibid, v. ii, p. 17, Epistle 6.

⁷⁷ Nūr-u'd-dīn Muḥammad Jahāngīr, *Tuzuk*, (Aligarh, 1864) pp. 272, 273.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid, p. 273.

own way. The growth of a strong movement to bolster up orthodoxy posed a challenge to the position of its opponents that had to be met. There were many half-baked or heterodox sufis whose teachings were subversive of Islam, but no notice was taken of their views or activities. It was sought to curb Shaikh Ahmad's activities because they had political overtones and it must have been represented to Jahāngir as highly dangerous. A sound justification had to be sought for imprisoning Shaikh Ahmad and it was found in the contents of his vision which had been objected to by some others as well. Those who had only the purity of doctrine in view were satisfied with the Shaikh's explanation, but those who were seeking some excuse to malign him dismissed it as unsatisfactory. The opponents of orthodoxy must have pointed out to Jahāngir that the Shaikh could amass dangerous power and misconstrued his intentions. The Shaikh was loyal to the monarch. He must have realized, as the Muslim nobles had done earlier, that rebellion would serve no purpose nor toppling the throne would strengthen Islam. All his letters show that he was highly critical of Akbar but he considered Jahāngir to be well disposed towards Islam. He was of the opinion that the new reign opened up great possibilities of a change for the better and tried to persuade every noble who had influence to exert it in the restoration of Islam to its original position.⁸⁰ All that Jahāngir says about him is unjustified and the sole purpose must have been to escape opprobrium for imprisoning him.

What Jahāngir calls the Shaikh's pride was really a matter of faith for him; he would not prostrate himself before anyone except God. The different forces were so nicely balanced in the Empire that every step had to be taken with great care and the pro-Islam group was most anxious that the Shaikh should not incur the Emperor's serious displeasure. The Prince Shāh Jahān who was favourably inclined towards the Shaikh tried to persuade him to conform to the court etiquette and not endanger himself by behaving in a manner that might be interpreted as insolence.⁸¹ The Prince also reinforced his plea by sending the Shaikh some

⁸⁰ There are a large number of letters in Sarhindi, op. cit., addressed to various influential nobles and officers.

⁸¹ Wakīl Ahmad Naqshbandī, *Hadiyah-i-Mujaddidiyah*, op. cit., p. 100.

rulings of jurists who had permitted prostration in some circumstances. The Shaikh demurred and pointed out that he was not under coercion to a degree that would justify such action on his part.⁸² He went cheerfully to the prison and devoted himself not only to prayers and meditation but also to preaching. His work outside the prison prospered and his influence went on increasing. It spread in the army as well. The meekness with which the Shaikh submitted to the Emperor's orders and his behaviour and way of life in the Fort convinced Jahāngir that the Shaikh was a learned and pious man and was not plotting rebellion. Hence after an incarceration of a year he was summoned again and was released with full freedom to go anywhere.⁸³ He was given robes of honour and a thousand rupees for expenses. However, the records of the Mujaddidi *silsilah* give additional information. Even though the Shaikh had officially been given the liberty to leave the camp, yet he was not permitted to depart by the officials, perhaps under the Emperor's orders, who probably was persuaded that the Shaikh's actions should be watched a little longer.⁸⁴ This also proved a blessing in disguise. The Shaikh was able to meet the Emperor and discuss with him matters relating to the Faith. All Muslim monarchs found time to meet learned men of their realm and Jahāngir was no exception. And what better opportunity could the Shaikh desire to influence the minds of those who wielded power?

He had earlier adopted the method of writing to all nobles who were known for their Islamic sympathies, bringing to their notice matters which needed attention, telling them how Islam had been humiliated in the previous reign and exhorting them to redouble their efforts.⁸⁵ The nobles were sensitive to the situation, but they also knew their limitations because the other party was neither dead nor helpless. Jahāngir himself could not disregard its sentiments and had to work warily. From the very beginning he had to deal with political opposition. His

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Jahāngir, op. cit., p. 308.

⁸⁴ Ghulām Sarwar Quraishī Asadī-u'l-Hāshimī, *Khizmat-u'l-aşfiyā* (Lucknow, 1873), v. i, p. 613.

⁸⁵ E.g. Sarhindī, op. cit., v. i, pp. 64-66, Epistle 47.

own son, Prince Khusraw, had given him trouble and he had been quite a serious rival. And it is a well-known fact that his health declined and he finally lost grip on the government. Hence the nobles also could not force the issues to a violent crisis without injuring the polity and the centre of Muslim power. Nevertheless the Mujaddid's efforts began to bear fruit in the political sphere as well. Led by Shaikh Farid Murtaḍā Khān and counting men like 'Abd-u'r-Raḥīm Khān Khānān and Dārāb Khān in their ranks, the orthodox nobles had gathered considerable power.⁸⁶ The very fact that they had succeeded in putting Salim on the throne despite the opposition of Rājā Mān Singh and Mirzā 'Aziz Kokah and crushing Prince Khusraw's rebellion was a testimony to their strength,⁸⁷ but they were confronted with a delicate situation later, when Nūr Jahān gained control over the Emperor's mind to a degree that she was able to turn him against Shāh Jahān and force the prince into rebellion. The fact that Shaikh 'Abd-u'l-Ḥaqq, who had never written a word that could be misconstrued as unorthodox or done a deed that could be labelled as anti-Jahāngir, was summoned to the court at the instance of some foes of orthodoxy showed that they had by no means been vanquished.⁸⁸

However Shaikh Aḥmad's movement had spread into the soldiers so well that it was no longer possible to suppress it. Indeed he had achieved remarkable success before he died in 1626. His contribution to raising orthodoxy to a place of partnership in the Empire, even though he could not achieve the impossible and restore it to the position of undisputed authority that it had enjoyed before Akbar's vendetta against it, had a profound influence over the development of the political situation during the rest of the century. His influence upon sūfī thought was even more profound. Hitherto Sufism had nurtured trends leading to heterodoxy but as the result of his writings, it turned more and more in the direction of orthodoxy. His influence spread from Indonesia to Turkey and from there to

⁸⁶ Muḥammad Miẓān, op. cit., pp. 196-198.

Khawāfi Khān, *Muntakhab-u'l-lubāb*, Bib. Ind., (Calcutta, 1865).

many *silsilahs* of Africa. For this great work he was hailed as the Mujaddid-i-alf-i-thāni, the man who revived Islam in the second millennium.

His work was carried on by his sons and followers.⁸⁹ The Mujaddidi branch of the Naqshbandiyah *silsilah* became an efficient and effective organization. The most outstanding successor was his third son, Khwājah Muḥammad Ma'ṣūm. He was held in high esteem by Shāh Jāhān.⁹⁰ Prince Awrangzib came to see him at his house and after some time expressed the desire that the Khwājah might spend some time with him.⁹¹ The Khwājah declined, but sent his son Mawlānā Saif-u'd-dīn with him. Awrangzib was greatly helped by the Naqshbandi influence in the war of succession, and when he emerged victorious and ascended the throne as Muḥiyy-u'd-dīn 'Ālamgīr he proved to be the political culmination of the Mujaddidi movement.

⁸⁹ Muḥammad Miyān, op. cit., pp. 279 ff.

⁹⁰ Ibid, p. 309.

⁹¹ Ibid, pp. 326, 327.

CHAPTER V

New Foundations

'Ālamgir I died in 1707. His death was followed by a rapid decline of the Mughul Empire and with it of the political power of Islam in the Subcontinent. British and Hindu historians have generally tried to find the causes of the downfall of the Mughul Empire in the policies of 'Ālamgir and have seldom probed below the surface to discern the various trends which ultimately plunged the Subcontinent into anarchy and chaos and paved the way for the establishment of British rule.

The basic weakness of the Muslim Empire in India was that the Muslims formed a minority of the population. The significant fact about this Empire was that it lasted for more than five centuries, not that it ultimately declined and withered away. This is not an opportune occasion for discussing the causes of the success of the Muslims in conquering such a vast area inhabited by men who had themselves established and sustained empires and who were by no means unaware of the principles of statecraft and the methods of running fairly effective governments. The establishment of the Empire of Vijayanagar in the middle of

the fourteenth century and its ability not only to hold its own against its Muslim neighbours but also to build up an effective administration would demonstrate that the Hindus had not lost their aptitude for empire building. The advantage of superior numbers was undoubtedly on their side. They possessed several castes and groups who were good fighters and preferred to die rather than flee from the battle-field. They, however, proved no match to the Muslim armies which were better trained and organized. The Hindus were deficient in strategy and mobility. Besides their political organization was so decentralized that the Muslims were never confronted with the total strength of Hindudom. The Muslim arms were almost uniformly successful against the Hindus so long as the Muslims were not seriously divided amongst themselves and they were in political control of the Empire.

The situation, however, changed under Akbar. His policies paid initial dividends in the shape of the expansion of the Empire and security of the dynasty against usurpation of authority by powerful nobles or groups. He secured the cooperation of the Rajputs by matrimonial alliances. Rajput chieftains achieved the status of princes of the blood and were treated accordingly. They enjoyed positions of power and prestige and were given key assignments. They commanded armies, governed provinces and participated in the councils of the Empire. They became partners in sovereign authority to an extent that Raja Todar Mal was able to say with confidence, "The Empire belongs to us".¹ A large number of capable soldiers and administrators migrated from Iran and were appointed to high offices. Authority was no longer monolithic, in the hands of a single ethnic or religious group. The only bond of unity was provided by loyalty to the monarch, who was the source of all honour and preferment. A heterogeneous population was ruled by a heterogeneous group of men who were held together by the wisdom and vigour of the monarch. It was a terrible burden for any single man to carry. Only a man who knew little relaxation, who worked hard all the time, who was ever vigilant and who attended to every minute

¹ Abu'l-Faql, *A'in-i-Akbari*, English Translation by H. Blochmann, (Calcutta 1927), v. i, p. 376.

detail of the business of state could keep such a polity together. He had to be continuously circumspect to eliminate the slightest possibility of any disturbance of the delicate balance.

Akbar's persecution of orthodoxy also created fissures in the society. If he had sustained the privileges of the orthodox ulema and not tried to break their power, the reaction would not have been so sharp and different religious groups would have found some *modus vivendi*, but the feeling that the Emperor had allied himself with heterodoxy and non-Muslims created a strong sense of danger and deprivation. As the Muslims were extremely sensitive on questions of religion, Akbar's policies created resentment not only against the Emperor but also against all those who were responsible for turning his mind away from orthodoxy. The employment of non-Muslims and Shi'ahs had not created jealousy, because a growing empire was able to accommodate all men of ability. It did not matter if others also were the beneficiaries of the expansion of the Empire, but the realization that participation in political power resulted in undermining the position of orthodox Islam and efforts might be made to subvert the faith of the Muslims was a different matter.

In an effort to search out the causes of the decline of the power of orthodoxy, it was discovered that all blame could not be apportioned to the influence of other sects and religions. Indeed some beliefs and tendencies among the Sunnis themselves which ran counter to orthodoxy also came in for criticism and created divisions. In such a situation it was inevitable that the gulf not only between the different sects of Islam, specially the Shi'ahs and the Sunnis should get wider but also between the different schools of thought within Sunni Islam itself. The assaults upon the doctrine of *wahdat-u'l-wujūd* created misgivings and even resentment among the sufis who adhered to that doctrine. There was no effort to iron out these differences and it was only natural that the controversies rivetted the attention of the Muslims upon the differences in a manner that they were exaggerated beyond all proportions.

All these factors destroyed the unity of the Muslim community

and inhibited their capacity for concerted action. It was no longer a well-knit, united and disciplined ruling minority; it was now reduced to the position of one of the several communities in the Empire, harbouring deep antagonisms and fissures which destroyed even that sentiment of unity that could have been expected from a common adherence to Islam. A sizable sector found it politic to seek alliances with non-Muslims. The Saiyid Brothers brought the Marathas to Delhi, oblivious of the consequences, because they could not have been so blind as not to know that the Marathas entertained the ambition of ruling over the entire Subcontinent.² Safdar Jang allied himself with the Jats forgetting what they had done earlier to the Muslims of Biyana.³ These were the indications of the perverse thinking of some of the Muslim nobles blinded by their selfishness as well as sectarian indifference to the welfare of the Muslim community as a whole.

All these symptoms had come to the surface in the lifetime of 'Ālamgīr I. His Shi'ah nobles were not averse to secret dealings not only with the Shi'ah Sultanates of the Deccan but also with the Marathas. Dhu'lfiqār Khān, in particular, acted in the interests of the Marathas when he was sent to besiege Gingee.⁴ It was only 'Ālamgīr's hard work and tenacity which kept the Empire together while he lived. Despite the treachery that some of the nobles entertained towards him in their hearts, he was able to utilize them because of his immense patience and tact.

He has been accused of hastening the downfall of the Empire through his intolerance. It is true that he was a zealous Muslim,

² Husain 'Alī entered into an agreement with the Marathas in 1717 which was "as disgraceful to the Mogul throne, as it was fortunate for the (Mahratta State)"—John Clark Marshman, *Abridgement of the History of India* (Serampore, 1873), p. 97. In 1718 he entered Delhi accompanied with 10,000 Marathas, *Ibid.* Around 1724 Bāji Rao urged the Maratha chief Shāo "to strike the trunk of the withering tree; the branches must fall off of themselves. Now is our time to drive strangers from the land of the Hindus. By directing our efforts to Hindustan the Mahratta flag shall float, in your reign, from the Kistna to Attock", *Ibid.*, p. 100. As early as 1662, Shivājī's father Shāhji, who had prospered in the service of Muslim rulers congratulated Shivājī "on the progress he had made towards the establishment of a Hindoo power, and encouraged him to persevere in the course he had begun", *Ibid.*, p. 80. Shivājī's tutor advised him in 1646 "to prosecute his schemes of independence", *Ibid.*, p. 78. The Saiyid Brothers allied themselves with these very Marathas.

³ Shāh Wali-u'llah's letter to Aḥmad Shāh Abdālī, Khaliq Aḥmad Nizāmī, Shāh Wali-u'llah ke siyāsī Maktūbāt, (Aligarh 1950), p. 49.

⁴ Marshman, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

but that did not weaken the Mughul Empire. It had already been corroded by the unwise policies of those who had failed to understand the complexity which invariably surrounds the task of rulers who have to preside over the destinies of states ruled by religious or ethnic minorities. The conciliation of groups which cannot be expected to identify themselves completely with the rulers is a different matter from making them partners in sovereignty. And when this process involves the disruption and weakening of the ruling minority itself, such sharing of the substance of authority is an exercise in suicide. Whatever might have been his own feelings, 'Ālamgīr did not make any effort to eliminate any group from a share in power and authority. No official was treated unjustly; all public servants were secure in their appointments; promotions were made on merit. Even conversion to Islam did not result in undue preferment.⁵

It is true that he demolished a few unauthorized temples and reimposed *jizyah*. Shāh Jahān had also demolished some temples,⁶ but he has not been accused of intolerance or held responsible for the downfall of the Empire. The Muslim Empire in the Subcontinent had always insisted that new temples should not be constructed without permission. This injunction had seldom been followed. Only when a temple was constructed near a Muslim locality or so prominently that it caused provocation, was action taken by the Government. As the result of Akbar's policies, the non-Muslims had taken to insult Muslim sentiment blatantly. It has been narrated in a previous chapter how a Hindu of Mathra had not only started the construction of a temple, but had also forcibly removed the materials collected for building a mosque to utilize them in the erection of the temple

⁵ Najīb Ashraf Nadwī, *Muqaddamah-i-Ruqqa'āt-i-'Ālamgīr*, (Azamgarh, n.d.), pp. 240-250. When a noble who had rendered good service sought promotion on the basis of his religion, 'Ālamgīr said, "The affairs of the State are not decided on the basis of the religion (of the person affected) and the pursuit of religion should not result in discrimination (against others). If discrimination were the rule, it would have followed that all persons (following a different religion) and their families be annihilated. Wise men consider it improper to replace men of ability", Choudharī Nabī Ahmad Sandilawī, *Waqā'i-i-'Ālamgīr*, (Aligarh, 1930), p. 59. On another occasion he said, "we are not concerned with any one's religion, Jesus follows his religion and Moses follows his religion", Ibid, p. 104 f.n.

⁶ Vincent Smith, *Oxford History of India*, (Oxford, 1958), p. 380.

and when asked to return them to the Muslims had abused the Prophet.⁷ Acts of grave provocation by the Hindus had increased greatly and there are several references to them in the letters written by the Mujaddid-i-alf-i-thānī to the nobles of the realm in the reign of Jahāngīr.⁸ It seems that Shāh Jahān had to take action because of the pressure of Muslim opinion which was no longer so quiescent as it had become under Akbar. 'Ālamgīr received reports that some of the newly constructed temples were being used as centres of disruptive activities.⁹ The reimposition of *jizyah* was demanded by orthodox Muslim circles because it was held to be a part of Muslim law. Its incidence was light and there were so many exceptions that it never brought large sums of money to the exchequer.¹⁰ Yet it cannot be denied that these two measures must have caused irritation to the Hindus.

It should, however, be remembered that 'Ālamgīr had come to the throne as the result of a political movement initiated by the Mujaddid-i-alf-i-thānī for the restoration of orthodox Islam to its original position of authority in the realm. The opponents of orthodoxy had gained such power that despite the personal predilections of Jahāngīr and Shāh Jahān, they continued to hold the dominant position in the affairs of the state. They could not but watch the growth of the influence of the orthodox group with concern. Under Jahāngīr, Nūr Jahān still occupied a position of power and was capable of looking after their interests. Under Shāh Jahān, they could rely upon Dārā Shikūh, who promised to be another Akbar so far as his religious leanings were concerned. Therefore, they pooled their resources to support him, but he failed to secure the throne. They knew it quite well that they could not hope to utilize 'Ālamgīr to improve their position. 'Ālamgīr

⁷ Badā'ūnī, op. cit., v. iii, pp. 80-83.

⁸ Sarhindī, op. cit., e.g. v. i, pp. 64-66, Epistle 47.

⁹ 'Ālamgīr took steps to safeguard the interests of Hindu priests and forbade disrespect to old temples and those which were not unauthorized, Sandilawī, op. cit., pp. 134-137, which also reproduces the famous Benares Farmān.

¹⁰ I.H. Qureshi, *The Administration of the Mughul Empire*, (Karachi, 1966), p. 145, e.g. the province of Gujrat which had large non-Muslim commercial communities raised only five hundred thousand rupees. 'Alī Muḥammad Khān, *Mir'at-i-Aḥmadi*, (ed. Nawāb 'Alī) (Baroda, 1927-28, 1930), v. i, p. 298.

made an earnest effort to gain their sincere cooperation but he failed. Jaswant Singh, who had been treated with so much consideration by 'Ālamgīr, betrayed him at a most crucial moment.¹¹ Indeed the opponents continued to work against the Emperor all the time. His son, Akbar, was persuaded to rebel against him, once again at a critical juncture.¹² The writings of Ni'mat Khān 'Āli show what poison was stored in the hearts of men of his way of thinking for the Emperor.¹³ Apart from his own loyalty to orthodox Islam, the Emperor could not be expected to ignore the wishes of the people who were loyal to him and supported him. In any case neither of the measures created any widespread resentment or discontent. Indeed the Emperor continued to make grants for the upkeep of temples which had not been built in contravention of his authority or for causing provocation to the Muslims.¹ He also continued the grants of land and stipends to Hindu men of religion and learning. The Emperor did not add anything to the hostility of those opposed to him by any action of his which could have been avoided.¹⁵

Nor can his Deccan policy be held responsible for the decay of Muslim authority in the Subcontinent. He did try to conciliate Shivāji, but the Maratha chieftain was happier as a brigand and a guerilla. He was not the kind of man who could be tamed through office, a trend he had already betrayed by refusing to follow in the footsteps of his father who held such a high position in the Sultanate of Bijāpur.¹⁶ The Maratha power had increased so greatly that it had become a threat to the peace of the entire Subcontinent. That challenge had to be met, whatever the consequences. The Sultanates of the Deccan had been so

¹¹ His treachery at the Battle of Khajwah, is well known, Khawāfi Khān, *Muntakhab-u'l-iubāb*, v. ii, pp. 51-53. There was no ostensible reason for the treachery except hatred for 'Ālamgīr.

¹² Ibid, pp. 264-269.

¹³ There is a good note on him in Sandilawī, op. cit., p. 63, f.n. Also, ibid, text pp. 63-65. His book *Waqā'i* is a long essay in maligning and ridiculing 'Ālamgīr I, Ni'mat Khān 'Āli. *Waqā'i*, (Lucknow, 1259 A.H.).

¹⁴ Series of articles by Jnan Chand in *Journal of Pakistan Historical Society*, January 1958, April, 1958, July, 1958, October, 1958, January, 1959 and April, 1959.

¹⁵ He could not waive *jizyah* or act otherwise in contravention of the law of Islam; no other provocative action is on record.

¹⁶ Marshman. op, cit., p. 78.

weakened by the Marathas that they were fast sinking into a state of anarchy. They, because of this weakness, became almost the storehouse of Maratha resources who grabbed whatever they needed from their territories. Besides they were in alliance with the Marathas, because they perversely thought that after the threat from the Mughuls had been averted, the Marathas could be dealt with more easily. This was a gross underestimate of the potentialities of the Maratha activities. So far as 'Ālamgīr was concerned, he had no choice. The Marathas and the Sultanates constituted a single problem and could not be detached from each other. Those who suggest that the Sultanates could be persuaded to act against the Marathas or could become a bulwark against Maratha expansion ignore the realities of the situation.

The causes of the downfall of the Mughl Empire have to be sought elsewhere; 'Ālamgīr's policies were certainly not responsible for it. He was confronted with a grave and complex situation and there were no obvious or easy solutions. Through his invincible determination, hard work and assiduity, he shored up the falling edifice, as if it were, with his towering personality and not a brick fell so long as he was alive.

He was able to foresee that his sons were not capable of bearing such a burden. He, therefore, suggested the division of the Empire,¹⁷ because he thought that the forces of disintegration could not be kept at bay for long. Given smaller areas and less responsibilities, perhaps the smaller units could be saved from the impending disaster of anarchy. The solution was not ideal; nor could the danger of civil war be ruled out; but if accepted and implemented with sincerity, perhaps the disaster that overtook the Muslim community could have been staved off for a reasonably long period. In any case the people could possibly be saved from the horrors of anarchy that plagued the Subcontinent for almost two centuries. Even though this advice had obvious drawbacks in so far as it would divide the Empire into kingdoms and there was no guarantee that princes of royal blood would not fight among themselves, yet in view of the Mughl tradition of each prince staking his all, even his life, in a

¹⁷ Khawāfi Khān, op. cit., v. ii, pp. 584-586.

bid to secure the throne, as well as the character of some of the persons concerned, it was a counsel of perfection.

The man who emerged as the new Emperor, Bahādur Shāh, was temperamentally and by conviction, incapable of fighting for his father's ideals. He was a Shī'ah by persuasion and went so far as to order the recitation of the Shī'ah formula in the *khutbah* and was persuaded to withdraw the order after great agitation and several riots.¹⁸ And then he did not live long enough to be able to make his mark. No ruler of ability or possessing sufficient vigour to control the selfish and intriguing nobles followed. The lack of proper leadership left the Muslims confused and ineffective. They had no sense of purpose or direction left. Many of them did not even realize that they had some responsibility in the malaise that had developed. Lack of purpose and despair regarding the possibilities of retrieval plunged the community and its leaders into a vortex of inactivity, irresponsibility, pettiness and moral decay. It was a situation in which no effort to save the common heritage or rescue even little parts of it from total destruction seemed worth-while and the utmost individual achievement was considered to be able to grab some portion for oneself.

It was in such atmosphere that Shāh Wali-u'llah felt called upon to undertake his mission of averting further disaster. He was born in 1702 at Phulat in the modern district of Muzaffarnagar in Uttar Pradesh, not very far from Delhi.¹⁹ His original name was Qutb-u'd-din Ahmad. He calls himself Ahmad in his writings. The title, Wali-u'llah, was given to him by his father,

¹⁸ Ibid, pp. 661, 663, 664, 682.

¹⁹ Ghulam Husain Jalbani, *Shāh Wali-u'llah ki ta'lim*, (Hyderabad, Pakistan, 1963), p. 1, f.n. 2. Jalbani does not give his source. Most authors simply say that he was born at Delhi. Khaliq Ahmad Nizami, *Shāh Wali-u'llah ke siyasi maktubāt*, op. cit., has several letters addressed to Shaikh Muhammad 'Ashiq, the compiler of the original collection from which Nizami has selected letters of political significance and included in the work referred to here. Shaikh Muhammad 'Ashiq was Shāh Wali-u'llah's cousin, being the son of his maternal uncle, Shaikh 'Ubaid-u'llah (ibid, p. 36). Shāh Wali-u'llah's mother thus came from Phulat. Therefore, it is not unlikely that he was born there. However, there is a more positive statement in Muhammad Miyān, *'Ulamā' kā shāndār māḍi*, op. cit., v. iv, p. 271, which says that local tradition points out the room and the house where Shāh Wali-u'llah was born. His paternal ancestors had earlier settled down in Rohtak in Indian Panjab, Jalbani, op. cit., p. 1.

Shāh 'Abd-u'r-Raḥīm, who discerned signs of spiritual greatness in his son at an early stage in his life. Shāh 'Abd-u'r-Raḥīm was a scholar as well as a sufi.²⁰ The quality of his learning in Islamic jurisprudence was recognized by the learned compilers of *Fatāwī-u'l-Ālamkriyah* who associated him with their work. He established a college, the Madrasah-i-Raḥīmiyyah, and was its principal. He could have secured a post of profit and eminence in the government if he had so desired, but he preferred to be independent. He was also an accomplished sufi. His son, Wali-u'llah received his education from his father and graduated from the Madrasah-i-Raḥīmiyyah. He proved to be a precocious youth, being able to graduate from the College at the early age of fifteen. He started teaching in the same institution when only seventeen. He also received training as a sufi from his father. He taught in Madrasah-i-Raḥīmiyyah in the first instance for twelve years and then decided to proceed to Hejaz for further studies and pilgrimage.²¹ His father's approach to controversial problems was academic and he sought to minimize differences and to reconcile opposite points of view.²² In Medinah Shāh Wali-u'llah came under the influence of a reputed scholar Shāikh Abū Ṭāhir bin Ibrāhīm who also was catholic in his attitude towards differences in opinions regarding details of belief and interpretation.²³ This was a happy coincidence because Shāh Wali-u'llah's training both at Delhi and at Medinah made him a man of broad understanding and capable of academic detachment from partisan arguments and beliefs.

He returned to Delhi on 9 July 1732 after a sojourn of fourteen months in Hejaz.²⁴ The weakness of the Mughul Empire and the rapid decline in its authority had already caused deep

²⁰ *History of the Freedom Movement*, op. cit., v. i, p. 493.

²¹ Shāh Wali-u'llah, *Al-juz'-u'l-latif fi tarjumatī 'abd-i-d-da'if*, printed with Shāh Wali-u'llah, *Anfās-u'l-ārīfin* (Delhi, 1897)), gives the main events of his early life and education. The outstanding facts are also mentioned in Shāh Wali-u'llah, *Hujjat-u'llah-i'l-bālighah* (Karachi, 1302 A.H.), v. i, Introduction by Abū Muḥammad 'Abd-u'l-Haqq Haqqānī. Shāh Wali-u'llah, *Al-qawl-u'l-jamil fi bayānī sawa'-i-s-sabīl* (Lahore, 1950), pp. 111-120 gives a full description of the *silsilahs* into which he was initiated by his father.

²² *History of Freedom Movement*, op. cit., v. i, p. 493.

²³ Shāh Wali-u'llah, *Anfās-u'l-ārīfin*, op. cit., has a note on him, pp. 190-192.

²⁴ Shāh Wali-ullah, *Hujjat-u'llah-i'l-bālighah*, op. cit., v. i, p. ف.

distress to Shāh Wali-u'llah. Indeed the conditions were so bad that he had been advised by some of his well wishers not to return to the Subcontinent, but he was not a man to run away either from danger or responsibility. On the contrary he sought guidance from God through prayer and meditation to decide his future line of action. By training and aptitude he was a scholar and a sufi, therefore, his main work would necessarily lie in these two spheres. He was aware of the fact that some immediate effort was necessary in the political and military fields, but he also realized that the real causes of the helplessness and decay of the Muslims lay much deeper. He assigned to himself the immense task of the analysis of these causes and in the learned, encyclopaedic and masterly accomplishment of this self imposed duty lies his real greatness. Shāh Wali-u'llah, it must be explained, did not consider his mission self imposed. It is in the lives of men like the Mujaddid-i-Alf-i-thānī and Shāh Wali-u'llah that the most beneficent aspects of mystic training and accomplishment are revealed, because instead of breeding escapism, mysticism impelled such men to undertake the gigantic task of redeeming society from error and suicidal tendencies. Shāh Wali-u'llah has recorded several visions which obviously gave him the strength to undertake such a colossal task.²⁵

When Shāh Wali-u'llah arrived at Delhi, he took up the principalship of Madrasah-i-Raḥīmiyah, a post that he had filled after his father's death before leaving for Hejaz. However, he left most of the teaching in the hands of other professors and devoted himself mainly to research and writing.²⁶ Very soon he established his reputation as a scholar and as a sufi. Events, however, were moving too fast to permit him to ignore the political developments around him. Nādir Shāh's invasion took place in 1739. It resulted in the notorious massacre of the people of Delhi and the city was plunged into misery. When Nādir Shāh left for Iran, he left the Mughul Empire literally prostrate. The capital, Delhi, had been reduced to shambles and the little prestige that the central government had still managed to maintain

²⁵ Shāh Wali-u'llah, *Fuyūd-u'l-ḥaramain*, (Bombay, n.d.) visions, 6, 33, 44, etc.

²⁶ Shāh Wali-u'llah, *Hujjat-u'llah-i'l-bālighah*, op. cit., v. i, p. ۳۰.

in the popular mind was irretrievably gone, leaving only a legal myth in place of sovereign authority. The Treasury was empty; the riches of the Imperial Household had been ravaged and the Emperor was left with no resources, even if he had possessed the talent and the vigour to build up an army.²⁷ All sections of the population of Delhi had been made to hand over the accumulated savings of three centuries and a half to the invader.²⁸

Nādir Shāh's invasion delivered a blow to the Muslim Empire which in the circumstances of those days made recovery impossible and it became obvious to all observers that the throne of Delhi henceforth would confer an empty honour with no power and its occupant would no longer be able to stand on his own legs. Who would give the necessary support without exacting a price which would, instead of strengthening the monarch's authority, weaken it even further? All those who had grabbed authority in their own territories did pay lip service to the sovereignty of the Emperor, but, in fact, were like vultures hovering on the corpse of the Empire, trying to tear away as large a chunk from it as others would permit. Muḥammad Shāh's name is seldom mentioned without the sobriquet—*Rangilā* (gay), indicating that he was so immersed in seeking pleasure that he had little time for other pursuits. And it is true that his court was thronged with jesters, singers, dancers and other men and women who chased away the last hope of the restoration of some order in the affairs of the state, Nizām-u'l-mulk Āṣaf Jāh I.²⁹ Yet he was not devoid of some saving grace. A British author notes that he "retained his life and dignity until 1798"³⁰ which, in view of what had happened after Bahādur Shāh to the occupants of the throne of Delhi, was quite an achievement. He recognized the merit of Shāh Wali-u'llah's work and gave him a large building in Shāhjahanābad to house his college which had now grown into a big institution. He, together with his family, visited Shāh

²⁷ Ghulam Husain Tabāṭabā'i, *Siyar-u'l-mut'akhhirīn* (Lucknow, n.d. v. ii, p. 485.

²⁸ Vincent Smith, *Oxford History of India*, op. cit., p. 437.

²⁹ Shāh Nawāz Khān, op. cit., v. ii, p. 842. His final departure from Delhi took place in 1153 A.H. (1724 A.C.). Fuller details are available in *History of Freedom Movement*, op. cit., v. i, pp. 246-255. Also Tabāṭabā'i op. cit., v. ii, p. 486.

³⁰ Vincent Smith, *Oxford History of India*, op. cit., p. 437.

Wali-u'llah to seek his advice and blessings.³¹ All this, however, did not change the situation. Muḥammad Shāh somehow was able to survive all the intrigues of the court which never seem to have subsided. He died in 1748 and was succeeded by his son Aḥmad Shāh.

Hitherto Shāh Wali-u'llah had mostly concentrated upon his academic work, but the conditions deteriorated to an extent that he rightly thought that effective political and military action was necessary. He kept on his academic work but turned his attention to short term measures. The Marathas and the Jats had become so aggressive that Muslim life and property were no longer safe. He looked around himself and the only man of stature, Nizām-u'l-mulk Āṣaf Jāh I had died in 1748. Shāh Wali-u'llah had tried to persuade him to come to the rescue of the Muslims in the North to strengthen the Mughul authority but Āṣaf Jāh had declined.³² He was aware of the conditions at the court and knew the situation to be beyond any retrieval. He, therefore, had decided not to entangle himself in the affairs of the North.³³ Being disappointed in that quarter, Shāh-Wali-u'llah could discern only two men on the horizon who could be of some use. One of them was the Afghan ruler, Aḥmad Shāh Abdālī.³⁴ He was a brave soldier, a good general and a pious Muslim. He had gained considerable experience of warfare under Nādir Shāh and if he could be persuaded to involve himself in the affairs of the Subcontinent, he might prove instrumental in the restoration of Muslim authority. He had shown interest in Indian affairs, but it was limited to securing the frontiers of his own kingdom. Nādir Shāh had annexed Mughul territories upto the river Indus³⁵ and Aḥmad Shāh Abdālī looked upon himself as Nādir Shāh's successor in the areas under his control. Besides, the greater part of his kingdom had been part of the

³¹ Khaliq Aḥmad Nizāmī, *Shāh Wali-u'llah ke siyāsī maktūbāt*, op. cit., pp. 68-69.

³² Ibid, pp. 80, 81, 84.

³³ Nizām-u'l-mulk Āṣaf Jāh I left Delhi first in 1724. He was persuaded to come back in 1737 and finally left in disgust in 1740, Ṭabāṭabā'ī, op. cit., v. ii, p. 486; *History of Freedom Movement*, op. cit., v. i, pp. 252, 255.

³⁴ For Aḥmad Shāh Abdālī, see ibid, v. i, Chapter IX.

³⁵ Ṭabāṭabā'ī, op. cit., v. ii, p. 485.

Mughul Empire until 1739 and, even though the Mughul court was in no position to try to recover those areas on the pretext that Aḥmad Shāh Abdālī could not legitimately claim to be Nādir Shāh's successor, there was no knowing that some more vigorous usurper of authority acting in the name of the Mughul Empire might not challenge his possession. Besides the river Indus made a vulnerable frontier and had to be secured by further expansion. Therefore, he maintained his interest in the Mughul territories adjacent to his own all the time he lived.³⁶ When the Marathas occupied the Panjab in 1759, it seemed that the supreme authority in the Subcontinent would firmly pass into their hands.³⁷ No one could predict what they would do next.

The other man whom Shāh Walī-u'llah considered to be capable of furthering the cause was Najīb-u'd-dawlah.³⁸ He was born in a village near Peshawar and migrated to Aonla in the Doāb in 1743 and was employed by a noble 'Alī Muḥammad Khān. He showed considerable ability and gradually rose to a position where he was able in 1753 to help the Mughul Emperor Aḥmad Shāh in his struggle against Šafdar Jang. It was in this connection that Najīb Khān was given a manṣab of five thousand and the title of Najīb-u'd-dawlah. He was pious and zealous in the cause of Islam. Another reason why Shāh Walī-u'llah thought that he was likely to be more effective was that being himself a Rohilla, he was likely to win Aḥmad Shāh Abdālī's confidence. It was obvious that Aḥmad Shāh Abdālī would have to be ably supported by some one in India and Najīb-u'd-dawlah was the most suitable person.

A collection of Shāh Walī-u'llah's letters is extant in manuscript, out of which Khālīq Aḥmad Nizāmī has published letters of political importance.³⁹ Several of these are addressed to Najīb-u'd-dawlah which show how Shāh Walī-u'llah encouraged him to

³⁶ Khālīq Aḥmad Nizāmī, *Shāh Walī-u'llah ke siyāsī maktūbāt*, op. cit., p. 190 mentions that he kept up his interventions in the affairs of the neighbouring territories of the Subcontinent until 1769.

³⁷ Marshman, op. cit., pp. 134-135.

³⁸ For his biography, see Saiyid Nūr-u'd-dīn Husain Khān Fakhrī, *Tārikh-i-Najīb-u'd-dawlah*, (British Museum ms. Additional 24410).

³⁹ Khālīq Aḥmad Nizāmī, *Shāh Walī-u'llah ke siyāsī maktūbāt*, op. cit. pp. 24, 25.

fight against the Jats and the Marathas. There is a long letter addressed to 'a monarch' but the context makes it clear that the addressee is Aḥmad Shāh Abdālī. It traces in brief outline the history of the decay of Muslim authority in the Subcontinent and poignantly refers to the helplessness and misery in which the Muslim population found itself.⁴⁰ Aḥmad Shāh Abdālī was the only Muslim monarch in sufficient proximity to come to their rescue. Shāh Walī-u'llah analyses the situation in a manner to convince Abdālī that the task was not too difficult and the Marathas and the Jats were not as formidable as they looked outwardly. The Maratha armies were not homogeneous and the Jats were not too numerous. Besides both had dispossessed so many nobles of their holdings that they would rise to make common cause with their liberator. And then the Mughul provinces, if properly administered, were rich and a good prize awaited the conqueror only if he would undertake the venture. A strong case was made out in favour of a large scale invasion of the Subcontinent with the intention of its total conquest. The letters are not dated and it can only be guessed when they were written. The one which was obviously addressed to Aḥmad Shāh Abdālī was written in all probability when the Marathas were capturing or had already captured the Panjab. It, therefore, for reasons enumerated above, found a ready response. In fact the Muslim states and nobles also were alarmed and made similar requests to Aḥmad Shāh Abdālī.⁴¹ Encouraged by these, he marched on Panipat and the Marathas suffered a crushing defeat. This was one of the decisive battles of history and wiped off the chances of the establishment of a Maratha Empire in the entire Subcontinent.

This battle was fought in 1761 and Shāh Walī-u'llah died in 1762.⁴² He had the satisfaction of seeing the Maratha power broken in his lifetime, but the resurrection of Muslim dominance

⁴⁰ Ibid, pp. 51-53.

⁴¹ *Tabāṭabā'ī*, op. cit., v. iii, p. 909. Many Hindu rājās also requested him to oust the Marathas, Ibid.

⁴² There is some difference of opinion. The accepted date is 1176 A.H. There is a statement which puts his death a year and eight months earlier, *Manāẓir Aḥsan Gīlānī*, *Tadhkirah-i-Haḍrat Shāh Walī-u'llah*, (Karachi, 1965), pp. 266, 267. The difference in the date of his death does not materially affect the argument.

was a different matter. Aḥmad Shāh Abdālī shrank from the colossal task of building a Muslim Empire anew. The odds were too great. The next steps would not have taken him to Hindu states but to the areas still ruled by the Muslims. It was one thing to secure the cooperation of the Muslim potentates in a venture when their own future was at stake and quite another to ask them to surrender their territories for being pooled into a vigorous empire or to accept the hegemony of Aḥmad Shāh Abdālī. Without their cooperation Aḥmad Shāh Abdālī's own resources were too meagre to attempt large scale conquests. He himself headed a state which contained turbulent and unruly elements. For these reasons, the conquerors at Panipat unwittingly paved the way for the establishment of the British Empire in the Subcontinent. Therefore, Shāh Wali-u'llah's achievement in his short term plan soon became merely an interesting page in the long history of the Subcontinent and would have been forgotten but for his more lasting contributions in other fields. It is as a scholar and a thinker that he occupies a niche of immortality in the history of the Subcontinent as well as Islam.

Shāh Wali-u'llah pondered deeply on the situation that had developed after the death of 'Ālamgīr, and, as his works indicate, he reached the conclusion that the basic cause of the malaise was the breakdown of Muslim society. It was riddled with strife and differences of all kinds, and inhibited smooth working and cooperation. Shāh Wali-u'llah started with the conviction that morality—private and public—is the cement that binds individuals and groups to society and engenders the spirit of cooperation and common effort.⁴³ It has already been mentioned that the Muslim society was plagued with a grave breakdown of public morality and was plunged in a deep crisis of character. It is obvious that when society breaks down there is little left to which the individual can dedicate himself except personal interest and aggrandisement. Even group sense is weakened because if the forces working for the fragmentation of society are diverse, there is little left of common interest to encourage the formation of a group or, if one already exists, loyalty to it. When common effort is inhibited in a community, it becomes politically dead. We have seen how

⁴³ Shāh Wali-u'llah, *Hujjat-u'llah-i'l-bālighah*, op. cit., v. i, p. 84.

Muslim communities were the victims of Maratha, Jat and, later, Sikh depredations, but even their instinct of self-preservation did not arouse them to organizing defence. Shāh Walī-u'llah pathetically draws attention to their helplessness in his letter to Aḥmad Shāh Abdālī. It was futile to think of galvanising such a community for effective action without first instilling into it a desire for self-preservation through the revival of unity of thought and action. Muslim society, therefore, had to be cured of disunity and strife was to be rooted out in all its forms. Smaller Muslim communities in the early days of Muslim conquest had defended themselves with great success because they were better integrated.

With the immigration of large numbers of Shī'ahs from Iran because of the encouragement extended by the Mughuls, the biggest cause of strife had come to be sectarianism. The entire Muslim community had rived from top to bottom. The nobles grouped themselves into Tūrānī and Irānī parties, which were mere euphemisms for Sunni and Shī'ah and common soldiers and citizens also were violently affected. Indeed this division did not play an insignificant role in the destruction of Muslim solidarity and political power. Shāh Walī-u'llah knew that differences based in religious convictions could not be wiped off by simple appeals for unity. He made a great effort to enlighten the people regarding the nature of these differences. He expressed sentiments of reverence for 'Alī, the son-in-law of the Prophet and the fourth caliph according to the Sunnīs.⁴⁴ These sentiments are shared by the Sunnīs. Shāh Walī-u'llah has also recorded a vision of his in which he was commissioned by 'Alī's sons, Ḥasan and Ḥusain to work for the uplift of the Muslims.⁴⁵ He also expressed his great admiration for the twelve imāms of the Shī'ahs for their spiritual greatness.⁴⁶ This would establish his bonafides with the Shī'ahs as would his unequivocal and sturdy stand that the Shī'ahs were not outside

⁴⁴ Shāh Walī-u'llah, *Izālat-u'l-khifā 'an khilāfat-i'l-khulafā'*, Urdu translation by 'Abd-u'sh-Shakūr and Inshā'-a'llah, (Karachi, n.d.) v. ii, pp. 487, ff.

⁴⁵ Shāh Walī-u'llah, *Fuyūd-u'l-ḥaramain*, op. cit., visions 6, 33.

⁴⁶ Shāh Walī-u'llah, *A't-tafhimāt-u'l-Ilāhiyah* (Dabhel, 1936), v. i, p. 107.

the pale of Islam.⁴⁷

All this would have been one sided if he had not discussed the question in a comprehensive manner explaining why the Shi'ah misunderstandings about the first three Caliphs were not justified. The *Izālat-u'l-khifā 'an khilāfat-i'l-khulafā* is a well balanced piece of sober and solid research and has not been written in a spirit of contentiousness or as an exercise in polemics.⁴⁸ Shāh Walī-u'llah could not have expected that the Shi'ahs would accept all his facts or contentions, because the question is basic for the Shi'ah school of thought, but it must convince the most ardent Shi'ah that the Sunnī regard for the first three Caliphs was genuine and based on facts which they believed to be authentic. And what is more, the Sunnīs not only harboured no ill will against 'Ali, Ḥasan and Ḥusain and the rest of the twelve imams but had respect and reverence for them.⁴⁹ This should remove hatred and hostility and reduce the differences to the level of academic and doctrinal disagreement, as it was in the earlier days of Islam.

The Sunnīs were themselves not united. Differences on the minute details of interpretation were magnified into disputes. The major cause of this intolerance was that the people derived their knowledge of Islam from what they were told by the ulema, most of whom were trained in *fiqh* or jurisprudence and had the lawyers' enthusiasm for argument and hair splitting. Debate and controversy on minor issues was the order of the day. It tended to take the mind of the believers from the fundamentals and instead of uniting them created divisions in their ranks. Rigidity and intolerance had become the accepted concomitants of faith. These barriers had to be broken if the community was to recapture its unity. The best method to achieve this was to emphasise the fundamentals and to introduce the people once again to the main sources of Islamic doctrine and law. The Qur'an was a sealed book for all those who did not know Arabic and they

⁴⁷ Shāh Walī-u'llah, *Al-'aqīdat-u'l-ḥasanah* (Agra, 1304 A.H.), p.9.

⁴⁸ The approach is positive and objective. Even Shāh Walī-u'llah's opponents recognized its merit, Gilānī, op.cit., pp. 186, 187. Also Ibid, p.249.

⁴⁹ Shāh Walī-u'llah, *A't-tafhimāt-u'l-Ilāhiyah*, op. cit., v. i, p. 107. Shāh Walī-u'llah, *Fuyūd-u'l-ḥaramain*, op.cit., visions 6 and 33.

formed the overwhelming majority even in the educated classes, Shāh Wali-u'llah, therefore, decided to translate it into Persian which was the language of culture, education and administration.⁵⁰ Even though this was not the first translation of the Qur'ān into a different language, yet many people held Shāh Wali-u'llah's action to be subversive of what they had come to believe as the true interpretation, because the exegesis of the Qur'ān had been developed into such a science that they were horrified to think that amateurs would draw their own conclusions from the Holy Book. These, in their opinion, were bound to be erroneous and misleading. But they forgot that the Qur'ān had been revealed to be read, so that it should guide humanity on the right path and to deprive anyone from direct access to it was neither proper nor in the spirit of Islam. Errors in understanding the Book could be removed by men of superior learning and wisdom.

In addition he wrote a book relating to the broad principles to be observed in the interpretation of the Qur'ān.⁵¹ He was opposed to limiting the universality of the application of the injunctions of the Qur'ān by too much dependence upon finding out the occasion on which each one of them had been revealed because he held that no injunction was intended to apply only to a particular situation and other situations of strictly the same nature or category and therefore the teachings of the Qur'ān should be taken as absolute, applicable in all conditions and situations limited only by their own sense or the context of other injunctions.⁵² In any case he argued that the real nature of the occasion of each revelation was not easy to determine with precision and certainty. The Qur'ān refers at numerous places to events relating to the lives of the Prophets of Israel. These references are brief and have occurred merely to illustrate some point that the Qur'ān makes. The authentic traditions of the Prophet also give only a few details, hence exegetes have borrowed many stories from the traditions of the Jews which in

⁵⁰ The translation bears the title, *Fatḥ-u'r-Raḥmān fī tarjumat-i'l-Qur'ān*.

⁵¹ *Al-fawz-u'l-kabīr fī uṣūl-i' t-tafsīr*, Urdu translation by Muḥammad Salīm 'Abd-u'llah (Karachi, 1960).

⁵² *Ibid*, pp. 192, 193.

their turn are not authentic.⁵³ Shāh Wali-u'llah considered this unsound. He wrote a book which gives such details about the previous prophets as can be culled from the well established traditions of the Prophet.⁵⁴ All these exercises were made for those who had some knowledge of the literature on the exegesis of the Qur'ān and *ḥadīth*, and were intended to correct their errors. For the common man Shāh Wali-u'llah thought it sufficient that he should learn the Qur'ān and understand its meaning with the help of a good translation if he did not know sufficient Arabic.

Next to the Qur'ān come the traditions of the Prophet as the source of the teachings of Islam. Here Shāh Wali-u'llah was confronted with a more difficult problem, because the *ḥadīth* literature is too bulky for the average man to get fully acquainted with, and then many traditions ascribed to the Prophet are of doubtful authority. His main contribution in the practical field was the establishment of a school for the study of *ḥadīth*.⁵⁵ He selected Imām Mālik's *Muwaffā* as the most authentic of all collections of *ḥadīth* and took steps to popularize its study.⁵⁶ It was also selected by him because it contains most of the basic traditions and its study gives the student a good insight into the teachings of Islam.⁵⁷ He also categorized other books of *ḥadīth* in accordance with their authenticity and made it easier for students to utilize them with confidence.⁵⁸

He rightly hoped that if the Muslims cultivated a proper sense of proportion regarding the various sources of the teachings of Islam, they would not be so contentious about non-essentials; yet he had to devote some attention to the inculcation of a proper understanding of *fiqh*, because most of the differences arose in this field. He first of all explained the function and

⁵³ Jewish mythology uncritically introduced into Islamic literature is collectively known as '*Isrā'iliyāt*.'

⁵⁴ Shāh Wali-u'llah, *Tāwīl-u'l-aḥādīth fī rumūzi qaṣaṣ-i'l-anbiyā'*, (Hyderabad, Pakistan, 1966).

⁵⁵ Jalbānī, op. cit., p. 46.

⁵⁶ Shāh Wali-u'llah, *Al-musaffā min aḥādīth-i'l-Muwaffā* (Mecca 1351 A.H.).

⁵⁷ Jalbānī, op. cit., p. 48, 51, 52.

⁵⁸ Shāh Wali-u'llah, *Hujjat-u'llah-i'l-bālighah*, op. cit., v. i, pp. 308-316.

scope of *ijtihād* in the formulation of *fiqh*.⁵⁹ In the course of history the Sunnis had come to regard four schools as being equally authentic: of these the Ḥanafī school was well established in the Subcontinent, Central Asia, Turkey and other areas, the Shāfi'ī *fiqh* was popular in Arabia, Egypt, Malaysia and Indonesia, the Mālikīs were numerous in North-West Africa and the Ḥanbalīs also in certain parts of the Arab countries. The establishment of these schools and the crystallization of their separate interpretations was due to the fact that unlimited and continuous interpretation created difficulties for the people as well as governments. How were cases relating to civil property and rights to be decided if the doctors of law differed on the interpretation of the Qur'ān and the *ḥadīth*? It was, therefore, generally accepted that individuals, groups and governments should adhere to one of the recognized schools and further interpretation should be governed by the already established interpretations. This was the doctrine of *ijtihādu muqayyad* or restricted interpretation. The jurists and the judges, under this principle, could not go beyond the interpretation accepted by the doctors of their school. Even today this principle rules the jurists in the world of Islam with a few exceptions where some groups do not believe in *taqlīd* or binding themselves to the interpretation of any school.

It was conceded at an early stage that in case the ruling of a school did not apply fully or created difficulties, a ruling of another school could be borrowed and applied. Shāh Walī-u'llah accepted this position, but he enunciated the general position that the right of new interpretation could not be taken away and, therefore, in principle, *ijtihād* could never be restricted nor could it come to an end.⁶⁰ But every one was not qualified to undertake it, because it needed learning, wisdom and expertise.⁶¹ For

⁵⁹ Shāh Walī-u'llah, *Al-muṣaffā min aḥādīth-i'l-Muwatṭā*, published under the title of *Muṣaffā*, (Delhi, 1346 A.H.), p. 11. Shāh Walī-u'llah has also dealt with the question of *ijtihād* in *Iqd-u'l-jūd fī aḥkām-i'l-ijtihād wa'l-taqlīd*, (Delhi, 1310 A.H.), also in *Al-inṣāf fī bayāni sababi ikhtilāf*, Urdu translation by Ṣadr-u'd-dīn Iṣlāhī as *Ikhṭilāfī masā'il men i'tidāl kī rāh* (Lahore, n.d.). Also, Jalbānī, op. cit., p. 79.

⁶⁰ Shāh Walī-u'llah, *Hujjat-u'llah-i'l-bālighah*, op. cit., v. i, p. 365.

⁶¹ Gilānī, op. cit., p. 245; Shāh Walī-u'llah, *Fuyūd-u'l-ḥaramain*, op. cit., vision 46.

those who did not possess these qualifications, the best course was *taqlid*, that is, to follow the *ijtihād* of those who had these qualities in a high degree. And the most qualified of the *mujtahids*, were the four great imāms who had been recognized as such by all the great doctors of law.

Because of the influence of the learned men of Hejaz, he felt greatly attracted to the *Shāfi'i* school, but he continued to remain a *Ḥanafī*. He described himself as a *Ḥanafī* by profession and a *Shāfi'i* intellectually. This he seems to have done for two reasons. He wanted to demonstrate that he did not attach so much importance to the differences in orthodox interpretations as to find it necessary to give up conformity with the school in which he was brought up and adhere to a system which he found intellectually more satisfying. The reason why some persons having been brought up as *Ḥanafīs* find the *Shāfi'i* interpretation more satisfying is that the latter follows the *Qur'ān* and the *Sunnah* more closely, whereas the *Ḥanafī* interpretation relies more on analogy and reason taking a more extended view of human nature and needs. The *Shāfi'i* school being prevalent in Arabic speaking countries has produced a larger number of scholars who have sustained its arguments and created more voluminous literature. *Shāh Wali-u'llah's* main argument was that small differences in interpretation are not of such tremendous importance as to cause serious disputes or divide Muslim society into hostile factions.

Ijtihād receives validity through consensus—*ijmā'*, and if any one differed from it, he ran the risk of incurring opprobrium in the orthodox society. This was a natural outcome of rigidity in following certain details which a group might have considered to be final and based in consensus, whereas the fact was that if it were held to be valid by all the doctors, the differences would not have arisen. *Shāh Wali-u'llah* pointed out that the only corpus of *fiqh* on which real consensus could be said to exist was what had come to be established by the end of the reign of 'Umar, the second caliph. Therefore, he took pains to collect his decisions and included them in his *Izālat-u'l-khifā 'an khilāfat-i'l-khulafā'*.⁶²

⁶² This portion has also been published separately with copious notes, as *Shāh Wali-u'llah, Risālah dar maḍhab-i-Farūq-i-A'zam*, Urdu translation by Abū Yahyā Imām Khān Nawshahrawī as *Fiqh-i-'Umar* (Lahore, 1952).

This was done to remove the sanctity that had come to be attached to later decisions and rulings. In this manner he widened the scope of further *ijtihād* and minimized the importance of the differences of opinion in the field of details of *fiqh*.

Another controversy was regarding the nature and reality of monism. The sufis were divided whether *waḥdat-u'l-wujūd* was a reality or only a mystic sensation. It would be recalled that the Mujaddid-i-alf-i-thānī had declared in no uncertain terms that the monism experienced by the sufis was not real, that it was an experience which was transcended when the sufi rose higher in his mystic accomplishments until he realized the truth. He, therefore, called the experience *waḥdat-u' sh-shuhūd*, or monism in experience, not reality.⁶³ Shāh Walī-u'llah tried to reconcile the two views. Ibn-u'l-'Arabi, who was looked upon as a heretic by some theologians and acclaimed as *shaiḫ-u'l-kabīr* by the majority of sufis, was looked upon as a great advocate of the doctrine of *waḥdat-u'l-wujūd* and because many eminent sufis also had considered it to be the highest experience available to a sufi and therefore true, hence, it was defended with great ardour as absolute truth. Shāh Walī-u'llah held that the difference was not important and was a question of mere semantics.⁶⁴ He argued that Ibn-u'l-'Arabi's ideas regarding *waḥdat-u'l-wujūd* had certain aspects which in themselves were not different from the concept of *waḥdat-u' sh-shuhūd*.⁶⁵ What separated objects from one another was the possession of attributes according to Ibn-u'l-'Arabi.⁶⁶ This, according to Shāh Walī-u'llah, is not so basically different from the Mujaddid's idea that objects came into existence when some attribute of God cast a reflection in a corresponding point of non-existence. Shāh Walī-u'llah, however, conceded that the realization that *waḥdat-u'l-wujūd* was not a reality was higher than considering it a reality.⁶⁷ In this way

⁶³ *Vide supra* Chapter IV.

⁶⁴ Shāh Walī-u'llah, *Faiṣalatu waḥdat-u'l-wujūd wa' sh-shuhūd*, (Delhi, 1304 A.H.), p. 6.

⁶⁵ Shāh Walī-u'llah, *Maktūb-i-Madani*, Urdu translation by Muḥammad Hanif Nadwi, (Lahore, 1965), pp. 23, 24.

⁶⁶ *Ibid*, p. 23.

⁶⁷ Shāh Walī-u'llah, *Faiṣalatu waḥdat-u'l-wujūd wa' sh-shuhūd*, op. cit., p. 6. It is also implicit in Shāh Walī-u'llah, *Fuyūd-u'l-ḥaramain*, vision 1. A more clear statement is in *Maktūb-i-Madani*, op. cit., p. 6.

he supported the Mujaddid's contention that he had transcended the station of *waḥdat-u'l-wujūd* when he experienced that it was not real but only a condition in which the sufi finds himself. Shāh Walī-u'llah laid greater emphasis on the fact that mystic training should be put to its proper use, which is the purification of one's soul and seeking conformity to God's will through love for Him.⁶⁸

Philosophically also he explained monism in the light of all existing objects being one in terms of existence which is their common quality whether the existence be real and necessary or merely contingent.⁶⁹ It may be pointed out here that his philosophy basically is very similar to Platonic idealism and in a way bears resemblance to the ideas of the Medieval metaphysicians.⁷⁰ However, because the purpose is to explain the philosophic basis of sufi mysticism, he introduces at places knowledge gained through mystic experience as a postulate in his argument.⁷¹ These postulates, however, are of a nature that they do not create any serious difficulty for a philosopher trained in the tradition of Platonic idealism.

It was not enough to remove doctrinal differences among the Muslims. The main problem was that the Muslims had lost their bearings to an extent that they were plunged in a moral crisis of grave dimensions. They had to be reformed through the creation

⁶⁸ Ibid. Also, Shāh Walī-u'llah, *Alqāf-u'l-quds fī ma'rīfatī laṭā'if-i'n-nafs*, (Gujranwala, 1946), p. 108.

⁶⁹ Shāh Walī-u'llah, *Lamḥāt*, Urdu translation by Fir Muḥammad Ḥasan (Lahore, 1966), p. 3.

⁷⁰ Shāh Walī-u'llah refers to *Shakhṣ-i-akbar* which corresponds to Plato's soul and world soul of the Neo Platonists, *Lamḥāt*, op. cit., p. 17. *Maktūb-i-Madani*, op. cit., p. 18 refers to *ma'ānī* and *wujūd-i-khārij* which correspond to ideas and objects. *Fuyūḍ-u'l-ḥaramain*, op. cit., p. 112 refers to *fardu mutashakḥḥas fī'l-mithāl* and *fardu muntashar* which also echoes Plato's conception of idea and objects; *Alqāf-u'l-quds fī ma'rīfatī laṭā'if-i'n-nafs*, op. cit. p. 27 and *Ham'āt*, Urdu translation by Ghulām Sarwar, (Lahore, 1957), pp. 144-146 refer to *nafs-i-kulliyah* which also reminds one strongly of world soul.

⁷¹ Shāh Walī-u'llah discusses the question of monism again and again e.g., in *Lamḥāt*, op. cit., *Maktūb-i-Madani*, op. cit., *Fuyūḍ-u'l-ḥaramain*, op. cit., *Maktūb-u'l-ma'ārif*, (Saharanpur, 1887), *Ham'āt*, Urdu translation by Muḥammad Sarwar, op. cit., *Al-khair-u'l-kathir*, Urdu translation as *Khair-i-kathir* by 'Abd-u'r-Raḥīm (Bombay, n.d.) pp. 67-73. In all these books mystic postulates have been introduced.

of a deeper and more sincere loyalty to the teachings of Islam. Shāh Wali-u'llah, therefore, made out a convincing case in favour of the belief that God had not laid down injunctions in an arbitrary manner. He was not a tyrant seeking obedience for his own sake.⁷² Indeed He did not stand to gain anything by man's obedience. The precepts and injunctions of Islam were not only reasonable but calculated to serve the interests of those who followed them. He, therefore, took up every injunction, one by one, and explained what benefits it would confer upon him who carried it out. He, thus produced a rational explanation of all the duties that Islam imposes upon the believers.⁷³

However strife is not encouraged in a society by differences in religious doctrines alone, though these assumed grave proportions when despite its decay, religion held the most important place in the thinking of the people and their main orientation was religious. Hence Shāh Wali-u'llah wrote extensively on religious topics. But he was fully aware of social and economic factors that create fissures in human society and set one class against another. Therefore, he pointed out that the Muslim community had lost its sense of unity because the different groups were not performing their functions properly and were trying to misappropriate public funds on false pretences and drawing benefits without giving any thing in return to society.⁷⁴ The working and poorer classes—the real producers of wealth—were, therefore, mercilessly exploited and so impoverished that they toiled and toiled without being able to meet their primary needs.⁷⁵ The most obvious cause of this state of affairs was maladministration. Shāh Wali-u'llah wrote to the monarch suggesting measures to remedy the situation⁷⁶ but he was in no position to do anything even if he had the will because all the servants of the state were involved in the exploitation and no one was interested in putting the administration on a sound footing. He appealed to the nobles, the high officials of the State, to the soldiers, to craftsmen

⁷² Shāh Wali-u'llah, *Hujjat-u'llah-i'l-bālighah*, op. cit., v. i, p. 6.

⁷³ He takes smallest details and gives their justification in *ibid*, v. i, ii.

⁷⁴ *Ibid*, v. i, p. 92.

⁷⁵ *Ibid*.

⁷⁶ Khaliq Ahmad Nizāmi, *Shāh Wali-u'llah ke siyāsī makrūbāt*, op. cit pp. 41-44, Letter I.

and skilled workers and to the ulema and religious leaders to reform themselves and to realize their responsibilities, hoping that some of them might be moved to perform their duties, properly.⁷⁷ Mere appeals, Shāh Walī-u'llah knew only too well, could not work in a corrupt society and if odd individuals were persuaded, they would find it difficult to work conscientiously in a perverted atmosphere. He, therefore, undertook to analyse the sociological and economic bases of society which he did with his characteristic insight.⁷⁸ There are several stages of social development. The individual finds it impossible to furnish himself with the basic needs of life without the cooperation of others. As society grows larger human needs multiply and man seeks the formation of larger groups.⁷⁹ Even the formation of a small state does not fulfil his needs fully because it is an easy prey to aggression by larger states and therefore large and powerful states emerge.⁸⁰ Though he does not say so explicitly yet Shāh Walī-u'llah's analysis and arguments all work in favour of internationalism and a world government.⁸¹

When societies attain a state of complexity, they necessarily develop a delicate equilibrium which it is necessary to maintain in the interest of the health of the society.⁸² This equilibrium (*tawāzun*) can be maintained only through justice (*‘adl*).⁸³ Thus it would be seen that the two basic urges which create society are economic and political. The first is based in the necessity of the production of commodities required for an easier sustenance of life and the second emerges because economic activity is impossible without security. Both demand a continuous adjustment between the rights of individuals among themselves and the rights of individuals *vis a vis* the health of the society. The maintenance of a proper balance in these spheres is the *sine qua non* of

⁷⁷ The appeals are in Shāh Walī-u'llah, *A't-tafhīmāt-u'l-Ilāhiyah*, op. cit., v. i, pp. 213 ff.

⁷⁸ In his voluminous work, *Hujjat-u' l-lahī'l-bālighah*, op.cit.

⁷⁹ Ibid, v. i, pp. 82-100.

⁸⁰ Ibid, p. 96.

⁸¹ *Jalbānī*, op. cit., p. 254.

⁸² Shāh Walī-u'llah, *Hujjat-u'llah-i'l-bālighah*, op. cit., v. i, pp. 82,87,90, 91, 99.

⁸³ Ibid, pp. 82,83.

equilibrium in a society. This would show that whereas the motive force behind social organization is economic, its health can be guaranteed only through justice, which is essentially a moral concept. The binding force of society, therefore, is moral.⁸⁴ The maintenance of justice is a complex matter and practically all aspects of social and personal morality get involved. It is for this reason that Shāh Walī-u'llah considers moral reformation necessary for curing the ills of a diseased society.⁸⁵ Being a Muslim, he could consider no morality higher than the morality of Islam and none could be more efficacious in restoring a Muslim society to its original vigour and efficiency. Morality is bolstered with emotion when it has a religious base and religion itself, in Shāh Walī-u'llah's view, needed the backing of mystic fervour to change it from a set of beliefs and a moral code into a pleasure and a joy. Therefore he has written so extensively on religious and mystic topics and exhorted the religious leaders submerged in dry legalistic forms and rites to delve into the riches of spiritual achievement and fervour.⁸⁶

Though he looked upon morality based in religion necessary for the health of society, he also knew that man's first need is the satisfaction of his hunger. In his primary needs he is not different from animals and if he is deprived of the means of fulfilling them, all his attention is turned towards them and he sinks to the level of a beast.⁸⁷ Therefore, if a society has to have a moral basis and a spiritual orientation, its members should be saved from economic distress.

Shāh Walī-u'llah did not want the Muslims of the Subcontinent to permit their cultural affiliations with the rest of their co-religionists in the world get diluted. He was very particular that even in seemingly small matters of dress, behaviour, style of living

⁸⁴ Ibid, pp. 81,84.

⁸⁵ Shāh Walī-u'llah, *A't-tafhimāt-u'l-Ilāhiyah*, op. cit., v. i, pp. 213,ff.

⁸⁶ According to Shāh Walī-u'llah the end of all religion is *ihāsān* or spiritual greatness, Shāh Walī-u'llah, *Fayūḍ-u'l-ḥaramain*, op. cit., p. 23. He also wrote extensively on sufism as would be apparent from the works cited above. There are a few books which have not been cited.

⁸⁷ Jalbānī, ip. cit., p. 255; Shāh Walī-u'llah, *Hujjat-u'llah-i'l-bālighah*, Urdu translation by 'Abd-u'r-Raḥīm (Lahore, 1953), v.i,p.106 (Karachi edition omits several topics).

and speech they should not identify themselves with the rest of the population of their habitat.⁸⁸ The reason was that a man of his keen insight must have seen the dangers inherent in the Muslims giving up any part of their culture and getting identified with the local population that would ultimately result in their absorption into the local milieu.

Shāh Walī-u'llah was a man of encyclopaedic learning. He was not one of those scholars who keep different branches of human knowledge in different chambers of their mind. Nor, for that matter, was his learning mere pedantry. He was opposed to men of academic eminence shutting themselves up in the ivory towers of their colleges and seminaries.⁸⁹ Knowledge must be put to use in the service of the community. He has left behind numerous works of solid worth, but they all gain greater stature because of his burning desire to save his people from impending disaster. All that he wrote drew validity from his emotional and practical involvement in the affairs of the Muslim community and his burning desire to save it from destruction. The world has not produced many scholars like him. During his lifetime his greatness was recognized by his contemporaries and his claim that he was the *mujaddid* of his century was not challenged by any one.⁹⁰ He did not succeed on all the fronts. There were too many forces at work against Muslim political power in the Subcontinent. The defeat of the Marathas at Panipat in 1761 did not open a new chapter of the renaissance of Muslim power in the history of the Subcontinent, nor was the voice of discord among the sects and sub-sects of Islam in India silenced. But he did succeed remarkably in kindling a flame that lighted the way of many who came after him and worked for the preservation of the religious beliefs and the ideological entity of the Muslim community. And this success was more lasting than any castles that could have been built with the shifting and loose sands of politics.

⁸⁸ Shāh Walī-u'llah, *Waṣīyat-nāmah*, (Lucknow, 1290 A.H.) p. 7. Also Shāh Walī-u'llah, *Al-balāgh-u'l-mubīn*, (Lahore, 1897), p. 1.

⁸⁹ Shāh Walī-u'llah, *A't-tafhīmāt-u'l-Ilāhīyah*, op. cit., appeal to ulema.

⁹⁰ Shāh Walī-u'llah, *Fuyūḍ-u'l-ḥaramain*, vision 44.

CHAPTER VI

Mountains of Wasted Effort

It has already been mentioned that the Battle of Panipat did not produce the results that Shāh Wali-u'llah had expected. The main reason was that the Muslim potentates were willing to join hands against the Marathas but not for the sake of building anew the edifice of the Muslim Empire. Even though the Battle of Plassey had been fought in 1757 and lost, the Muslim rulers seemed to be oblivious of the danger posed by the East India Company. Sunk in the cesspool of narrow selfishness, they were incapable of taking a broad and enlightened view even of their interests; naturally any considerations of saving Muslim political power from complete destruction could not even cross their minds. The situation, therefore, deteriorated rapidly. This would be clear from a brief resume of the main events.

In 1754, seven years before the Battle of Panipat, Ghāzi-u'd-dīn deposed Aḥmad Shāh and put a son of Jahāndār Shāh on the throne of Delhi with the title of 'Ālamgīr II. In 1757 Intizām-u'd-dawlah seized the person of 'Ālamgīr II and tried to capture his son 'Alī Gawhar who escaped and, after visting Farrukhabad

and Saharanpur, joined Shujā'-u'd-dawlah at Lucknow in January 1758 and was advised to recover Bengal. Intizām-u'd-dawlah killed 'Ālamgīr II in November 1760 and raised Shāh Jahān III to the powerless throne. When Intizām-u'd-dawlah realized that he was likely to be punished for his crime by Aḥmad Shāh Abdālī, he took shelter with the Jāts. After the spectacular victory at Panipat in 1761 Aḥmad Shāh Abdālī went to Delhi and put Mughul affairs in some kind of order. Prince 'Alī Gawhar was proclaimed Emperor as Shāh 'Ālam II *in absentia* because he was still away in the East. His eldest son Jawān Bakht was made regent and Najīb-u'd-dawlah was appointed *amīr-u'l-umārā*.¹ His time was spent mainly in dealing with the Sikhs and the Jāts. He justified the expectation that he would rule efficiently and look after the welfare of the population over which he was able to exercise control. The maintenance of the *status quo* was difficult enough; any expansion of Mughul authority was impossible. He died in 1770, leaving a gap that could not be filled.² In the meanwhile, the British were rapidly gaining ground in Bengal.

Prince 'Alī Gawhar laid siege to Patna in 1759, but he was not able to take it and retired to Oudh. In 1760, he made another attempt, now with added prestige because he had proclaimed himself emperor after the assassination of his father by Ghāzī-u'd-dīn Khān. The Mughul troops were defeated, but Shāh 'Ālam did not lose hope and marched on Murshidabad. Receiving no help from the Marathas, who had promised support, he returned and laid siege to Patna once again. This time it seemed that he would succeed, but the arrival of a British force from Murshidabad reversed the position and Patna remained with the East India Company. In 1760 Mīr Ja'far was deposed by the British and Mīr Qāsim was installed in his stead. The new Nawab was made of a different stuff and wanted to assert his authority. This was not palatable to the British and the conflict resulted in war. Mīr Qāsim was defeated and fled to Oudh. Mīr Ja'far was again raised to the *masnad*. Next year in 1764, Shāh 'Ālam, Shujā'-u'd-dawlah and Mīr Qāsim led an incursion

¹ For details, vide *History of Freedom Movement*, v. i, Chapter IV.

² Vincent Smith, *Oxford History of India*, op. cit., p. 486.

into Oudh and were defeated at Baksar. This battle was disastrous for the Muslims in all its consequences. The Nawāb-wazīr of Oudh was a fugitive in Bareilly; Shāh 'Ālam was in the hands of the British and the entire Gangetic plain was virtually at the feet of the East India Company, which itself was not prepared to undertake the governance of these extensive territories.³ Mir Ja'far had been under pressure for payment of large sums of money to the Company and its servants which he could not afford to pay. "These harassing importunities", says Marshman, "combined with age and disease, served to hasten his end, and on his return to Murshidabad he expired in January 1765".⁴

Clive acted with circumspection. He restored Oudh to Shujā'-u'd-dawlah with the exception of Kora and Allahabad, which he kept for Shāh 'Ālam, because "to extend our territories beyond Curumnasa would be a scheme so extravagantly ambitious that no government in its senses would dream of it".⁵ Shāh 'Ālam was given Kora and Allahabad and "a tribute" of twenty-five lacs of rupees, in return for which he conferred the *dtwānt* of the provinces of Bihar, Orissa and Bengal on the Company. This happened on 12 August, 1765, most certainly as a British historian remarks, "a memorable day in the political and constitutional history of British India".⁶ The transaction took less time than the sale of a jackass, as pointed out by the author of the *Siyar-u'l-mut-ākhkhirtn*.⁷ Mir Ja'far's successor was deprived of his troops and was virtually reduced to the status of a pensioner.⁸ The gross misrule of the East India Company and the merciless exploitation of the people left them so exhausted that the famine of 1770, aggravated by maladministration, swept away a third of the population.⁹ The British authority, however, was so firmly established that nothing could shake it.

³ Marshman, op. cit., pp. 159-161.

⁴ Ibid, p. 159.

⁵ Ibid, p. 162, Curumnasa, the Karamnāsā river.

⁶ Ibid, p. 161.

⁷ Tabatabā'i, op. cit., v. ii, p. 774. He remarks, "Such momentous matters were decided without an objection—with such ease and so smoothly that even the sale of a donkey used as a beast of burden or a transport animal is not finalized so quickly or without an argument".

⁸ Marshman, op. cit., p. 161.

⁹ Ibid, p. 164.

Shāh 'Ālam was not without talent. He was well educated and a good conversationalist.¹⁰ He did not shirk fighting. He was not happy living as a pensioner and seemed to be waiting for an opportunity to go back to Delhi. It was a gamble to leave the comfort of Allahabad for the uncertainties of the Red Fort, but it is a tribute to his spirit and sense of dignity that he chose the latter. After Najīb-u'd-dawlah's death there was an authority gap at the court. Shāh 'Ālam negotiated with the Marathas and was escorted by them. He entered Delhi in 1772 and the city rejoiced in the hope that the Emperor's presence would result in some amelioration of the situation, but this expectation was not fulfilled. Shāh 'Ālam brought with him an Irānī adventurer, Najaf Khān, who did not lack ability. He adroitly saved the Emperor from the tutelage of the Marathas which had seemed to be inevitable because it was through their help that Shāh 'Ālam had been able to return. "The Sikhs were repulsed, the Jats suppressed, Agra recovered and the Marathas held at arm's length. At his death he controlled a broad band of territory stretching from the Sutlej to the Chambal and from Jaipur to the Ganges".¹¹ For ten years, until his death in 1782, Najaf Khān ruled Delhi with a firm hand. It is somewhat puzzling why Shāh 'Ālam II was not able to wield his sceptre himself. Since Muḥammad Shāh's death in particular, the monarchs had become helpless puppets in the hands of powerful nobles, but Shāh 'Ālam II was in a different position because he had not been raised to the throne by Najaf Khān, nor was the Khān so powerful from the beginning.

Najaf Khān's great failing was his sectarian bias amounting to grave intolerance.¹² It was a two pronged policy of rewarding

¹⁰ Vincent Smith, *Oxford History of India*, op. cit., p. 486.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Epitomized in the couplet :

جهان را جهاندار دارد خراب
زدست نجف خان و اقراسیاب

"The ruler keeps the people in distress through Najaf Khān and Afrāsyāb". Afrāsyāb was Najaf Khān's protege and had been brought up by him. The famous sufi and scholar Mirzā Mazhar Jānjānān writes, "The people of this city, from the monarch down to the (humblest) beggar, have been in distress ever since Najaf Khān has come to power"—Abu'l-Khair Muḥammad bin Ahmad Murādābādī, *Kalimāt-i-taiyibāt*, (being the table talk and letters of Mirzā Muḥammad Mazhar Jānjānān), (Delhi, 1309 A.H.), p.45.

conversions from Sunnism to Shi'ism by promotions, appointments and assignments of land and depriving those who persisted in Sunnī belief of their offices and even property. The House of Oudh had successfully followed a similar policy.¹³ Najaf Khān must have felt encouraged because the intolerance practised in Oudh had brought no retribution. Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Aziz, whose activities will be discussed presently, incurred Najaf Khān's displeasure and his property was confiscated.¹⁴ A contemporary scholar and sufi, whose memory is cherished even today, Mirzā Maẓhar Jānjānān was assassinated by a Shi'ah fanatic and even though Shāh 'Ālam personally requested Najaf Khān to punish the culprit, he did nothing,¹⁵ despite the assassin being known.¹⁶ Najaf Khān died in 1782 and the Sunnīs heaved a sigh of relief. But his successor, Afrāsyāb was no better.

He invited Sindia to help him against another noble Muḥammad Beg. However Afrāsyāb was assassinated and Sindia was appointed *nā'ib wakīl* in 1784 to exercise supreme authority on behalf of the head of the Maratha Confederacy, the Peshwa, who was given the office of absentee *wakīl-i-muṭlaq*, or the vicerent of the Empire. Sindia was assigned the Doab, the area between the Ganges and the Jamna. He demanded the arrears of imperial tribute from the Rajputs, a major part of which was paid, but because he demanded a total clearance which the Rajputs found difficult, they decided to resist. The battle took place at Lālsont near Jaipur where Sindia was defeated. Muḥammad Beg had deserted to the Rajputs and was slain in battle and his place was taken by his nephew Ismā'il Beg. He laid siege to Agra on behalf of the Rajputs and was joined by Ghulām Qādir Rohilla, grandson of Najīb-u'd-dawlah. Sindia advanced to raise the siege and was defeated again. However, Ghulām Qādir had to go to his *jāgīr* to repel a sikh incursion and Ismā'il was defeated

¹³ Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Aziz, *Faḍā'il-i-ṣaḥābah wa ahl-i-bait*, (Lahore, 1967), Introduction by Muḥammad Ayyūb Qādī, pp. 22-41.

¹⁴ Ibid, pp. 54-57.

¹⁵ Ibid, pp. 50-53; Also 'Abd-u'l-Qādir Khān, *Waḳā'i-i-'Abd-u'l-Qādir Khānī*, translated into Urdu as *'Ilm-wa-'amal* by Mu'in-u'd-dīn Afḍalgarhī, (Karachi, 1960), v. i, pp. 228-229. For a short note on Mirzā Maẓhar Jānjānān, Ibid, f.n.

¹⁶ His name was Fawlad Khān, Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Aziz, *Faḍā'il-i-ṣaḥābah wa ahl-i-bait*, op. cit., p. 51.

by Sindia. Ismā'il escaped, joined hands with Ghulām Qādir and the two siezed Delhi. Ghulām Qādir indulged in grave excesses and, frustrated at finding the treasury empty, he blinded Shāh 'Ālam II and maltreated the royal family. Ismā'il Beg turned away from these horrors and joined Sindia, who marched on Delhi and took possession of the city in 1788. Ghulām Qādir, who fled, was captured, blinded and executed.¹⁷ Sindia treated the Emperor with courtesy but kept him impecunious so that the court was reduced to pitiable shabbiness.

Mahādājī Sindia died in 1794. On his death Marātha dissensions paved the way for British intervention. We are concerned only with the declaration of war by the British against Dawlat Rao Sindia in 1802. General Lake took Aligarh and marched on Delhi which fell after a well contested battle between Lake and Sindia's French force.¹⁸ On 15 September 1803. "General Lake was ushered into the royal presence, and found the unfortunate and venerable emperor, oppressed by the accumulated calamities of old age and degraded authority, extreme poverty and loss of sight, seated under a small tattered canopy, the remnant of his royal state, with every external appearance of the misery of his condition".¹⁹ Lord Wellesley settled a pension, but wanted the Emperor to move to Monghyr, but this was firmly refused by him.²⁰ To complete the story of the Mughuls, Shāh 'Ālam II died in 1806 and was succeeded by Akbar II, who, on his death in 1837, was followed by Bahādur Shāh II. The war of 1857 resulted in his humiliation, trial and exile to Rangoon. In any case it had been ordained by the British even earlier that on his death, the royal family would vacate the Red Fort.

It is necessary at this stage to complete the historical frame work by making a brief reference to the development of the Sikh power. It does not fall within the purview of this work to trace the history of the transformation of a purely religious group into a militant community of warriors. The sect had a large number

¹⁷ Marshman, op. cit., pp. 229-230.

¹⁸ Ibid, pp. 267, 268.

¹⁹ Lord Wellesley's proclamation, quoted by Marshman, op. cit., p. 268.

²⁰ Ibid.

of Jat adherents whose pugnacious tendencies could not but seek some outlet. Gurū Nānak was trained as a mystic by a Muslim sufi and his views approximated more closely to Islam.²¹ The first four gurūs (teachers) lived like other sufis or Bhaktas, but the fifth, Arjun acquired affluence and started dabbling in politics. He assisted Khusraw in his rebellion against Jahāngir and incurred the Emperor's grave displeasure. He was arrested and executed in 1606. A number of Muslim nobles and others shared the same fate. The sixth gurū Hargovind decided, at the time of his installation, to take up arms and build up political power. He refused to don the traditional turban and rosary and said, "My rosary shall be my sword belt and my turban shall be adorned with a royal aigrette". This began to transform the Sikhs into a brotherhood of fierce warriors.²² They adopted predatory habits and began to harass the population. Reports reached 'Ālamgir I who ordered stern action and the ninth gurū Tegh Bahādur was captured and executed for rebellion and robbery in 1675.²³ The next gurū Govind Singh moulded the entire brotherhood into an army by ordering them to carry arms. "After a life of war and banditry" he took service under Bahādur Shāh I and was killed by an Afghan in the Deccan in 1708. He was the last gurū.²⁴ Bandā who was an impostor and claimed to be Gurū Govind Singh perpetrated a reign of terror.²⁵ He was defeated by Bahādur Shāh I, though he escaped. Under Farrukhsiyar he was captured and executed with many of his bandits in 1716.²⁶

The Sikh power was scotched but not totally destroyed. The leaderless warriors were left in the hills licking their wounds. Nādir Shāh's invasion weakened Mughul authority and the Sikhs began to stir. After the Battle of Panipat in 1761, they started

²¹ I.H. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Sub-continent* (Hague, 1962), pp. 118, 119.

²² Vincent Smith, *Oxford History of India*, op. cit., p. 431. The Hindi word *mālā* is used both for a necklace and a rosary. Sadhus and fakirs traditionally wear rosaries, not necklaces.

²³ *Tabātabā'ī*, op. cit., v ii p. 401. The name Tegh Bahādur (Brave Sword) is significant. Ibid, pp. 400-403 gives a good history of the rise of the sect.

²⁴ Vincent Smith, *Oxford History of India*, op. cit, p. 432.

²⁵ E.g. Sarnind "was given up to the pillage, the mosques were defiled, the houses burnt, and the Muhammadans slaughtered; even their women and children were not spared." Ibid, quoting Irvine.

²⁶ *Tabātabā'ī*, op. cit., v. ii, pp. 402, 403.

giving trouble to Najib-u'd-dawlah and gradually resumed their incursions for pillaging defenceless villages and townships. The horrors inflicted by them upon the Muslims were incredible.²⁷ Gradually they organized themselves into twelve *misls*, each one a loose organization under some prominent person or leader. A young boy of ten, Ranjit Singh succeeded to the headship of one of the *misls*, the Shukerchakia. When the Afghan ruler Shāh Zamān, after his last incursion into the Panjab in 1798, was returning to his capital in 1799, he found it difficult to transport his artillery across the Ravi and Ranjit Singh who was familiar with fords helped him and was rewarded with formal recognition as the ruler of Lahore which he had already controlled. He now started upon a career of conquest and consolidation and ultimately brought the Panjab from the Sutlej to the Indus and beyond right upto the Pathan areas of Hazara and Peshawar as well as Kashmir under his control. He died in 1839 as the head of a militarily strong state with a disciplined, modernized and well trained army. His death was followed by intrigue. The kingdom came into conflict with the British with whom Ranjit Singh had wisely maintained good relations and was defeated in four well contested battles. Ultimately it was annexed in 1849.²⁸

It is now opportune to revert to the main topic of this chapter. Shāh Walī-u'llah had established a tradition and a school. However, the circumstances in which he had carried on his movement had changed for the worse and his son and successor in the mission, Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Azīz had to think out new methods. He was born on 30 September 1746 and was fifteen or sixteen years old at the time of the death of his father.²⁹ Shāh Walī-u'llah had known the importance of early education and training imparted by a capable father to his son, being himself a bene-

²⁷ Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Azīz, *Malfūzāt* (Karachi, 1960), pp. 26-28. See Also *supra*, Chapter V. Also, Saiyid Abu'l-Hasan 'Alī Nadwī, *Sīrat-i-Saiyid Ahmad Shahid*, (Lucknow, n.d.). Third Edition, pp. 31-33. *Ṭabāṭabā'ī*, (op. cit., v. ii, p. 402) says, Bandā "raided all villages and townships where Muslims lived and he could reach and did not spare any one, even little children. He even tore embryos out of the wombs of pregnant Muslim women and destroyed them." *Gilānī* (op. cit., p. 52) quotes a statement to the effect that Muslim captives were put in cages and burnt alive.

²⁸ Vincent Smith, *Oxford History of India*, op. cit., pp. 611-619.

²⁹ Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Azīz, *Faḍā'il-i-ṣaḥābah wa ahl-i-bait*, op. cit., p. 6.

ficiary of Shāh 'Abd-u'r-Raḥīm's close and affectionate attention Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Azīz was, therefore, a pupil of his learned father who was most anxious that his mission should not die after his death. With the same end in view he had trained a few disciples as well and they continued to supervise Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Azīz's education after his father's death.³⁰ The young pupil was keen, intelligent and industrious and soon became proficient in the religious and mundane sciences of his day. When he was only seventeen, he started lecturing to advanced students and it did not take him long to establish a reputation for erudition and clarity of thought. He was an efficient teacher and an eloquent preacher. He was fully conscious of the importance of the task that had been entrusted to him by his farsighted father. Like him, Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Azīz was a trained and practising mystic which added to his learning a spiritual sensitivity and an emotional commitment to the cause of the revival of Islam, both as an agency for individual reformation and in its social and political spheres of action. He was not so original a thinker as his father; he did not propound any new theories; and he did not rely to the same extent in the formulation of his views and policies on mystic experience as did Shāh Walī-u'llah. He was, however, of a more practical turn of mind and, therefore, well equipped for patient endeavour to achieve properly defined goals and to set his targets in the context of available resources and external circumstances.

It was obvious soon after the Battle of Panipat that any idea of the restoration of Muslim authority through the intervention of the ruler of Afghanistan or a concerted action of the Muslim states must be abandoned for good. The sectarian conflict between the Sunnis and the Shi'ahs could not be resolved, indeed it was growing more bitter every day. They could not be induced to fight together against a common enemy on any large scale; if the interests of two rulers of different sects demanded it, they could combine for a short while, just as they would join hands with non-Muslim states for purely selfish ends. And a new complication had grown in the situation by the aggressive policies of some of the Shi'ah rulers in dealing with their Sunni subjects. It was too

³⁰ Ibid. The main teachers were Shaikh Muḥammad 'Ashiq of Phulat, Khwājah Muḥammad Amin Kāshmirī and Mawlā'ī Nūr-u'llah of Bādhāna.

much, in those days, to expect any theologian, however politically oriented, to be indifferent to the conversion of his people to another sect. Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Aziz could not, therefore, be indifferent to the spread of Shi'ism because of political pressure or pecuniary inducement. Besides, the people, the vast majority of whom were still Sunnis, could not be aroused to their political and social responsibilities except through the advocacy of a closer and more strict adherence to the code of Islam. The weakening of a sense of responsibility was the direct result of a deterioration in the moral behaviour of individuals and the community as a whole. It has been found again and again that a loosening of the hold of religion on a people gives rise, sooner or later, to corruption and social irresponsibility. Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Aziz may not have been aware of it, but there was an inherent dilemma in the situation. The Muslim community could not be re-awakened to a sense of responsibility except on the basis of religion and religion had become divisive because of the deep sectarian schism. And, besides, he could not escape his responsibility as a great Sunni divine. Apart from the duty of keeping the followers of his own persuasion on the true path as he saw it, the problem was exercising the minds of the Sunnis to an extent that they would not permit him to avoid the issue. He had adopted the triple method of creating religious consciousness: preaching sermons, writing, and answering queries, both oral and written. Of these, he devoted the greatest attention to the first.

He lived for seventy-eight years and died on 5 June 1824.³¹ For more than sixty years he preached twice a week to large audiences. He did not absent himself even once; when he was indisposed, he would come, leaning upon his staff or on one or two persons and deliver his sermon.³² And the sermons were not short. He would speak continuously for two hours and then he would reply to questions. It was after one of these sermons

³¹ Ibid, pp. 6, 7.

³² Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Aziz, *Fatāwā* (Delhi, v. i, 1311, A.H., v. ii, 1322 A.H.) v. i, p. 9. Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Aziz was an effective speaker. Even as a young student he was known for his eloquence. Men gathered from far and near to listen to his sermons. Followers of other sects and religions also came to hear him, Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Aziz, *Malfūzāt*, op. cit., pp. 15, 16.

that he was accused of being a Shi'ah, because, like his father, he stoutly held that the Shi'ahs are not outside the pale of Islam.³³ His sermons created a great impact and he was revered in all circles,³⁴ though unfortunately he incurred the displeasure of Najaf Khān, who persecuted him and confiscated his property.³⁵ The reason must have been that despite Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Aziz's moderation, his sermons and writings were, in all probability, acting as a deterrent against the conversion of Sunnis to Shi'ism. His major work on this topic, *Tuḥfah-i-Ithnā-'ashariyah*³⁶ is not couched in immoderate language and is well argued, even though it is obviously an exercise in polemics. He also wrote smaller tracts on some cognate subjects which also are intended to serve the same purpose.³⁷ These tracts are intended mainly to guide the Sunnis, but the *Tuḥfah-i-Ithnā-'ashariyah* follows a different technique. All the arguments are based upon Shi'ah authoritative books and no reference is made to Sunni works. It was not Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Aziz's desire to foment strife or even unnecessary controversy, because he enjoins that "only that person should read this treatise who is fully familiar with the fundamentals and details

³³ Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Aziz held that those who did not deny the fundamentals of Islam were not unbelievers, Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Aziz, *Fatāwā*, op. cit., v. i, pp. 40, 41; so far as Shi'ahs were concerned, the majority of the Sunni doctors hold them to be Muslims and not outside the pale of Islam, *ibid*, p. 48.

His attitude towards 'Alī was most respectful. He held the orthodox view that Abu Bakr, 'Umar and 'Uthmān had precedence over 'Alī, *ibid*, pp. 61, 62, but he emphasized a *ḥadīth* to the effect that "affection for 'Alī is a sign of faith and enmity towards 'Alī is a sign of divergence from it (*nifāq*)". *ibid*, p. 100. He also held a *majlis* each year in which the greatness of Ḥasan and Ḥusain was explained to the people, *ibid*, p. 104.

³⁴ *Ibid*, p. 3. Even the British officers held him in high respect, e.g. the British resident visited him, *ibid*, p. 4, British officers consulted him on questions of law, *ibid*, p. 141. Scholars and mystics from other cities and countries came to consult him, *ibid*, p. 9. The Amir of Bukhara corresponded with him on religious matters, *ibid*, p. 181 ff.

³⁵ Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Aziz, *Faḍā'il-i-ṣaḥābah wa ahl-i-bait*, op. cit., pp. 55, 56. According to another report the entire family including his brothers and their dependents were exiled from Delhi, *ibid*.

³⁶ Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Aziz, *Tuḥfah-i-Ithnā-'ashariyah*, Urdu translation by Sa'ad Ḥasan Khān Yūsufi, (Karachi, 1956).

³⁷ The following tracts have been included in Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Aziz, *Faḍā'il-i-ṣaḥābah wa ahl-i-bait*, op. cit.:

1. *Sirr-u'l-jalīl fī mas'alat-i't-tafḍīl*
2. *'Aziz-u'l-īqtiḥās fī faḍā'ili akhyār-i'n-nās;*
3. *Wasīlat-u'n-nijāt*

A small essay on *tafḍīl* is included in Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Aziz, *Fatāwā*, op. cit., pp. 61-62.

of the teachings of both the schools, the Shi'i as well as Sunni. A person who knows only one and does not possess a full knowledge of the other is not qualified to study this book."³⁸ This would show that he wanted to keep the discussion at an academic level and had no intention of taking it to the streets. Despite all this he and his family did not escape persecution.³⁹

However, all this was a little removed from his main mission and he had to write against the Shi'ah effort because he could not escape the responsibility of a Sunni theologian. He devoted most of his time to popularize his father's views and was greatly successful both through his preachings and his writings. If the Muslims of the Subcontinent were to be rescued from political subservience, they had to be prepared for a political movement of some dimensions. The first step in this direction was to establish contacts with the Muslim middle class and masses and to wean them away from indifference, sloth and decadence. He was greatly helped by his erudition, his spiritual stature and his undoubted sincerity. Gradually and slowly his disciples and pupils spread all over the Subcontinent.⁴⁰ In this manner the ground work for the initiation of a strong movement was completed.

The catastrophic changes in the political situation needed new planning. Now it was impossible to achieve anything through the intervention of a foreign power or the effort of any Muslim ruler of the Subcontinent. The throne of Delhi had been reduced to a mere legal myth.⁴¹ The reality was so glaring that the Muslims knew that their political authority was gone, but they were still confused about the legal position. Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Aziz removed the cobwebs of legal myths by ruling that the Subcontinent was no longer *dār-u'l-Islām*, a land where the Faith

³⁸ Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Aziz, *Tuḥfah-i-Ithnā 'ashariyah*, op. cit., p. 2.

³⁹ See *supra*, f.n. 35.

⁴⁰ 'Ubaid-u'llah Sindhi, *Shāh Walī-u'llah awr unki siyāsī taḥrīk* (Lahore, 1965), pp. 86, 87.

⁴¹ "The emperor (Shāh 'Alam), though a prisoner and sightless, was still considered the fountain of honour by Hindoos and Mahomedans, and a patent of nobility under the imperial seal was as highly prized in the remotest provinces of the Deccan as it had been in the days of Aurangzebe"—Marshman, op. cit., p. 268.

enjoyed sovereign authority and political power. The emperor was utterly helpless and the real power was in the hands of the British. If certain areas had been left in native hands for administration, it was only because the British found it politic to do so. They did not interfere with the observance of Muslim rites and practices because they did not want to, but they had the power to do so, if they desired. The Subcontinent, therefore, had been converted into a *dār-u'l-ḥarb*, a land where Islam was not free.⁴²

This ruling brought it to the notice of the Muslim population forcefully that it was living in bondage. A legal implication of the ruling was that it was the duty of every Muslim to make all effort to restore such an area to its former status of a *dār-u'l-Islām*. In no case should Muslims cooperate with the British in propagating false beliefs and un-Islamic practices and it was a mortal sin to help them to destroy Muslim lives or further subvert Muslim authority.⁴³ It was lawful to learn their language, if its knowledge was to be used for lawful and beneficent purposes and not to seek their favour, when it would become unlawful and evil. Similarly Muslims could enter their service if they were to be employed for lawful and beneficial ends like suppression of crimes, the clarification of points of Islamic law and its application, on the construction and repairs of buildings of public utility, in short anything that would serve the interests of the people. In such instances the employee would be performing praiseworthy duties; but if such service resulted in the furtherance of injustice and iniquity or in the performance of unlawful acts or in their abetment, then it was forbidden. Besides, the employment should not be of a nature that humiliated the believer or compromised his dignity.⁴⁴

This ruling was of great importance, because it prepared the way for an armed struggle or *jihād*. And, yet, it was obvious that mere rulings could not create a movement which had to be initiated and organized. *Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Azīz* created a nucleus in Delhi, at first working in close cooperation with his brothers,

⁴² *Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Azīz, Fatāwā*, v. i, pp. 16-17.

⁴³ *Ibid*, p. 186.

⁴⁴ *Ibid*.

Shāh Rafī'-u'd-dīn and Shāh 'Abd'-u'l-Qādir. The former was noted for his wisdom and clarity of thought and the latter for his mystic attainments. Shāh 'Abd'-u'l-'Aziz, himself combined all these qualities in his person.⁴⁵ Shāh Rafī'-u'd-dīn translated the Qur'ān into simple Urdu. His translation being literal, Shāh 'Abd'-u'l-Qādir produced a more idiomatic version in the same language. Shāh 'Abd'-u'l-'Aziz's son-in-law produced a handy dictionary of the vocabulary of the Qur'ān which helped beginners to understand the Book more easily.⁴⁶ All this was to further Shāh Walī-u'llah's aim to popularize the teachings of the Qur'ān among the less educated sectors of the Muslim society. The next step was to create nuclei in all cities and substantial townships, which having been achieved, the stage was set for more effective action.

Ultimately an armed struggle had to be organized, because no government could be dislodged merely by wishful thinking or widespread disaffection, unless that disaffection was channelled into active armed rebellion. For this purpose, it was first necessary to canvass support on a much wider scale and to find a good military leader. Indeed the discovery of a good fighter must have been considered to be an immediate necessity. The leader must not only be a good fighter, but a man of impeccable character and likely to command the loyalty of the people at large and in particular of those who were to be his comrades in arms. In those days when sufism was so much in vogue, it was almost essential to fix upon a person of spiritual and mystic eminence. It must have been felt that Saiyid Aḥmad was very well suited to be trained for this purpose. He was born at Rai Barielly on 29 November 1786.⁴⁷ His father was Saiyid Muḥammad 'Irfān who died in 1800. Very little is known about him beyond the fact that he was pious and retiring by nature. The family claimed descent from Ḥasan, the grandson of the Prophet. Saiyid Quṭb-u'd-dīn came to

⁴⁵ Sindhi op. cit., pp. 88, 98.

⁴⁶ Ibid, p. 89.

⁴⁷ There is some difference of opinion regarding the date and the month; the date in the text has been taken from Ghulām Rasūl Mihr, *Saiyid Aḥmad Shahīd*, (Lahore, n.d.). This corresponds to 6 Šafar 1201 A. H. There is considerable force in Mihr's argument that 1 Muḥarrar was adopted because it was the first day of the 13th century of the Hījrah to bolster the feeling that Saiyid Aḥmad was the *imām* of the century.

the Subcontinent under Belban and attained fame as a scholar. One of his descendants, Shāh 'Ilm-u'llah came into prominence in the reign of 'Ālamgir I. Saiyid Muḥammad 'Irfān, was his great grandson. During the period when Shāh Wali-u'llah and Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Aziz were active, this family had retained a good deal of eminence in religious knowledge as well as piety.⁴⁸

It is generally believed that Saiyid Aḥmad did not show much interest in his studies. This was perhaps true to the extent that he was not as devoted to his books as other children of the family were, though one of his own brothers showed even less interest. However the legend that he was almost unlettered does not seem to be true, because on many occasions in later life he surprised more learned men by his understanding and exposition of complicated problems.⁴⁹ He was a sturdy child and soon cultivated a taste for manly sports and physical exercise. He developed into a strong, vigorous and healthy man. Even as a child, it is reported, he would organize his playmates into little armies and play games of mock battles.⁵⁰ When he was about eighteen years old, he went to Lucknow in search of employment, but having failed, he decided to proceed to Delhi.⁵¹ There he went to Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Aziz who received him kindly and sent him to his brother Shāh 'Abd-u'l-Qādir for education. Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Aziz himself gave him mystic training in which he made remarkable progress. He developed into a mystic of great eminence, though he never became an equally great scholar.⁵²

⁴⁸ Saiyid Abu'l-Ḥasan 'Alī Nadwī, op. cit., pp. 44-68.

⁴⁹ He gave effective sermons, Saiyid Abu'l-Ḥasan 'Alī Nadwī, op. cit., v. 1, pp. 180-182, 231-232. Muḥammad Ja'far Thānesari, *Ḥayat-i-Saiyid Aḥmad Shāhid*, (Karachi, 1968), p. 139 (how he gave an impromptu exegesis of the *surah* Al-Fātiḥah); p. 140 (how he confused a logician and a philosopher in argument regarding God); p. 142 (how he discussed higher Mathematics with a Christian priest). Some of his followers have asserted that his education was so very elementary that he was almost illiterate, vide Mihr, op. cit., pp. 57, 58, who refutes the assertion. The myth seems to have been created to emphasise his spiritual powers and to prove that his knowledge was all inspired and not acquired. An incident has been reported to the effect that when he was at Delhi he could not see the writing in the books but he could see the warp and woof of fine cloth, at which Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Aziz concluded that Saiyid Aḥmad would learn little through formal education and that his knowledge would come through spiritual means, Saiyid Abu'l-Ḥasan 'Alī Nadwī, op. cit., p. 82.

⁵⁰ Ibid, pp. 70-72.

⁵¹ Ibid, pp. 73-75.

⁵² Ibid, pp. 83-85.

After the initial training he returned home where he stayed for a short while and then departed to join the Pindari leader Amīr Khān's service.⁵³

The question arises as to what prompted him to seek service under Amīr Khān. One reason could be that an elder brother of his had served Amīr Khān, and after the initial disappointment at Lucknow, Saiyid Aḥmad's thoughts would naturally turn to Amīr Khān in search of employment. However, the fact that when Amīr Khān made peace with the British, Saiyid Aḥmad did not attach any importance to the need of earning a livelihood and returned to Delhi militates against this assumption. At the time of his departure from Amīr Khān's camp he informed Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Azīz that no useful purpose would be served by his further attachment to Amīr Khān.⁵⁴ It can, therefore, be assumed safely that Saiyid Aḥmad's motive in seeking service under Amīr Khān was not gainful employment in the pecuniary sense. It is believed by some that his purpose was *jihād*, war against the forces arrayed against the political authority of Islam.⁵⁵ Others simply hold that the main motive was to ward off the importunate requests of those who, believing in his spiritual eminence, had plagued him with demands for intercession.⁵⁶ Yet others hold that his motive was to acquire military training and knowledge. There is a natural desire among his admirers to prove his absolutely independent role in the movement of *jihād* against the Sikhs and that even the initiative to organize the campaign was entirely his in response to divine direction.⁵⁷ This is at par with the contention that his formal education was less than meagre and the later theory of his physical disappearance for appearing later at the opportune moment to fulfil his mission.⁵⁸ The uncertainty has arisen because there is no direct contemporary recorded evidence to prove the theory that the initiative and planning were of some one else.⁵⁹

⁵³ Thānesari, *Hayāt-i-Saiyid Aḥmad Shahīd*, op. cit., p. 71.

⁵⁴ Mihr, op. cit., v. i, p. 109.

⁵⁵ Ibid, p. 84.

⁵⁶ Thānesari, *Hayāt-i-Saiyid Aḥmad Shahīd*, op. cit., pp. 67, 68.

⁵⁷ Mihr, *Saiyid Aḥmad Shahīd*, op. cit., v. i, p. 84, quoting *Manẓūrāt-u's-sa'd*, Panjab University ms.

⁵⁸ For this theory, see *infra*, Chapter vii.

⁵⁹ Mihr, *Saiyid Aḥmad Shahīd*, op. cit., v. i, p. 91.

And, yet, the circumstantial evidence is almost overwhelming. It has been mentioned how Shāh Walī-u'llah had worked all his life for the resuscitation of the Muslim authority in the Sub-continent. His closest pupils had trained his son Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Azīz who had worked incessantly and quietly, preparing the ground for a major effort. It would not be reasonable to believe that Shāh Walī-u'llah's successors had contented themselves with the placid mission of popularizing religious knowledge among the masses and imparting mystic insight to a chosen few. The thought of joining Amīr Khān's camp came to Saiyid Aḥmad after his spiritual training had come to a satisfactory level under Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Azīz. And one does not find that burning desire for *jihād* in the future leader of the movement before his attachment to Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Azīz. His childhood game of fighting battles or his attachment to sport should not be taken as a desire for *jihād*. If there had been no connection between Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Azīz and the Saiyid's joining Amīr Khān, there would have been no need for Saiyid Aḥmad to inform Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Azīz about his decision to leave Amīr Khān's service and Saiyid Aḥmad would not have made a bee line to Delhi after his resignation. It has been argued that Saiyid Aḥmad was interested only in fighting against the British and when peace was made despite his efforts, that purpose could no longer be served.⁶⁰ There is no improbability in that suggestion, but there is a tradition to the contrary that Saiyid Aḥmad prophesied that he would soon lead an army for *jihād* and pass through Amīr Khān's state of which he was yet to become the ruler.⁶¹ Whatever might have been the source of this knowledge, whether mystic intuition or more concrete information of the maturity of the plans in Delhi, Saiyid Aḥmad had by now come to know that he had to play a bigger role in a different theatre. Subsequent events show more positively that Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Azīz had carefully drawn up the plans which Saiyid Aḥmad was to execute. To ensure that the Saiyid was properly advised, two of Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Azīz's extremely capable relations, his nephew Shāh Ismā'il and his son-in-law Mawlānā 'Abd-u'l-Ḥayī, were associated with him.

⁶⁰ Saiyid Abu'l-Ḥasan 'Alī Nadwī, op. cit., p. 86, Mihr, op. cit., v. i, p. 84.

⁶¹ Thānesarī, *Ḥayāt-i-Saiyid Aḥmad Shāhid*, op. cit., p. 72.

This discussion has violated the chronological order of events, hence it is necessary to revert to their narration. Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Aziz once, in the course of a mystic vision, felt that he was directed to learn Pushtu, which he understood to mean that he should keep the Pushtu speaking people in his mind.⁶² It was also natural for him to think of that area as a convenient base for military operations against the Sikhs. There has arisen some controversy whether the intention was to limit the operations to the fight against the Sikhs or the organizers of the movement had planned, in case of success, to fight against the British as well. Mawlawī Muḥammad Ja'far Thānesarī is emphatic that there was no intention of turning the movement against the British, the reason being that the Sikhs suppressed Islamic practices and the British were tolerant.⁶³ This view was obviously an after thought put forward when the movement against the British had been ruthlessly crushed and the motive seems to have been to save the so called 'Indian Wāhhābis' from British vindictiveness. But Thānesarī has gone too far in this attempt; he has even mutilated historical evidence to serve his ends.⁶⁴ The evidence against his point of view, however, remains overwhelming.

The most convincing part of it is documentary. Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Aziz's *fatwā* declaring the Subcontinent to be *dār-u'l-ḥarb* has been mentioned. In several historical texts mutilated by Thānesarī, the correct version mentions the British quite clearly. And then, after the British conquest of the Panjab the movement should have come to an end, if the Sikhs alone were the target, but, as we shall see later, the followers of Saiyid Aḥmad Shahīd, including Thānesarī himself, remained active against the British.⁶⁵

When Saiyid Aḥmad reached Delhi in May or June 1818, he was received by Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Aziz and his group with great cordiality.⁶⁶ The Saiyid had now matured considerably. He was

⁶² Sindhi, op. cit., p. 70.

⁶³ Thānesarī, *Ḥayāt-i-Saiyid Aḥmad Shahīd*, op. cit., pp. 170-171.

⁶⁴ Mihr, *Saiyid Aḥmad Shahīd*, op. cit., v. i, pp. 259-261. Thānesarī is guilty of replacing the word *Naṣārā* (Christians, referring to the British) by the words *sikhān* or *darāz māyān* (long haired) and making other changes necessary in the context.

⁶⁵ Ibid, v. i, pp. 259, 260. Also ibid, pp. 255-257.

⁶⁶ Ibid, v. ii, p. 115.

almost thirty-two years old, was familiar with methods of warfare and had grown greatly in stature as a mystic.⁶⁷ It seems that Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Aziz felt that he could be safely chosen as the leader of the movement. However, it was necessary to associate with him men who would constantly tender him advice. The first person who was directed to accept Saiyid Aḥmad as his spiritual preceptor was Mawlānā Muḥammad Yūsuf of Phulat, who was a grandson of Shāh Walī-u'llah's elder brother, Shāh Ahl-u'llah. After he reported that the Saiyid was a competent preceptor, Mawlānā 'Abd-u'l-'Haiy and Shāh Ismā'il entered the Saiyid's discipleship. The fact that members of Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Aziz's family accepted Saiyid Aḥmad as their preceptor had a tremendous impact upon the people,⁶⁷ and added greatly to his reputation and prestige. This was a deliberate measure to build him up, but it could not have been successful, nor would it have been attempted, if the Saiyid had not possessed the necessary competence. The three attached themselves to him with the utmost devotion and served under him until their death.⁶⁸ A tour of Rohelkhand and the Doab was organized which was a success.⁶⁹ Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Aziz robed the Saiyid in his own white gown and black turban and bade him God speed.⁷⁰ After visiting a number of places and some sojourn in his native city of Rae Bareilly, the Saiyid left for *haj* with a large party on 30 July 1821.⁷¹ The Saiyid chose the longer route via Calcutta, perhaps for two reasons. There were a number of women in the group and river travel was easier for them than going to Bombay. Besides, it seems that Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Aziz's ground work had been more successful in the area between Delhi and Calcutta, which becomes obvious if one takes into consideration the great enthusiasm with which the party was received every where en

⁶⁷ Abu-'l-Ḥasan 'Alī Nadwī, op. cit., pp. 90-91.

⁶⁸ Mawlawī Muḥammad Yūsuf is not as well known as the other two. He was a trusted adviser, treasurer and general steward, Mihr, op. cit., v. i, p. 116. Mawlawī 'Abd-u'l-'Haiy and Shāh Ismā'il were distinguished scholars. Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Aziz called the former Shāikh-u'l-Islām and the latter Hujjat-u'l-Islām and praised their learning very highly, Abu-'l-Ḥasan 'Alī Nadwī, op. cit., p. 89.

⁶⁹ Mihr, *Saiyid Aḥmad Shāhid*, op. cit., v. i, pp. 123-131.

⁷⁰ Thānesarī, *Ḥayāt-i-Saiyid Aḥmad Shāhid*, op. cit., p. 85.

⁷¹ Mihr, *Saiyid Aḥmad Shāhid*, op. cit., v. i, p. 186. The party consisted of about four hundred persons.

route. When they started, they were penniless, but they were so generously helped by admirers that they travelled quite comfortably to Hejaz and back and lived there without want.⁷²

Saiyid Ahmad reached Rae Bareilly on 29 April 1824 and lost no time in organizing the campaign against the Sikhs. He started on his journey on 17 January 1826.⁷³ There appeared to be good reasons for choosing the Sikh kingdom of the Panjab for attack. The Sikh rule was extremely oppressive and the Muslims were groaning under an almost unbearable tyranny. Besides, though Ranjit Singh had built up an effective and large army, yet his government was not as securely established as was British rule in Indian territories. The Sikhs were expanding their dominions in Pathan areas and there was considerable fear and frustration in the population. The Pathans were good fighters and it could reasonably be expected that they would cooperate with the Saiyid. Even though this would strain the supply line gravely, yet it would have been most unwise to try to start hostilities from a base in British territories. Ranjit Singh was an ally of the British and they would not permit the Mujāhidin to carry on hostilities against him from British territory. It was not possible to reach the Pathan areas directly through Sikh territories, therefore the Saiyid had to choose a circuitous route through Gwalior, Rajputana, Sind, Baluchistan, Qandahar, Ghazni and Kabul. The ruler of Bahawalpur and the Mirs of Sind were afraid of the Sikhs and could not support the movement. However, the party reached Nowshera through Peshawar and established its headquarters there on 19 December 1826.⁷⁴

Operations started against the Sikhs and the Mujāhids met with considerable success in the beginning in spite of small numbers and meagre equipment. They won some creditable victories. They successfully carried out a night raid at Akora and captured good deal of booty from the Sikh army which had to retreat.⁷⁵ This raised the Saiyid's prestige considerably among the Pathans. A

⁷² For details vide *ibid*, pp. 224-241.

⁷³ *Ibid*, p. 224.

⁷⁴ *Ibid*, p. 348.

⁷⁵ *Ibid*, pp. 349-363.

similar raid against Khuzro was not so successful, yet the Sikhs were not able to resist the Mujāhids properly.⁷⁶ Then the Mujāhidūn were able to harass a Sikh force under Budh Singh at Saidu to an extent that all his communications were cut off and he was forced to fight. Sikh defeat seemed to be imminent but a Durrani chief of Peshawar, Yār Muḥammad Khān, treacherously left the field which created great confusion in the Mujāhid army and it suffered heavy losses.⁷⁷ On the eve of the battle the Saiyid had been poisoned and there were strong reasons to believe that Yār Muḥammad Khān was responsible.⁷⁸ The Mujāhid forces somehow, after having been scattered, reached Changlai which became the headquarter for some time. Here renewed efforts were made to approach the people and the chieftains of the area to join the movement. Letters were also sent to a number of neighbouring rulers regarding the aims of the campaign.⁷⁹ The pattern of the war soon developed into raids against Sikh posts. However, the debacle at Saidu had been an eye opener and even earlier it had been noticed that lack of discipline among certain sectors of the force neutralized the bravery of others. The Mujāhid force consisted of Indians, Qandahārīs and tribesmen; of these the last showed greater interest in plunder and booty. The serious fighters thus were put at a disadvantage *vis à vis* the enemy and were also deprived of their proper share in the booty. Authority had to be created for imposing some discipline. Many of the warriors were theologians and, therefore, a legal and religious base had to be provided. Hence Saiyid Aḥmad was acknowledged as the *imām* and, as such, acquired legal and religious authority as the supreme ruler.⁸⁰

As a corollary, instead of a group of the Saiyid's followers from India and their Qandāharī helpers being sustained by a tribal confederacy fighting a well organized government with large resources, the Mujāhidūn became the army of an established

⁷⁶ Ibid, pp. 366-371.

⁷⁷ Ibid, pp. 390-401.

⁷⁸ Ibid, pp. 391-392, 396-397.

⁷⁹ Ibid, pp. 418 ff. The list of rulers etc. to whom letters were sent is on pp. 433-435.

⁸⁰ Ibid, p. 374.

government which ruled and raised taxes. In the beginning the system worked but soon doubts began to arise in the minds of the neighbouring rulers and local chieftains. How would the Mujāhid state develop and into which areas would it expand? The Saiyid soon became aware of these fears and proclaimed through his letters and otherwise that he did not want to deprive anyone of his territories. He was a fakir and had no ambition of becoming a king or an emperor. His sole purpose was to recover Muslim territories from the hands of infidels who persecuted the Muslims.⁸¹ This concept of an *imāmate* was rather removed from its pristine nature, when the caliph or the *imām* was an effective ruler. Indeed an *imām* had to rule directly or through his governors and must exercise suzerainty over other potentates and rulers. There is not the slightest doubt that the Saiyid was sincere and said what he meant; but the average chief must have thought that after the establishment of his supremacy he might change his mind. Yār Muḥammad Khān had in fact been won over by threats and promises by the Sikhs.⁸² After his treachery he was afraid of retribution and made preparations for war against the Mujāhids. Saiyid Aḥmad had to take action in self defence and Yār Muḥammad Khān was wounded and died soon after.⁸³ However, before his defeat, the situation had become so complicated because of the shifting loyalties of some of the local chieftains that it was considered necessary to shift the headquarters to Panjtār.⁸⁴

It was there and before Yār Muḥammad Khān's defeat that the French general Ventura, who had fought under Napoleon Bonaparte and was serving Ranjit Singh, attacked Panjtār and had to retreat in face of determined defence.⁸⁵ Despite continued military success on the whole, the nature of the campaign did not change. A constant factor was the ficklemindedness of some local chieftains. After Yār Muḥammad's death, Saiyid Aḥmad,

⁸¹ Thānesarī, *Makṭūbāt-i-Saiyid Aḥmad Shahid*, (Karachi, 1969), pp. 131, 148-149, 264. He wrote in a letter quite clearly that after suppressing the Sikhs he would return to India and hand over all the territories to their rulers, *ibid*, pp. 54, 55.

⁸² Mihr, *Saiyid Aḥmad Shahid*, *op. cit.*, v. i, p. 399, v. ii, p. 136.

⁸³ *Ibid*, pp. 129-133.

⁸⁴ *Ibid*, p. 58.

⁸⁵ *Ibid*, p. 102.

in an effort to reconcile the family, recognized his brother Sulṭān Muḥammad Khān as the ruler of Peshawar, but he was under pressure from his family to avenge the death of his brother.⁸⁶ He succumbed to it because tribal notions proved stronger than the dictates of Islam and even plain gratitude. He was brought to his knees as the result of a successful action. However, when he submitted, his territory was restored to him against the advice of many,⁸⁷ because the Saiyid wanted to demonstrate that he was not after any one's territories.⁸⁸ The net result of the fighting up to Sulṭān Muḥammad's defeat was highly satisfactory. All the area from the Khyber Pass to Amb was in the hands of the Mujāhids who had a regular income from revenue and could muster a sizable army. Treachery, however, nullified all the gains. At Sulṭān Muḥammad's instigation, the local population rose and killed all the officers appointed by the Saiyid.⁸⁹

It is necessary at this stage to analyse the causes of this development. The main reason was the narrow selfishness of the tribal chiefs. Many of them did not understand the full implications of the establishment of non-Muslim rule in such proximity to their homeland. The Sikhs were expanding their power and were bound to establish their rule in the area, but this seemed to be still some distance away whereas the Saiyid's domination was an immediate and palpable reality. Besides there were so many feuds among them that if one sided with the Saiyid, the other decided to oppose him. There was so much jealousy even among those who supported the movement, that if one was commended in any way for some service, the other resented it. It was extremely difficult to keep such men together in the pursuit of any common goal. The populace was not used to the observance of any law beyond what was approved by tribal usage and custom; it could not tolerate the establishment of any government based upon a law to be uniformly administered restraining high and low alike from taking it into their hands. When the Saiyid ordered an inquiry, it was revealed that the people who had been used to a

⁸⁶ Ibid, p. 227.

⁸⁷ Ibid, p. 271.

⁸⁸ Ibid, p. 272.

⁸⁹ Ibid, pp. 290-322.

rough and ready justice of their own contrivance considered punishments and fines imposed by properly constituted courts as persecution and impositions.⁹⁰ And the zeal with which reforms were pushed also irritated the people. They considered it below their dignity that their daughters should be married off without handsome amounts being paid by the families of the bridegrooms. Sometimes sufficiently rich bridegrooms were not available even initially; quite often a family found it impossible to pay the money after the legal rites, so that the girl could neither join her husband nor could marry another. Pressure was put by officials on the parents of girls who had waited too long to waive the demand for the money and attempts were made to get older girls married without any financial gain to the girl's family. If local men were not forthcoming, perhaps because of the girl's age, she was married to a non local. This was looked upon as forced matrimony and was resented.⁹¹

The people were staunch Ḥanafīs and to them little points in rituals were of fundamental importance. Shāh Ismā'il Shahīd had adopted some points of the Shāfi'i *fiqh* in prayers like *raf'u yadain*, raising the hands up to the ears in the midst of prayers at the change of some postures. This created so much mischief that the Saiyid had to assert publicly that the Mujāhidūn were staunch Ḥanafīs. This was true, because Shāh Ismā'il also called himself a Ḥanafī subject to conclusions arrived at by personal inquiry.⁹² This deviation was so close to *ghairu taqlīd* (non conformity with established belief) that the common man could not understand the difference. Indeed when carried further, it did create the sect of Ghair Muqallids or Ahl-i-ḥadīth. The Saiyid himself was moderate in these matters, and he successfully persuaded Shāh Ismā'il to conform to the prevailing norms.⁹³ These differences created opposition even in the more sophisticated India.⁹⁴ Among the Pathans it created a most explosive situation. Though the Saiyid's intervention was successful with

⁹⁰ Ibid, p. 326.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid, p. 221.

⁹³ Sindhi, op. cit., p. 114.

⁹⁴ Vide *supra*., Chapter V, p. 116

Shāh Ismā'il and his small group of followers, some of the more extremist adherents of non-conformity to the Ḥanafī ritual, did not give up their practices. One of these had even to be expelled, but the Saiyid could do little more in a matter of religious conviction.⁹⁵ The local chiefs had received a *maḥḍar* which bore seals of many ulema alleging that the Saiyid was a British agent and had been sent to collect information about the area. He was ostensibly leading a *jihād* but in fact his purpose was to corrupt the faith of the people. He had invented a new religion which did not believe in any saint or man of spiritual greatness. Then there was an appeal that the recipients should combine together to destroy the Saiyid and his followers before they were able to indulge in any further mischief.⁹⁶

The first allegation was palpably false, but the other had a germ of truth in it in so far as the Saiyid did hold and preach that reverence for saints should not be so immoderate as to compromise belief in monotheism. He, therefore, considered many practices smacking of saint worship as un-Islamic. In this context the simple people considered aberrations of many of the Mujāhidūn from the normal Ḥanafī practices as heresy. The allegations became exaggerated in the popular mind so that the Saiyid had to contradict the charge of heresy in his letter to some leading ulema of Peshawar.⁹⁷ It seems that the allegations had snowballed enormously and Shāh Ismā'il also had to address leading ulema of the locality twice, refuting the charges of a similar nature.⁹⁸ The rumours in general circulation accused the Saiyid of being such a great heretic that he did not follow any moral code and went to the extent of justifying unlawful pleasures.⁹⁹ This was totally false because the Saiyid and his followers were known for the purity and austerity of their lives. They were men who had given up their home and hearth for a religious purpose; they had been attracted to the Saiyid because

⁹⁵ Sindhī, op. cit., p. 114.

⁹⁶ Mihr, *Saiyid Aḥmad Shāhid*, op. cit., v. ii, p. 280. Sultān Muḥammad Khān of Peshawar produced a copy in his interview with the Saiyid to explain the cause of his rebellion.

⁹⁷ Thānesarī, *Makrūbāt-i-Saiyid Aḥmad Shāhid*, op. cit., p. 221.

⁹⁸ Mihr, *Saiyid Aḥmad Shāhid*, op. cit., v. ii, pp. 281-282.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

he preached adherence to the code of Islam and the utmost sacrifice in its cause; some of them had been men of means and were now content to live most frugally, sometimes going hungry and doing menial chores for the upkeep of the camp.¹⁰⁰ It is obvious that the slanderous campaign must have originated from the Sikhs, but it found credence because of minor differences that had been introduced in the ritual. Another reason of the discontent of the tribesmen was that the Saiyid had to appoint officers mostly from amongst men who had come from India, not because of any discrimination, but because of the lack of such persons among the locals.

Being disappointed in the people of the area the Saiyid's mind turned towards Kashmir and Hazara. The headquarters were first shifted to Rājdwārī¹⁰¹ and then to Bālākot.¹⁰² It may be mentioned that the Sikhs soon occupied the area from which the Saiyid had withdrawn and the people were subjected to severe atrocities.¹⁰³ The Saiyid reached Bālākot on 18 April, 1831. On 5 May the Sikhs were led to the top of the ridge on the slopes of which Bālākot is located. A small detachment posted to guard the route which was known only to some locals was overwhelmed and could not inform the main army in time. Next day the Sikhs attacked Bālākot. The battle had been really lost when the Sikhs had occupied the ridge practically unopposed and undetected. Next day the Mujāhids fought a desperate battle. The losses were severe, nearly six hundred Mujāhids lost their lives, and Shāh Ismā'il and Saiyid Aḥmad Shāhid were killed.¹⁰⁴

One who never turned his back but marched breast forward,
Never doubted clouds would break,
Never dreamed, though right were worsted, wrong would
triumph,
Held we fall to rise, are baffled to fight better,
Sleep to wake.

¹⁰⁰ Abu-'l-Ḥasan 'Alī Nadwī, op. cit., p. 18. Thānesarī, *Ḥayāt-i-Saiyid Aḥmad Shāhid*, op. cit., e.g., p. 230.

¹⁰¹ Mihr, *Saiyid Aḥmad Shāhid*, op. cit., v. ii, pp. 334-342.

¹⁰² Ibid, p. 365.

¹⁰³ Ibid, pp. 345, 346.

¹⁰⁴ For details of the battle vide *ibid*, pp. 394-434.

CHAPTER VII

Cinders and Ashes

The disaster of Bālākot was inevitable; it could have been postponed; but it could not be finally avoided. The difficulties were enormous and could not be overcome. The Mujāhidūn were sincere and enthusiastic, but for the sterling qualities of their character, the campaign could not have been organized. It was not ordinary zeal that pitted scholars and theologians against professional veterans like Ventura and rewarded them with some measure of success. And yet there were grave miscalculations in their thinking. They projected their own altruism and sincerity into their expectations of others. The tribal chiefs were too enmeshed in their petty ambitions and interests to free themselves from them. They had a long tradition of internecine warfare and vendetta; in their long history they had never made a common cause of resisting an aggressor or helping a liberator. To each one of them the Sikh peril existed only to the extent that it affected him. It was beyond their comprehension that a united defence of their ancestral homeland or the liberation of fellow Muslims from non-Muslim rule could be objectives worthy of the sacrifice

of personal interests. The Sikh kingdom of the Panjab was not a contemptible foe. Only a few years later the British were to discover that the Sikhs were good and well-trained fighters and the East India Company did not consider its victory against them a mean achievement. The neighbouring governments of Bahawalpur and Sind were mortally afraid of them. Kashmir had been conquered by them without any great effort. In contrast, the Mujāhidūn were weak in all respects. They had precious little support in the area where they had set up their base, so much so, that they had to change their headquarters several times. They had extremely meagre financial resources, the local revenue was uncertain and totally inadequate and the contributions from Indian supporters also were neither entirely dependable nor sufficient to sustain a war against an organized government with considerable means. Nor could the Mujāhid force match its military expertise with that of the Sikh armies and its generals. Then there was the tremendous difference in the equipment. Saiyid Ahmad Shahid and his followers were all the time short of firearms. He sometimes did not have even a sufficient number of swords and spears.¹ The only commodity of which they had a superior supply was their zeal. That can be a valuable asset in warfare, but only when other factors are not so tremendously unbalanced.

Saiyid Ahmad Shahid and his followers were not unaware of the tremendous odds against which they were fighting. It does not seem to have been their strategy that they would come into a headlong clash with the Sikhs by invading their territory in depth. They had hitherto been fighting a border warfare and harassing the enemy and, in this manner, they had hoped to stop further Sikh penetration into purely Muslim lands. In this effort also they were frustrated because of the rebellion in what was then called the Samah territory which covered the area where they had previously set up their administration. They had hardly turned their backs when the Sikhs marched in and occupied the entire district. The Saiyid had felt greatly distressed at the rebellion in Samah but he did not give up the struggle, hoping to

¹ As the supply of arms was inadequate, the Saiyid got some choppers tied to bamboos and these were used in battle, Mihr, op. cit., v. ii, p. 256.

find a better response in Hazara. Here also he was betrayed, not by the entire population, but by a chief whose cooperation enabled the Sikhs to get access, through a less known route, to the ridge commanding Bālākot.² In the melee that ensued, the Saiyid was killed, but none of his followers saw him being attacked, wounded and falling.

It is not difficult to imagine a situation in which he rushed against a group of Sikhs, was surrounded so that he was not visible to his followers and slain. According to one of the traditions his decapitated body was recognized by a captive and buried with military honours near the river in what is believed by many to be his grave.³ In a less likely tradition his head is reported to have been thrown into the river Kunhār and picked up a few miles downstream and buried there.⁴ The truth, however, is that the Sikhs discovered the body, removed it from the battlefield, burnt it and destroyed the ashes.⁵ Thus both the graves whether empty or entombing some remains have to do nothing with the Saiyid's body. Some persons, it is not known at whose inspiration, raised the cry that the Saiyid had been wounded and taken away from the field by some Gujars.⁶ It may have been raised to save the Mujāhidīn from further slaughter or to save the Sikhs from further frenzied attacks; in any case, the remnants of the Saiyid's army withdrew and struggled up the ridge on the opposite side of the valley. There they gradually assembled and passed the night at Angrai. Two Gujars came and stated that the Saiyid was safe and alive some distance away and that they could show the way if the Mujāhidīs would accompany them. The

² Thānesarī (*Hayāt-i-Saiyid Ahmad Shahid*, op. cit., pp. 284-285), blames some (unknown) Panjabi or Pathan member of the small body of men posted to guard the approach through the comparatively unknown route; but local tradition blames the chief of Garhī Ḥabīb-u'llah and the residents of the area should be better informed.

³ Mihr, *Sarguzasht-i-Mujāhidīn*, (Lahore, 1956), p. 25; Thānesarī, *Hayāt-i-Saiyid Ahmad Shahid*, op. cit., p. 289.

⁴ The grave in which the head is believed to be buried is right on the roadside, some distance downstream from Bālākot.

⁵ Mahmud Husain, "The Mystery of Saiyid Ahmad Shahid's Death," *Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society*, Karachi, July 1955; Also Wade's dispatch to Princep, secretary to the Governor General, Records Office, Lahore. The dispatch is dated 17 May 1831.

⁶ Mihr, *Sarguzasht-i-Mujāhidīn*, op. cit., p. 21.

Mujāhids were persuaded not to do so but to wait for the morning and when, after sunrise, they did proceed in the direction indicated by the Gujars, there was no trace of the Saiyid.⁷

The whole affair seems to have been some kind of a ruse, the motive for which is hard to determine. It could be to hand over the Mujāhids in a state of utter exhaustion to the Sikhs or to plunder them for arms when they could hardly resist. This incident together with the earlier reports that no Mujāhid had seen the Saiyid after he disappeared from the midst of the army and the disappearance of the dead body created a belief among many of his followers that he had vanished miraculously and would reappear at the opportune time to head his followers to victory. This belief, generally called faith in *ghaibūbat* was held for quite some time among the elite as well as ignorant sectors of those who held him in reverence.⁸ It inspired some of his successors to keep the movement alive.

In any case when the Mujāhids found themselves without their leader in their midst, they were grief-stricken but not demoralised. They did not entertain the idea of forsaking the cause. Therefore they proceeded to find some one to act as an interim leader pending the Saiyid's return or the confirmation of his death. They chose Shaiḫ Wali Muḥammad of Phulat who was persuaded with considerable difficulty to accept the responsibility.⁹ The army, however, was face to face with grave difficulties. They had no resources left after the defeat, the force was depleted, besides those who were killed, some lost heart and went back to their homes; and their prestige had suffered so greatly that none but the most sincere or venturesome could be expected to come to their rescue. Their plight made them dependent on local help and alliances, and these had proved unreliable before and could not be expected to get better now.

And indeed the shifting sands of local sentiment and diplomacy proved as dangerous and treacherous as they had done before.

⁷ Ibid, pp. 22, 23.

⁸ Thānesarī, *Ḥayāt-i-Saiyid Aḥmad Shāhid*, op. cit., pp. 288, 290. The belief in *ghaibūbat* was on the decline sixty years after the Saiyid's death but it had not disappeared, *ibid*.

⁹ Mihr, *Sarguzasht-i-Mujāhidīn*, op. cit., pp. 26-28.

One incident would show that local financial aid was totally unreliable and efforts to raise revenue were fraught with danger. The Mujāhids had been invited to stay in Nandhiār and the local influential people had agreed to raise a levy for their keep. In March 1833 when they had been in the area for about ten months, a conspiracy to kill all of them like the one that had resulted in the massacre of all the officials in Samah came to light.¹⁰ The Mujāhids left Nandhiār and took up residence in Panjtār. The pattern of their dependence did not change. They were welcome only so long as they could be utilized to further the interests of the host.¹¹ They cooperated gladly if this implied hostilities against the Sikhs, but quite often their help was solicited against Muslim opponents in which case the Mujāhidūn were put on the horns of a serious dilemma, but they invariably chose to demur except where they felt that the party against whom help was sought was in league with the Sikhs. To add to the difficulties, many chiefs had some understanding with the enemy.¹² Even in those difficult circumstances the Mujāhids went on fighting and harassing the Sikhs under the devoted and able leadership of Mawlānā Naṣir-u'd-dīn who originally belonged to Manglor in the modern district of Bijnore in Uttar Pradesh.¹³ Ultimately the Mujāhidūn settled down at Sithāna.¹⁴ Shaikh Walī Muḥammad of Phulat who had been elected the *amīr* did not show much capacity of leadership and went away to Sind to escort the widow of Saiyid Aḥmad Shahid to safety.¹⁵ Mawlānā Naṣir-u'd-dīn of Manglor was killed at Minārah in a skirmish against the locals who had been active in harassing the Mujāhids.¹⁶ After this the party was reduced in numbers and though it elected Mir Awlād 'Alī as their leader, it became practically dormant.¹⁷

It is necessary now to refer to a less known phase of the

¹⁰ Ibid, pp. 38-42.

¹¹ Ibid, p. 99.

¹² Ibid, e.g. pp. 87, 101, etc.

¹³ H. W. Bellew, *A general report on the Usufzai*, (Lahore, 1864), p. 95.

¹⁴ Mihr, *Sarguzasht-i-Mujāhidin*, op. cit., p. 117.

¹⁵ Ibid, p. 124.

¹⁶ Bellew, op. cit., pp. 94-95.

¹⁷ Mihr, *Sarguzasht-i-Mujāhidin*, op. cit., p. 128.

movement. Its supporters in India were greatly disappointed with the setback to the activities of the *Mujāhidūn* in the Pathan area. Mawlānā Saiyid Naṣir-u'd-dīn of Delhi made up his mind to resuscitate the effort and to seek, if possible, a more suitable theatre for *jihād* against the Sikhs to start with. He was a grandson of *Shāh* Rafī'-u'd-dīn, being his daughter's son and was thus a descendent of *Shāh* Walī-u'llah. He was married to the daughter of *Shāh* Muḥammad Ishāq who had succeeded *Shāh* 'Abd-u'l-'Aziz as the principal of Madrasah-i-Raḥīmiyah, and, according to Mawlānā 'Ubaid-u'llah Sindhī, as the organizer of the *Jihād* Movement.¹⁸ Mawlānā Naṣir-u'd-dīn felt it was incumbent upon him to revive the movement and he first made a tour of the areas where the Muslims had shown enthusiasm in supporting Saiyid Aḥmad *Shahīd*. Having collected a band of fighters, he set out for Tonk in the first instance where he was given generous contributions of money and equipment. He decided to base his activities in Sind because the people were sympathetic and were not intriguers like the Pathan tribal chiefs. He first went to *Shibghat*-u'llah *Shāh* I, the *Pir* Pagāro at that time. The *Pir* had been friendly to Saiyid Aḥmad *Shahīd* whose family was now staying under the *Pir*'s guardianship at *Pir-jo-goth*. At that time the *Mazārī* tribe of the Baluchs was fighting the Sikhs and the Mawlānā decided to join forces with them. Because of the increasing pressure of the Sikhs upon the tribe, it lost heart and made peace with them. This made Mawlānā Naṣir-u'd-dīn's position untenable and he went to Kalat in Baluchistan. Now an unexpected avenue opened up when the British intervened in Afghanistan.¹⁹

They sent Alexander Burnes to Kabul to secure Afghan alliance to counter Russian advance in Central Asia. He reached Kabul in September 1837 and found Dost Muḥammad willing to join hands if the British would persuade the Sikhs to hand over Peshawar to the Afghans which they had lost after a hotly contested battle at Jamrud in 1834. The British were not prepared to put any pressure upon the Sikhs or to intercede and yet they were keen upon securing Afghan cooperation. It was, therefore,

¹⁸ Ibid, pp. 135, 136. Sindhī, op. cit., pp. 105, 106.

¹⁹ Mihr, *Sarguzash-i-Mujāhidīn*, op. cit., pp. 135-200.

decided to invade Afghanistan and to put Shāh Shujā', a former ruler and now a fugitive in the Panjab, on the Afghan throne.²⁰ We are not concerned here with subsequent events of this war, but Mawlānā Naṣir-u'd-dīn's participation in the defence of Afghanistan against unprovoked aggression is relevant. A thousand Mujāhids fought the British, nearly all of them were killed, three hundred in Ghaznī alone.²¹ After the British occupation, the Mawlānā and a few of his surviving followers escaped to Sithāna where he was elected leader. He was very old and the campaign had worn him out. He was taken ill at Amb and died at Sithāna probably in 1841.²² After his death the Mujāhidūn once again elected Mir Awlād 'Alī as their leader, but their numbers and resources were greatly depleted and they were not able to achieve much. This was a source of anxiety to their supporters in India.²³

Mawlānā Wilāyat 'Alī had been an enthusiastic member of Saiyid Aḥmad Shahīd's party and had gone with him to the Pathan area, but he had been sent back for the purpose of canvassing support for the movement. He went to Hyderabad in the Deccan and was successful in preaching reforms. After he came to know of the disaster at Bālākot, he returned to Patna and started work in Bengal, Bihar and Allahabad area.²⁴ His younger brother 'Ināyat 'Alī was equally enthusiastic and Bengal was the centre of his activities. After Ranjit Singh's death in 1839, the Sikh Kingdom was plunged in intrigue and internal difficulties. This loosened their hold on the Pathan areas. The chiefs of lower Hazara combined and inflicted a defeat on the Sikhs and elected Saiyid Akbar Shāh, one of the Saiyids of Sithāna as their ruler.²⁵ The Saiyids of Sithāna, it may be mentioned, had always supported the Mujāhids. It was during this period that Mawlānā Wilāyat 'Alī received an invitation from the Kunhār Valley saying

²⁰ Vincent Smith, *Oxford History of India*, op. cit., pp. 605, 606. For the complicated diplomacy leading to British invasion, see Marshman, op. cit., pp. 385 ff.

²¹ W. W. Hunter, *The Indian Musalmans*, (Calcutta, 1945), p. 13.

²² Mihr, *Sarguzāsh-i-Mujāhidīn*, op. cit., p. 207.

²³ Ibid, p. 225.

²⁴ Ibid, pp. 227-230.

²⁵ Ibid, p. 234.

that time was opportune for *jihād* in that area.²⁶ At this Mawlānā 'Ināyat 'Alī assembled about two thousand men, many of whom made their way in small batches of five or six men each.²⁷ He captured Bālākot in December 1845. At this the Mujāhidūn, elected Mawlānā 'Ināyat 'Alī as their leader. He was able to defeat a strong Sikh force at Muzaffarabad in 1846 and brought considerable area of upper Hazara including Kunhār Valley under his control.²⁸ Mawlānā Wilāyat 'Alī now joined the Mujāhids and was elected leader. Soon after, however the situation took an adverse turn. The British defeated the Sikhs in 1846 and imposed a settlement on them under which Gulāb Singh was handed over Kashmir.²⁹ After some initial difficulties, he established his authority in his newly acquired dominions and came into conflict with the Mujāhids, who were defeated badly at Dūb, near Muzaffarabad. Thus the short-lived domination of Upper Hazara by the Mujāhids came to an end. At this the two brothers, Mawlānā Wilāyat 'Alī and Mawlānā 'Ināyat 'Alī returned to Patna.³⁰ The British government imposed restrictions upon both of them but they found ways and means of keeping the organization effective.³¹ After the period for which they were bound over had expired they once again migrated to Sithāna, where some differences grew up between them and Mawlānā 'Ināyat 'Alī who left Sithāna and went to Mangal Thāna on 16 June, 1852. Mawlānā Wilāyat 'Alī died about five months later.³² The differences had arisen because Mawlānā Wilāyat 'Alī was more cautious and did not want to precipitate hostilities with the British.

On the death of his brother, Mawlānā 'Ināyat 'Alī returned to Sithāna and was elected leader. The British were steadily expanding their influence and as the area around Sithāna grew hazardous for activities, Mawlānā 'Ināyat 'Alī first tried to canvass support in Swat and then turned his attention to Peshawar valley, where

²⁶ Ibid, p. 235.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid, pp. 237-251.

²⁹ Vincent Smith, *The Oxford History of India*, op. cit., pp. 617, 618.

³⁰ Mihr, *Sarguzāsh-i-Mujāhidīn*, op. cit., pp. 258-267.

³¹ Ibid, p. 268.

³² Ibid, pp. 274-277.

most of his time was spent in stirring anti-British feelings. The rebellion of 1857 would have offered a golden opportunity, but the local situation was not favourable, because there was a change in Swat where the dominant influence was that of Mullā 'Abd-u'l-Ghafār Ākhund, the founder of the House of the Wālis, and he was not in favour of any action against the British at this juncture. Fifty-five Native Infantry was posted at Mardan and Nowshera and the latter sector intended to mutiny. The British defeated them and some escaped into Swat and tribal areas, but they were not able to find even refuge, much less support. Some made their way to the Mujāhid camp.³³ Mawlānā 'Ināyat 'Alī found the situation so unfavourable because of British intrigues with the tribal chiefs that he retired to Nārinjī which was located on the top of a mountain, surrounded by narrow and steep valleys, and therefore, access to it was difficult for a modern army. From here he carried on his depredations. A force was sent against him in July 1858 which did not succeed in dislodging the Mujāhids but the second attack on 1 August 1858 was more successful and Nārinjī was captured. Mawlānā 'Ināyat 'Alī, however, had escaped earlier. His appeals to tribal chiefs to take advantage of British difficulties because of the rebellion of 1857 had proved ineffective. Communications with Patna had been totally disrupted because of disturbed conditions and Mawlānā 'Ināyat 'Alī was reduced to extreme financial distress. He had to sell all he had to discharge his debts to importunate debtors and he was reduced to starvation. Disease and hunger took their toll and he died in March 1858.³⁴

On his death the leadership was put in commission but later Mawlānā Nūr-u'llah seems to have been entrusted with the command of the warriors and he continued to harass the British who sent a force of nearly five thousand strong under Sir Sydney Cotton to root out the Mujāhids. This army destroyed Panjtār, Changlai and Mangal Thāna in April 1858. In the beginning of May same year Sithāna was destroyed by a British punitive force. The Saiyids of Sithāna had always helped the Mujāhids and finding Sithāna exposed they had built another centre at Malka

³³ Ibid, pp. 291-295.

³⁴ Ibid, pp. 296-301.

about 35 miles away in the Western party of Mahāban. Their leader at this time was Shāhzādah Mubārak Shāh who captured Sithāna once again and reformed it. This was considered to be a direct challenge to British authority who had watched with distaste the recovery of authority by the Saiyids of Sithāna with whom the Mujāhids were in alliance.³⁵ The latter were too depleted in numbers to hold the initiative but the British held them to be responsible and British writers made no distinction between the Saiyids and the Mujāhids.³⁶ The latter were, at this time, 1155 in number divided into ten unequal companies each consisting of forty to one hundred and fifty men. They had 301 fire arms all told, mostly matchlocks.³⁷ They were trained as guerillas and their sincerity and zeal knew no limits, hence they enjoyed a high reputation as fighters.

The British made extensive preparations and it soon became apparent to the local population that the Mujāhids could not be the only target. Mullā 'Abd-u'l-Ghaffar Ākhund was now aroused, because he could sense the real intentions of the British. He had great influence in the area. He was born at Jabrai in Upper Swat in 1794 and was known for his piety and mystic attainments. His word carried greater weight among the Pathans than that of any other man. The British had a number of chiefs under their influence who had to be consulted regarding routes and reactions of different chiefs and tribes. Information filtered through them regarding British intentions and most of the tribes and their leaders felt that their freedom was in danger. They had not cherished frequent incursions into their territories which they had traditionally come to consider independent. The Ākhund's dictum that this was a war between Islam and the British electrified the entire area and even those who otherwise would have stayed away felt obliged to join the defence.³⁸ The ruler of Dir, for instance, forgot his traditional enmity with Swat and joined the common cause even though belatedly.³⁹ The tribesmen

³⁵ Ibid, pp. 312-328.

³⁶ Ibid, 329.

³⁷ Bellew, op. cit., p. 110.

³⁸ Mihr, *Sarguzasht-i-Mujāhidin*, op. cit., pp. 354, 355.

³⁹ Ibid, p. 360.

were not as steadfast as could have been expected because of the general sentiment and treachery was not absent in their midst, yet the British, despite great preparations, did not make much headway. "A large force" says Marshman, "under the command of Brigadier Chamberlain, consisting of two European and six native regiments, was pushed forward in the fastness in which the whole army of Akbar had been exterminated two centuries before; but it was not only held in check but vigorously assailed by the irreconcilable highlanders. The Brigadier was disabled by wounds, and the position of the army became so critical that the Council in Calcutta, contrary to the remonstrances of the Commander-in-Chief, was on the point of withdrawing the troops from what appeared to them a bootless warfare in the mountains, a step which would have brought all the wild tribes down upon the Punjab."⁴⁰ The Ākhund of Swat was a far-sighted statesman. Even though the British were in difficulties, yet they had the resources of an empire at their command and being a stable power could sustain the campaign for quite long. The tribesmen could fight for a short time only. Besides he was also aware of the fissures in their united front and of the insidious influence of British diplomacy. He thought that the British had been taught the lesson that it was neither easy nor profitable to subjugate the area. He, therefore, wanted to capitalize on the advantage that had been gained but which would thaw and melt away if the struggle were prolonged. He knew that the tribal forces were already in disarray.

He was in communication with the British forces. They had been protesting that they did not want to crush the tribes and their sole purpose was the destruction of Malka. The Ākhund took them upon their word and persuaded the tribesmen to let the British achieve that limited objective.⁴¹ With considerable fanfare a few British officers and men escorted by some chiefs, proceeded to Malka to demolish it. The campaign, according to Marshman, "was brought to a satisfactory close by the end of 1803."⁴² In fact the British were able to achieve nothing. The ostensible

⁴⁰ Marshman, op. cit., p. 526.

⁴¹ Mihr, *Sarguzasht-i-Mujāhidīn*, op. cit., p. 365.

⁴² Marshman, op. cit., p. 526.

objective of annihilating the Mujāhids was not achieved, indeed the campaign left their organization intact, even though they had fully participated in the war and, nominally at least, their leader, Mawlānā 'Abd-u'llah was in command.⁴³ The British were not able to demolish Malka, not even a straw roof was destroyed. The chiefs who had accompanied the British officers stopped them from damaging any property.⁴⁴

After the Ambela campaign was over, the Mujāhids were exposed to fresh difficulties. The British had not gone back totally empty handed. They had extracted a promise from the tribal chiefs that they would not permit the Mujāhids and the Saiyids of Sithāna to live together. This created difficulties for both because their cooperation was a source of strength to each party. After this we find that the Saiyids ceased to play an effective role in the affairs of the area.⁴⁵ The old sectarian trouble again raised its head and the followers of the Ākhund were not enamoured of the religious views of the Mujāhids, who were expelled from Charaghzai where they had been settled by the Ākhund. The British were aware that the failure of the Ambela campaign would adversely affect their prestige and now they launched a policy of expanding their influence and securing posts of strategic importance which created unrest among the tribes. This led to skirmishes and sporadic warfare continued but the tribesmen were not able to resist the British in their programme of opening up communications by building roads and establishing military posts and pickets. In the defence put up by the tribes against expansion and British expeditions sent to enforce decisions or inflict punishment, the Mujāhids always sided with the tribes, and as soon as hostilities ceased they were the first to be betrayed. For instance after the third campaign in the Black Mountains, the tribesmen had agreed that they would not permit the Mujāhids to settle down in their midst. It was with great difficulty that they were able to establish themselves in Tilwai among the Mubarak Khel who were impressed with the spiritual

⁴³ Mihr, *Sarguzāsh-i-Mujāhidīn*, op. cit., p. 356.

⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 365, quoting a statement of Saiyid 'Abd-u'l-Jabbār Shāh to whose family Malka belonged.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

eminence of the leader, Mawlānā 'Abd-u'llah.⁴⁶ The demarcation of the Durand Line between Afghanistan and British territories in 1893 confirmed the tribes in their belief that they were to be placed under British tutelage. The campaign against Chitral in 1895 enhanced the fears of the tribesmen and there was, once again a widespread rising in 1897. Sir Bruce Lockhart was sent with a force of 35000 to suppress it.⁴⁷ The Mujāhids fought along with the tribesmen with great bravery but the British arms were so superior that the valour of the Mujāhids recoiled upon them in the shape of heavy losses.⁴⁸ The leading figure from the tribal area during this was Mullā Sa'd-u'llah Khān, who was generally known as Mastānah Mullā.⁴⁹

Mawlānā 'Abd-u'llah, the Mujāhid leader, died on 29 November 1902 and was succeeded by Mawlānā 'Abd u'l-Karīm who transferred the Mujāhid headquarters to Ismast for reasons which have not been recorded.⁵⁰ The situation had now changed and there was not much scope left for *jihād* against the British. He died on 11 February 1915 and was succeeded by Mawlānā Ni'mat-u'llah. He is generally believed to have changed the policy and to have arrived at some understanding with the British, perhaps because any warfare against them seemed to be futile. It was during this period that Mawlānā 'Abdur Raḥīm who assumed the name Muḥammad Baṣḥir after joining the Camp established several centres to keep up the spirit of *jihād*. These were instrumental in making it necessary for the British to maintain troops in the area so that they could not be diverted to the various theatres of war. It was because of him that the Mujāhids made some small incursions into British territory. His main contribution was the establishment of a centre in Chamarkand in Yāghistān which soon established a much higher reputation than that of Ismast. Mawlānā Ni'mat-u'llah was assassinated by 'Abd-u'r-Raḥīd who had assumed the name of Muḥamad Yūsuf and had earlier received college education upto the graduation level.

⁴⁶ Ibid, pp. 474-489.

⁴⁷ Vincent Smith, *Oxford History of India*, op. cit., p. 700.

⁴⁸ Mihr, *Sarguzasht-i-Mujāhidin*, op. cit., p. 489.

⁴⁹ Ibid, p. 491.

⁵⁰ Ibid, pp. 491, 494.

He belonged to Mardan and had migrated to participate in *jihād*. He was dissatisfied with Mawlānā Ni‘mat-u’llah’s policy and, therefore, assassinated him.⁵¹

This brings us to the close of the history of the *jihād* against the Sikhs and the British. There are some other aspects of the movement which are no less significant. It is necessary, therefore, to turn to them.

The movement was sustained by contributions from India. It needed a big organization to collect funds and persuade able-bodied men to leave their families, their belongings and their past associations to undertake a hazardous venture which promised only austerity, privation and fighting for a cause that seemed destined to fail after the early hopes of success that had begun to dwindle after the unhappy rebellion in Samah territory and seemed to be dashed at Bālākot. Even the expectation that Saiyid Aḥmad Shahīd had only disappeared and would reappear soon to lead his followers to victory had gradually died out. Thus no promise of immediate or future success fired the enthusiasm of these dedicated men. They were disheartened neither by their own defeats nor by the treachery of their allies who were quick in seeking their help and then betraying them. There was only one source of inspiration for them and no other. They sought the pleasure of God. They believed that so long as they and their brethren were under the yoke of non-Muslims, it was incumbent upon them, to make the utmost effort to shake it off. They believed that it was their duty to make effort, success was not theirs to command. Even their enemies could not withhold praise for their sincerity and devotion. W. W. Hunter who was greatly perturbed at the fact that such widespread “conspiracy” should exist in British India against the government and brands the leaders as “traitors”,⁵² says about the chief organizers at Ṣādiqpur in Patna that Saiyid Aḥmad Shahīd “chose men of indomitable zeal and strength of will. We have seen how, time after time, when the cause appeared ruined, they again and again, raised the standard of Holy War from the dust. Indefatigable as

⁵¹ Ibid, op. 499-510.

⁵² W.W. Hunter, op. cit., e.g., p. 70.

missionaries, careless of themselves, blameless in their lives, supremely devoted to the overthrow of the English Infidels, admirably skilful in organizing a permanent system for supplying money and recruits, the Patna Khalifs stand forth as the types and examples of the sect. Much of their teaching was faultless, and it has been given to them to stir up thousands of their countrymen to a purer life, a truer conception of the Almighty".⁵³

There were trusted workers posted in every district, who sent up recruits to Patna for training. "Of them, the greater part, after having their zeal still further stimulated by the lectures of the Patna leaders, were sent off by detachments to the camp on the Frontier. The more promising youths were singled out for a longer course of instruction, and after being thoroughly trained in the doctrine of sedition, were returned as colporteurs or missionaries to their own Province."⁵⁴ "There were two kinds of missionaries, those stationed at places considered to be sufficiently important for organizational work and itinerant preachers. Some of the latter spent practically all their lives travelling from one place to another. They had no belongings worth the name, no shelter, no company and no personal friends. Much more does the blameless Wahabi missionary's lonely life render him an object of interest to the villagers upon his route. Throughout many months of the year he enters the door of no human dwelling. He comes from a distant province, and during the long journey, he admits no companion, save perhaps a faithful disciple, to interrupt his self-communings. His serenity of demeanour and indifference to external surroundings make him a visibly different being from ordinary men. It is not surprising, therefore, that the villagers cluster around him, and forget for a moment their disputes about water courses and their long standing boundary feuds."⁵⁵

It was not only through warriors and missionaries that the movement was sustained. A good deal of literature also was produced. It is quite true that some of it was merely of propaganda value, because an appeal was made to men who were

⁵³ Ibid, p. 60.

⁵⁴ Ibid, p. 61.

⁵⁵ Ibid, p. 64.

barely literate but men of learning also had to be canvassed or the leadership would have died out and there were some works of solid worth. This was also necessary because, as we shall see later, there were some ulema who did not agree with the tenets and the philosophy of the movement, whose arguments had to be countered and this could not be done merely by inflammatory statements and poems.⁵⁶

If we take into consideration the fact that the network of the organization covered the entire Subcontinent we are struck with the business-like efficiency of the headquarters and its agencies. The most remarkable feature of the movement was its discipline. There did arise occasions of serious dissent. There were instances, very few in number, when men who had gone to the Camp with the intention of fighting came back because they did not approve of the policies pursued by the leader. And if they tried to stir trouble in the Camp, they did not succeed in winning much support.⁵⁷ When Mawlānā 'Ināyat 'Alī did not agree with the policy of his brother Mawlānā Wilāyat 'Alī, he only withdrew for a short while. While the fight was against the Sikhs and the British had yet not taken alarm, it was comparatively easier to carry on the work because secrecy was not so essential, but after the British conquest of the Panjab, it was a different story. Before the clash with the British, it was common for workers in indigo factories, for instance, to apply for leave for doing some work for the movement, even for fighting in the Pathan areas;⁵⁸ but after the British became involved, it became high treason to work against them. Then every little action became highly hazardous. Just as the warrior on the battlefield ran the risk of losing his head, the humblest messenger who carried a letter or a sum of money consciously incurred the danger of the noose falling around his neck.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Ibid, pp. 55-60 gives a list of some publications meant for the people. The names of more solid works are found in most of the literature produced on the movement, e.g., Thānesarī, *Ḥayāt-i-Saiyid Ahmad Shahid*, op. cit., gives a list of the works of Shāh Muḥammad Ismā'īl Shahid on pp. 311-315. He was not a "popular" writer.

⁵⁷ Ibid, pp. 234-236 for Mawlawī Maḥbūb 'Alī's role in the Camp.

⁵⁸ W.W. Hunter, op. cit., p. 12.

⁵⁹ Mihr, *Sarguzāsh-i-Mujāhidīn*, op. cit., pp. 617, 618. A typical case is described in Ibid, pp. 601-607.

The colossal organization needed a large secretariat. The leadership at Patna could not have functioned at all, much less so efficiently as it did, if it had not been assisted by a capable, trustworthy and business-like bureau. It had all the time to work secretly undisturbed by idlers or curious visitors and had to take special precautions against intelligence agents. Hence gradually a maze of buildings grew up, ostensibly a cluster of domestic structures sprawling in a disorganized and confused manner, but in fact carefully planned to exclude unwanted visitors and intruders. It was also admirably suited to provide, as Hunter puts it from his own point of view, "a caravan-serai for rebels and traitors", or, in unloaded language, for secret workers. "They surrounded it", he continues, "with a labyrinth of walls and outhouses, with one enclosure leading into another by side-doors, and little secret courts in out of the way corners. The early khalifs had threatened to resist the Magistrate's warrant by force of arms, but their successors found a less dangerous defence in a network of passages, chambers and outlets. When Government at length took proceedings against this nest of conspirators, it found it necessary to procure a plan of the buildings, just as if it were dealing with a fortified town".⁶⁰ Šādiqpur, as the centre was generally called, contained a mosque and a hospice, along with other buildings. All the buildings were plain and functional. The recruits sent up by the itinerant preachers and local leaders were accommodated in the hospice for the time they were under training. The head of the organization was an extremely busy man. He corresponded with all the field workers, led the prayers in the mosque, delivered lectures on religious topics to the recruits and others and "organized and personally worked a complicated system of drafts in a secret language, by which large sums were safely transmitted," to the Camp. The recruits had to travel long distances through areas where they could easily be recognized as strangers because of the differences in their physiognomy and language and therefore an organization was set up to remove these difficulties. At every stage there were men to receive the travellers and to put them up for as long as was necessary. It is remarkable that none of them

⁶⁰ W.W. Hunter, *op. cit.*, p. 61. Hunter uses the word 'khalifs' for the leaders of the movement at Patna. The movement itself did not use the term.

betrayed his trust and neither temptation of reward nor fear of detection could induce a single person to give evidence in the trials initiated by the Government. The local committees functioned efficiently and the recruits faced no difficulties.⁶¹

The British attached greater importance to the Jihād Movement and the Mujāhidūn's centre than to the recalcitrance of the tribes on their north-west frontier. The reasons are fairly obvious. The tribes had only a spirit of local independence which could be humoured or even suppressed if it grew inconvenient. The British had learnt from experience that it was difficult for any one to forge real unity amongst them because of long standing feuds and jealousies. Their chiefs could be bribed; the loyalties of even entire tribes could be purchased. Their problem could be solved piecemeal; one tribe could be dealt with at one time. And even when they made common cause against the British, their holding power was extremely limited. They could not fight continuously for long, their excitement was at best sporadic. They had the advantage of good terrain for guerilla warfare, but it was being gradually neutralized by the expansion of roads. The tribes were motivated only by a tradition, not by any burning conviction or ideal. If peace with the British were made more attractive for them than war, they would compromise with their traditions and seek a new *modus vivendi* with the British. The Mujāhidūn, on the other hand, were customers of a different kind. They were knit together by a passionately held religious conviction. They were a closely united brotherhood held together by an ideal. Their hearts enshrined a flame that was hard to extinguish. They had hitched their wagon to the star of immortal bliss. In the medley of shifting loyalties in the tribal area, they alone had remained constant in their hostility to the British domination of the Subcontinent. The British, therefore, singled them out with unerring instinct for total destruction. The entire machinery of the Government, was put into action for this purpose and no front was left inactive. We have seen the Mujāhidūn first isolated, then defeated several times and ultimately reduced to military imbecility by the armed might of the British Empire.

⁶¹ Ibid, pp. 83-85.

But so long as the organization in British India remained alive it would prove to be a source of danger.

The first line of attack was provided by the Mujāhid organization itself. It has been mentioned how deviations from the Ḥanafī ritual and rulings created the rift with the tribal population. Inside India as well veritable dust storms of controversy on unimportant details of doctrine, interpretation and practice clouded the entire issue. The movement was launched to deliver the Muslims from political bondage; thanks to the shortsightedness of some of the leaders, it got stuck in the quagmire of sectarian differences. The focal point was provided by Shāh Ismā'il and the movement became the meeting place for all those who had been influenced by the doctrines of Najd and Yemen.⁶² Large sections of the Muslims of the Subcontinent turned their faces away from the Mujāhidūn and came to look upon them as heretics. This was one of the results of the movement becoming independent of the House of Shāh Wali-u'llah in Delhi. After the martyrdom of Saiyid Aḥmad, Ṣādiqpur established full control and, after that, extremist *ghairu taqlid* became the creed of the movement, thus converting it into a sect. As the beliefs of the sect corresponded in a great degree to those of the Wāhhābis of Najd, those connected with the Jihad Movement came to be called Indian Wāhhābis by British writers. This was a clever move for 'Abd-u'l-Wāhhāb and his followers, because of their excesses in the Hejaz, had incurred opprobrium in the Muslim world including India. In a short while many sincere theologians of the orthodox Ḥanafī school felt bound to challenge the views of the leaders of the Jihad Movement and British machinations induced some not so honest ulema to join the attack as well.⁶³ The supporters of the movement were thus isolated and an important undertaking like *jihād* was downgraded from being an Islamic endeavour to a sectarian venture. The sole beneficiaries were the British who had abetted this development. They could now take most severe steps against the so-called 'Indian Wāhhābi fanatics' without any reactions among other sectors of the Muslim society. The Muslim elite or masses were not enamoured

⁶² Sindhi, op. cit., pp. 109-117.

⁶³ Thānesari, *Ḥayāt-i-Saiyid Aḥmad Shāhid*, op. cit., pp. 23, 24.

of British rule as they fully demonstrated in the rebellion of 1857,⁶⁴ but because of the success of the propaganda against the Mujāhids, which, as we have seen, was not baseless, they became indifferent to their fate.

The British then launched a number of prosecutions against the leaders, workers and supporters of the Movement.⁶⁵ The police was successful in unearthing a good deal of information and no important worker was left without being brought to face a trial; some accused turned crown witnesses; where sufficient evidence was not available to ensure a conviction, it is alleged, it was fabricated.⁶⁶ Some persons were yet to be arrested and investigations were still proceeding when W. W. Hunter published his book *The Indian Musalmans* which could not but prejudice the courts.⁶⁷ The sentences were generally severe; long terms of imprisonment or transportation to the Andamans were awarded to many; the properties of the main leaders were confiscated and sold at ridiculous prices. The entire complex of buildings at Śādiqpur was razed to the ground.⁶⁸ The surprising fact is not that a severe blow was dealt to the movement but that it did not collapse completely and, as we have seen, the Camp in the tribal area continued to exist and draw contributions from India. The only change was that money was collected by the Camp itself through its own agents, who showed all ingeniousness and devotion in undertaking extremely hazardous missions.⁶⁹

British vindictiveness, however, succeeded completely in breaking the morale of the community which had been dubbed as Wahhābis. A person who had shown great courage in the course of his trial and had refused to compromise with his

⁶⁴ I.H. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Sub-continent*, op. cit., pp. 232-233.

⁶⁵ Mihr, *Sarguzasht-i-Mujāhidin*, op. cit., pp. 371-425; Thānesarī, *Hayāt-i-Saiyid Aḥmad Shahid*, op. cit., pp. 21-22.

⁶⁶ Mihr, *Sarguzasht-i-Mujāhidin*, op. cit., e.g., p. 387.

⁶⁷ Thānesarī, *Hayāt-i-Saiyid Aḥmad Shahid*, op. cit., 391-396. The confiscations were so widespread that a large number of the Muslim families of Bengal were totally ruined. Sir 'Abd-u'r-Rahīm's address, All India Muslim League, 1925 session. Also, Mihr, *Sarguzasht-i-Mujāhidin*, op. cit., pp. 407, 408.

⁶⁸ Hunter himself was aware of this, W.W. Hunter, op. cit., p. 75.

⁶⁹ Mihr, *Sarguzasht-i-Mujāhidin*, op. cit., pp. 611-618.

convictions, Mawlawī Muḥammad Ja'far Thānesarī, now began to protest, against blatant facts, that the movement had been directed solely against the Sikhs and had never been intended to come into conflict with the British, for whom Saiyid Aḥmad Shahīd had entertained feelings of respect, even loyalty, because of their religious tolerance.⁷⁰ He went to such extremes in the effort to seek conciliation with the British that he misquoted historical records.⁷¹ The ball that was set rolling by Sir Syed Ahmed Khān⁷² and Thānesarī soon gathered momentum until Mawlawī Muḥammad Ḥusain Batālawī applied, on behalf of his community, to the British Government to replace the word Wahhābī by Ahl-i-Ḥadīth which is the present accepted name used by the community as well as by others. This request was granted by the Government in 1888.⁷³ In fairness it must be mentioned that the community had never called itself Wahhābī. In the beginning they had claimed to be Ḥanafīs differing from them only in matters where some direct authority of ḥadīth, in their view, came into conflict with a Ḥanafī ruling or practice. This, as has been mentioned was the stand of Saiyid Aḥmad Shahīd as well as his later followers like Mawlānā Wilāyat 'Alī. One Mawlawī Muḥammad Faṣīh was deputed by those who objected to the practices of *raf'u yadain* and *āmīn bi'l-jahr* to debate the matter with Mawlānā Wilāyat 'Alī. Mawlawī Muḥammad Faṣīh had to concede the contention that if a Ḥanafī is convinced that there is a clear ḥadīth on some point and he acts upon it in preference to a Ḥanafī ruling, he does not thereby forsake the Ḥanafī fold.⁷⁴ However it seems that later this stand was given up, because Nawab Ṣiddīq Ḥasan Khān

⁷⁰ These efforts are discussed in Mihr, *Saiyid Aḥmad Shahīd*, op. cit., pp. 159-162.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² He published a review of W.W. Hunter, *Indian Musalmans* in the *Pioneer*, Allahabad which was reproduced as a pamphlet in Benares in 1872 and has since been reproduced and quoted at numerous places. Also Ṣafī-u'd-dawlah Ḥusām-u'l-mulk Saiyid Muḥammad 'Alī Ḥasan Khān, *Ma'āthir-i-Ṣiddīqī mawsūm ba Sirat-i-Walāyāhī* (Lucknow, 1924), v. ii, pp. 141-143. The review was published in the form of a pamphlet in England as well, ibid, p. 143.

⁷³ Thānesarī, *Ḥayāt-i-Saiyid Aḥmad Shahīd*, p. 26. The letter from Government of India is quoted in Muḥammad 'Alī Ḥasan Khān, op. cit., v. iii, p. 163.

⁷⁴ Ibid, pp. 342-344. The Ḥanafīs generally do not concede that the traditions regarding *raf'u yadain* and *āmīn bi'l-jahr* were not superseded.

of Bhopal, who was a stalwart of the Ahl-i-Hadīth school, no longer claimed that the followers of that school were Hanafīs in any sense, because, according to him, the Wahhābīs were in fact *muqallids* and followed the interpretation of Imām Ḥanbal whereas the Ahl-i-Hadīth did not follow any *imām* in preference to others and were independent in the matter of *ijtihād*. "For them Wahhābī is a term of abuse, precisely for the reason that the Wahhābīs are *muqallids*."⁷⁵ The similarity, however, persists because like Saiyid Aḥmad Shahīd and Shāh Ismā'il and others of that school, the Wahhābīs also claim that they prefer to act on a clear tradition if it contravenes a ruling of the school they profess to follow.⁷⁶ The British did exploit the allegation that the followers of Saiyid Aḥmad Shahīd were Wahhābīs, but they did not first apply the epithet; it was first used by Mawlawī Faḍl-i-Rasūl of Badā'un and his followers and has not gone out of use even now.⁷⁷ Nor does it seem to have been resented in the beginning, because Sir Syed Aḥmed Khan asserted that he himself was a Wahhābī in his review of Hunter's *Indian Muslims*.⁷⁸ The tragedy was that a great movement that had been inaugurated for the purpose of liberating the Muslims from non-Muslim domination was not able to command general support because of the tactical mistake of combining it with an enthusiasm for reforming religious beliefs. It is sad that its only living monument should be the addition of a new sect to the already large number of schisms in the community. In the earlier days there were clashes

⁷⁵ Muḥammad 'Alī Hasan Khān, op. cit., v. ii, pp. 153, 160-161. Mas'ūd 'Ālam Nadwī in *Muḥammad bin 'Abd-u'l-Wahhāb* (Karachi, 1949) quotes (on p. 140) *Al-hadiyāt-i's-sunniyah* (p. 99) which says, "We (Wahhābīs) follow in details the school of Imām Aḥmad bin Ḥanbal, the *imām* of Ahl-i's-sunnah; we do not claim (independent) *ijtihād*". The Arabic original reads.
 واما مذ هبتا فبذهب الاسام احمد حنبل امام اهل السنة في الروع ولا ندعي الاجتهاد
 At another place (p. 141), it says, "We also follow Imām Aḥmad Shahīd Ḥanbal's school and do not condemn the followers of (any of) the four *imāms*".

However, the first quotation is followed by this qualifying statement; "But if some *sunnah* of the Prophet becomes manifest to us, we act upon it and do not prefer any one else's opinion to it". This was precisely the stand of the earlier Ahl-i-Hadīth from Shāh Muḥammad Ismā'il to Mawlānā Wilāyat 'Alī, see *supra* f.n. 74.

⁷⁶ Mas'ūd 'Ālam Nadwī, op. cit., pp. 140-141.

⁷⁷ Muḥammad Hasan 'Alī Khān, op. cit., p. 156.

⁷⁸ *Ibid*, p. 162.

and litigation which soured relations between the Ahl-i-Ḥadīth and others, but fortunately now the intolerance has subsided to a great extent.⁷⁹

To conclude the discussion of the *jihād* and reform movement, a brief reference is necessary to its offshoot and a parallel development in Bengal.

It has already been mentioned that Saiyid Aḥmad twice visited Calcutta and many men came from the interior of the Province to listen to him and his associates. It is not known for certain whether Mīr Nithār 'Alī commonly known as Tītū Mīr met him there, or as another tradition has it, in Hejaz. In any case Tītū Mīr became his disciple.⁸⁰ Hindu customs and ideas were strong in Bengal and in the rural areas sometimes large communities of peasants were Muslim only in name and still followed many idolatrous practices. Even some well-known Muslim poets found it necessary to pay homage to Hindu deities.⁸¹ Thus there was a pressing need for the propagation of Islamic beliefs and a crusade against superstition, heathen beliefs and un-Islamic practices. It is also true that the Bengali Muslim was susceptible to the preaching of Islam, as would be clear from the fact that, when convinced, he was willing even to travel to the Mujāhid Camp right across North India and run all the hazards of arrest and prosecution and to face an inclement climate and the risk of being killed in battle after reaching there. He had every reason to detest his Hindu and British exploiters who had reduced him to poverty and helplessness. Tītū Mīr was, therefore, successful in converting the Muslims of Nadia and Twenty-four Parganahs to his views and creating religious consciousness among them. They were awakened to a new sense of dignity and the Hindu landlords, who had been foisted on Bengal by the British, no longer found them as servile as their other tenants or as Tītū Mīr's followers themselves had been before their conversion.

⁷⁹ For early disputes, see Thānesarī, *Ḥayāt-i-Sāiyid Aḥmad Shahīd*, op. cit., pp. 391-396.

⁸⁰ The former view is held by Dr. 'Abd-ul-Bārī in (*A*) *History of Freedom Movement*, op. cit., v. i, p. 550 and the latter by Mihr, *Sarguzasht-i-Mujāhidīn*, op. cit., p. 216, also by W.W. Hunter, op. cit., p. 37.

⁸¹ (*A*) *History of the Freedom Movement*, op. cit., pp. 542, 543.

Hence the Hindu zamindars started persecuting them in various ways. The most obnoxious measure was the imposition of a heavy tax on beards.⁸² The peasants were generally ignorant and simple. They had not been used to demanding receipts for payment of rent to the landlords, who, now brought fraudulent claims of arrears against them and, because the British law gave the landlords arbitrary powers of summary arrest, the peasants were arrested and maltreated.⁸³

One of the villages, Sarfarāzpur, refused to pay the beard tax, whereupon the zamindars attacked it and plundered the houses. They also burnt a mosque. Petitions to the Government authorities went unheeded and brought no relief. A responsible emissary was sent to Calcutta to approach the higher authorities but no one listened to him. In the meanwhile the high-handedness of the zamindars continued unabated. The peasants were thus goaded into taking the law into their own hands. They built up a strong bamboo palisade around one of their villages, Narkulbāriā, and stored up rice and other provisions. They attacked a number of villages and in retaliation for the destruction of their mosque, they slaughtered cows in the market places and defiled some temples. In all these incursions the most serious event was that the brother of the zamindar, who had been foremost in persecuting them, was killed. They grew more confident and, as their power increased, they proclaimed that the days of British rule were over and that the Muslims were the legitimate masters of the Empire whom the British had deprived of sovereignty. In those days small indigo factories and other British concerns were scattered in the countryside. The resident British agents took fright and made strong representations to the Government to suppress the movement. At last the British Joint Magistrate of Bashīrhāt, Alexander moved against Narkulbāriā with a strong force of police which was beaten off by the defenders. The British lost two native officers, ten sepoy

⁸² The tax was Rupees two and a half per beard, which in terms of the value of rupee in those days was extortionate, W.W. Hunter, *op. cit.*, p. 37, f.n.2.

⁸³ The law was Regulation VII of 1799. For details vide Bengal Judicial Consultations, 13 April, 1832.

and two musketeers.⁸⁴ The peasants chased Alexander, who escaped. They destroyed a factory at Baraguri and arrested the European superintendent of another, who bought his release by swearing allegiance to Titā Mir and promising to manufacture indigo for his people. Alexander repaired to Calcutta and persuaded the Government to send a force against the insurgents. A fairly strong force consisting of a regiment of native infantry, a contingent of House Artillery with two field guns and some troopers of the Body Guard was sent against Titā Mir whose followers came out of their palisade and gave battle in the open field and, though untrained and ill-armed, offered brave and stubborn resistance.⁸⁵ Titā Mir and fifty of his followers were killed. Their dead bodies were burnt and their houses were looted.

A reign of terror followed the defeat. All suspected sympathizers of the movement were rounded up, resulting in the trial of one hundred and ninety-seven persons, out of whom one was sentenced to death, eleven to transportation for life and one hundred and twenty-eight to various terms of imprisonment. Four died during the trial. Fifty-three were acquitted or released.⁸⁶ Hunter has attempted to connect Titā Mir's movement with the fortunes of Saiyid Aḥmad Shahīd. He has asserted that when the Saiyid was able to capture Peshawar, Titā Mir threw off 'all disguise' and has expressed the opinion that "the petty oppression to which the Hindu zamindars subjected his followers", helped him in finding the necessary support to launch a programme of violent action.⁸⁷ This interpretation does not hold water because Titā Mir had started preaching earlier and the Hindu interference started when the first Friday prayers were organized.⁸⁸ The disaster of Bālākot took place on 6 May 1831 and right upto 25 September 1831, Titā Mir's lieutenant was knocking at the doors of the British authorities in Calcutta to get some redress. Therefore, the idea that Titā Mir had secretly been

⁸⁴ Criminal consultations, 22 November, 1831; Proceedings of the Hon'ble President-in-Council Military Department, 16 November, 1831.

⁸⁵ W.W. Hunter, op. cit., p. 39.

⁸⁶ Bengal Judicial Consultations, 5 August 1833 (ii).

⁸⁷ W.W. Hunter, op. cit., p. 37, several other British writers have also expressed the same view.

⁸⁸ Mihr, *Sarguzāsh-i-Mujāhidīn*, op. cit., p. 217.

working for or even thinking of subverting British rule in India is much too far fetched to make any sense. Indeed the literature of the Jihād Movement does not mention Tītā Mir's movement at all, and even the link of his having been influenced by Saiyid Aḥmad Shahīd has been mentioned only by British writers, some of whom also mention that one Miskīn Shāh of the Panjab inspired the armed rebellion which resulted in Tītā Mir's death and defeat.⁸⁹

Another reformer whose work proved to be more lasting was Ḥājī Shari'at-u'llah, the founder of the Farā'idī movement. He was so self-effacing that the information about his life is extremely meagre. He was born of obscure parents in the Parganah of Bandarkhola in the district of Faridpur. He left for *haj* when he was eighteen years old. He seems to have been an earnest minded young man and took advantage of his reaching Mecca by devoting himself to religious studies. It seems that he had studied in some *madrasah* in Bengal before embarking for *haj*. It is not unlikely that when he left his home he had two purposes in mind, to perform the *haj* and to study at a more advanced level. All this is conjecture. It is not even known fully how he spent the twenty long years of absence from Bengal. One tradition says that while in Mecca, he sat at the feet of the well known scholar, Shaikh Ṭāhir a's-Sanbal al-Makkī.⁹⁰ There is another less known report that while on his way back he had a large number of books with him. He was waylaid by robbers who deprived him of his valuable books, at which he joined the band and, through his piety and persuasion, converted them to honest and legal ways of livelihood. This is less probable, though by no means impossible.⁹¹ There is no unanimity regarding the date of his return to Bengal either, which is variously conjectured

⁸⁹ Ibid, p. 219.

⁹⁰ (A) *History of the Freedom Movement*, op. cit., v. i, pp. 542-543. Muin-u'd-din Ahmad Khan, *Faraidi Movement*, (Karachi, 1965), pp. 5, 6 thinks that Ḥājī Shari'at-u'llah's teacher was a different person, Sombol, because a's-Sanbal al-Makkī was a Shāfi'ite whereas the Ḥājī was a staunch Hanafi. This argument is not convincing, because the teachers of Shaikh 'Abd-u'l-Ḥaq and Shāh Walī-u'llah were alike of the Shāfi'i persuasion and the two eminent pupils were Hanāfi's. The book contains a good description of the Farā'idīs and narrates their history in detail.

⁹¹ Mihr, *Sarguzasht-i-Mujāhidin*, op. cit., pp. 214-215.

to be 1802, 1822 and 1828. There is even the suggestion that he came back to Bengal, stayed there for a while, went again to Mecca and finally returned and settled down, when, presumably he started his work.⁹² Because of this confusion regarding the dates, it is not possible to argue conclusively whether he came under Wāhhābī influence in Arabia or he could possibly not have had any contacts with them because of chronological difficulties.⁹³

All that we know for certain is that he was a reformer of great eminence who sought to rid his followers of un-Islamic practices and superstitions. One need not be a Wāhhābī to preach that Muslims should be steadfast in the observance of the duties enjoined by Islam. As his followers were asked to be strict in the performance of their religious duties—*farā'id*, they came to be called Farā'idīs. We have seen how Hindu influence had persisted among the Muslims of Bengal and they had come to have beliefs and follow practices that found no sanction in Islam or were even contradictory to its teachings. Naturally such beliefs and customs were condemned by Ḥājī Shari'at-u'llah, who also was against excessive respect shown to any person, alive or dead. As this was also a Wāhhābī doctrine, efforts have been made to connect Ḥājī Shari'at-u'llah with Wahhabism. Indeed the Ḥājī's teachings were identical neither with those of the Arab Wāhhābīs nor of the Indian Ahl-i-Ḥadīth, though there was some common ground between him and the other two. He forbade for instance the offerings of fruits and flowers at graves and the ceremonies on fixed days after death. Like Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Aziz he ruled that India had become a *dār-u'l-ḥarb* after its passing under British rule and, therefore, 'Id and Friday prayers could not be held.⁹⁴ Until the establishment of Pakistan the Farā'idīs did not hold these congregations. He did not, however, preach *jihād* against the British, perhaps because he considered such an undertaking outside the capabilities of his followers. Shari'at-u'llah was a true missionary. He won the hearts of the simple and poor country folk by living in their midst like one of them. His self-effacement was exemplary. He would not let anyone call

⁹² (A) *History of the Freedom Movement*, op. cit., v. i, p. 545, f.n. 3.

⁹³ Ibid, p. 545.

⁹⁴ Ibid, pp. 545-547. Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Aziz did not interdict Friday and 'Id prayers.

him *pir* or himself a *murid*, or a disciple. He was only an *ustād*, a teacher, to his people and they were his pupils.

He died probably in 1830⁹⁵ and was succeeded by his son Muḥammad Muḥsin, commonly known as Dādḥā Miyān. He was a dynamic leader and a great organizer. He believed that his father's ruling that India was *dār-u'l-ḥarb* had its logical corollaries. To what extent should Muslims subordinate themselves to the non-Muslim rulers? He was too realistic like his father to advocate an armed struggle, hence he laid down that the Muslims should organize their own affairs and have as little recourse to British authorities as possible. He, therefore, divided the area where his followers lived into manageable districts or circles. A deputy was appointed in each who carried on missionary work and collected funds for the furtherance of the movement. He also tried to settle disputes by arbitration and parties could take them to Dādḥā Miyān himself if they so desired. But they were prohibited from going to British Courts. He practically organized a parallel administration for the Farā'īdīs which worked efficiently. No movement that worked for the dignity and independence of the Muslim peasantry could fail to incur the displeasure and hostility of the Hindu landlords. Dādḥā Miyān found it unbearable that they should force Muslims to pay for idolatrous religious functions of the Hindus like Durgā Pūjā. Yet he tried to avoid a head-long clash with them. He believed and propagated that land belonged to God and that the state was entitled to revenue and no one else could claim the ownership of the land or rent from the cultivators.⁹⁶ But he does not seem to have launched a campaign against the payment of rent. He merely persuaded his followers to settle on state-owned lands so that they might be free from the illegal and humiliating extortions and compulsory contributions for idolatrous purposes.⁹⁷ It is significant that the Hindu landlords and British indigo planters always looked with disfavour upon any effort to ameliorate the condition of the Muslim peasantry of Bengal and the Farā'īdīs also incurred their hostility. They tried to persuade the peasants not to be-

⁹⁵ Mihr, *Sarguzāsh-i-Mujāhidīn*, op. cit., p. 215.

⁹⁶ (A) *History of the Freedom Movement*, op. cit., v. i, p. 548.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

come Farā'īḍis and used all kinds of coercive methods to reinforce their efforts, but they did not succeed. Then they instituted many false cases against Dūdhā Miyān but he had been careful not to get involved in any illegal action and, therefore, the suits failed because of lack of evidence. The resourceful enemies, however, possessed considerable influence with the Government and they succeeded in bringing about Dūdhā Miyān's incarceration in the Alipur Jail as a state prisoner.⁹⁸ The Farā'īḍis were now leaderless and the movement lost its momentum, but the sect continued to exist and stuck to its beliefs.

The reform movements of Titū Mir and Dūdhā Miyān leavened the Muslim religious thought in Bengal and brought about a greater political consciousness. It was easier for the later followers of Saiyid Aḥmad Shahīd to work in the province because of this. It has already been mentioned how much success attended the work of Mawlānās Wilāyat 'Alī and 'Ināyat 'Alī. Other religious leaders who are still remembered are Mawlānās Karāmat 'Alī, Imām-u'd-dīn and 'Abd-u'llah.⁹⁹

⁹⁸ Ibid, p. 549.

⁹⁹ Ibid, p. 555.

The Great Conflagration

So much has been written on the rebellion of 1857 that it is not necessary to devote much space in this book to its causes or a narrative of its main events, nor would it serve any purpose to discuss the causes of its failure.¹ It would suffice to say here that the British had exploited the people so mercilessly that discontent was smouldering everywhere and British observers were by no means unaware of it.² Besides the economic drain,³

¹ There are several books devoted to this subject. Indeed the quantity of available material is embarrassing. The most recent works are Syed Moinul Haq, *The Great Revolution of 1857* (Karachi, 1968), and Surendra Nath Sen, *Eighteen Fifty-seven*, (Delhi, 1958). There is a brief discussion in the present author's *The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent*, op. cit., pp. 212-233. Also see *A History of the Freedom Movement*, op. cit., v. ii, Part I, Chapters X, XI and XII.

² At the valedictory banquet given to Lord Canning by the Court of Directors, he uttered these memorable words:-"I wish for a peaceful time of office; but I cannot forget that in the sky of India, serene as it is, a small cloud may arise no larger than a man's hand, but which, growing larger and larger, may at last threaten to burst, and overwhelm us with ruin." Marshman, op. cit., pp. 489, 490. Also R.W. Frazer, *British India*, (London, 1924), pp. 272, 273. says that many Britishers had sensed danger in Dalhousie's measures.

³ Moinul Haq, op. cit., pp. 17-22. Montgomery Martin wrote, "I do not think it possible for human ingenuity to avert entirely the evil effects of a continued drain of three or four million pounds a year from a distant country like India, and which is not returned to it in any shape," R.C. Dutt, *The Economic History of India*, (London, 1906), p. 410.

the susceptibilities of the people were wounded by crude efforts to convert them to Christianity⁴ as well as by the destruction of their systems of education.⁵ Even more blatant than these were the gratuitous insults heaped upon their religious beliefs and customs.⁶ The introduction of the greased cartridge was the last straw and the fact that the Government came out with the statement that the grease did not contain beef or pork fat further angered the sepoys because it was false.⁷ The outbreak of the mutiny among the sepoys was a godsend for all those who had been patiently working for the overthrow of the British empire in India. The foremost among these were ulema and sufis, because they could not forget that the Muslims were in duty bound to recover their heritage. They were disunited, disorganized and bewildered; therefore they felt helpless. The spark was not dead in their hearts, but it had to remain hidden because its exposure would only bring disaster.

There had to be a reasonable scope for a struggle, because desire alone could not provide any hope of inflicting a real injury on a well-established and powerful empire. Saiyid Ahmad Shahid fought against a much smaller state and he soon discovered that it was not easy to strike an effective blow against it. He also realized that there was not sufficient awakening among the Muslims themselves to unite them even against the Sikhs who had established their rule over a Muslim majority area and were extending their dominions at the cost of warlike Pathans whose solid population in the area should have been a source of great strength to him. In the rest of India the odds were very heavy against those who cared for the liberty of the Muslims. Nowhere except in Bengal did they form the majority and there the East India Company's policies had reduced them to atject helplessness. There could be little hope of gaining the cooperation of the vast Hindu population in any effort to restore Muslim domination. The ideological gap between the Muslims and

⁴ Moinul Haq, op. cit., pp. 23-28, Sen, op. cit., pp. 9-12.

⁵ Moinul Haq, op. cit., pp. 29-31.

⁶ Sen, op. cit., 2-9.

⁷ Kaye and Malleison, *History of the Sepoy War in India*, (London, 1889) v. i, p. 381, Roberts, *Letters Written during the Indian Mutiny*, (London, 1924), v. i, p. 431.

the Hindus seemed to be unbridgeable. The British had done their utmost to alienate the Hindus from the Muslims ever since they came to power.⁸ They could not have succeeded if the two peoples had not been already nursing feelings of antagonism against each other, but the British brought about much greater hostility than had existed earlier. Indeed the Hindus had taken advantage of the British policy of advancing them at the cost of the Muslims. It was almost obvious that the best that the Muslims could achieve was to ensure for themselves security and protection.

But the British themselves changed the situation through their unwise policies. Economic exploitation, general impoverishment of the population, the uprooting of ruling dynasties, indulgence in missionary activities by officials and the state patronage of proselytism to Christianity created an atmosphere where it became possible for the Hindus and the Muslims to make common cause against the alien rulers, who, instead of building bridges between themselves and the subject peoples, had been deliberately destroying them because of racial pride and the false notion that isolation would add to their prestige.⁹ The Doctrine of Lapse, based on refusal to recognize adopted sons as legal heirs of rulers dying without offspring, resulted in the annexation of many states.¹⁰ It may be noted here that Hindu law fully recognizes adopted children as equal in all respects to real children.¹¹ It made little difference whether the dynasty had been defiant at some time or constantly loyal to the British.¹² If Nagpur had sometimes defied the British, Tanjore had been a

⁸ For a fuller discussion see I.H. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Sub-continent*, op. cit., pp. 234-236.

⁹ Syed Ahmed Khan, *Risālah asbāb-i-baghāwat-i-Hind*, (Karachi, 1955), p. 34; *The Mutinies, the Government, and the People*, by a Hindu (Calcutta 1858), p. 39.

¹⁰ The Doctrine of Lapse laid it down that "princely adoptions could only be valid if ratified by the supreme government. If that was withheld, the state would pass by 'lapse' to the Paramount Power". Vincent Smith, *Oxford History of India*, op. cit., p. 638. The affected states were Satara (1848), Jaitpur and Sambalpur (1849), Baghat (1850), Udaipur (1852), Jhansi (1853) and Nagpur (1854), *Ibid*, p. 659.

¹¹ *Ibid*, p. 658.

¹² The ruler of Nagpur's personal property, his elephants, horses, pp. 83-84. *iture and jewels were auctioned, Kaye and Malleeson, op. cit., v. i,*

faithful ally. Even pensioners like the Nawab of Karnatak and Nānā Ṣāhib, a friend of the British in his earlier years and claimant to the office of the Peshwa, were not spared.¹³ Oudh was annexed simply because the British had coveted its rich lands from the beginning.¹⁴ The British had not permitted Wājid 'Alī Shāh to function at all; his attempts at reorganizing his administration and to bring about an efficient handling of affairs had been deliberately countered. Then charges of maladministration were brought against the ruler and he was packed away to Calcutta.¹⁵ The reasons advanced for treating a faithful ally like this deceived nobody.¹⁶ It mattered little whether the British openly confessed that they had unjustly siezed Sind or found seemingly plausible reasons for annexing Oudh; the result was uniformly disaffection against a paramount power that had acted in obviously a treacherous manner.

The annexation of Indian states affected the Hindus and the Muslims alike, for instance, Muslims were not excluded from higher posts in Hindu states, nor Hindus in Muslim states, but the British excluded the natives from all higher posts. When the Oudh army was disbanded, the greater sufferers were high caste Brahmins who had generally formed the bulk of the armed forces.¹⁷

¹³ Vincent Smith, *Oxford History of India*, op. cit., p. 660. "The Maharaja was constantly in the habit of entertaining European gentlemen", J. Lang, *Wanderings in India and other Sketches of Life in Hindustan*, (London, 1879), p. 116. The treasure at Kanpur had been placed in his custody and it was even proposed that British women should be placed under his care at his residence for safety when the Rebellion started. "The relations we had always sustained with this man had been of so friendly a nature that not a suspicion of his fidelity entered the minds of any of our leaders," M. Thomson, *The Story of Cawnpore* (London, 1859), pp. 32, 33.

¹⁴ Pandit Sundar Lal, *San Sattāwan* (Aligarh, 1957), pp. 25, 26 records a report placed before the British Parliament which speaks of the fertility, the richness and the beauty of Oudh. That was the reason why treaties were enforced upon Oudh on various pretexts. First the state promised to pay forty lacs of rupees and two lacs a month during the time the services of the British troops were needed for the infamous invasion of Rohelkhand in 1773 and then to cede Benares, Marshman, op. cit., p. 178. Wellesley annexed half the kingdom in 1801, Ibid, p. 255.

¹⁵ Najm-u'l-Ghanī Khān, *Tārīkh-i-Awadh*, (Lucknow, 1919), v. v, pp. 125-126.

¹⁶ Mrs. J.A. Harris, *A Lady's Diary of the Siege of Lucknow*, (London, 1858), p. 60 records how the besieged British thought that their plight was a just punishment for the iniquity of the annexation of Oudh.

¹⁷ I.H. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Sub-continent*, op. cit., pp. 227, 228.

Common grievances created a favourable atmosphere for common action. Many persons who had cherished the dream of ridding the Subcontinent of British rule saw a unique opportunity for action in the general atmosphere of discontent that prevailed every where and in all the strata of the society, from princes to peasants. The princes were now uncertain about the future of their dynasties; the peasants, already impoverished by the general economic drain, were made to pay a higher rate of revenue to the new rulers.¹⁸ No sector of the Indian society was contented.¹⁹ It is true that the British found supporters among the Indian princes as well as commoners who came to their rescue not because they believed that the British were in the right but for the sordid reason that a careful calculation seemed to make it certain that they would win and all who rebelled would be heavily punished.²⁰

It is not certain whether there was a conspiracy to overthrow the British Government. The arguments generally advanced against the existence of a conspiracy are that the way the struggle developed did not display any plan, but then a conspiracy and a good plan of a large scale rebellion are not identical. Hitherto most of the writings on the subject were based upon official records or the memoirs published by Europeans, who were not fully aware of what was happening around them.²¹ Even then many British observers noticed mysterious movements of itinerant preachers, fakirs and others.²² It is

¹⁸ "... In Hindustan they have exacted as revenue Rupees 300/- where only Rs. 200/- were due..." Proclamation issued in the name of the Hindus and Muslims of Delhi, *Foreign Secret Consultations*, No: 14, 30 April, 1958.

¹⁹ W.H. Russell, *My Diary in India in the year 1858-59* (London, 1860), v. i, p. 146 says "Our race is not even feared at times by many, and that by all it is disliked".

²⁰ Rāo Tullā Rām of Rewārī wrote to Ghulām Muḥammad Khān, a rebel officer, "Are you intoxicated that you think the English are going away from Hindustan? They will most assuredly return and destroy you", T. Metcalfe, *Two Native Narratives of the Mutiny at Delhi* (Westminster, 1898), p. 174.

²¹ John Kaye says about Lord Canning, "How was he to know, how was any Englishman, shut up all day long in his house, and having no more living intercourse with the people than if they were clay figures, to know what was passing beneath the surface of native society." Kaye and Malletson, op. cit., v. i, pp. 421-422.

²² Cave-Browne, *The Punjab and Delhi in 1857*, (London and Edinburgh 1861), v. i, p. 6; J.J. McLeod, *The Sepoy Revolt*; (London, 1897), p. 55; *Punjab Mutiny Report* (Lahore, 1859), p. 87.

surprising that anyone should hold that all that took place was entirely spontaneous and that there was nothing premeditated. If that were so, the distribution of *chapatis* and lotus flowers would not have taken place, emissaries would not have travelled from place to place, a cypher for communications would not have been adopted and no unusual activity would have been noticed even by the semi-somnolent British officers.²³ A perusal of Muslim writings, however, shows that the instinctive reaction of the prosecutors of Bahādur Shāh Zafar—instinctive, because they did not possess real evidence—to the effect that it was a Muslim conspiracy was correct, though they wrongly thought that other Muslim powers were involved.²⁴ It was a Muslim conspiracy in the sense that it was conceived by Muslim brains and prosecuted by them. The Hindus joined in the struggle later, though their leaders played no insignificant role in the fighting.²⁵

It is a matter of some astonishment, which reflects enormous credit upon the organizers, that, in spite of its activities spread over such a huge area, the names of the chief conspirators never came to light. The British were helped by a large network of informers and spies and, on several occasions, the revolutionary forces suffered serious losses or lost important battles simply because their plans were revealed to their adversaries, yet they were never able to lay their hands on the planners of the rebellion. Many humble soldiers and leaders of the middle and high level were captured alive by the British, but no one revealed how and where the planning took place. Such secrecy is difficult to maintain. Later when the theatre of the activities became very wide and information or instructions had to be sent to men who could not be taken into confidence earlier, the code and the cypher could not work and ingenious methods were used to send

²³ For *chapatis*, see G.B. Malleon, *The Indian Mutiny of 1857*, (London, 1891), p. 33; Collin Campbell, *Narrative of the Indian Revolt from its outbreak to the capture of Lucknow*, (London, 1858), p. 4; for lotus flowers, *ibid*, for letters in cypher, J.J. McLeod Innes, *The Sepoy Revolt: a critical narrative* (London, 1897), p. 55.

²⁴ Kaye and Malleon, *op. cit.*, v. i, p. 339.

²⁵ All European writers are not silent regarding the fact of there being a conspiracy, e.g., Malleon, *op. cit.*, p. 33, refers to an Executive Council of the conspiracy, which obviously means that he thought that there was a small group or caucus that was masterminding the movement.

important messages. Because all messengers were not fully trained, some fell into the hands of the British authorities, but they revealed nothing beyond the sole matter to which the message referred. The only feasible explanation is that the scheme had been worked out in broad outline only and once support for the objectives and methods had been canvassed, the actual execution was left in the hands of the local leaders. No other method was possible. The leaders of the revolution had no control over the telegraph and the post, hence local developments could not be reported to any headquarters, even if such an agency had been established, and the same applied to any instructions being possibly sent by a central authority. Yet it will probably ever remain a mystery how the plan came into existence and who were its initiators. There is only one obvious fact: that in the formulation of this conspiracy, in canvassing support for it and in the actual fighting the ulema played the most significant and devoted role. Their participation was not dictated by any selfish motives of advancement or gain and their sacrifices were enormous.

The foremost among them was Mawlānā Aḥmad-u'llah Shāh, who finds mention in British writings as 'the Moulvie of Fyzabad'. His original name was Sayyid Aḥmad 'Alī Khān and he was given the sobriquet of Diyā-u'd-dīn.²⁶ Even though a biography in verse by a disciple exists,²⁷ the information that has come down to us is meagre. It may be said to the credit of the biographer that he has presented a sober narrative of facts which bear the stamp of authenticity because of the way in which they have been related. One of the reasons of the scantiness of the information is that the author has recorded only those facts that he considered to be authentic. Even then there are serious lacunae and some of the recorded facts do not easily fit into a narrative and are difficult to reconcile. The Mawlānā was born around 1817 at Chinapatan near Madras.²⁸ He seems to have been a precocious boy because he attained

²⁶ Faḥ Muḥammad Tā'ib, *Tawārikh-i-Aḥmadi*, (Lucknow, n.d.), p. 28.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ This date is based upon the statement of another leader of the rebellion, Dr. Wazir Khān who says that Mawlānā Aḥmad-u'llah Shāh was about forty years old during the war, *Freedom Struggle in Uttar Pradesh*, (Lucknow, 1957), v. ii, p. 148.

proficiency in *ḥadīth*, *tafsir*, Arabic and Persian at an early age. It is not known when he learnt English because he knew it, when he was in Oudh.²⁹ He went to Hyderabad when he was only sixteen. He belonged to a rich and influential family, which is apparent from the fact that there was a serious proposal of his marriage into the Nizam's family, though, for some reason, it did not come off. Another indication of his family's importance is that his parents were persuaded by an Englishman to send him to England where he was received in audience by Queen Victoria. But no further details of the family are available. We also do not know how much time he spent in England and if he visited some other European country. He performed the *haj* and travelled back *via* Iran where he was offered employment by the *Shāh*, but he preferred to return to the Subcontinent.

All that we know is that he was still young when he reached India, though the biographer's statement that his beard now started growing seems to be an exaggeration, because if his beard began to appear at the age of twenty, this would mean that twenty years elapsed between his arrival and the outbreak of the rebellion. Nor do we know how he kept himself employed during most of this time. Oudh was annexed in February 1856 and Nagpur in 1854. The full impact of Dalhousie's policies could not have been felt very much earlier, and therefore, it is unlikely that Mawlānā Aḥmad-u'llah *Shāh* became active in the movement any sooner. One is confronted with serious difficulties in reconstructing the story of his life. He must have been, if the sequence of events has been recorded correctly, a mere boy when he went to England. How important was his family that a boy of his age should meet notables and be received in audience by the monarch? How much promise did he show to be invited to join the *Shāh*'s service in Iran? It seems that there has been some transposition in the order of the lines of the biography and the Mawlāna's beard must have started growing when he left Hyderabad, because if he was sixteen when he reached there, it is reasonable to assume that he would be twenty or more when he left. Even that might be too early, because he is

²⁹ G. Hutchinson, *Narratives of the Mutinies in Oudh* (Calcutta, 1859),

reported to have distinguished himself in a battle in Hyderabad. This must have been a minor affair against some freebooters and is difficult to date.

However we are on surer ground so far as his involvement in the Rebellion is concerned. After his return, he developed a yearning for mystic training and went to Delhi in search of a guide, met some sufis there and then went to Rajputana where he enrolled himself as a disciple of a sufi, Saiyid Furqān 'Alī Shāh at Sanbhar. He treated the neophyte kindly, changed his name to Aḥmad-u'llah Shāh, invested him with his *khilāfat* and directed him to go on a tour. Was Saiyid Furqān 'Alī Shāh privy to some plans of *jihād*? But this point of time, as we shall see later, seems to be too early for any plans of a war. Perhaps it was the Mawlānā's own restless soul that found some relief while he was active and travelling. He travelled and mixed with other sufis and took to giving lectures which were well attended. But all this did not bring peace to his mind and he even thought of going back to his parents, when he was directed in a vision, to proceed to Gwalior again, where he had experienced a condition of restlessness and had decided to go to Madras. There he presented himself before a sufi, Mihrāb Shāh Qalandar who was a member of the Qādiriyyah order.³⁰ He was employed as a footman under some notable.³¹ He had perhaps deliberately chosen a humble station in life to hide his spiritual greatness. He gave excellent training to Mawlānā Aḥmad Shāh, it seems, because he spent four and a half years with him. From the very first day Mihrāb Shāh emphasized the need of *jihād* and when Aḥmad-u'llah Shāh's training had been completed and he was invested with the *khilāfat*, a recognition of the attainments of the disciple who was now deemed capable of training others, he was explicitly asked to engage in armed struggle against the British. It is interesting to note here the likely historical background of Mihrāb Shāh's enthusiasm for *jihād*. When Muslim authority collapsed in Bengal as

³⁰ These details are mainly based on Tā'ib. There are some other details mentioned by other authors and even Tā'ib which are difficult to verify. For instance that the Mawlānā was a descendant of the Quṭb Shāhī dynasty, Mihr, 1857 *ke mujāhid*, (Lahore n.d.), p. 61.

³¹ Ibid, p. 65.

result of the Battle of Plassey in 1757, the leader of the order of *faqirs* founded by Shāh Madār was Majnūn Shāh, a native of Mewāt. He was able to understand the significance of the defeat and organized a *jihād* against the British. He took parties of his followers to Bengal from Mewāt and the areas around Delhi. Majnūn Shāh died in Gwalior, but the effort was continued by his successors, Gul Shāh, Chirāgh Shāh and others for a quarter of a century. It collapsed around 1785. Cinders of the sentiment would be hidden in many hecets including Mihrāb Shāh's.³²

Aḥmad-u'llah Shāh first went to Delhi to feel the ground, but he found the British resident too vigilant for his schemes to prosper, hence Mufti Ṣadr-u'd-dīn Āzurdah advised him to go to Agra and gave him good introductions. There he was able to collect a goodly number of followers, whereupon the British officers grew suspicious. He felt that he had done his work in that city and, besides, it was getting dangerous to stay there much longer.³³ After he had left, the Government prosecuted some of his associates but nothing could be proved against them. Then he undertook an extensive tour, preaching that the paramount duty at that time was to oust the British. As his activities could not possibly be kept secret, he was ousted from some places, but his work does not seem to have been hampered at all. He visited numerous towns, including Meerut, Patna and Calcutta.³⁴ At Aligarh, we are told, he enrolled a large number of disciples and predicted that there would be an armed conflict with the British within six months.³⁵ He was a good orator; for instance thousands of men, Hindus and Muslims, gathered to hear him speak, when he was at Agra.³⁶

When he thought that the situation in Oudh was ripe, he visited his preceptor Mihrāb Shāh again to seek his advice and,

³² The author is indebted to Professor Saiyid Muḥammad Salim for this information.

³³ Saiyid Muḥammad Miyān, '*Ulamā' kā ṣhāndār māqī*, op. cit., v. iv, pp. 397-398.

³⁴ G.B. Malleson, op. cit., pp. 17, 18.

³⁵ Moinul Haq, op. cit., p. 60.

³⁶ Saiyid Tufail Aḥmad Manglorī, *Musalmānon kā rawṣhan mustaqbil*, (Delhi, 1945), p. 80.

with his permission, repaired to Lucknow. On the way he met 'Azim-u'llah Khān and, in all probability, discussed with him future plans.³⁷ At Lucknow the crowds increased and large groups of sepoys also came, not only to listen to his speeches but also to meet him privately.³⁸ He lived in the quarter known as Ghasiyārī Mandī. Perhaps he felt that a less central place than Lucknow would be better suited for his purpose, hence he moved to Fyzabad. Here his followers began to take military training in the form of parades and marches.³⁹ The local magistrate felt uneasy but the Mawlānā's following was so large and well organized that he did not feel strong enough to arrest him. He, therefore, sent for troops and ordered the Mawlānā to desist from his activities. When effort was made to arrest the Mawlānā, he and his followers put up an armed resistance, but it seems that they were taken by surprise, because they did not fight with fire arms and were easily overwhelmed.⁴⁰ The Mawlānā was prosecuted and sentenced to death. While still in prison, awaiting execution, he was rescued by insurgents, because now the rebellion had broken out.⁴¹ The troops in Fyzabad rose on 8 June, 1857 and Mawlānā Aḥmad-u'llah Shāh assumed their command as soon as he was released. However, after two days, the sepoys who were mostly Hindus, elected one Rājā Mān Singh, who, as it transpired later, was not singleminded in his loyalties.⁴² The Mawlānā became unpopular with the Hindus, because he ordered the restoration of an old mosque to Muslims, which had been converted into a temple and had been the subject of agitation.⁴³

The whole of Oudh was soon in revolt and though Lucknow was apparently quiet, yet it was becoming clear that insurgent forces would make an effort to conquer it. The British, therefore, made preparations for standing a siege; the Residency was fortified

³⁷ Mihr, 1857 *ke mujāhid*, op. cit., pp. 68, 69.

³⁸ Tā'ib, op. cit., p. 19.

³⁹ Mihr, 1857 *ke mujāhid*, op. cit., p. 69.

⁴⁰ *Tilism*, Lucknow, dated 6 March, 1856.

⁴¹ Khurshid Muṣṭafā Ridwī, *Jang-i-Āzādī, Athārahsaw sattāwan*, (Delhi, 1959), p. 275.

⁴² *Freedom Struggle in Uttar Pradesh*, op. cit., v. ii, p. 35.

⁴³ Tā'ib, op. cit., pp. 58, 59.

and batteries were set up at suitable points.⁴⁴ Another precaution was to arrest a number of persons on suspicion, some of them patently innocent.⁴⁵ Mawlānā Aḥmad-u'llah Shāh was encamped during this time at Nawabganj with a striking force and was in touch with Nānā Śāhib at Kanpur. When General Wheeler surrendered and Nānā Śāhib was secure, the Mawlānā marched on Lucknow. He inflicted a defeat on a British force sent against him at Chinhut. Even though he was wounded, he chased the British right upto Lucknow.⁴⁶ Thus started the famous seige of the Residency. He disapproved of the plundering raids carried out by the sepoys on principle and differences threatened to crop up on other issues as well, but he adopted a statesmanlike attitude and did not press his views too far. The course of the fighting at Lucknow has been described fully in various works. The rebel assault on the Residency in which Mawlānā Aḥmad-u'llah Shāh participated failed. Later relief arrived and the British contingent in the Residency was increased. At last, on 22 November, the garrison was able to march out of the Residency. Only 'Ālam Bāgh was kept under Outram to counter rebel activities.⁴⁷

Eleven years old Birjis Qadr had been proclaimed Wālī (Ruler) under the guardianship of his able mother, Haḍrat Maḥal, a wife of Wājid 'Alī Shāh, on the occupation of Lucknow by the rebel forces.⁴⁸ The Mughul Emperor, Bahādur Shāh Zafar had approved of the choice at the request of Oudh authorities and it is significant that the title of king bestowed by the British for creating a rift in Muslim ranks had been abandoned.⁴⁹ The chief officer of the Oudh government was, in fact, one 'Alī Muḥammad Khān, commonly known as Mammū Khān, because he enjoyed Haḍrat Maḥal's confidence. Unfortunately he and Aḥmad-u'llah Shāh did not see eye to eye and these differences

⁴⁴ M.A. Gubbins, *An Account of the Mutinies in Oudh and the Siege of the Lucknow Residency* (London, 1859), pp. 153-164.

⁴⁵ Ibid, p. 145.

⁴⁶ Ibid, p. 181; T.R. Holmes, *History of the Indian Mutiny*, (London, 1898), pp. 265-267; Kaye and Malleeson, op. cit., v. iii, pp. 284-286.

⁴⁷ Moinul Haq, op. cit., p. 479, Sen, op. cit., p. 230.

⁴⁸ Kamāl-u'd-dīn Haider Husainī, *Qaisar-u't-tawārikh* (Lucknow, 1906 v. ii, p. 227.

⁴⁹ Ibid, pp. 220, 222, 448-449.

obstructed the smooth conduct of the war, but it may be said to the Mawlānā's credit that he did not withhold cooperation whenever he was permitted to take part. He was, however, disappointed at the turn the events had taken, because he did not have confidence in the efficiency of the administration.⁵⁰ His fears proved true and the effort collapsed. Lucknow fell to the British, Haḍrat Maḥal and Birjis Qadr escaped and, after a last attempt to rally the rebels, which will be mentioned later, they escaped to Nepal where, unlike most others, they found asylum.⁵¹

The Mawlānā had earlier assessed the situation correctly and lost all hope of victory, even then he carried on the war. He showed remarkable resilience and despite heavy odds, was able to extricate his forces from Lucknow and then planned an attack on the British contingent moving against Haḍrat Maḥal who was still in Oudh trying to muster the remnants of her troops. His plan was excellent but it failed. The troops he had sent to take the British in the rear foolishly captured two guns which revealed their presence.⁵² The battle was fought near Barī and Aḥmad-u'llah Shāh sustained a defeat.⁵³ He marched towards Bareilly hoping to create a diversion in favour of its defenders against British attack. However he found Shahjahanpur weakly held and captured it, though part of it remained in British hands.⁵⁴ A British force dislodged him from there, but he took up a strong position at Muḥammadi, from where he could not be dislodged.⁵⁵ Never-

⁵⁰ Tā'ib, op. cit., pp. 64-65.

⁵¹ Mihr, 1857 ke mujāhid, pp. 14-16.

⁵² Tā'ib, op. cit., p. 94.

⁵³ G.W. Forrest, *Selections from Letters, Dispatches and other State Papers preserved in the Military Department of the Government of India* (Calcutta, 1893), v. iii, p. 483.

⁵⁴ Sen, op. cit., p. 355.

⁵⁵ Various authorities say that the Mawlānā proclaimed himself Pādshāh at Muḥammadi and set up a provisional government with Nānā Sāhib, as *Diwān*, General Bakht Khān as Defence Minister, Mawlānā Sarfarāz 'Alī as Chief Justice and Mawlānā Liyāqat 'Alī, Mawlānā Faiz Ahmad and Dr. Wazīr Khān as members of the Council. A few coins were struck with the legend:

سکہ زد در ہفت کشور خادم محراب شاہ
حامی دین محمد احمد اللہ پاد شاہ

Ridwī, op. cit., p. 355; Holmes, op. cit., p. 512. Husainī, op. cit., v. ii, p. 467. Mihr, 1857 ke mujāhid, p. 86 considers this action as unlikely. But then it should be remembered that the throne of Delhi was vacant now, Bahādur Shāh Zafar being prisoner, Birjis Qadr was a *wālī*, not an independent monarch and the ulema must have insisted on the legal necessity of a central authority under whose orders alone *jihād* could be legal.

theless, the end was near. He entered into negotiations with the Raja of Powāin, a small fort a few miles away from Shahjahanpur, seeking his cooperation in the struggle. He was invited to direct parleys, but as it subsequently transpired, this was a trap. When the Mawlānā appeared before the fort the gates were closed. He was riding an elephant and, therefore made an easy target. He was shot and his head was severed from his body. The Raja collected fifty thousand rupees from the British as reward.⁵⁶

Despite the details enumerated in various works, there are many aspects of the Mawlānā's life which are shrouded in mystery. What part was played by him in the overall organization of the Rebellion? We know from the testimony of British authors that he played a prominent role in stirring up revolt in Oudh.⁵⁷ It has also been stated that the distribution of *chapātīs*—and by inference, of lotus flowers—was attributed to him by some. There seems to be no improbability in that statement. From the day he came into touch with Miḥrāb Shāh his only passion was *jihād* and he worked incessantly. The curious fact is that Miḥrāb Shāh has not been mentioned at all in any connection with the Rebellion except as having inspired Aḥmad-u'llah Shāh, whose allegiance to Miḥrāb Shāh remained untarnished upto the very end. Was there a higher organizing authority, an Executive Committee as mentioned by Malleson?⁵⁸ If there was one, was Miḥrāb Shāh in any way connected with it? Aḥmad-u'llah Shāh's judgment is praised even by his enemies and his life does not betray weaknesses of ambition or self aggrandisement, as is evident by the fact that he never swerved from the main purpose of fighting against the British. Though Mammū Khān did every thing that could disgust a leader like the Mawlānā, yet he did nothing to embarrass Haḍrat Maḥal in her struggle against the British.⁵⁹ Why then, did he adopt cheap methods of publicity like getting a drum beaten in front of him wherever he went or even walking

⁵⁶ Holmes, op. cit., p. 71. The trap was laid at the instance of the British, vide Ridwī, op. cit., pp. 322, 323, f.n. 2.

⁵⁷ Malleson, op. cit., p. 33.

⁵⁸ Ḥusainī, op. cit., v. ii, p. 300.

⁵⁹ Ibid, p. 203, Ridwī, op. cit., p. 274 f.n.

on fire in his seances with the sufis and his disciples?⁶⁰ Was this a part of the campaign to draw as many men to him as he could to further the cause?

He was not a trained soldier, yet as a general he displayed great ability in tactics.⁶¹ He was brilliant in assessing possibilities and situations. When asked to assist Oudh forces in an assault upon the Residency, he participated in it wholeheartedly, yet he had correctly prophesied that the venture would not succeed.⁶² Before the situation in Lucknow was considered to be unsatisfactory by the rebel forces, he foretold that they were in a trap and that the city could not be defended against the British.⁶³ He never lost a good military opportunity.⁶⁴ And the final doubt that haunts the mind is whether his antecedents before he joined Miḥrāb Shāh were what have been generally reported. His biographer was a disciple and presumably joined him after Mawlānā Aḥmad-u'llah Shāh had completed his training under Miḥrāb Shāh. Therefore, if policy had demanded that the Mawlānā's antecedents should remain obscure or camouflaged, it could be done conveniently. But it is idle to speculate on this point, except perhaps to get an indication of the methods used by the organizers of the plan. Falsification is ruled out by the fact that the antecedents of all other chief characters are well-known. Once Mawlānā Aḥmad-u'llah Shāh had come out in the open, there was no need to obscure any facts of his life. He has been called "by far the best soldier among the rebels."⁶⁵ In Malleson's words "If a patriot is a man who plots and fights for the independence, wrongly destroyed, of his native country, then most certainly the Moulvi was a true patriot. He had not stained his sword by assassination; he had connived at no murders; he had fought manfully, honourably, and stubbornly in the field against the strangers who had

⁶⁰ *The Tiliism*, op. cit., dated 21 November 1856.

⁶¹ "The Maulavi of Faizabad had no military training but he had the natural instincts of a born leader. He never missed a weak point in the enemy line and always strove to strike at it"—Sen, op. cit., p. 355.

⁶² Tā'ib, op. cit., pp. 66-67.

⁶³ Ibid, p. 481.

⁶⁴ Vide Supra, f.n. 60.

⁶⁵ Thomas Seaton, quoted by G.B. Malleson, *History of the Indian Mutiny* (v. i, ii, London, 1878, v. iii, London, 1880), v. ii, p. 541.

seized his country, and his memory is entitled to the respect of the brave and the true-hearted of all nations.”⁶⁶

It has not been possible to maintain the chronological order of events because of the importance of Mawlānā Aḥmad-u'llah Shāh's exploits. We now revert to the happenings in other centres.

The most important centre was Delhi. A remarkable confirmation of the opinion that the Rebellion of 1857 was not just a haphazard and spontaneous outburst is provided by the fact that ulema of various schools of thought suddenly became active and began to call the faithful more vehemently to their duty of fighting the alien government and uprooting it.⁶⁷ A new feature of this campaign was that Hindu pandits also did the same kind of work among the Hindus.⁶⁸ It may be mentioned that there had been a Jihād Movement among the Muslims even earlier but the preaching of rebellion among the Hindus by their religious leaders was unprecedented during British rule. This was the result of the endeavours of another Muslim leader of great ability, 'Azīm-u'llah Khān who was Nānā Śāhib's adviser and the real organizer of his activities against the British Government. The two had travelled in North India secretly and Nānā Śāhib had visited the centres of Hindu religious learning and places of pilgrimage.⁶⁹ It should be remembered that Mawlānā Aḥmad-u'llah Shāh, who had worked incessantly to work up enthusiasm for *jihād* among the Muslims, had met 'Azīm-u'llah Khān and presumably Nānā Śāhib as well at their headquarters,⁷⁰ and before marching on Lucknow, when hostilities started, he had been watching the developments in Kanpur.⁷¹ Thus there was a liaison between 'Azīm-u'llah Khān and the Mawlānā and it seems quite likely that it had been established even before 'Azīm-u'llah

⁶⁶ Ibid, p. 544.

⁶⁷ Saiyid Muḥammad Miyān, '*Ulamā' kā shāndār māqī* op. cit., v. iv, p. 113.

⁶⁸ Khān Bahādur Shams-u'l-'ulamā Muḥammad Dhakā'-u'llah, *Tārīkh-i-'Urūj-i-'ahd-i-Saltanat-i-Inglishyah-i-Hind*, (Delhi, 1904), p. 876.

⁶⁹ Russel, op. cit., v. i, pp. 107-108; Kaye and Malletson, v. i, p. 422.

⁷⁰ Mihr, *1857 ke mujāhid*, op. cit., p. 69.

⁷¹ Gubbins op cit p 121

Khān's trip to England, Europe, Crimea and Turkey.⁷² The Hindu Pandits could not have been activated by the Muslims, nor, for that matter, by the Hindu sepoys, if a sufficiently important man like Nānā Ṣāhib had not taken the lead.

A fact which does credit to the ulema of Delhi deserves mention. They ruled and represented vehemently that helpless men, women and children should not be killed by the rebels, but feelings were running too high for their protests to be effective.⁷³ The sepoys had entered Delhi on 11 May and despite Bahādur Shāh's efforts, the administration could not be based on a sound basis. It was on 2 July that Bakht Khān joined Bahādur Shāh and was invested with high authority. This confidence he fully justified and brought order and discipline into the city. It was soon after this that Mawlānā Faiḍ Aḥmad, who had held an official appointment at Agra, came to Delhi and presented himself before the Emperor and was assigned judicial duties. He had a high reputation for learning. At Agra he had struggled to get the Jāmi' Masjid restored for worship and had succeeded in his efforts. He became an ardent upholder of rebellion against the British, when Mawlānā Aḥmad-u'llah Shāh went to Agra. When Bakht Khān was forced to leave Delhi, Mawlānā Faiḍ Aḥmad and Dr. Wazīr Khān, who had been his associate all along, went to Lucknow and joined Mawlānā Aḥmad-u'llah Shāh and fought under his command. After the fall of Lucknow the two went to Badā'un and participated in the fighting along with Shāhzādah Fīrūz Shāh. When the struggle collapsed there, they joined Aḥmad-u'llah Shāh at Muḥammadi. After Aḥmad-u'llah Shāh was killed, Mawlānā Faiḍ Aḥmad disappeared totally and his family tried to trace him upto Constantinople without any success.⁷⁴

Bakht Khān, after assuming his duties, wanted to have a proper legal backing for the war against the British. He thought that even though the Emperor as the embodiment of the central

⁷² Regarding 'Azīm-u'llah Khān, vide Mihr, 1857 *ke mujāhid*, op. cit., pp. 43-60, Moinul Haq, op. cit., pp. 88-69.

⁷³ Muḥammad Miyyān, 'Ulamā' *kā shārdār māqā* op. cit., v. iv, p. 111.

⁷⁴ Ibid, pp. 393-399.

political authority and sovereignty of the Muslims enjoyed great prestige, the endorsement of the war as a religious duty by the ulema would be of immense value in mustering support of the Muslim masses. A meeting of the leading ulema, therefore, convened in the Jāmi' Masjid and ruled that in the circumstances then pertaining, it was incumbent upon the Muslims to take up arms against the British.⁷⁵ Subsequent writers who wanted to bring about conciliation between the Muslims and the victorious British have tried to minimize the importance of the document, saying that some of those who appended their signatures were under duress and that, two persons, of whom one was Mawlawī Maḥbūb 'Alī disagreed with the ruling on the basis that all the conditions justifying *jihād* were not present.⁷⁶ It is strange that these two persons did not consider themselves constrained in any manner to subscribe to the document and nothing happened to them, and yet certain others should find themselves under duress. Great capital was made out later by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan and others of the attitude adopted by Mawlawī Maḥbūb 'Alī and his abstention was interpreted as the dissociation of the 'Wahhābī' ulema as a whole.⁷⁷ This interpretation is patently wrong because the Mawlawī had vehemently criticized the Jihād Movement after his visit to the Mujāhid camp when it was headed by Saiyid Aḥmad Shahid.⁷⁸ He had never rejoined the movement and in no way belonged to that school. On the contrary Mawlānā Sarfarāz 'Alī, who accompanied Bakht Khān when he came to Delhi, was a follower of Saiyid Aḥmad Shahid. Indeed this distortion of the truth was part of the deliberate falsification of history to prove to the British that the 'Wahhābī' ulema had been loyal to them. Another statement in the same vein is that a large group of the ulema considered the Emperor to be a great Bid'atī,⁷⁹ a term used by the Deobandīs and Ghair

⁷⁵ *Sādiq-u'l-akhbār*, Delhi dated 26 July, 1857, reproduced the *farwā* in full with the signatures of all those who subscribed to it.

⁷⁶ *Dhakā-u'llah*, op. cit., p. 675; one of them, Khwājah Diyā-u'd-dīn later withdrew his objections and affixed his signature.

⁷⁷ Saiyid Muḥammad 'Alī Khān, op. cit., v. iii, pp. 159-160.

⁷⁸ Thānesarī, *Hayāt-i-Saiyid Aḥmad Shahid*, op. cit., pp. 234-236. "No Sikh or Durrānī was able to strike such a blow upon the affairs of *jihād* as was struck by Mawlawī Maḥbūb 'Alī's machinations"—ibid, p. 236.

⁷⁹ *Bid'atī*, a person who digresses from the pristine doctrines of the Faith. The statement occurs in Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, *Risālah Asbāb-i-Baghāwat-i-Hind*.

Muqallids for those who did not agree with their interpretation of the *Shari'ah*. In short, all kinds of stories were invented to prove that the ulema were really not interested in the rebellion and did not attach any importance to the movement which had enveloped the area from Delhi to the borders of Bengal like wildfire. If the 'Wahhābī' ulema had been inclined the way Sir Syed Ahmed Khan says they were, it would be difficult to explain why they fought against the British in various places, for instance the fighting in Sardhana was organized by them.⁸⁰ From the common sense point of view, the 'Wahhābīs' would welcome accretion of strength to their movement for the expulsion of the British which continued for decades after the crushing defeat at Bālākot in 1840.

We also read of contingent after contingent of fighters arriving in Delhi to participate in the rebellion. They are mentioned again and again fighting the British and sometimes incurring heavy losses. The number of these warriors—generally described as Jihādīs rose to several thousand.⁸¹ When they started arriving, the Emperor expressed his inability to make any provision for their maintenance and their meagre needs of food were supplied by some God-fearing Muslims of Delhi.⁸² They lived in mosques and most of them were concentrated in the Jāmi' Masjid. When the walls of Delhi had been breached and a British column moved through Kashmir Gate towards Jāmi' Masjid, the Jihādīs who were living there took up arms, fell upon the column and, though they suffered heavy losses, they repulsed it, thus saving the mosque for the time being.⁸³ The Jihādīs were the most determined fighters in the ranks of the rebel forces and contested almost every inch of ground in the city.⁸⁴ The enthusiasm was so great

⁸⁰ Muḥammad Miyān, '*Ulamā' kā shāndār māḍī*', op. cit., v. iv, p. 269.

⁸¹ Their arrival is mentioned in *Dhakā-u'llah*, op. cit., in various places; the information has been put together by Saiyid Muḥammad Miyān, '*Ulamā' kā shāndār māḍī*' op. cit., v. iv, pp. 205, 206; Jīvan Lāl in Metcalfe, op. cit., also mentions them in entries of 25, 30 June, 2, 7, 21, 24, 31 July, 3, 5, 9, 20 August and 2 and 14 September.

⁸² Jīvan Lāl in Metcalfe, op. cit., entry of 31 July; *Dhakā-u'llah*, op. cit., p. 615.

⁸³ Khwājah Hasan Nizāmī, *Dehlī ki jānkani* (Delhi, 1922), pp. 33-34, Rāqim-u'd-dawlah, *Zahīr Dehlawī, Dāstān-i-Ghadr* (Lahore, 1955), p. 114.

⁸⁴ Ridwī, op. cit., pp. 199-200.

that even women fought in the field; an old woman, clad in green, boldly rode into the enemy ranks and wrought havoc in their midst. She was at last captured alive.⁸⁵ The last defenders of Delhi were the Jihādīs. "Ultimately there remained only a small party of *mujāhidīn* who passed the nights in hunger, but rushed to fight at dawn and waged war against the enemy".⁸⁶ And this was true of the Jihādīs in all other places where the banner of revolt was raised.

The rebellion spread to various areas in Rohelkhand and the Doab. One of the centres of Muslim education was Thāna Bhawan in the modern district of Muzaffarnagar in Uttar Pradesh. The leading scholar here was Hājī Imdād-u'llah, whose eminence as a scholar, theologian and sufi was recognized in the academic and pious circles of the Subcontinent. He had a large circle of pupils, disciples and admirers. He was a disciple of Mawlānā Naṣīr-u'd-dīn of Delhi who had organized *jihād* in Sind and then had moved on to the Mujāhid camp in the tribal area.⁸⁷ Hājī Imdād-u'llah had been connected with the Jihād Movement after its revival under his preceptor. He, then, went to Mecca to consult Shāh Ishāq, who was the representative of the House of Shah Walī-u'llah. When he came back, he engaged himself in preaching *jihād* against the British saying that time was ripe for revolt.⁸⁸ When rebellion broke out in the district, Hājī Imdād-u'llah held a meeting of the leading ulema in Thāna Bhawan and organized *jihād*. He was elected the leader.⁸⁹ Here also dissent was expressed initially on the basis that sufficient resources were not available to fight the British, but this objection was overruled.⁹⁰ The leaders made hasty preparations and marched against Shāmli and captured it. The *mujāhid* forces were commanded by Mawlānā Dāmin 'Alī supported by Mawlānā Rashīd Aḥmad Gangohī and Mawlānā Muḥammad Qāsim

⁸⁵ Khwājah Hasan Nizāmī, *Begamāt ke ānsā* (Delhi, 1924), p. 126.

⁸⁶ 'Allāmah Faḍl-i-Haqq, *A'ththawrat-u'l-Hindiyah*, English translation published in *Journal of Pakistan Historical Society*, Karachi, v. v, p. 33.

⁸⁷ Vide Supra, Chapter VII, pp. 158, 159.

⁸⁸ Ridwī, op. cit., p. 459.

⁸⁹ Muḥammad Miyān, *'Ulamā' kā shāndār māqā*, op. cit., v. iv, p. 301.

⁹⁰ Ibid, p. 300.

Nānawtawī.⁹¹ This was the end of their venture because now the tide had turned in favour of the British. The fall of Delhi had brought about a great psychological change in the rebels, their supporters and others. The *mujāhids* lost Shāmlī soon after capturing it.

British forces then marched against Thāna Bhawan itself which was hastily put in a state of defence. The first seige by the British was unsuccessful and they retreated. Next time they returned with a larger force and more arms. The defenders had only one gun, a few muskets and swords. Despite a spirited defence, the walls were breached, the doors were blown up and the houses were plundered. Some of the bigger houses were sprinkled with kerosene and set on fire.⁹² The leaders were able to effect their escape. Hāji Imdād-u'llah was able to find his way to Mecca with great difficulty because the British authorities were anxious to arrest him. Two others, Mawlānā 'Abd-u'l-Ghanī and Mawlānā Raḥmat-u'llah, also reached Mecca. The latter had earlier been sent to Delhi to assess the situation there and it was on his report that the *jihād* had been organized at Thāna Bhawan. Mawlānā Muḥammad Qāsim Nānawtawī and Mawlānā Rashīd Aḥmad Gangohī were left behind in accordance with a plan which will be discussed in the next chapter.⁹³ It may be added that Mawlānā Raḥmat-u'llah organized a rebellion in Kerānah, which was crushed and he escaped to Delhi. From there he travelled to Surat via Rajputana and then embarked for Mecca.⁹⁴

The revolt in Aligarh started with the execution of a Brahmin sepoy who had been arrested for subversive activities in the neighbourhood. The rebels expelled the British officers and took up the administration of the city. Same day Mawlānā 'Abd-u'l-Jalīl issued a *fatwā* that it was incumbent upon the Muslims to wage *jihād* against the British. He was elected the leader of the insurgents and asked to administer the city and its surrounding area.

⁹¹ Kaye and Malletson, v. vi, p. 124, H.G. Keene, *Fifty-seven* (London, 1883), p. 18. Also Rif'at Thānawī, "1857 kā Thāna Bhawan", *Al-Jamī'at* Delhi, dated 13, 15, 16 October, 1957.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Moinul Haq, op. cit., pp. 380-381.

⁹⁴ Ibid, pp. 385, 387.

He belonged to the well-known community of Banū Isrā'il in Aligarh, who obviously were Jews at some time before their conversion. The Mawlānā was a pupil of the famous scholars, Shāh Rafī'-u'd-dīn and Shāh Muḥammad Isḥāq of Delhi.⁹⁵ The British forces came to recover Aligarh in the third week of August 1857. They were met by the *mujāhids* at Madrak who, despite the fact that they were ill armed, fought bravely and were killed in large numbers. Mawlānā 'Abd-u'l-Jalil was also killed fighting. He, along with seventy-two of his comrades lies buried in the court of the Jāmi' Masjid, Aligarh.⁹⁵ Despite their victory, the British did not feel encouraged to occupy Aligarh, so great was the resistance offered at Madrak. It was in early October that the city was occupied. Realizing that the resistance was collapsing everywhere, the *mujāhids* had evacuated the city earlier and the British were surprised to find that there were no forces to oppose their entry.⁹⁶

The Nawab of Farrukhabad, Tafaḍḍui Husain Khān, joined the rebellion, but he was not able to oust the British for some time, because they continued to occupy the fort in the cantonment town of Fathgarh which is quite close to Farrukhabad. The fort was well equipped with artillery and the rebel forces were not able to take it because they did not possess cannon. However, the Nawab's forces did not lose heart and succeeded in breaching the walls by laying mines. On this the besieged British garrison escaped. The Nawab's strength soon became fairly formidable. Apart from the sepoys, the Nawab was supported by the warlike population of the area. They have been described by British writers as being "peculiarly turbulent" in character and strongly hostile to British rule.⁹⁷ The British sent a strong force from Delhi. The first battle took place near Patiali on 17 December in which the rebel forces were defeated. Another hotly contested battle took place near Farrukhabad which also was lost by the rebels. The British occupied the town which was given up to plunder. The Nawab's palace was razed to the ground. He

⁹⁵ *Al-Jam'at*, op. cit., 25 November, 1957, Kaye and Malleison, op. cit., v. iii, p. 192, Keene, op. cit., p. 49.

⁹⁶ Moinul Haq op. cit., p. 388, Kaye and Malleison, op. cit., v. iv, p. 65.

⁹⁷ *Ibid*, v. iii, p. 224.

escaped and joined Haḍrat Maḥal's camp in Bondi. After the defeat of the Oudh forces he surrendered to the British on the promise that his life would be spared. He went to Mecca where he lived in poverty.⁹⁸

Mawlānā Aḥmad-u'llah Shāh, it would be remembered, spent considerable time at Agra. He organized a *majlis-u'l-'ulamā'* in that city. When rebellion broke out, it was led by the *koṭwāl* and was not suppressed for some time. After its occupation by the British, an attack by Shāhzādah Fīrūz Shāh was repulsed with heavy losses.⁹⁹

It would be noticed that there is no record of the activities of the ulema either at Farrukhabad or Agra. At the latter place, there had existed a *majlis-u'l-'ulamā'*. It could not have remained idle. Nor could the enthusiasm of the people of Farrukhabad be due only to their turbulence. But for the tributes paid by British authors, perhaps Mawlānā Aḥmad-u'llah Shāh would not have been attached the importance due to him. The reason is that most of the records were left by the followers of the House of Shāh Walī-u'llah and Saiyid Aḥmad Shahīd. They were writing about their own leaders and were not concerned with the activities of the ulema of other schools of thought unless some reference became relevant in connection with their own history. The remarkable feature of the movement of 1857 was that ulema of other schools also were active. In Farrukhabad, for instance, Mawlāwī Ghulām Ḥusain, elder brother of the grand father of the author of the present treatise, played a part in arousing the people to fight against the British. He fought in the battle at Patiali, was captured alive and hanged. The family tradition describes him as a man of considerable prowess, of heavy build and inclined to be corpulent, though by no means flabby. The rope broke because of his struggle and he was hanged again with a thicker rope. His memory as a martyr is honoured even today in the family.

⁹⁸ Ibid, pp. 398, 399, Kaye and Malletson, v. iv, pp. 203, 204.

⁹⁹ Moinul Haq, op. cit., pp. 390-393.

Many facets of the rebellion at Kanpur were overshadowed by the position of Nānā Śāhib, who was the leader of the insurgents. The treatment of Europeans who had been granted amnesty and then fired upon while leaving Kanpur in boats and the incarceration of British women,¹⁰⁰ have been given such publicity by Western writers that even the personality of 'Azīm-u'llah Khān has not received its due.¹⁰¹ He was one of the most outstanding figures of the Rebellion. The details of his career do not fall within the scope of this book and should be studied elsewhere. However, there is one intriguing and significant part of it which deserves discussion. When Nānā Śāhib made up his mind to send an agent to England to plead for the restitution of the Peshwa's pension, he selected 'Azīm-u'llah Khān because of his good knowledge of English and general ability. He also knew French. He did not succeed in his mission because the Court of Directors had already decided to sustain the Governor-General's decision not to confer the pension, but he made a great impression upon British Society. Queen Victoria's government also refused to intervene. On his way back 'Azīm-u'llah Khān decided to visit Paris, Constantinople and Crimea.¹⁰² One could understand the desire of a person travelling in leisure to see as much of Europe as he conveniently could, but the visit to Crimea adds a new dimension, because 'Azīm-u'llah Khān wanted to see something of the Crimean war. He later wrote two letters to 'Umar Pāshā, the Turkish general who fought in Crimea,¹⁰³ met the Prime Minister of Iran on his way back to India,¹⁰⁴ and it was rumoured that he was in touch with the Russian Govern-

¹⁰⁰ For details vide, G.O.Trevelyan, *Cawnpore* (London, 1899) pp.229-230, Munshi 'Ināyat Husain, *Sarguzasht-i-ayyām-i-Ghadr* (Lucknow, 1936), pp. 22-23 Sen, op. cit., pp. 149-151; Roberts, *Forty-one years in India*, (London, 1900), pp. 162-163.

¹⁰¹ For a biographical note see, Mihr, *1857 ke mujāhid*, op. cit., pp.43-60.

¹⁰² Moinul Haq, op. cit., p. 68.

¹⁰³ Roberts, op. cit., p. 239.

¹⁰⁴ *Freedom Struggle in Uttar Pradesh*, v. ii, p. 312. This seems unlikely unless it can be established that 'Azīm-u'llah Khān travelled overland part of the journey.

ment.¹⁰⁵ It is further said that he also met the famous freedom fighter of Italy, Garibaldi, who had made preparations for helping the rebels to the extent of loading arms on board some ships which did not sail because the Rebellion collapsed too soon.¹⁰⁶ It would seem that 'Azim-u'llah Khān had already started to think of rebellion before he went to Europe—this finds support in a statement by his associate, Muḥammad 'Alī, that 'Azim-u'llah Khān himself had solicited appointment as Nānā Ṣāhib's agent to London.¹⁰⁷ It cannot be determined on the basis of the available evidence whether Nānā Ṣāhib was privy to these designs. It seems unlikely that 'Azim-u'llah Khān could nurture plans of the rebellion alone. Who were his associates, or even inspirers of the idea? The only possibility seems to be that Mawlānā Aḥmad-u'llah Shāh had come into touch with him before his departure to England.

It is true that Nānā Ṣāhib and his officer Tāntā Topi played an important role in the Rebellion; but even in Kanpur the Muslims came to occupy dominant positions in the actual warfare. And there is little doubt that their inspiration was mainly religious. Sufis and ulema had been instrumental in creating enthusiasm among them.¹⁰⁸ Once again they were mostly anonymous.

Allahabad was, from the strategic point of view, the most important place in the Doab. It commanded river communications on the Ganges and the Jumna, was on the main railway line and Grand Trunk Road and Central India and Oudh were easily accessible from it. The fort commanding the confluence of the two rivers was strong and well guarded. The rebellion started in accordance with the pattern of other places, the Muslim population

¹⁰⁵ There seems to be some truth in this report. Muḥammad 'Alī alias Jimmy Green, stated that in Constantinople he and 'Azim-u'llah Khān "met certain real or pretended Russian agents, who made large promises of material support if Azeemolla could stir up a rebellion in India". The agents must have been bogus because Turkey was at war with Russia at that time. W. Forbes-Mitchell, *Reminiscences of the Great Mutiny, 1857-58*, (London, 1897), p. 186.

¹⁰⁶ Pandit Sundar Lāl, *San Sattāwan*, op. cit., p. 53.

¹⁰⁷ W. Forbes-Mitchell, op. cit. pp. 185-186

¹⁰⁸ Trevelyan (op. cit., p. 137), says that when the green standard of *jihād* was unfurled, a large number of Muslims gathered; on the first day the poor and common people, the next day men of all classes. This would not have been possible without previous canvassing by religious leaders.

had been canvassed for *jihād*, the sepoys mutinied and all authority collapsed. The British inhabitants took refuge in the fort. Mawlānā Liyāqat 'Alī emerged as the leader. He set up his headquarters in the Khusraw Bāgh. He was born in Mahgāon, a village in the parganah of Chail in Allahabad district. His father, Mihr 'Alī was a peasant. He was a Saiyid and not a weaver, as has been alleged by some British writers. Mawlānā Liyāqat 'Alī's teacher was a pupil of Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Aziz and he himself was deeply influenced by the ideas and beliefs of the school of Saiyid Aḥmad Shahīd. He was deeply religious and pious and was respected for these qualities. He served for some time in the army, and then resigned to be able to devote more time to preaching. He was convinced that British domination should be uprooted and it is said that he attended a meeting of the leaders of the rebellion attended by Nānā Shāhib, Mawlānā Aḥmad-u'llah Shāh, 'Azīm-u'llah Khān and Bakht Khān amongst others. There he was assigned the duty of informing the revolutionaries in different centres of the date prescribed for the beginning of the rebellion, namely 31 May 1857. Thereupon he toured the various areas with great diligence.¹⁰⁹ He was recognized as the Governor of Allahabad by the Emperor Bahādur Shāh Zafar. As he did not possess artillery, he was not able to capture the fort.¹¹⁰ Only a few days later, Allahabad was captured by the British. Mawlānā Liyāqat 'Alī was able to escape and joined Nānā Shāhib. He was present at the Battle of Fathpūr.¹¹¹ He remained attached to Nānā Shāhib and when Mawlānā Aḥmad-u'llah Shāh set up a provisional government at Muḥammadi, Mawlānā Liyāqat 'Alī was one of its members.¹¹² He survived the collapse of the rebellion and was tried in 1872. He boldly confessed that he had played an active role in the war, but now the British anger having somewhat subsided, he was sentenced only to transportation for life.¹¹³

¹⁰⁹ 'Abd-u'l-Bārī 'Aṣī in the *Al-Jamī'at* dated 17 August 1957. This shows he was not base born or a weaver, as alleged by European writers, e.g., Kaye and Malleon, op. cit., v. ii, pp. 196-198.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid, p. 273.

¹¹² Vide Supra, f.n. 54.

¹¹³ *Freedom Struggle in Uttar Pradesh*, op. cit., v. iv, p. 643.

It may be recalled that Rohelkhand had been under the influence of the House of Shāh Walī-u'llah since the beginning of his movement. As early as 1816, the people of Bareilly had risen in revolt against the imposition of a house tax in 1814 under the leadership of Muftī Muḥammad 'Iwāḍ, but it was suppressed with heavy losses to the insurgents.¹¹⁴ Before the actual start of hostilities in 1857, a number of ulema had been active; of these the more prominent were Mawlānā Sarfarāz Alī,¹¹⁵ who later accompanied Bakht Khān to Delhi and Muftī 'Ināyat Aḥmad, who worked secretly because he was an employee of the government.¹¹⁶ A fakir, Jhandā Shāh, who was highly respected was also active.¹¹⁷ The population was showing restlessness, therefore, the British took precautions and persuaded a *mawlawī* to preach loyalty to the Government and to declare that *jihād* was unlawful. Another *mawlawī* Rahīm-u'llah, was prevented from delivering his sermons on *jihād*.¹¹⁸ On 28 May the sepoys rose and rebellion started in right earnest.

Khān Bahādur Khān, a grandson of Hāfiẓ Raḥmat Khān, was highly respected. He was a pensioner of the Government. He was asked to take up the leadership, which he did with great ability. He organized the civil administration, began to recruit soldiers and established an ordnance factory.¹¹⁹ The Emperor Bahādur Shāh issued letters patent conferring the viceroyalty of Rohelkhand upon him.¹²⁰ It was he who sent Bakht Khān and his contingent to Delhi.¹²¹ Town after town acknowledged Khān Bahādur's authority and Badā'un, Pilibhit, Aonla, Shahjahanpur, Tilhar, Mirānpur and Jalālābād came under his sway.¹²² The

¹¹⁴ Muḥammad Alī Hasan Khān, op. cit., v. i, pp. 67-69.

¹¹⁵ *Al-Ilm*, Karachi, October, 1958, p. 84.

¹¹⁶ Muḥammad Alī Haidar, *Tadhkirah-i-mashāhīr-i-Kākori*, (Lucknow, 1927), pp. 24-25.

¹¹⁷ Muḥammad Ja'far Thānesarī, *Tārikh-i-'ajīb* (Lucknow 1892), p. 78.

¹¹⁸ *Freedom Struggle in Uttar Pradesh*, op. cit., p. 170.

¹¹⁹ At one time his standing army consisted of 91 cavalry corps (4,618 men), 57 infantry regiments (24,330 men), 40 guns mostly cast in his own factory. (District Gazetteer, Bareilly, p. 175). The troops were well armed, Zahir Dihlawī, op. cit., pp. 187-188.

¹²⁰ Moinul Haq, op. cit., p. 505.

¹²¹ Najm-u'l-Ghānī Khān, *Akhhār-u's-ṣanādīd* (Lucknow, 1904), pp. 550-551.

¹²² Moinul Haq, op. cit., pp. 507-514.

Nawab of Rampur, however, remained loyal to the British. We find everywhere ulema active in preaching and organizing *jihād*. Mawlānā Sarfarāz 'Alī, for instance, seems to have been active throughout; there is a record, for example of his presence in Shahjahanpur.¹²³ Khān Bahādur Khān was not able to take Nainital where the British had concentrated after withdrawal.¹²⁴ At last the British began to press on all sides. The last stand was made at Bareilly and the cream of the remaining revolutionary leaders were there—Nānā Ṣāhib, Tafaḍḍul Husain Khān of Farrukhabad, Prince Firāz Shāh and Dr. Wazīr Khān.¹²⁵ And the best fighters among the soldiers were the *ghāzīs*, "fine fellows grizzly bearded elderly men for the most part, with green turbans and cummerbunds"¹²⁶ of whom "none attempted to escape; they had evidently come to kill or be killed."¹²⁷ The battle was lost, then Bareilly fell. Khān Bahādur Khān escaped into Nepal, was handed over to the British and was hanged in Bareilly.¹²⁸ Throughout Rohelkhand we find the ulema active. In Bijnor Syed Ahmed Khan's friend Shakespeare was persuaded to hand over the administration to Najīb-u'd-dawlah's great grandson, Maḥmūd Khān who had risen in revolt, making Shakespeare's position untenable.¹²⁹ Mawlānā Munīr Khān joined Maḥmūd Khān with a band of four hundred *ghāzīs*.¹³⁰ He fell into the hands of the British and died while in prison.¹³¹

Moradabad was an important centre of the activities of the ulema. Three of the leading ulema were Mawlānā Kifāyat 'Alī Kāfī, Mawlānā 'Ālam 'Alī and Mawlawī Wahhāj-u'd-dīn alias Mawlawī Munnū. Mawlānā Kāfī was the author of a well-known versified translation of *Sharḥ Ṣhamā'il Tirmidhī*. He toured the whole of Rohelkhand preaching *jihād*. He was hanged on 30 April 1857.¹³²

¹²³ *Freedom Struggle in Uttar Pradesh*, op. cit., v. v, p. 297.

¹²⁴ Moinul Haq, op. cit., pp. 514-515.

¹²⁵ *Freedom Struggle in Uttar Pradesh*, op. cit., v. vi, pp. 430-435.

¹²⁶ Russell, op. cit., p.16.

¹²⁷ Forbes-Mitchel, op. cit., p. 255.

¹²⁸ *Freedom Struggle in Uttar Pradesh*, op. cit., pp. 586-614.

¹²⁹ Syed Ahmed Khan, *Sarkashī-i-Dīl-i-Bijnor*, (Karachi, 1956), p. 172.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Kaye and Malleeson, op. cit., v. vi, p. 115 f.n.

¹³² 'Abd-ul-Hayy Ṣafā, *Tadhkirah-i-shamīm-i-sukhan* (Moradabad n.d.), p. 191.

Mawlānā 'Ālam 'Alī was a pupil of Mawlānā Muḥammad Ishāq, successor to Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Azīz as principal of Shāh 'Abd-u'r-Raḥīm's famous *madrasah* at Delhi. He was saved from the gallows by Syed Ahmed Khan on the plea that he had given protection to some Christians.¹³³ Mawlawī Munnā had been in the confidence of some leaders of the Rebellion and worked to further their cause.¹³⁴ Moradabad was occupied by Yūsuf 'Alī Khān, Nawab of Rampur, on behalf of the British and subsequently by Shāhzādah Fīrūz Shāh.¹³⁵ At last it fell to the British on 26 April 1858.

The story of the tribal area has been told in a previous chapter. The British were able to sow suspicion in the mind of the Pathan tribes by describing the entire movement as a Hindustani effort to establish their supremacy. In the Panjab the Sikhs were won over by arousing their anti-Muslim antipathies.¹³⁶ As large sections of the population had been alienated from the cause, it was easier to have a better system of espionage. There were unmistakable rumblings, but the British were vigilant and well informed. Any signs of restlessness in the native army were handled expeditiously and most easily, the movements of possible emissaries were carefully watched and quite often valuable information fell into the hands of officers through intercepted letters and messages.¹³⁷ In most of the places where trouble was suspected no one got the opportunity of working openly for *jihād*. Ludhiana seems to have been a notable exception. The descendents of Shāh Shujā' and Shāh Zamān of Afghanistan lived here as pensioners. Two of the Afghan princes joined the movement. A *mawlawī*, whose name has not been mentioned, but who seems to have been connected with the Mujāhids of the Frontier created great enthusiasm in the Muslim population who were aroused to an extent that the British lost control of the town for some time

¹³³ Ahmad 'Alī Shawq, *Tadhkirah-i-kāmilān-i-Rāmpūr*, (Delhi, 1929), pp. 188-189.

¹³⁴ Moinul Haq, op. cit., pp. 539-543.

¹³⁵ Najm-u'l-Ghani Khān, *Tārīkh-i-Awadh*, op. cit., v. i, p. 507.

¹³⁶ J. Cave-Brown, *The Punjab and Delhi in 1857*, op. cit., v. i, pp. 156-157, 254-260.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

and recovered it only when reinforcements arrived. The *mawlawī*, however, in the meantime joined the rebel forces.¹³⁸

As Ṣādiqpur was the centre of the Jihād Movement in the Pathan areas, it could legitimately be expected that it would be active in the armed struggle of 1857 as well, but this did not happen and we find that Bihar and Bengal played only a minor role. There could have been many reasons for Ṣādiqpur's inactivity. As the centre worked in secrecy, it might have thought that its participation in open rebellion might hamper its secret activities in the future. They were already under suspicion and three of their leaders were arrested as a precaution by Taylor.

However, Bihar did play some part. At Danapur, there were some indications of unrest and the authorities received a report that the public intended to revolt.¹³⁹ Taylor who was in charge learnt that "conferences were held at night, both in mosques and private houses, though with such secrecy and cunning that proof or capture was impossible. He suspected three ulema, Mawlawī Wā'iz-u'l-Ḥaq, Mawlawī Aḥmad-u'llah and Shāh Aḥmad Ḥasan of anti-Government activities because of their adherence to the Ahl-i-Ḥadīth beliefs and as has been mentioned earlier, arrested them treacherously after inviting them to a conference.¹⁴⁰

The motive was to have hostages to ensure good behaviour on the part of their community.¹⁴¹ Taylor went on with his policy of repression, demanding the surrender of arms from all the inhabitants of the town and executing any person who appeared of a suspicious character to him, despite a warning from the higher authorities.¹⁴² The Ṣādiqpur leaders were not aroused to any action by Taylor's harshness; but there were other elements in Bihar which were active.

A learned 'ālim, Mawlānā Pīr 'Alī ostensibly ran a bookshop in Patna, but he was in fact organizing the anti-British activities

¹³⁸ *Mutiny Records: Correspondence* (Lahore, 1911), v. viii, Part-I, p. 95.

¹³⁹ W. Taylor, *The Patna Crisis* (London, 1858), p. 31.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 50, 51.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 56, Forrest, op. cit., v. iii, p. 405.

in the province which came to the surface from time to time. He and his associate in those activities, Mawlawī Yaḥyā 'Alī toured the province to canvass support for the movement.¹⁴³ Mawlānā Pīr 'Alī came from Lucknow and regularly corresponded with a bookseller Masiḥ-u'-z-zamān in that city. When he thought time was ripe, he raised the standard of revolt in Patna.¹⁴⁴ Pīr 'Alī was overpowered after having been wounded and he was hanged. Before the execution he was offered amnesty if he would betray the entire conspiracy, but he scornfully spurned the offer and walked with calm dignity to the gallows.¹⁴⁵ However, this did not quell the rebellion, which spread to the Indian troops. A Rajput zamindar Kunwar Singh emerged as a formidable leader of the rebellion which could not be put down until after his death.¹⁴⁶ Bengal remained almost inactive and apart from the secret involvement of some officers of Wājīd 'Alī Shāh in spreading discontent, little action of a serious nature challenged British authority. One Mawlānā Karāmat 'Alī was active in Dacca without much effect.¹⁴⁷

Shāh Muḥammad Ishāq of Delhi sent his pupil Qārī 'Abd-u'r-Raḥmān Pānīpatī to establish a seminary at Bāndah in response to a request from the Nawab, Dhu'lfiqār Khān Bahādur. His nephew 'Alī Bahādur Khān succeeded him. It seems that the seminary played its part well in spreading the message of *jihād*, because we find that the new nawab was gradually converted along with his people and the entire district rose in rebellion, which was rapid as well as complete.¹⁴⁸ 'Alī Muḥammad Khān had ultimately to surrender. He was interned and all his property was confiscated. Though the Raja of Gwalior did not rebel, yet his Muslim subjects were active. Macpherson, a Britisher, narrowly escaped an attack "from a strong party of Mahomedan fanatics".¹⁴⁹ The British writers used the word 'fanatics' for

¹⁴³ Saiyid Muḥammad 'Alī 'Azīmābādi, *Mir'at-u'l-anzār*, also called *Tārikh-i-ṣubah-i-Bihār* (Azimabad, 1898), p. 168.

¹⁴⁴ Kaye and Malletson, op. cit., v. iii, p. 37.

¹⁴⁵ Taylor, op. cit., pp. 66-69.

¹⁴⁶ Moinul Haq, op. cit., pp. 311-317.

¹⁴⁷ Muḥammad Miyān, '*Ulamā' kā shāndār māḍī*, op. cit. v. iv., p. 367.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid, pp. 328-329.

¹⁴⁹ Holmes, op. cit., p. 148.

ghāzis. Similarly at Jhansi, the last to resist and die to the last man were a band of *ghāzis*.¹⁵⁰ In the same manner, "there was indeed a strong Mahomedan faction in Jaypore," which eagerly desired the success of the Delhi mutineers.¹⁵¹ Mandeshwar in Indore state, for a while, became the headquarters of *Shāhzādah Firūz Shāh* who was able to gather a force of three thousand sepoy mutineers and a large number of *ghāzis*. In the adjoining areas there was considerable activity which was disclosed by intercepted letters.¹⁵² One of the agents was a sufi, Pādshāh Miyān, who seems to have travelled from place to place canvassing for *jihād*.¹⁵³

The area around Bombay was not neglected by the ulema. Mawlawī Aḥmad Miyān Naṣr-u'llah was the leader of the movement at Baroach. In Poona one Muḥammad Ismā'il, who had come from Hyderabad, was arrested for addressing a group in the Jāmi' Masjid. Similarly Mawlawī Nūr-u'l-Hudā was arrested at Belgaum and it was discovered that the network of the organization spread from Bombay to Madras.¹⁵⁴ Despite Sālār Jang's policy of loyalty to the British, the sentiments of the people of Hyderabad were sympathetic to the rebellion. "Moulvis put forth all their eloquence to stir up the passions of the Mahomedan gentry to crusading fervour. Fakirs preached, in ruder phrases, to ragged zealots."¹⁵⁵ The public pressure can be judged from the fact that posters in favour of *jihād* and threatening the Nizam and Sālār Jang and criticising ulema for not issuing a *fatwā* for *jihād* were posted in the city.¹⁵⁶ These activities resulted in a revolt on 17 July 1857, but was suppressed. Mawlawī 'Alā-u'd-dīn was arrested and transported to the Andamans.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁰ Forrest, op. cit., v. iii, p. 292.

¹⁵¹ Holmes, op. cit., p. 395.

¹⁵² Moinul Haq, op. cit., pp. 358-360.

¹⁵³ Ibid, p. 359.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid, pp. 364-370.

¹⁵⁵ Holmes, op. cit., p. 500.

¹⁵⁶ 'Atīq Siddīqī, *Attharāhsaw sattiāwan, akhbār awr dastāwezen* (Delhi, 1966), pp. 377, 378.

¹⁵⁷ Kaye and Malleon, v. v, p. 8.

CHAPTER IX

New Horizons

It would be recalled that the Jihād Movement was originally organized at Delhi under the direct inspiration of Shāh ‘Abd-u’l-‘Azīz. The intention was that the command in the war area would be in the hands of Saiyid Aḥmad Shahīd. It was hoped that he would muster sufficient local support, so that it would not be necessary to organise any direct administration in the areas that had not fallen to the Sikhs and were still in the hands of the Muslim chiefs. If any part of the Sikh territories were to fall in the hands of the Mujāhidīn, it was obvious that Saiyid Aḥmad Shahīd and his officers would administer them. Communications between Delhi and the Camp being difficult and unreliable, a division of authority and responsibilities was inevitable. It, therefore, followed that the Saiyid became the supreme commander and administrator and Delhi’s main role became advisory and subsidiary, though it still continued to be important because all the business of fund raising and recruitment could be carried out only in India. To a large extent all this had been anticipated. The fact that Shāh Muḥammad Ismā‘īl and Mawlānā ‘Abd-u’l-Ḥayy accompanied Saiyid Aḥmad Shahīd in all his travels and then to the

Camp shows that Delhi had taken care that its objectives would be constantly kept in view. However, it was natural that policy making should shift to the Camp which would become the real centre. So far as Delhi was concerned, its position could be successfully undermined by building up another centre of support for fund raising and recruitment. This is precisely what happened when Ṣādiqpur emerged as the hub of the Jihād Movement and Delhi was gradually eliminated. This was done deliberately and there were positive reasons why the initiative was taken away from the hands of Delhi.

When it was felt at the Camp that local support had to be disciplined, Saiyid Aḥmad Shahīd was elected *amīr-u'l-mu'minīn*, the Commander of the Faithful. Delhi seems to have tolerated the step, but it could not have been happy.¹ Shāh Walī-u'llah was a reformist, but he was a Ḥanafī. His school never subscribed to the Wahhābī doctrines. Even though Shāh Muḥammad Ismā'il was, to some extent, an extremist in his views, yet he kept himself strictly within the pale of Ḥanafī doctrine.² But there were elements among the followers of Saiyid Aḥmad Shahīd in the Camp which had been influenced by the doctrines of 'Abd-u'l-Wahhāb, and, yet others who followed the Yemeni jurist, Shawkānī, who was a Zaidī.³ These elements were desirous of ending the influence of Shāh Walī-u'llah's school and the two best methods were to give Saiyid Aḥmad Shahīd an independent position by claiming that he was the originator of the entire movement and to create a rival centre at Ṣādiqpur. Saiyid Aḥmad Shahīd's death at Bālākot also helped the process. With him had died Shāh Muḥammad Ismā'il and Mawlānā 'Abd-u'l-Ḥaiy had passed away even earlier. Thus Delhi was no longer effectively represented at the Camp. The doctrine of *ghaibūbat*—that the Saiyid had not died but had disappeared from the battle-field mysteriously and would come again to lead his followers to victory—also

¹ Sindhī, Shāh Walī-u'llah awr unki siyāsī taḥrik, op. cit., p. 128.

² The main points of difference were that Shāh Muḥammad Ismā'il did not hold that the seeking of intercession in prayers (*tawassul fi'd-du'ā'*) is sinful and that actions smacking of polytheism but not actual polytheism (*shirk-u aṣghar*) put a believer outside the pale of Islam, *ibid*, pp. 235-237.

³ The main difference between Shawkānī and Ḥanafīs is that the former does not believe in the doctrine of *ijmā'* (consensus). The Shī'ahs also hold the same view as Shawkānī in this regard, *ibid*, p. 239.

contributed to the bifurcation, because Ṣādiqpur was organized by men who believed in the doctrine and Delhi held the more rational view that the Saiyid had died. The leader of those who differed from Delhi was Mawlānā Wilāyat 'Alī. He grew stronger in his religious views after visiting Najd and Yemen, the strongholds of Wahhābī and Yemenī doctrines.⁴ It may be said to the credit of both, the parties that they refrained from coming into open conflict. The Ṣādiqpur group did not carry on its activities around Delhi in deference to the school of Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Aziz and when Mawlānā Naṣīr-u'd-dīn of that group reached the Camp after the British successes in Afghanistan, he was accepted as leader. The Delhi school also did not act against the Ṣādiqpur group in any field. As we are concerned now with the activities of the Delhi group, it is necessary to trace its history.

Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Aziz nominated Shāh Muḥammad Iṣḥāq as his successor.⁵ Saiyid Aḥmad Shahīd accepted the validity of this nomination and when he visited Delhi after the death of Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Aziz and before his departure for *jihād*, it was understood that Shāh Muḥammad Iṣḥāq was the head of the party and Saiyid Aḥmad Shahīd was the leader of the *jihād*, the relationship between the two was comparable, to some extent, between the leader of a political party and the chief executive of the government run by it. When Saiyid Aḥmad Shahīd became *amīr-u'l-mu'minīn*, there was a setback to the original idea of the Delhi group, which had intended to steer the movement clear of any complications with Muslim governments and potentates. Throughout the history of their movement until the very end when they came into open conflict with the Muslim League in total disregard of their earlier and wiser traditions, they believed

⁴ Ibid, p. 140.

⁵ The principalship of the *Madrasah* was considered the leadership of the party, *ibid*, p. 105. The facts and their interpretations regarding the activities of the Delhi group are mostly based upon Mawlānā 'Ubaid-u'llah Sindhi's writings, who was closely associated with the Deobandī group of political workers and drew his information through his studies and his association with the activities of Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan, about whom we shall have to say a good deal later. However the main facts have been checked from other sources and are part of recorded history. It must be mentioned that Deobandī sources are generally reticent about their differences with Ṣādiqpur because of the possible ill effects of open airing of the differences upon the prosecution of the *jihād*. Ṣādiqpur reciprocated. But the literature about the Jihād Movement mostly represents the Ṣādiqpur point of view.

in positive work without any dissipation of their energies in countering the efforts of other groups, even though they might have disagreed with their aims and methods.

The election of Saiyid Aḥmad Shahīd was bound to raise doubts not only in the minds of the tribal chiefs but also the neighbouring Muslim rulers about the intentions of the Mujāhidīn, and indeed Saiyid Aḥmad Shahīd had to reassure them by a novel interpretation of the functions and nature of the office which in fact corresponded neither to its historical role nor to the rulings of the previous jurists.⁶ The supporters of the Saiyid seemed to be so insensitive to the repercussions of the election that they ignored the well-known fact that the Sultan of Turkey was acknowledged caliph—a more common nomenclature of the office—in the greater part of Muslim world.⁷ No benefit seems to have accrued to the Mujāhids from the step, because there was no visible impact upon the discipline of the local supporters. On the other hand, the Saiyid had to do a good deal of explaining, disclaiming any intention of depriving the existing rulers of their authority. However, Shāh Muḥammad Ishāq did not withdraw his support in a hurry; he continued to send money to the Camp. When Mawlānā Maḥbūb 'Alī, after his return from the Frontier carried on propaganda against the movement in Delhi, it was countered by Shāh Muḥammad Ishāq.⁸ Nevertheless, because the leadership had slipped out of his hands and the policies followed by Ṣādiqpur were at variance with the convictions of the Delhi group, the latter could not keep itself associated with the movement for long. In any case it was politic to let Ṣādiqpur have a free hand and bear full responsibility for the campaign.

Yet there was an aspect of the problem that could not be ignored. It was Shāh Walī-u'llah's conviction that no reform would

⁶ Historically the four 'rightly guided' caliphs, who have been held to have set the precedents for all orthodox Islam, and their successors exercised political authority. The exceptions were the weak Abbasid caliphs at Baghdad after the usurpation of authority by powerful Turkish chiefs and the Abbasid caliphs of Cairo. For the theory of the caliphate vide Abu'l-Hasan 'Alī al-Baḡdādī al-Māwardī, *Al-aḥkām-u's-sultāniyah* (Cairo, 1298-A.H.), pp. 3, 16; Thomas W. Arnold, *The Caliphate*, (London, 1884), pp. 3, 16, 31-34, 72.

⁷ It is interesting to note that the Sikh authorities referred to the Saiyid as "Khalīfah ṣāhib."

⁸ *Sindhī*, op. cit., pp. 129, 130.

succeed which cut itself adrift from the Ḥanafī school of jurisprudence and doctrine. He had, however, introduced an active adherence to the principle that the Ḥanafī rulings could be modified when a clear injunction of the Qur'an or the *sunnah* came into conflict with them. In actual practice, as has been pointed out in an earlier chapter, this reduced the distinction between *taqlid* and *ghairu taqlid* to a legal subtlety. It was this principle that led Shāh Muḥammad Ismā'il to follow the Shāfi' rite of *āmīn bi'l-jahr* and *raf'u yadain*, which created so much mischief in the tribal area.⁹ Besides, it opened the door for the infiltration of Wahhābīs and Shawkānites into the movement and ultimately capturing it. The orthodox Ḥanafī reaction was severe and caused a great deal of damage. The British were able to exploit Ḥanafī resentment to their advantage. The lasting injury inflicted upon the unity of the Muslim community in the Subcontinent will be discussed later. The schism created by efforts to bring about changes in the belief and ritual of the Ḥanafīs divided them into hostile groups and, as it happens in all such instances, they failed to treat the differences with any degree of tolerance. Shāh Muḥammad Isḥāq reversed the process and advocated a strict adherence to the Ḥanafī interpretation.¹⁰ This did succeed in closing the door of infiltration upon those who had accepted Najdī or Yemeni influences, but because the later Deobandīs did not exercise restraint, it did not reconcile the more conservative Ḥanafīs to the school.¹¹ It is anachronistic to use the word Deobandī for the school of thought established by Shāh Muḥammad Isḥāq because the seminary was founded much later, but in its doctrines it followed the principles laid down by him. He considered the followers of the Ṣādiqpur school to be in error and tinged with heresy.¹²

When the Ṣādiqpur party practically captured the movement and the Mujāhid effort on the Frontier developed signs of weak-

⁹ *Āmīn bi'l-jahr*, saying *āmīn* (English equivalent is amen) after *Sūrat-u'l-Fātiḥah* loudly in congregational prayers and *raf'u yadain* raising the hands upto the ears in the beginning of some *rukns* in *ṣalāt* (prayers).

¹⁰ Sindhī, op. cit., p. 133.

¹¹ This was against the teachings of Shāh Walī-u'llah, who says in *Anfās-u'l-ʿArifīn*, op. cit., p. 62 that he was told in a vision never to oppose Muslims in the matters of detail (*furūʿ*).

¹² Sindhī, op. cit., p. 134.

ness, Shāh Muḥammad Ishāq withdrew from it and migrated to Arabia. His brother Mawlānā Muḥammad Ya'qūb also migrated with him. The migration was significant from several points of view. It seems reasonable to conclude that he had reached the conclusion that the Jihād Movement had proved too weak to affect the political situation in the Subcontinent, and yet it would be fatal to permit the people to get into a state of total despondency. Time might offer some opportunity later and, therefore, it was necessary to keep the flame burning, because if it were extinguished, the community would get fully reconciled to its fate of foreign subjugation. He, therefore, evolved a twofold programme of creating an educated elite to provide inspiration and guidance in the Subcontinent and to gain a better knowledge of conditions in the Muslim world through a permanent mission in the Hejaz.

Indeed this mission was to provide leadership in keeping with the changing patterns of the international situation. Before he left, he organized a local committee under the chairmanship of Mawlānā Mamūk 'Alī; Mawlānā Quṭb-u'd-dīn Dehlawī, Mawlānā Muẓaffar Ḥusain Kāndhlawī and Mawlānā 'Abd-u'l-Ḡhānī Dehlawī being its other members. It was to raise funds for the upkeep of the mission in Hejaz and to carry out its instructions. Shāh Muḥammad Ishāq's activities in Hejaz created misgivings in the minds of the Ottoman Foreign office which decided to extern him, but he succeeded in securing the intercession of the Shaiḫ of the Ḥaram at Mecca and was permitted to live as a political refugee on the explicit condition that he would have implicit faith in the guidance of the Turkish government.¹³ In this manner, the Delhi committee also came under the influence of the Turkish Government. The condition imposed by the Ottoman Foreign office seems to have been a mere formality, because the authority gained under it does not appear to have been exercised. During the rebellion of 1857, as we shall see later, the British obtained a letter from the Sultan in his capacity as the caliph addressed to Muslim rulers in the Subcontinent advising them not to rebel against the East India Company, but no such instructions

¹³ Ibid, pp. 134-136. The Shaiḫ of the Ḥaram was a leading theologian and the seniormost *imām* of the sanctuary.

were given to the mission in Hejaz or the Indian Muslim ulema who were under its influence. Shāh Muḥammad Ishāq's acceptance of the condition shows that he was confident that the Turkish Government would not issue any instructions to him which could run counter to the interests of Islam. It has been reported that he had already reached the conclusion that he should seek to establish relations with the Ottoman Government and seek its guidance and help, perhaps because of its resources for a better assessment of the international situation.¹⁴ In any case he could not guide an anti-British movement sitting in Delhi because of the effectiveness of British vigilance.

Mawlānā Mamlūk 'Alī was an erudite scholar. He was a professor in the famous Delhi College and was an employee of the British Government. He was selected perhaps because of his great influence upon his pupils and also because his activities were not likely to create suspicion. One of his famous pupils was the future founder of the Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College, Aligarh, Sir Syed Aḥmed Khān. He pays a high tribute to Mawlānā Mamlūk 'Alī indeed when he says that if all the books relating to the sciences known to the encyclopaedic professor were destroyed, he could recreate them from his memory. He trained his pupils well, not only imparting academic instruction to them, but kindling in their hearts a love for Islam and a burning desire to recover its lost glory. Later, when developments required a more active participation in political activity, he was replaced by Mawlānā Imdād-u'llah.

Shāh Muḥammad Ishāq succeeded Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Azīz in 1824 and migrated to the Hejaz in 1841 where he died in 1846.¹⁵ His work was taken over by his brother Mawlānā Muḥammad Ya'qūb, but it is not clear when Mawlānā Imdād-u'llah replaced Mawlānā Mamlūk 'Alī in India. It must have been near about 1846, because both the appointments were made by Shāh Muḥammad Ishāq and he could not have made the changes too soon after his departure. It has already been mentioned that Mawlānā Imdād-

¹⁴ Ibid, p. 134.

¹⁵ Muḥammad Sarwar, *Mawlānā 'Ubaid-u'llah Sindhi*, (Lahore, 1967), p. 392.

u'llah was at Thāna Bhawan when the rebellion of 1857 broke out and that the Shāmli expedition took place under his leadership. When the British emerged victorious, Mawlānā Imdād-u'llah was able to escape to Mecca where consultations regarding the future line of action started again.¹⁶ It was clear that conditions in the Subcontinent were far from congenial for any political movement, hence there was nothing left to do except to find ways and means to keep the spirit of freedom alive. For this purpose it was decided to establish a *madrasah* on the lines of the Madrasah-i-Raḥīmiyah as it had developed under the guidance of Shāh Wali-u'llah and Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Aziz. It had earned fame throughout the Muslim world for the learning of its professors and the excellence of its instruction. It had held the torch of piety and spiritual fervour aloft in a society that had succumbed to the enervating influences of idle pleasure and moral decay and had inspired a burning desire for recapturing the former glory of Islam. It had ceased to exist after the destruction of its buildings by the British when they reoccupied Delhi in 1858.¹⁷ It was deemed impolitic to locate the new institution in Delhi or, for that matter, in any large city, because then its activities would draw the unwelcome attention of the alien government.

Deoband, a small sleepy township hardly bigger than a village and away from the high roads of communication, was selected for its location. As the town provided no facilities of residence, the college was to be necessarily residential, housing a community of teachers and students. Mawlānā Muḥammad Qāsim Nānawtawī¹⁸ drew up the scheme and later founded the institution without any fanfare and with very humble beginnings.¹⁹ Soon subscriptions began to come in and the institution grew from strength to strength. Mawlānā Muḥammad Qāsim had to work for seven years to bring the college into existence in 1866 and then devoted the rest of his life to building it up. The institution

¹⁶ Ibid, p. 389.

¹⁷ Ibid, p. 182. It was situated where Edward Park is located now.

¹⁸ For a short biography see Muḥammad Ya'qūb Nānawtawī, *Sawānīḥ 'Umri*, (Deoband, n.d.). The short title does not mention the subject of the biography, the book is devoted to the life of Mawlānā Muḥammad Qāsim Nānawtawī.

¹⁹ Ibid, p. 14.

provided instruction in the Islamic sciences in accordance with the Hanafi interpretation and it sought to equip its graduates with the necessary knowledge to act as *imāms* in mosques and teachers in schools and colleges. This was an essential part of the scheme, because only in this manner the message of Deoband could reach the different parts of the Subcontinent. In this mission the seminary succeeded remarkably well and its influence reached not only the remotest corners of the Subcontinent but also spread in the tribal areas and Afghanistan. There have always existed facilities for higher studies and specialization, but no curricula have been prescribed for these and advanced students receive guidance from professors who are specialists in the field concerned. Formerly the curricula spread over seven years, now it takes eight years to earn graduation, which is the only available degree, specialization does not earn a higher degree. In its own field, Deoband has established a high reputation in the Muslim world.²⁰

It has always sought not to compromise its independence through the acceptance of any grant or subsidy from the Government. Sir James Meston, the Governor of the United Provinces in which Deoband is situated, had grown unpopular among the Muslims because of his policy in connection with the Kanpur mosque, to which we shall have occasion to refer later. He was, therefore, anxious to make some amends. Accordingly a visit was arranged and Sir James wanted to announce a recurring or a non-recurring grant, but the offer was politely refused with the explanation that it was against the policy of the institution to accept any financial help from the Government.²¹ Even the invitation to the Governor and the acceptance of the title of *Shams-u'l-'ulamā'* by the *muhtamim* was criticized in the institution as well as outside. It was also the original policy of the planners that the professors of the seminary would not involve themselves in sectarian controversies with other schools of Sunni theologians, but unfortunately this was not adhered to and the controversies that started with Mawlānā Rashīd Aḥmad Gangohī

²⁰ Sindhi, op. cit., pp. 149-152.

²¹ Sir Hāfiz Muḥammad Aḥmad Sa'id Khān, Nawāb of Chhātari, *Yād-i-ayyām*, (Aligarh, 1949), pp. 63-65.

have split the Ḥanafīs into rival groups and little love is lost between the two.

As the college was to function in British India it would have been unwise to give the Government any pretext to close it down. Its existence was jealously guarded and it was understood that its professors and students would be free to choose their political affiliations, even to participate actively in political movements, but if such activities posed any danger to the existence of the institution, they would sever their formal relations with it. This is precisely what happened when Mawlānā 'Ubaīd-u'llāh Sindhi's political activities took a turn which made a clash with the British imminent; he had to leave Deoband and to work in Delhi.²² This will be discussed in its proper context, but the incident has to be mentioned here to illustrate the point.

The policy of adhering strongly to the Ḥanafī school and to refrain from raising controversy was sound in view of the intention to expand the influence of Deoband into Afghanistan and the tribal territory, but unfortunately even some of the leading lights of the seminary did not resist the urge to express opinions that could not possibly go unchallenged. Mawlānā Rashīd Aḥmad Gangohī was a scholar of great eminence as well as a sufi of profound spiritual attainments. His memory excites sentiments of deep veneration. He was a member of the innermost circle of ulema who guided the policies of Deoband.²³ He ruled that it was lawful for Muslims to eat the meat of crows, which was then and is even now against the sentiment and tradition of Muslims all over the world. He also argued that it was within the power of God to create another prophet like Muḥammad. He also opined that God can, if He so desires, utter a falsehood though He does not do so. And, of course, he condemned the institution of the annual gatherings at the tombs of saints as well as the prevalent rites of *fātiḥah* and *mīlād*. A rejoinder was published anonymously which drew a reply from Mawlānā Khalīl Aḥmad Ambethwī. It must be mentioned that this reply is couched in unnecessarily harsh language. Passions were aroused among the followers of both the schools,

²² Husain Aḥmad, *Naqsh-i-ḥayāt* (Deoband, 1953-1954), v. ii, p. 144.

²³ He was born in 1829 and died on 3 August 1905. For his biography see Muḥammad 'Ashiq Ilāhī, *Tadhkirat-u'r-Rashīd* (Delhi, n.d.).

and this naturally caused concern, so that Mawlānā Hājī Shāh Imdād-u'llah had to come out with a more conciliatory statement.²⁴ The controversy created more or less the same kind of rift as had been created by some of the opinions of Saiyid Aḥmad Shāhid's followers through their adherence to rites which were not liked by the local population in the tribal area. The opposition to the Deoband school of *fiqh* was quite widespread and persists even now. In course of time Mawlānā Aḥmad Riḍā Khān of Bareilly emerged as the leading opponent of the Deobandīs. The Ḥanafīs, who formed the vast majority among the Muslims of the Subcontinent, became divided into two hostile camps of Deobandīs and Bareilwīs and the controversy shows no signs of subsiding even now. Indeed political differences between the leading ulema of the two groups have made the situation much worse. In the minds of the ignorant masses the Deobandī ideas came to be identified as a somewhat milder form of Wahhābism. This is precisely what the organizers of the Deoband movement had wanted to avoid by insisting upon strict conformity with the doctrines of the Ḥanafī school.²⁵

The college was a sanctuary for quite a number of eminent fighters in the Rebellion of 1857. For instance Mawlānā Muḥammad Munīr Nānawtawī who was a pupil of the famous Mawlānā Mamlūk 'Alī, Muftī Ṣadr-u'd-dīn Āzurdah and Mawlānā 'Abd-u'l-Ghānī and was prominent among those who fought against the British with great courage, was the *muhtamim* of the institu-

²⁴ Therejoinderto Mawlānā Rashīd Aḥmad Gangohī was, in all probability, written by Mawlānā 'Abd-u's-Samī' of Rāmpur Manhiārān in the district of Saharanpur because, though he did not append his name, he did not hide the fact from his friends and others. The book bore the title *Anwāru sātī'ah*, Mawlānā Khālil Aḥmad Ambethwī's book was given the name of *Al-burāhīnu qāṭī'ah 'alā ṣill-i'l-anwār-i's-sātī'ah*. Both the books have been published, the upper part of each page has *Anwāru sātī'ah* and the lower part *Al-burāhīnu qāṭī'ah* (Deoband, 1355 A.H.). The same volume reproduces Hājī Shāh Imdād-u'llah's letter to Mawlānā Nadhīr Aḥmad Khān, a professor at the *Madrasah* at Aḥmadabad. A separate tract on the same problems called *Faiṣlah-i-haft masā'il* was published at Lahore (n.d.).

²⁵ Compare Sindhi, op. cit., p. 151 where it is regretted that Deoband came into conflict with other Muslim groups. Mawlānā Rashīd Aḥmad Gangohī was an associate of Mawlānā Hājī Imdād-u'llah and one of the first organizers of Deoband and, therefore, fully conversant with its objectives and policies, ibid, p. 150.

tion for several years.²⁶ Appointments like these were in accord with the policy of the institution, because despite the greatest caution exercised in its relations with the British, so that they might find no cause for taking action, the main purpose was not to let the Muslims completely quiesce and get reconciled to their subjugation. The establishment of sister institutions with the same ideals was encouraged. The first two *madrasahs* were established at Saharanpur and Moradabad.²⁷ Later the number of such institutions rose to about forty. There was no system of formal affiliation, but the teachers were mostly men who belonged to the same school of thought; later the graduates of Deoband and sometimes teachers were recommended for appointment. The *madrasah* at Saharanpur was established under the supervision of Mawlānā Sa'ādat 'Alī Sahāranpurī. Three months later in 1866, Mawlānā Muḥammad Maẓhar Nānawtawī was appointed professor of *ḥadīth* and principal. He also was a pupil of Mawlānā Mamlūk 'Alī and had learnt *ḥadīth* at the feet of Shāh Muḥammad Ishāq. He had fought in the Rebellion of 1857 and had gone into hiding after the fall of Shāmli. The *madrasah* prospered under his care. Very soon it was able to construct a good building, after moving into which it was named Maẓāhir-u'l-'ulūm and earned fame as a seat of Islamic learning.²⁸ These institutions were run in the best academic traditions of Islam. They were communities of teachers and students run by the academicians themselves. The teachers were content with the small pittances they received as salaries but did not compromise their independence by forcing the institution to accept grants with strings from any one. No donor was permitted to interfere in the affairs of a college. Every generation of teachers produced scholars of eminence in various fields. As we shall see later, these institutions did not produce mere book-worms; their teachers and students

²⁶ Muḥammad Ayyūb Qādirī, *Mawlānā Muḥammad Aḥsan Nānawtawī*, (Karachi, 1966), pp. 154-157. Mawlānā Muḥammad Maẓhar Nānawtawī was born at Nānawta in 1823 and died in 1885. He was a close associate of Mawlānā Muḥammad Qāsim Nānawtawī and Mawlānā Raḥīd Aḥmad Gangohī. He went into hiding after the fall of Shāmli to the British, and when the situation permitted, joined Bareilly College where he taught from 1861 to 1877. He retired from Deoband in 1894, *ibid.*

²⁷ Sindhi, op. cit., pp. 148-149.

²⁸ Muḥammad Ayyūb Qādirī, *Mawlānā Muḥammad Aḥsan Nānawtawī*, op. cit., pp. 157-160.

were interested in the world around themselves, and whenever they saw any danger on the horizon, they made plans to meet it. And yet, because of their conservatism and suspicion of the corrosive influences of non-Muslim advances in learning, they failed in their primary objective of providing leadership to the Muslim masses, who despite their respect for the ulema, could no longer trust them with their fate. However this development took quite some time to make itself felt.

A totally unexpected offshoot of the efforts of the followers of Shāh Wali-u'llah was Sir Syed Ahmed Khān's movement for the reorientation of Muslim politics and education. He was a pupil of the famous Mawlānā Mamlūk 'Alī who was entirely a product of the Wali-u'llahī school and tradition.²⁹ It was perhaps because of this relationship that he claimed to be a 'Wahhābī', but, apart from this claim which was in connection with his efforts to bring about a rapprochement between the Government and the Ahl-i-Hadīth, there is little evidence of any adherence to their doctrines in his life or writings. Indeed he was the founder of a new school himself which laid it down that there can be no contradiction between "the word of God and the work of God", meaning thereby that revealed truth and natural sciences are different facets of the same reality and therefore the one cannot possibly contradict the other. For this reason many ulema called him and those who accepted his point of view as Necharīs, believers in Nature rather than in revelation, because the criterion of their acceptance of an interpretation was its conformity with the laws of nature. The significant fact is that Deoband and Aligarh observed a benevolent neutrality towards each other, though in all probability Mawlānā 'Ubaid-u'llah Sindhī's characterization of Sir Syed's movement as a wing of the same movement as brought Deoband into existence is an exaggeration.³⁰

In politics, however, the two were poles apart. Sir Syed Ahmed's policy was based in loyalty to and cooperation with the British and Deoband maintained a studied neutrality towards the Government so long as it did not become necessary to work against the

²⁹ Sindhī, op. cit., p. 137, f.n. 1.

³⁰ Ibid.

British in the interests of Islam and its political power.³¹ In pursuit of their respective policies, therefore, when the Indian National Congress was founded in 1825 and began to canvas support among the Muslims, Sir Syed Ahmed Khān opposed it and persuaded the Muslims not to join it, but Deoband supported the Indian National Congress. Sir Syed Ahmed Khān founded the Patriotic Association; many ulema, led by Mawlānā Muḥammad and his brothers, Mawlānā 'Abd-u'l-'Aziz and Mawlānā 'Abd-u'llah issued a *fatwā* saying that it was unlawful to join the Patriotic Association and supporting entry into the Congress. This *fatwā* was signed by about one hundred ulema from all over the Subcontinent including Mawlānā Rashīd Aḥmad Gangohī, Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan and other professors of Deoband. These *fatwās* were collected into a pamphlet under the title *Nusrat-u'l-ābrār*.³² Even at this early stage the ulema had lost so much ground that their *fatwā* did not result in the Muslims crowding into the Congress. Mawlānā Muḥammad's family had long traditions of anti-British sentiment. Mawlānā 'Abd-u'l-Qādir had supported Saiyid Aḥmad Shahīd's movement. He had fought the British in 1857 along with his sons Mawlānā Muḥammad, Mawlānā 'Abd-u'llah and Mawlānā 'Abd-u'l-'Aziz, the signatories of the *fatwā* and Mawlānā Saif-ur-Raḥmān who was the eldest and had migrated to Kabul after the Rebellion had been suppressed. Mawlānā 'Abd-u'l-Qādir, after the defeat of the rebels had gone to Delhi. Mawlānā Saif-u'r-Raḥmān was one of the signatories of the Delhi *fatwā* of *jihād*. After the fall of Delhi Mawlānā 'Abd-u'l-Qādir and his sons escaped to the Panjab and took shelter with some villagers. Later, after several vicissitudes, the family again settled down in Ludhiana and maintained their tradition of anti-British attitudes.³³ The Aḥrār leader Mawlānā Ḥabīb-u'r-Raḥmān was Mawlānā Muḥammad's grandson.³⁴ He migrated to Delhi after independence and was opposed to the demand of Pakistan.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ḥusain Aḥmad, op. cit., v. ii, p. 71.

³³ Mawlānā 'Abd-u'l-Qādir was born in Naukharwah, in the district of Jullundhur in Indian Panjab in 1792; Muḥammad Akbar 'Alī Ṣūfī, *Salim-u'r-tawārīkh*, (Jullundhar, 1919), pp. 470, 473. 'Aziz-u'r-Raḥman Jāmi'i, *Ra'is-u'l-aḥrār Mawlānā Ḥabīb-u'r-Raḥmān Ludhiānawī awr Hindustān ki jang-i-āzādī*, (Delhi, 1961), p. 5; Sunder Lal, op. cit., p. 123.

³⁴ Ibid.

Those ulema who advocated Muslim cooperation with the Hindus did not lay down any conditions for it. Their sole motive was to remove the British domination and they assumed that they had nothing to fear from the Hindus. The main weakness in the thinking of Deoband has always been a serious lack of realism. The fact that Hindu goodwill could not be taken for granted began to emerge more clearly as time passed. The *fatwās* in *Nuṣrat-u'l-abrār* were compiled in 1888.³⁵ The ulema, unlike Sir Syed Ahmed Khan had taken no notice of the agitation in favour of Hindi against Urdu. As early as 1884, a Hindu newspaper, the *Tribune* of Lahore, wrote that the Hindus and the Muslims should "if they want this country to rise to its ancient glory once again, become fused into one nation", this, "however, must be the work of generations".³⁶ The distinctiveness of the Muslims was so obvious to the British that they mostly referred to the Hindus and the Muslims as "the two peoples", or more often as "two races."³⁷ *Shāh* Wali-u'llah had emphasized the necessity of not permitting the Muslim community to be absorbed into Hinduism by losing its distinctiveness and getting completely identified with the overwhelming larger Hindu population. It is strange that in this task the mantle should have fallen upon Sir Syed Ahmed Khan rather than upon Deoband. In 1893, only five years after the *fatwā* had been published, the Hindu nationalist leader, Bāl Gangādhār Tilak organized a festival in honour of the Hindu god *Ganeṣha*, who is also called *Ganpatī*.³⁸ This was done to strike terror among the Muslims, because, earlier, there had been riots at Prabhas Patan in Kathiawar on the occasion of Muḥarram in which the Hindus had tried to obstruct the procession and the Muslims had beaten them back. The Muḥarram processions in the Subcontinent consist of banners, *ta'ziyahs*, which are paper models of the mausoleum of the martyr, Ḥusain, and *turbats* which are replica of graves, also generally made of paper. These are accompanied by mourners and parties

³⁵ The title *Nuṣrat-u'l-abrār* was highly significant, because it means "assistance of the pious". Sir Syed Ahmed Khan came out against the Muslim entry into Congress on 28 December 1887; the *fatwā* could not have been prepared immediately, therefore 1888 is a probable date.

³⁶ C.F.I. Graham, *The life and work of Syed Ahmed Khan*, p. 343.

³⁷ E.g. Al Carthill, *Lost Dominion* (Edinburgh-London, 1924), p. 220.

³⁸ S.M. Edwards, *The Bombay City Police* (Bombay, 1923), pp. 100-105.

of sword-dancers and fencers who give demonstrations of war-like manly sports. The Ganpatī procession was organized in a similar manner; it, of course, had the image of Ganeṣha instead of *ta'ziyahs* and *turbats* and no mourners but parties of Hindu fencers and swordsmen were included. Tilak created the cult of *Shivāji* to whom homage was paid as the great avenger of the subjugation of the Hindus by the Muslims.³⁹ The anti-Muslim feelings of the Hindus became more and more marked almost every day, but the ulema, in particular the savants of Deoband remained somnolent and mostly unconcerned. The increasing hostility of the Hindus and its manifestations did not prod them into any action.

However, very soon happenings on the international scene began to draw the attention of the Muslims in general including the ulema. Practically the entire Muslim world was now under assault by Europe. The Greeks were encouraged to rebel against Turkey by the Czar Alexander I of Russia under the influence of his Greek foreign minister Capo d'Istria in 1821. They were unsuccessful in the beginning, but practically the whole of Europe showed interest in the venture. Money and volunteers poured in. The most notable of the volunteers was the English poet Byron. Then Russia, Britain and France intervened asking the Turks to accept an armistice at a time when Turkish arms were victorious. Naturally the Turks refused; at this the fleets of the three countries attacked the Egyptian fleet sent by the Ottoman Viceroy of Egypt, Muḥammad 'Alī resulting in the Battle of Navarino. Turkey, having been defeated, accepted the Treaty of Adrianople which granted Greece autonomy under the suzerainty of the Sultan. In 1832 the European powers recognized Greece as an independent country even though Turkey had given no provocation. Greece again went to war in 1896 and was easily defeated by the Turks the following year, but the European powers intervened again and Crete was taken away from Turkey.

As a matter of fact, the European countries, because of their hatred for Islam, lost no opportunity of encouraging rebellion by the Christian minorities and war by the Balkan states, or direct

³⁹ Sir Valentine Chirol, *Indian Unrest* (London, 1910), pp. 46-47.

assault upon the outlying provinces and dependencies of the Turks. For instance France conquered Algeria in 1830 and by the end of 1909 had brought the greater part of Sahara under its control. Tunisia, another Turkish dependency, was siezed by France in 1881, though the Bey (as the Turkish hereditary governor was styled) was permitted to remain, shorn of all real authority. Morocco, an independent Muslim Kingdom was forcibly made a protectorate in 1905 by France and Spain took a slice as well. Because of danger to German interests, a clash seemed to be inevitable, but Europe did not want a war at that time and, therefore, to avoid it, French and Spanish occupation obtained confirmation and Germany had to be content with a guarantee to its commercial interests. Italy which had ambitions in the Mediterranean and did not want to be left behind in the general scramble for territories at the cost of Muslim peoples invaded Libya in 1911 and conquered it in 1912, even though the Turks and the Arabs put up a determined resistance. Encouraged by the European powers as well as Turkish preoccupation in Libya, the Balkan states of Serbia, Bulgaria, Montenegro and Greece attacked Turkey in 1912. In this war Turkey lost all her European territories except Constantinople though Adrianople was recovered later. Thus Gladstone's ambition was almost fulfilled, a mere fourteen years after his death, to see Turkey totally expelled from Europe. These developments could not but cause dismay among the Muslims of the Subcontinent who had now tasted the bitter fruits of subjugation by an European power for the better part of a century. Earlier they were concerned only with their misfortunes, now it was a deluge which spread over the greater part of the Muslim world and threatened to destroy it totally.

In Egypt, the Khedive Tawfiq Pasha had submitted to joint British-French control over Egyptian finances in 1880 because of his indebtedness to the two countries. An anti-foreign rebellion forced the Khedive to appoint a nationalist cabinet. The British did not permit the cabinet to function and landed their troops in Alexandria. Egyptian resistance was easily crushed. Lord Cromer was appointed British Consul-General but he was *defacto* ruler from 1883 to 1907. During this period Lord Kitchener crushed the Mahdi and conquered Sudan. Subsequently he be-

came Consul-General which office he held from 1911 to 1914. For all practical purposes Egypt became a British protectorate. When World War I began, the Khedive 'Abbās I was deposed and Egypt was officially proclaimed to be a protectorate. Formerly the rivalry between the Western powers and Russia had somewhat kept the encroachment on the Muslim countries in check, but the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1908 created fresh dangers for Turkey and other Muslim countries. Iran was divided into British and Russian spheres of influence and Afghanistan's position as a buffer state was compromised.

The downfall of Muslim political power had engaged the attention of the Muslim thinkers for quite some time. The great Pan-Islamic scholar, Jamāl-u'd-din al-Afghāni had reached the conclusion that none of the Muslim countries by itself could escape the fate of subjugation by the West. They should, therefore, weld themselves into a strong alliance and make a joint effort for their preservation and progress. Similarly there was the need to liberate the Muslim lands that had been incorporated in the various Western Empires. The European powers saw danger in this doctrine and the word Pan-Islam became obnoxious to all imperialists, not only because they did not want to let go what they held, but also because they were deterred to grab more. It was not easy to hide this sentiment which was sometimes expressed openly, and sometimes clothed in ambiguous and less offensive words. With the growth of European power, European languages came to be studied in varying degrees in the various Muslim countries and the Subcontinent was no exception. An access to European journals, reports and books gave the Muslims an insight into Western policies and ambitions. The knowledge percolated to the masses and the ulema, who had mostly, almost universally, abstained from learning any European language. But this did not prove much of a handicap so far as international news of significance to the Muslims was concerned, because it was translated into the local languages and published in the language press. Besides, every year on the occasion of the *haj*, many of them, coming from all parts of the Islamic world, congregated in Mecca and a good deal of information changed hands. The ulema were, therefore, fairly well informed about the

happenings in the rest of the Muslim world. In the Subcontinent they made a great contribution to the awakening of the community to the dangers that beset the Muslim world and creating a renewed sense of identification with the world community of Islam. Without their work, a good deal of the subsequent history of the Muslims of the Subcontinent would have been different.

One of these was Shibli Nu'mānī who was a teacher in M.A.O. College founded by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan at Aligarh.⁴⁰ Shibli himself, like Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, a product of the old system of education, benefitted a good deal from his association with Aligarh. He came across several European members of the teaching staff and had also close relations with Arnold, the orientalist. He was a good poet and wrote poems regarding the plight of the Muslim world which were read with avidity and appealed to the emotions of the readers in a remarkable manner. He was an erudite scholar and wrote extensively on Islamic history, literature and religious topics. He adopted modern critical methods of scholarship and his writings were found on the desks of many orientalists in different Western countries. His life of the Prophet, the *Strat-un'n-Nabi*, which had to be completed by his pupil Saiyid Sulaimān Nadwī because Shibli died before he could complete the work, is by far the best informed biography of the Prophet. The historical literature produced by him created a pride in the down trodden Muslim community of the Subcontinent in the achievements of its ancestors. His sojourn at Aligarh gave him added confidence as a researcher, because the standard of scholarship at Aligarh was not particularly high. Scholarship with any depth remained a rare commodity in the

⁴⁰ For a full biography, see Saiyid Sulaiman Nadwi, *Hayāt-i-Shibli*, (Azamgarh, 1943). Here is a brief chronology of his life. He was born at Bindāwāl, a village in the district of Azamgarh in the Uttar Pradesh in a prosperous middle class family in 1857. He went for *haj* in 1876 and, after practising as a lawyer for a short while, took up government service.. He left law because he could not reconcile himself to accepting briefs for false cases. At last he joined Aligarh in 1882 and resigned in 1898. He travelled in Turkey, Syria and Egypt in 1892, while he was still attached to Aligarh. Nadwat-u'l-'ulamā', briefly called Nadwah, was in fact sponsored by Mawlānā Muḥammad 'Alī Kānpūrī and Shibli attended the second meeting of the sponsors. Shibli took full charge of Nadwah in 1904 on the resignation of Mawlānā Muḥammad 'Alī Kānpūrī and himself resigned in 1913 because of the disruptive activities of some who wanted to capture the institution. He died on 18 November 1914.

universities of the Subcontinent until quite recently. He, therefore, joined the sponsor of a college at Lucknow, in which they hoped to combine the best in oriental and Islamic traditions of scholarship with modern knowledge. The Nadwat-u'l-'ulamā' as it was called, failed in producing the results envisaged by Shibli. Its students, with rare exceptions, could hold their own against the graduates of neither Deoband nor Aligarh.

His visit to Constantinople had given him an insight into the Western intrigues against the Islamic world in general and the Ottoman Empire in particular and he had brought back depressing thoughts about the future of the remnants of Muslim political power in the world and the urgency of concerted efforts to bolster at least some parts of the falling edifice. Therefore, when Italy invaded Libya in 1911, he expressed his distress in no uncertain terms. When the Balkan Wars began, he wrote a famous poem under the title "Shahr āshub-i-Islām" which was recited almost in every literate home in the Subcontinent. A medical mission was sent by the Muslims to Turkey under Dr. Mukhtār Aḥmad Anṣārī. When it passed through Lucknow, Mawlānā Shibli was at the railway station to greet it. He was so overwhelmed with emotion that he kissed Dr. Ansari's shoes which were practically washed by his tears. He also wrote eloquent poems on the demolition of a part of Kanpur mosque and the resulting killing of Muslims who had gathered there to protest. He started a newspaper *Muslim Gazette* from Lucknow in 1912 in which he strongly advocated a more independent line for Muslim politics in the Subcontinent and to give up the fad of loyalty to the Government. He had always disliked Sir Syed Ahmed Khan's loyalty to the British Government.

Mawlānā Abu'l-kalām Āzād holds an important position in the history of the Muslim community of the Subcontinent.⁴² He was a good scholar and an ardent pan-Islamist in his earlier days.

⁴¹ He was born in 1888 and died in 1958. Abu'l-kalām Āzād *Tadhkirah*, (Lahore, n.d.), pp. 297-320 gives a short autobiography. He says his original name was Aḥmad. Also Mahadev Desai, *Maulana Abul Kalam Azad* (London, 1941). For an eulogistic notice, Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Islam in Modern India* (London, 1946), Abu'l-kalām Āzād, *India wins Freedom*, (Bombay, 1959) has a good deal of autobiographical material. Unfortunately a good deal of what Abu'l-kalām Āzād says about his parents, his family and the place of his birth has been contested on good grounds.

He went to the extent of saying that the problems of the Muslim community in the Subcontinent could be solved only in the context of the world community of Islam, and, therefore, no movement confined to the Muslims of the Subcontinent would prove fruitful.⁴² His weekly review, *Al-Hilāl*, was written in highly ornate language which had a disproportionately large percentage of Arabic and Persian words, therefore, it was read mostly by the highly educated elite. He played no mean part in creating pan-Islamic feelings among his readers. He acquired a working knowledge of English only at a much later stage in his life and was prejudiced against the new system of education. He did not agree with Sir Syed Ahmed Khan's policies regarding his efforts to introduce new education among the Muslims; his politics he liked even less, because like the ulema of the Deoband School he considered the British responsible for all the ills of Islam. His opposition to Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, or perhaps his training as a theologian took him to the extreme of denying even the need of understanding Islam in the context of the discoveries of science.⁴³ One can endorse the feeling that there are truths higher than what science can comprehend or concern itself with, but the human mind cannot keep its comprehension of the material world and spiritual truth in totally different compartments of belief. His writings in *Al-Hilāl*, unlike his later works, were exercises more in rhetoric than in rational argument and many of his less emotional readers were left wondering about the practical worth of his exhortations, because he knew how to pile word upon word and build up a mighty structure of seeming profundity of thought but in reality he seldom went beyond pointing to the problems that faced the Muslims, or saying in general terms that the Muslims should seek solutions in the teachings of their faith. A well-known Muslim writer complained in a letter to *Al-Hilāl* that "the Muslims have been exhorted to put their hand into the hand of God in a series of articles ; they have also been asked to go back to the Qur'ān; but at no place has the hand of God been defined nor have those teachings of the Qur'ān been pointed out which can still take the Muslims from the

⁴² *Al-Hilāl*, (Calcutta), 6 November 1912, p.19.

⁴³ Abu-'l-kalām Āzād, *Tadhkirah*, op.cit., p.222.

caverns of backwardness to the heights of progress.”⁴⁴ He created among the Muslims a pride in their faith and his writings inspired self-confidence which was to stand them in good stead, as the deep despondency created by their desperate situation could well destroy their very soul and render them too spiritless for meeting the challenge posed by the rapid deterioration in their position both in the Subcontinent and outside.

But he did not suggest any positive programme of action, Indeed what little he suggested in the way of policies was totally unrelated to the circumstances in which the Muslims were placed in those days. For instance, he seriously expressed the opinion that it was a mistake to think of establishing a Muslim University at Aligarh.⁴⁵ Similarly he was opposed to the objectives of the Muslim Educational Conference.⁴⁶ He strongly advocated full Muslim participation in the Indian National Congress but did not suggest the need of any understanding with the Hindus regarding minority rights of the Muslims.⁴⁷ In fact he did not believe that the Muslims had any special interests to safeguard, therefore, he was opposed to the very existence of the Muslim League.⁴⁸ Even if it is conceded that the Muslims should have identified themselves fully with the Hindus in all political matters, it is still difficult to hold that despite the differences in religion and culture, the Muslims should have made no provision for meeting their particular needs in the sphere of education. As a matter of fact, his views were a complete antithesis of the Muslim anxiety for preserving their separate entity. On the one hand he tried to create a romantic attachment to the Islamic faith among the Muslims, on the other hand he opposed even the primary need of building up a nucleus of thinkers who would continuously examine the daily changing needs of the Muslims in the field of education through their own organization. A backward minority even if it does not possess a distinctive culture has to adopt measures for removing its backwardness in the one field which is all important for progress, namely education.

⁴⁴ *Al-Hilāl*, op. cit., 6 November 1912, p. 15.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, 27 July 1912, p. 5; *Ibid*, 1 September 1912, p.9.

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, 10 December 1914, p. 439.

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, 1 September 1912, p. 8; 10 December 1914, pp. 437-438.

⁴⁸ *Ibid*, 1 September 1912, p. 8; 10 December 1914, pp. 439-440.

All that Mawlānā Abu-'l-kalām Āzād preached in *Al-Hilāl* was neither sound in theory nor of practical significance in the circumstances in which the Muslims found themselves. It is not a good principle that a backward minority with a proud past, which had thrown up such splendid leadership as late as 1857, and had slid down to a position where it was not able to compete with others in any sphere of life, be it educational, or economic, mainly because it had hesitated too long in taking up the new education, should make no special efforts to catch up with other communities. And from the practical point of view, even if the Muslims had not insisted upon any safeguards, they still would have required a forum to discuss their own attitudes relating to political problems arising from time to time. If the Muslim community had trusted the majority to look after its destiny, would it have been able, despite its backwardness, to get its proper share in the body politic? Even highly advanced and powerful minorities like the Jews in several Western countries have their organizations to look after their interests. Then it becomes a matter of strategy whether to press their special interests or keep silent about them.

The net result of Mawlānā Abu-'l-kalām Āzād's writings and speeches—and he was a powerful speaker—was that the Muslims endorsed his pan-Islamism and adopted for a while his advice that they should enter the Congress in large numbers when this step was advocated by other leaders as well. And this resulted in grave disappointment as we shall see later. As there was a wide gap between the theory of pride in Islam and the advocacy of giving up practical efforts to recapture its lost glory, it created among those who were addressed an emotional attachment to the Faith without much endeavour to act upon its teachings. Because of his total disregard of the practical needs of the community, it and Mawlānā Abu-'l-kalām Āzād slowly drifted apart until they were almost totally estranged from each other, and this process began as soon as domestic politics came to the forefront replacing the overwhelming involvement in the world Muslim situation. The Muslims of the Subcontinent did not lose interest in the affairs of their coreligionists abroad but they could not ignore their own problems which

were demanding immediate solutions. These will be discussed later.

While Mawlānā Abu-'l-kalām Āzād was only fulminating, there were others who were taking more concrete steps. Mawlānā 'Abd-u'l-Bārī of Firāngī Maḥal, Lucknow started taking interest in the situation created by the Balkan wars.⁴⁹ Muṣhīr Ḥusain Qidwā'i suggested that a medical mission should be sent to help the Turkish Red Crescent in looking after the wounded and the sick.⁵⁰ The proposal was warmly supported by the Ali Brothers, Mawlānā 'Abd-u'l-Bārī as well as Mawlānā Abu-'l-kalām Āzād, but all the practical steps were taken by Muṣhīr Ḥusain Qidwā'i, the Ali Brothers and Mawlānā 'Abd-u'l-Bārī. They also laid the foundation of the Majlis-i-Khuddām-i-Ka'bah almost simultaneously.⁵¹ The purpose of this organization was to serve the cause of the Muslims of the world and specially the Turks. The membership rose to nine thousand within a short period. It was given out by the sponsors that those who were afraid of the police were not wanted, which shows that they knew that some conflict with the Government was inevitable.⁵² This was apparent because the British attitude towards Turkey had been far from friendly and any effort to strengthen the Ottoman Empire was bound to be disliked by the Government of India.

Another avoidable irritant to Muslim opinion was provided by the Government to which a brief reference has been made above. It was thought necessary to widen a road in Kanpur. When plans were drawn up it was found that a Hindu temple came in the way, therefore, the road was realigned, but according to the revised

⁴⁹ Firāngī Maḥal, so called because it was originally a Dutch factory and was handed over to the ancestors of the Firāngī Maḥal family by Muslim rulers. Short sketches of the biographies of the ulema of Firāngī Maḥal are contained in Muḥammad 'Ināyat-u'llah bin Sharāfat-u'llah, *Tadhkirah-i-'ulama'-i-Firāngī Maḥal* (Lucknow n.d.). Mawlānā 'Abd-u'l-Bārī's biography is on pp. 106-118.

⁵⁰ P.C. Bamford, *Histories of the Non-cooperation and Khilafat Movement*, (Delhi, 1925), (a classified document of the Government of India, every copy being numbered to ensure secrecy), p. 113.

⁵¹ Ibid, op. cit., Mawlānās Salāmat-u'llah, Muḥammad Qā'im, Naṣir-u'd-dīn and Quṭb Miyyān were also members, *Al-Hilāl*, 22 April, 1913; Muḥammad 'Ināyat-u'llah, *Ḥasrāt-u'l-āfāq bi wafāti Majāmi'-i'l-akhlāq* (Lucknow, 1929), pp. 16-17.

⁵² Bamford, op. cit., p. 115.

plan, a portion of the Machhli Bāzār Mosque would have to be demolished.⁵³ This came to the knowledge of the Muslims who were greatly perturbed. At this stage Sir James Meston, the lieutenant governor of the United Provinces gave a public assurance that "the mosque will be saved *in its entirety*."⁵⁴ However, later he seems to have changed his mind and expressed agreement with the local authorities that the portion affected was not mosque proper because it consisted of bath cubicles, lavatories and the area for ablutions.⁵⁵ Leading ulema ruled that no part of a mosque could be taken away and that it would be sacrilegious to demolish it.⁵⁶ A memorial to this effect was submitted to the Lieutenant-Governor on behalf of the Muslims,⁵⁷ and even before the official reply could be conveyed to the memorialists, the demolition was carried out under heavy police protection on 1 July, 1913.⁵⁸ The Muslims gathered in a huge public meeting and decided to approach the Governor-General for redress.⁵⁹ All speakers appealed to the audience to remain calm, but some thought that mere petitions and memorials would have no effect.⁶⁰ Mawlānā Mohamed Ali had carried on correspondence with Sir James Meston and had drawn a blank.⁶¹ Indeed the Government spokesman had said that the entire agitation was artificial and that there was really no excitement in the Muslim public in general.⁶² Out of a crowd of more than thirty thousand men who had assembled in the meeting, a few hundred made their way to the mosque and started rebuilding its demolished portion.⁶³ At this police was summoned and ordered to open fire. The crowd was thick, about a thousand men had gathered in a small area, therefore casualties were severe and quite a few were killed.⁶⁴ This caused great resentment among the

⁵³ Ra'īs Aḥmad Ja'fī, *Alī Birādarān*, (Lahore, 1963), p. 330.

⁵⁴ *Herald of India*, Kanpur, 24 November 1912.

⁵⁵ Ra'īs Aḥmad Ja'fī, *Alī Birādarān*, op. cit., p. 333.

⁵⁶ Ibid, pp. 333, 334.

⁵⁷ Ibid, p. 333.

⁵⁸ Ibid, p. 335.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid, pp. 351, 352.

⁶¹ Reproduced in *ibid*, pp. 340-346.

⁶² Ibid, p. 353.

⁶³ Ibid, pp. 351, 352.

⁶⁴ Ibid, p. 358.

Muslims of the entire Subcontinent,⁶⁵ but even then all requests for permission to rebuild the mosque were turned down. Mawlānā Āzād Subḥānī of Kanpur, Mawlānā ‘Abd-u’l-Bārī of Firangi Maḥal and ‘Allāmah Shibli among the ulema played an important role in the movement. At last Lord Hardinge, the Governor-General, visited Kanpur and permitted the reconstruction of the mosque with the condition that the mosque building would be constructed in a manner that a pedestrian passage would be accommodated under the building along the road.⁶⁶ The Muslims did not consider this arrangement satisfactory but were persuaded by their leaders to accept it. All the prisoners were released and the cases against them were withdrawn.⁶⁷ Among those released was Mawlānā Āzād Subḥānī who had been arrested as one of the instigators.

⁶⁵ Read for instance Khwājah Ḥasan Nizāmī's moving speech at Meerut bid, pp. 345, 348.

⁶⁶ Ibid, p. 391.

⁶⁷ Ibid, pp. 392, 393.

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A Brief Honeymoon

The European Powers had taken advantage of the presence of Christian minorities in the Turkish Empire. The *Shari'ah* extends the widest toleration to non-Muslim peoples living in a Muslim state so long as they accept its suzerainty and pay the prescribed taxes. They keep their religious and communal organization intact and enjoy a remarkable degree of autonomy. Each one of these communities is recognized as a unit and in the Ottoman Empire was called a *millet* (*millat*) and the rights enjoyed by them were known to the European powers as capitulations. These concessions granted in the days of strength and out of tolerance became fetters on the polity of the Ottoman Empire in the days of its weakness. Foreign powers carried on subversive activities through the Christian minorities and after tampering with their loyalty set themselves up as their guardians and advocates. They were encouraged to rebel against the Sultan's authority to declare their independence and several independent kingdoms were carved out of the Balkan territories of the Sultan. Then, as happened in the two Balkan wars, they were encouraged to make an assault upon Turkey and snatch away large slices

of fertile lands. Turkey became the 'Sick Man' of Europe, not because the disease was self inflicted, but because those who were interested in his death would not let him take any medicine.

Gradually even the Muslims were bribed to revolt. The American University of Beirut spread the poison among the Christian Arabs to start with and later among the Muslims as well. The Christian Arabs spread the gospel of Arab nationalism and painted glowing pictures of the possibilities of Arab achievements by bringing about an Arab renaissance through the independence of the great Arab nation. According to their thinking the Prophet was a great Arab, the Muslim achievements in science, art, architecture, statecraft and empire building were Arab achievements and the Arabs were not suffering because of the injuries inflicted upon the Muslim world by the Mongols in the thirteenth and by the Europeans from the middle of the sixteenth century, but by the tyranny of the Turkish rulers. History was perverted deliberately and the record has yet not been put straight in the Arab World. In the beginning saner Arab statesmen were thinking of autonomy under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire in their search for a compromise between the impatience of extremist Arab thinkers and the obvious need of Islamic solidarity in the face of constant European aggression and pressure. But the combined resources—both intellectual and material—of Christian Arab nationalists, Christian missionaries who did not even hide their alliance with imperialism, Western expansionists and Zionist colonists were too great for the enlightened Muslim Arabs to combat. The Sick Man was alive only because the vultures had yet not been able to agree upon the division of the corpse if it were to die in a hurry. All this was known to the Turks as well as the Muslims of this Subcontinent on the eve of World War I. Nothing that happened to Turkey was unexpected, not even the revolt of the Arabs.

Soon after the Russo-Turkish war of 1876-78, the feeling in the Muslim world that the area of Islamic independence was steadily shrinking, became almost universal. How could this process be stopped? If the Muslim countries were to arm themselves—and they had already started the modernization of their war equipment as well as armies—would they be able to catch

up with the West? They could, as was demonstrated by Japan, but then Japan was not under such continuous pressure as the Muslim World had been. The collapse of the Mughul Empire in the Subcontinent had put Great Britain in the centre of Asia. The Western part of the Muslim world was surrounded. In the north was Europe with a long tradition of expansion in North Africa and Asia Minor and held back only when the Muslims were powerful; South and Central Africa had succumbed to European colonization; the Muslim supremacy in the Indian ocean having gone, the Eastern part of the Muslim world extending from the Malay Peninsula to South Philippines and the extremities of the East Indian Archipelago had been occupied. Now practically the combined might of Europe was bent upon giving no time to the Ottomans to recover from one assault after another.

As early as the Russo-Turkish war of 1876-78, it had been suggested to the Sultan that he should forge an alliance with the Mahdī of Sudan and Iran and invade India by some Muslim dreamers who obviously were conversant neither with geography nor the realities of the international situation.¹ The Sultan did not pay much heed to such an impossible proposition, but he did begin to think of getting some Muslim support. The Muslims of the Subcontinent also followed the course of the Greco-Turkish War with great interest. They raised funds to help the families of the Turkish soldiers who had been killed or maimed. When the Turks inflicted a crushing defeat on the Greeks in Thessaly in 1897, there were rejoicings in cities as wide apart as Simla and Bombay. A Muslim deputation waited on the Turkish Consul-General requesting him to convey the congratulations of the Muslims of the Subcontinent to the Caliph. The custom of mentioning the name of the Sultan of Turkey with his titles in the *khutbah* started at that time. The Christian powers had been subverting the loyalty of his Christian subjects, could he try his hand at gaining the support of the Muslim subjects of Christian powers? He was the caliph and as such the commander of all the Faithful wherever they lived. Hence he began to emphasize his position as the Caliph and, because his efforts were bearing some fruit in the shape of the recognition of his position outside his empire, especially in areas where Muslims were not free, he felt encouraged. He had access to the most

¹ Bamford, op. cit. p. 110.

religious minded sectors of the World Muslim population through the large congregations during *haj* every year. Word spread around that the Muslims owed allegiance to the caliph. Ironically the British had a hand in giving this idea to the Sultan. They had persuaded him to write to Tipu Sultan suggesting loyalty to the British. They had again persuaded him to write to the Muslim feudatory princes asking them not to side with the rebels in 1857.² If the Sultan's influence could prevent participation in a rebellion, could it not inspire rebellion as well?

Therefore, he intensified his efforts when it was obvious that Turkey would be drawn into the World War I. The Muslims of the Subcontinent had shown great sympathy for the Turks in the wars forced upon them during the period 1911-13, hence special efforts were directed towards them. Several Turks visited the Subcontinent on various pretexts. Kemal Omar Bey and Adnan Bey were sent on behalf of the Turkish Red Crescent Society to thank the Muslims of the Subcontinent for their help during the Balkan Wars. They visited Bombay, Delhi, Lahore, Patna and Calcutta and established contacts with leading Muslims. Slightly later they were joined by S. M. Tewfik, the editor of a Constantinople newspaper. He had been in touch with the Pan-Islamists in the Subcontinent. They were followed by Mohamed Samey Bey and Lieutenant Mustafa Sadek of the Turkish army who disembarked at Karachi in July and visited Bombay, Delhi and Lahore to cement relations with Pan-Islamists. Then three Turks and two servants landed at Bombay with the intention of going to Kashgar. They were sent to contact the Central Asian Muslims in a bid to gain support on the basis of pan-Islam and pan-Turan sentiments. Indian intelligence found out that Mohamed Samey Bey was really Haji Samey Bey and was sent by the Committee of Union and Progress, which was the Young Turks' political organization. Samey Bey's brother Ashraf Bey had been sent to Egypt for securing support for the Turks and had been arrested³. An Indian Muslim published a weekly newspaper called *Jahān-i-Islām* from Constantinople which had articles

² Husain Ahmad, *Naqsh-i-hayāt*, (Deoband, 1954), v. ii, p. 211. It was also used in the tribal territory to keep the tribes quiet, *ibid*.

³ Bamford, *op. cit.*, pp. 115, 116.

in Turkish, Arabic and Urdu and was intended to influence opinion in Central Asia, Arabic speaking countries and the Subcontinent. It was received regularly by the editors of Muslim newspapers and pan-Islamists of the Subcontinent. They also received a secret circular letter from Kemal Omar Bey and Adnan Bey saying that Turkey would join the war in alliance with Germany.⁴ Turkish canvassing also extended to Afghanistan. Apart from direct contacts with these areas, the returning *hājīs* brought leaflets seeking support for Turkey. In response the *Sirāj-u'l-akḥbār* of Kabul expressed deep sympathy for Turkey and also asserted that India was *dār-u'l-ḥarb*. A large number of the copies of this issue were received in the Subcontinent and were read avidly.⁵ Mawlānā Mohamed Ali wrote his famous article "The choice of the Turks" in his weekly *Comrade* which later resulted in his internment and the confiscation of his press.

At last news reached the Subcontinent that the Sultan had declared war and that he had also asserted that this war was a *jihād*. Seven hundred *hājīs* led by two members of the *Khuddām-i-Ka'bah* remained in Hejaz to join the war on the side of Turkey.⁶ The famous Egyptian pan-Islamist, 'Abd-u'l-'Azīz *Shāwesh* was appointed by the Committee of Union and Progress to work against the Allies. He was in touch with Mawlānā Mohamed Ali, Mawlānā Zafar 'Alī *Khān* and Imām-u'd-dīn of Calcutta.⁷ A meeting of a few leading Muslims was held in the office of the *Hamdard* in Delhi in great secrecy to discuss the possibilities of *jihād*.⁸ The Government now took action. Mawlānā Zafar 'Alī *Khān* was interned for making a pro-Turkish speech. Mawlānā Mohamed Ali and his brother Mawlānā Shaukat Ali were interned and the *Comrade* and *Hamdard* Press was confiscated.⁹ Mawlānā Abu'l-kalām Āzād was also interned and *Al-Hilāl* ceased publication.¹⁰

⁴ Ibid., p. 118.

⁵ Ibid., p. 119.

⁶ Ibid., p. 120.

⁷ Ibid., p. 121.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid., Mohamed Ali, Oxford educated Muslim leader and editor of *Hamdard* and *Comrade*; Zafar 'Alī *Khān*, a Muslim leader and editor of an influential Urdu newspaper *Zamīndār*.

The Mujahid Camp in the Frontier had received copies of the *fatwā* of *jihād* issued by the Sultan in his capacity as the Caliph. The Panjab representative of the organization was Mawlawī Faḍl-i-Ilāhī whose agent in Lahore was Mawlawī ‘Abd-u’r-Raḥīm, commonly known as Mawlawī Bashir. There was a group of enthusiastic Muslim students in Government College, Lahore who were persuaded by Mawlawī ‘Abd-u’r-Raḥīm to take part in the *jihād* by joining the Turkish army. Eight students of Government College, four of King Edward Medical College and one each from Aitchinson Chiefs College and Islamia College took the oath of secrecy and fled on 5 February 1915 and, after considerable hardship, reached the Camp and at last arrived at Kabul.¹¹ A few students from Kohat and Peshawar also joined them.

These young men were not the only Muslims whose minds were working in this direction. Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan, a professor in Deoband, was also thinking of the possibilities of organizing rebellion in the Subcontinent to help the Turks. He had an apt pupil in Mawlānā ‘Ubaid-u’llah Sindhī, who was almost a born revolutionary. He was a Sikh by birth and had become a Muslim while still a schoolboy. The teacher and the pupil influenced each other profoundly. Mawlānā ‘Ubaid-u’llah had a scheme to spread the gospel of *jihād* through the agency of the graduates of Deoband throughout the Subcontinent. The management of Deoband were anxious not to give the Government any pretext for destroying the institution, therefore they removed him from the professorship. Undaunted, the Mawlānā went to Delhi where he organized the Naẓārat-u’l-ma‘ārif with the help of Ḥakīm Ajmal Khān and Nawāb Waqār-u’l-mulk.¹² The institution was established to popularize Islamic teachings among the Muslim youth coming under the influence of British Indian secular education. Here also he was able to write two pamphlets stressing the importance of world Muslim solidarity. In these he also advocated a plan of action to the effect that there should be an invasion of the Subcontinent from outside followed by a rebellion against the British inside.¹³

¹¹ Zafar Ḥasan Aibek, *Ap Bli*, (Lahore, n.d.), v. i. pp. 21-63.

¹² Husain Aḥmad, *op. cit.*, v. ii. pp. 144-145

¹³ Bamford, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

He had been working in close cooperation with Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan, who thought that the work could best be carried out by going to some Muslim country and, therefore, he decided to go to Hejaz and asked Mawlānā 'Ubaid-u'llah Sindhī to go to Afghanistan which had become a centre of German, Turkish and Indian rebel activities. Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan was able to leave India in the nick of time because the Government of India had decided to arrest him but the information had been leaked out to Dr. Mukhtār Aḥmad Anṣārī by some Muslim sympathizers on which he had arranged passage for the Mawlānā.¹⁴ Previous to his departure Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan had been working secretly against the British. He was in touch with Hindu and Sikh revolutionaries who often visited him secretly at Deoband where he had rented a house specially for accommodating them on these visits.

Besides he made efforts to activate the Mujāhid Camp on the Frontier and sent his trusted emissaries to the area for bringing about unity among the tribes and to remove their misunderstandings about the Mujāhids. This he was able to achieve to a considerable degree because he had many pupils in the area who were trusted by the local population. Ḥājī Turangza'i was also persuaded to move from the British settled areas into the tribal territory. In the beginning the tribes and the Mujāhids were successful, but later they began to face difficulties because of shortage of arms and the British propaganda to the effect that the Muslims of the Frontier area should wait for a lead from the Amīr of Afghanistan who was the nearest Muslim monarch. The trick worked because the British knew that Amīr Ḥabīb-u'llah Khān would not fight against the British. It was in view of these developments that Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan had decided to send Mawlānā 'Ubaid-u'llah Sindhī to Afghanistan and, even if the news that the British intended to arrest him had not arrived, he would have left for Hejaz. The news only expedited his departure.¹⁵ He was lucky because Government of India's telegraphic

¹⁴ Husain Aḥmad, op. cit., v. ii, p. 200. Dr. Anṣārī and his brother Ḥakīm 'Abd-u'r-Razzāq were later questioned in this connection because the fact of his sending telegrams for booking Mawlānā Husain Aḥmad's passage could not be kept a secret, but there was no proof that Dr. Ansari had known the reasons of the Mawlānā's departure, Ibid., p. 201.

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 207-212.

A BRIEF HONEYMOON

orders to the provincial government reached Bombay when the ship had left the harbour and the same happened at Aden.¹⁶

Mawlānā 'Ubaid-u'llah Sindhī first went to Sind and from there, through Baluchistan, to Qandahar with the help of the local people.¹⁷ He was then sent to Kabul where he was given a secret audience by the Amīr, Ḥabīb-u'llah Khān. Mawlānā 'Ubaid-u'llah Sindhī contacted the Revolutionary Indian Mission. At the outbreak of the war, several Indians had gone to Berlin, where they organized anti-British activities under the leadership of Har Dayāl. The Berlin Group thought that it should be represented in Afghanistan, so that it could establish contacts with India. The leaders of the group in Kabul were Raja Mahendra Pratāp and Barkat-u'llah.¹⁸ The latter was a member of the Indian Ghadr Party which had been organized in the United States of America by a number of Indians resident there.¹⁹ He had been professor of Urdu at Tokyo and edited a violently anti-British journal. He was dismissed and his paper was suppressed by the Japanese authorities. From Tokyo he had gone to Berlin from where he had been sent to Kabul. Similarly Raja Mahendra Pratāp had gone to Geneva where he had met Har Dayāl and then he went to Berlin from where he was dispatched to Kabul.²⁰ The German Mission was soon disillusioned with its Indian counterpart, because the Indians had raised high hopes of success in stirring a rebellion in the Subcontinent, but they found that neither the Amīr of Afghanistan was likely to join the war, nor were the Indians able to do anything in India.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 213.

¹⁷ Mawlānā 'Ubaid-u'llah Sindhī's *diary*, p. 63 quoted in Ḥusain Aḥmad, op. cit., v. ii, p. 149. This contradicts the British information that he first went to the Mujāhid Camp, Bamford, op. cit., p. 124. Some details of Mawlānā 'Ubaid-u'llah Sindhī's activities in Afghanistan are contained in Sir Michael O'Dwyer, *India as I knew it* (1885-1925), (London, 1925), pp. 172, 182 and *Sedition Committee Report*, commonly called *Rowlatt Committee Report*, (Chairman: Justice S.A.T. Rowlatt) (Calcutta, 1918), pp. 175-176. The information contained in British sources has to be modified in view of the first hand information contained in Mawlānā 'Ubaid-u'llah Sindhī's *diary* and Mawlānā Ḥusain Aḥmad's *Naqsh-i-ḥayāt*, op. cit.,

¹⁸ Ḥusain Aḥmad, op. cit., v. ii, pp. 153, 154.

¹⁹ For Ghadr Party see *Sedition Committee Report*, op. cit., pp. 70, 170 ff.

²⁰ Bamford, op. cit., p. 124; also *Sedition Committee Report*, op. cit., paragraph 164.

Mawlānā 'Ubaid-u'llah Sindhī was also disillusioned with the Indian mission. It was his opinion that Raja Mahendra Pratāp was a Hindu communalist and in league with Pandit Madan Mohan Mālviya, to whom he passed on all the secrets of Turco-German efforts in Afghanistan.²¹ He formed the same opinion of Lālā Lājpat Rāi, the Panjabi Arya Samajist leader.²² His opinion of the Berlin Group also was that it was a body of Hindu communalists in the garb of Indian nationalism and its objective was to ward off any Turco-German invasion of the Subcontinent and, if such an invasion became inevitable and looked like succeeding with the help of Amir of Afghanistan, to get similar involvement of Nepal to safeguard Hindu interests.²³ Barkatullah was able to play no significant role. Indeed he seems to have been included simply to give a Hindu organization the colour of being fully Indian.²⁴ The Indian mission organized a Provisional Government of India in which, after considerable hesitation and because of Mawlānā 'Ubaid-u'llah Sindhī's seemingly growing influence with the Government of Afghanistan and the German Mission, he also was included.²⁵

Mawlānā 'Ubaid-u'llah Sindhī was joined by Mawlānā Muḥammad Miyyān Anṣārī who had been his co-worker at Deoband. He had travelled with Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan to Hejaz and had been sent back from there to India by him with an appeal for *jihād* from the Turkish general Ghālib Pāshā. The copies of this appeal were distributed by Mawlānā Muḥammad Miyyān Anṣārī in India and enroute. The document was referred to by those who were in confidence as Ghālib-nāmah.²⁶ Only a few copies could be distributed because of the vigilance of the Government of India. Orders for arresting Mawlānā Muḥammad Miyyān Anṣārī were issued but he was able to escape into the tribal territory where he stayed for some time in the Mujāhid Camp

²¹ Ḥusain Aḥmad, op. cit., v. ii, pp. 158, 159.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid., p. 159.

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 165, 166.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Bamford, op. cit., pp. 124, 125. *Sedition Committee Report*, op. cit., 164.

and then made his way to Kabul.²⁷

The provisional Government set up at Kabul had Raja Mahendra Pratāp as president and Barkat-u'llah as Prime Minister. When Mawlānā 'Ubaid-u'llah Sindhī was included, he was appointed Minister.²⁸ The German mission went back in the beginning of 1916.²⁹ The provisional Government sent a mission to Russia requesting the Czar to give up his alliance with Great Britain and to invade India. This letter was inscribed on a gold plate.³⁰ Missions were also sent to Turkey and Japan.³¹ Mawlānā 'Ubaid-u'llah insisted upon the inclusion of his nominees in the missions to ensure that the Muslim point of view did not go unrepresented and also that he should know what had transpired.³²

Mawlānā Muḥammad Miyān Anṣārī wrote a letter to Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan which gave details of all that had transpired upto then and included proposals for the organization of an army to be called Ḥizb-u'llah with its centre at Medina and local centres in Constantinople, Teheran and Kabul. The entire organization was to be under Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan and the Kabul centre under Mawlānā 'Ubaid-u'llah Sindhī. The other letter was also from Mawlānā Muḥammad Miyān Anṣārī to Shaikh 'Abd-u'r-Raḥīm of Hyderabad in Sind requesting him to get the letter addressed to Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan sent to him at Mecca through some reliable *hājī* and, if no sufficiently

²⁷ He travelled under the assumed name of Manṣūrī. For a short note on him see Ḥusain Aḥmad, op. cit. pp. 189-191.

The relevant passage from *Ghālib-nāmah* runs as follows: "The Muslims of Asia, Europe and Africa have equipped themselves with all kinds of arms and have hastened to join the *jihād* (now being waged) for the sake of Allah. Thanks to Almighty God the Turkish army and the *mujāhids* have overcome the enemies of Islam. . . Muslims! Attack the tyrannical Christian Government under whose bondage you are living... Hasten to put all your efforts with strong determination to strangle the enemy to death and show your hatred and enmity for them. It may be known to you that Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan Effendī, formerly of Deoband Madrasah in India, came to us and sought our counsel. We agreed with him on this matter and gave him necessary instructions. If he comes to you, trust him and help him with men, money and whatever he needs". Bamford, op. cit., p. 124.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ *Sedition Committee Report*, op. cit., paragraph 164.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ḥusain Aḥmad, op. cit., v. ii, pp. 168-169.

³² Ibid., pp. 163, 168.

reliable person were available, he himself was to carry it. These letters were written *en clair* on yellow silk, hence they came to be called silk letters.³³ The silk was sewn in between the cloth of the messenger's jacket and its lining to prevent detection and he was given careful directions. His ostensible mission was to give the father of one of the students who had gone over to Afghanistan news of the welfare of his son. The father, who was a friend of Sir Michael O'Dwyer, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Panjab, ferretted out the secret and took possession of the letters which he handed over to Sir Michael.³⁴ On this a number of arrests were made. The Government of India protested to Afghanistan and Mawlānā 'Ubaid-u'llah Sindhī and his friends were interned.³⁵ Mawlānā Muḥammad Miyān Anṣārī had already gone to the Mujāhid Camp.³⁶ The writers of silk letters were not fully aware of the international situation, because before the letter could possibly be delivered, the Sharif of Mecca had rebelled against the Turks. Mawlānā 'Ubaid-u'llah Sindhī and his associates were removed to Jalalabad.³⁷ Amīr Ḥabīb-u'llah Khān was assassinated and was succeeded by Amān-u'llah Khān, who was not so pro-British and he summoned Mawlānā 'Ubaid-u'llah Sindhī to Kabul.³⁸ It was decided to open hostilities against the British. Zafar Ḥasan, one of the Lahore students rendered creditable service at Thal in the Anglo-Afghan War.³⁹ Another Indian student Allah Nawāz rendered good service to the present dynasty during Bacha Saqqā's rebellion.⁴⁰ Mawlānā 'Ubaid-u'llah Sindhī crossed over to Soviet Union in November 1922.⁴¹

We now turn to the activities of Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan in Hejaz. There he sought an interview with the Turkish governor, Ghālib Pāshā. After making inquiries regarding his antecedents,

³³ *Sedition Committee Report*, op. cit., paragraph 164.

³⁴ The student's name was Allah Nawāz, and the father was Khān Bahādur Ḥaq Nawāz Khān. The messenger was a convert, Shaikh 'Abd-u'l-Ḥaq, Ḥusain Aḥmad, op. cit., v. ii, p. 170.

³⁵ Ibid., pp. 171-172.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 171.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 172.

³⁸ Ibid., pp. 172-177.

³⁹ Zafar Ḥasan Aibek, op. cit., v. i, pp. 137 ff.

⁴⁰ Ḥusain Aḥmad, op. cit., v. ii, p. 177.

⁴¹ Ibid., pp. 177, 178.

Ghālib Pāshā took Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan into confidence and advised him to go back to India to work there, but the Mawlānā explained that he would be arrested the moment he set his foot in India. Ghālib Pāshā insisted that the Muslims of India by themselves would not be able to achieve much, therefore they must secure the cooperation of the Hindus.⁴² This was precisely the advice given by his Afghan sympathizers to Mawlānā 'Uḥayd-u'llah Sindhī and his associates. This advice was transmitted to the Muslim leadership in the Subcontinent and was to have a tremendous influence upon the Muslims during the Khilafat Movement and upon the majority of the ulema of the Deoband school of thought in all their subsequent political thinking. Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan also wanted to go to Constantinople and meet Anwar Pāshā for which arrangements were made but later Anwar Pāshā and Jamāl Pāshā themselves came to Medina and Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan was able to meet them in secrecy and discuss his projects.⁴³ They advised the Indians not to compromise on the question of complete independence by accepting the mandate of any power or its tutelage in any form. They were sanguine that a peace conference would be convened in not too distant a future where Turkey and her allies would raise the question of Indian independence. Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan requested for arrangements for his travel to the Mujāhid Camp on the frontier of the Subcontinent but he was told that the Allies were in occupation of parts of Iran so that transit through that country was not possible.

They promised to send him a letter in Arabic and Persian which could be utilized by him in furthering the cause.⁴⁴ The promised letters arrived very soon from Syria where the two Turkish ministers, Anwar Pāshā and Jamāl Pāshā, had gone from Medina. This letter was carefully concealed in the cavity of the bottom of a box in which some clothes were packed and sent to India with some persons in confidence of Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan with instructions to deliver the letters to Ḥāji Nūr-u'l-Ḥasan in district Muzaffarnager, who was to get them photographed by

⁴² Ibid., pp. 214-215.

⁴³ Ibid., pp. 219, 220.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

Aḥmad Mirzā, photographer of Delhi and then distribute them to the persons indicated. The whole mission was successfully completed even though the Indian police got correct information several times but, despite a thorough search every time, their attempts to seize the letters failed.⁴⁵

The story reads like an interesting detective story, but the net result of the adventure was nil, because the war had taken a bad turn for the Central Powers and it had become certain that their defeat was inevitable. Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan went from Medina to Ṭā'if to see Ghālib Pāshā to discuss with him his future programme of action. He was still there when the Sharif of Mecca rebelled against Turkey and Ṭā'if was cut off. Communications were restored after about six weeks and Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan was able to move to Mecca. Here he was asked by an agent of the Sharif to sign a statement justifying his rebellion against Turkey. On his refusal, he and his companions were arrested and sent to Jeddah and from there to Cairo, where he was closely interrogated by a British officer deputed from India. Then he was transported to Malta as a prisoner of war.⁴⁶

All that had transpired in Afghanistan and Ḥejaz was not known to the public until the publication of the Sedition Committee Report in 1918. Until then even what occasionally came to the knowledge of the Government did not find its way into the press, because it would have been impolitic to publish it. The secrets were on the whole well kept by the agents who were employed for the tricky adventures. The two exceptions were—and there were only two—the man who was entrusted with the delivery of the Silk Letters and a relation of Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan. The latter had been commissioned to deliver a thousand rupees to the Mawlānā by Dr. Ansari and to give him an indication of the general attitude of the Government of India towards him. The Mawlānā took him into confidence regarding the letter from Anwar Pāshā and Jamāl Pāshā, because the persons who had taken the box with them had been arrested on disembarkation at Bombay. The Mawlānā wanted the message to get through

⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 221-227. The copies were delivered and not burnt as stated by Mawlānā 'Ubaid-u'llah Sindhi, Ibid., p. 171.

⁴⁶ Ibid., pp. 227-235.

to the persons who were to take various steps for the delivery of the copies to several persons. This relation through inexperience, broke down under examination by an experienced police officer and 'spilt the beans'.⁴⁷ It was no mean feat for two theologians brought up in the cloistered seclusion of seminaries without any previous experience of secret organisations or even of normal political activities to manipulate a conspiracy of an international complexion and to organize secret work on such a large scale.

It is necessary now to trace the developments in the Subcontinent which were within general cognizance. It has already been mentioned that political leaders and ulema had built up a general feeling among the Muslims of the Subcontinent that the Western Powers led by Great Britain were bent upon annihilating the political existence of Islam. When the war broke out, it was generally felt among the Muslims that the Turks had no choice and that they could perhaps recoversome of their lost power and prestige by participating in the war in alliance with Germany. The war became a topic of keen discussion; newspapers were read avidly every where; because post was delivered twice a week in the villages, a new category of newspapers came into existence in Urdu which were published twice a week to cater for the rural population; in short there was an unprecedented interest in the progress of the war; because all the sections of the community felt involved in the fate of Turkey. Sentiment was overwhelmingly anti-British, the Allies were generally looked upon as enemies.

The Sultan of Turkey came to be recognized as the Caliph all over the Subcontinent. This was done in such an inostentatious manner that even today it is difficult to trace the history of the growth of the belief. So long as the Abbasids of Baghdad lasted, they were recognized as *dejure* suzerains of the Empire of Delhi. No clear decision was taken after the sack of Baghdad and the execution of Musta'shim-bi'llah in 1258. Later when the Abbasids were restored in Egypt, and Muḥammad bin Tughluq came to know of their existence, he recognized their suzerainty.⁴⁸ However, with the establishment of the Mughul Empire the position

⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 228-231.

⁴⁸ For details see I.H. Qureshi, *The Administration of the Sultanate of Delhi*, (Karachi, 1958), Chapter II.

changed completely, because the Mughuls subscribed to the theory that each independent Muslim monarch was the caliph within his own territories.⁴⁹ The Mughul Emperors were, therefore, recognized to be caliphs within the Mughul Empire. After 1858, when the last Emperor Bahadur Shāh II was arrested and exiled, the name of the monarch was removed from the *khutbah* and a vague reference was made to the ruler of the Muslims without specifying who he was, because it was understood that there was none. Then the name of the Sultan of Turkey came to be inserted with his titles.⁵⁰

It has already been mentioned that the practice started in 1897 when there was general rejoicing over the Turkish victory over the Greeks in Thessaly. In a few years, with the beginning of the second decade of the century, it spread to all the mosques where Friday congregational prayers were held. This was quite an achievement for the ulema. Perhaps the beginning was made in some of the important mosques of big cities and then the formula was taken up by other mosques without any prompting from any quarter. In this quiet manner allegiance for the sultan of Turkey as the caliph of Islam was built up in the most effective way and, because not a word was printed in the newspapers, no one noticed the remarkable phenomenon. Therefore, when it was claimed that the Muslims of the Subcontinent owned allegiance to the Sultan of Turkey, no British or Hindu eyebrows were raised and the claim was accepted at its face value. Another remarkable feature of this development was that it did not become a matter of sectarian or legal dispute. Of course it was recognized that the Shī'ahs did not believe in the institution of the caliphate at all, but no one raised the point. It is doubtful whether the caliph has any position in Islamic law in the territories where his political authority receives no official recognition. Even when the caliphs were merely nominal and *faineant*

⁴⁹ I.H. Qureshi, *The Administration of the Mughul, Empire* (Karachi, 1966), pp. 28, 29.

⁵⁰ The titles were:

السلطان ابن السلطان الخاقان ابن الخاقان سلطان البرين و البحرين
خادم الحرمين الشريفين

"Sultan the son of Sultan, the Khāqān (emperor) son of Khāqān, the Sultan of the two continents and the two oceans, the servant of the two noble Sanctuaries (of Mecca and Medina).

their authority received legal recognition, but such recognition was extended by the constituted political authority of a Muslim country exercised by a Muslim ruler. There was no parallel of a Muslim people living under a non-Muslim government recognizing the authority of a Muslim ruler. Thus a rare unanimity was achieved on the general principle that the Turkish Sultan was the lawful caliph of the Muslims and that their concern with his fate was genuine. Mere sympathy with Turkey on the basis of a general pan-Islamic feeling could not have received the same recognition in any quarter. In any case the belief that the Sultan of Turkey was the caliph of the Muslims of the world was sincerely held by the Muslims of the Subcontinent and its validity was recognized by the British and the Hindus alike.

It was recognized in Europe as well where its full significance was not understood. A wrong parallel was drawn between the Pope and the caliph, but in fact there is no similarity. The Pope is the spiritual head of the Catholics; he is their supreme pontiff. The Caliph on the other hand was no priest. There is no priesthood in Islam and therefore there is no church. The caliph is in fact the head of the community of Islam organized into a state. His religious position comes from the fact of his post being based in the *Shari'ah*, the sacred law of Islam, which regulates their religious as well as temporal affairs. The caliphate was a religious institution in this sense and it is for this reason that Ibn Khaldūn calls it a canonical necessity.⁵¹ The Government of India did not question the genuineness of the Muslim sentiment, because whatever might have been the legal position of the caliphate, the Muslims of the Subcontinent did believe in its sacred character as was demonstrated by the massive response to the call of the leaders who asked the people to make an all out effort to save it. When the news of the rebellion of the *Sharif* of Mecca came to the Subcontinent, there was a general revulsion of feeling against him. There is not the least doubt that British diplomacy had played an important role in persuading the *Sharif* to rebel. Therefore the British Government was considered responsible for breaking the solidarity of the Muslims to serve its own ends.⁵²

⁵¹ Ibn Khaldūn, *Muqaddimah*, Urdu Translation by Mawlānā 'Abd-u'r-Rahmān (Lahore, n.d.) (Paisa Akhbar edition), pp. 165, 166.

⁵² Bamford, op. cit., p. 126.

The Muslims in the Subcontinent were unable to understand the action of the Arabs who had shown no respect to the institution of the caliphate nor to the cause of Muslim solidarity. It was painful to think that a Muslim potentate should stab his suzerain in the back at a time when the entire future of Muslim political power was at stake. Could Arab purpose not be served by the achievement of autonomy within the Ottoman fold? The Muslims of the Subcontinent were angry with the Sharif, but they were bitter against the British.

The leaders of the Mujāhid Camp in the Frontier sent *mawlawis* in the tribal area to explain the magnitude of the disaster that had befallen Islam, accusing the British for engineering it.⁵³ The *Sirāj-u'l-akhbār* of Kabul called the Sharif a traitor to the cause of Islam.⁵⁴ The Amīr of the Mujāhidīn (of the Mujāhid Camp) published a decree signed by eight ulema of eight different countries to the effect that it was incumbent upon all Muslim soldiers serving under Great Britain, France and Russia to rebel.⁵⁵ Mawlānā 'Abd-u'l-Bārī of Firangī Maḥal (Lucknow) inspired a *fatwā* to the effect that the appointment of a caliph was a religious duty of the Muslims, that there was no bar against a person's eligibility on the basis of his not being a Quraishī, that the Sultan of Turkey was the rightful caliph, that it was the duty of the Muslims to turn out the Sharif of Mecca and that it was also their duty to help the caliph in recovering Mesopotamia and Syria. A copy of this *fatwā* was sent to the Governor-General of India.⁵⁶

A digression is called for at this stage to mention the events in Amritsar in April 1919 to explain the Hindu support of the Khilafat Movement and the Muslim involvement in the demand for the freedom of the Subcontinent in cooperation with the Hindus and the Congress. The latter could well have been natural, because, after all, the Muslims were even greater sufferers than the Hindus as the result of foreign domination. The Hindu involvement in the Khilafat Movement, however, was not so

⁵³ Ibid., pp. 127, 128.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 128.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 129, The *fatwā* was issued in 1917.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 130.

natural. British statesmen themselves had conceded that Indian cooperation during the World War I would have to be rewarded by some constitutional reforms to provide for greater participation by the Indians in the government of their country. It was thought necessary that pressure be put upon the British Government to fulfil the promises made by its spokesmen during the war. In the beginning, the effort took the shape of Mrs. Annie Besant's agitation for home rule, which was mostly a mild affair consisting of meetings of educated classes in the main cities and towns.⁵⁷ The Government, however, made the serious mistake of enacting the Rowlatt Act in March 1919 in the teeth of unanimous public opposition. The Act was based on the report of the Sedition Committee presided over by Justice S.A.T. Rowlatt.⁵⁸ Mahatma Gandhi had successfully tried passive resistance as a political weapon in South Africa. When the Sedition Committee Report was out, he threatened to launch a programme of *satyagrah* in case the recommendations of the Report were implemented.⁵⁹ He had toured the Subcontinent extensively and had created a big following for himself. In addition to the enactment of the Rowlatt Act, which legalized imprisonment without a proper trial of any person suspected of seditious or subversive activities, the Government arrested two popular leaders who were making preparations for the forthcoming session of the Indian National Congress to be held at Amritsar. They were taken to some unknown place.⁶⁰ When the news spread, a large crowd gathered and started moving towards the area where government offices and the residences of officials were located. It was stopped by military pickets stationed to guard the locality from any mob attack. At this, the crowd became excited and started pelting the soldiers with brickbats, who fired on the crowd killing one or two and wounding others. The inflamed crowd turned back carrying the victims of the firing in a procession. On their way they killed five Europeans and set several buildings on fire.⁶¹ There were

⁵⁷ Sitaramayya, op. cit., v. i, pp. 130-132.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 160.

⁵⁹ Ibid., *Satyagrah* is a Sanskrit word which was used as a technical term by Mahatma Gandhi for passive resistance for the vindication of a just right.

riots of varying intensity in other towns as well.⁶² At this Mahatma Gandhi withdrew *satyagrah*, because he realized that people were not sufficiently trained for non-violent action.⁶³

A serious tragedy took place at Amritsar which greatly inflamed public opinion. There is an open space in the centre of the city called Jallianwālā Bāgh. It is surrounded on all sides with tall houses which make an unbroken wall but for a single entrance. A public meeting was held there on 13 April 1919. Government had prohibited meetings, though Martial Law had not been imposed. When people had gathered for the meeting, General Dyer occupied the entrance with a force of one hundred and fifty soldiers, who were put on a raised platform. The crowd was peaceful, yet without giving it time for dispersing, the soldiers were asked to fire upon it. They continued shooting volleys into the mass of people until ammunition ran out at which they left the dead and the wounded to their fate and, no arrangements were made to render medical assistance. This was a massacre in every sense of the word. The official figures of the casualties were four hundred dead and between one and two thousand wounded.⁶⁴ The soldiers had sixteen hundred rounds of ammunition when they started, therefore it must have been known to General Dyer that with that much ammunition and a thick mass of humanity for a target, the casualties would be high. Martial Law was imposed two days later, not to stop further violence because there was almost none, but to humiliate the people. For instance an European woman missionary had been attacked in a street by the mob, however, before any serious molestation could take place, decent people of the locality had come to her rescue.⁶⁵ But now every passer-by was made to crawl on the spot where she had been attacked. Martial Law was imposed in some other towns as well and shooting also took place. Almost everywhere the intention turned out to be to inflict humiliation upon the people and cause serious inconvenience to them rather than to restore law and order.⁶⁶ From that point of view

⁶² Ibid., pp. 163, 164.

⁶³ Ibid., p. 171.

⁶⁴ Ibid., pp. 164, 165.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 165.

⁶⁶ Ibid., pp. 165 ff.

the imposition of Martial Law seemed to be unjustified because there was little violence that could not be curbed by normal police vigilance.

There were several other reasons of discontent. The reforms envisaged in the Government of India Act 1919 fell far short of Indian expectations. The Hunter Commission appointed to inquire into the excesses committed during the Martial Law produced a divided report, the European and Indian members finding themselves in two opposite camps.⁶⁷ There were other factors not visible on the surface. A large number of soldiers were demobilized causing considerable unemployment. Some of them had served in European countries and seen the striking difference between European standard of living and their own. They naturally blamed the government for the chronic and unbearable poverty of their families to whom they returned.

At long last the Congress met at Amritsar. The Ali Brothers attended it, coming straight from their detention. It was here that a Hindu Muslim alliance was forged. The Muslims accepted Mahatma Gandhi's leadership, techniques and programmes; Muslim leaders and organizations only echoed in their language what the Mahatma and the Indian National Congress declared or laid down. There were several reasons for this policy. The Muslims realized that single handed they could achieve nothing. They had waged a lone struggle against British domination and had gained a modicum of temporary success only in the war of 1857 when a fair number of Hindus had made common cause with them. Both the Afghans and the Turks had impressed upon their leaders the stark necessity of gaining the cooperation of the Hindus. Now was the opportunity and it had to be seized. It had been impressed upon them that the citadel of British power in Asia was India, which made all the Muslim countries vulnerable to attack and encroachment. Oil still only hovering on the horizon, the main reason for the assault upon the Muslim lands was, according to their assessment, the need to secure imperial communications as well as neighbouring lands against a possible encroachment by any other power. Therefore, whatever the cost

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 189.

involved, the British power must be dislodged from this citadel. They, like the Hindus, wanted freedom, but if the Hindus were to play false after the departure of the British, at least the Muslim countries would be able to breathe freely. The Muslims of the Subcontinent wanted to be partners in the freedom of their habitat as well as in the liberty of the rest of the Muslim world, but if the glory of Islam and the prosperity of other Muslim lands could be built only upon their own misery and deprivation, they thought the price was not too high to pay. Few peoples in history have displayed such altruism in fighting for a cause.

The stage was, therefore, set for Hindu-Muslim cooperation and Mahatma Gandhi, knowing full well the depths of the emotion that surged in Muslim breasts and swayed Muslim minds, was too shrewd a politician to let such an opportunity go. Muslim sentiment and energies could be roped in for the deliverance of India for little to be given in return. The bargain was therefore struck.⁶⁸

It has been mentioned that Amān-u'llah Khān who succeeded to the throne of Kabul after the assassination of Amīr Ḥabīb-u'llah Khān was not at all pro-British. He was also under pressure from the tribal chiefs as well as his own officers to take advantage of the British difficulties and to strike a blow for the complete independence of his country, because hitherto Afghanistan had been within the British sphere of influence and its foreign relations were controlled by the British. His forces marched and occupied the British outpost of Thal in 1919. On this an armistice was concluded and the British and the Afghan delegations met in Mussoorie in 1920. Afghanistan's total independence was recognized and Amān-u'llah Khān assumed the title of king. The leader of the Afghan delegation was Maḥmūd Tarzī who told some Indian Muslim leader that one of the aims of the Afghan War was to secure a just peace for Turkey and that the Afghan king would go to the extent of laying down his life for the sake of preserving the sanctity of the khilafat. This was stated

⁶⁸ The Congress expressed dissatisfaction with the proposed reforms in its special session held at Bombay on 29 August 1918 (*Ibid.*, p. 153) and at the annual session held at Delhi on 26 December 1918 (*Ibid.*, pp. 157, 158). The majority report of the Hunter Commission was condemned in the special session held at Calcutta in September 1920 (*Ibid.*, pp. 201, 202).

by a speaker in a public meeting in Delhi.⁶⁹ It is difficult to find out whether Maḥmūd Tarzī had made the alleged statement or not, but it does stand on record that in a ceremony for saying prayers for Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan after his death on 30 November 1920, Amān-u'llah Khān said, "The Shaiḥ-u'l-Hind"—this was the title by which the Mawlānā came to be known in the Subcontinent after his return—"started a movement, I will, God willing, take it to a successful conclusion."⁷⁰

Muslim feelings were running so high that the Government of India asked the British Government to take some steps to assuage them. Even before the war came to an end, the Prime Minister, Lloyd George, was persuaded to state in the Parliament, "Nor are we fighting to deprive Turkey of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace which are predominantly Turkish in race."⁷¹ When the armistice was signed, the attitude of the Allies towards the Turks was so hostile that it caused grave misgivings among the Muslims of the Subcontinent. Constantinople was under Allied occupation and the Sultan was a prisoner in his palace. British forces, despite the Armistice, advanced from the South to occupy Mosul to secure the future oil fields for themselves. Protest meetings were held at different places. The more important of these was a Muslim Conference held at Lucknow on 26 January 1919 and presided over by Mawlānā 'Abd-u'l-Bārī which decided to constitute the Khilafat Committee. A Khilafat Conference was convened at Delhi on 22 September 1919 and was presided over by the Bengal leader A. K. Fazl-ul-Haq, who emphasised the need of securing Hindu cooperation for making the Khilafat Movement successful. It was resolved to boycott victory celebrations and to hold protest meetings and if the provisions of the treaty imposed upon the Turks were unfair, to organize an effective movement against the Government. It was also decided to send a deputation to England under the leadership of Mawlānā Mohamed Ali.

Before this deputation could be organized it was decided to send another deputation to wait upon the viceroy under the leader-

⁶⁹ Bamford, op. cit., p. 132.

⁷⁰ Husain Ahmad, op. cit., v. ii, p. 180.

⁷¹ Quoted in Sitaramayya, op. cit., v. i, p. 189.

ship of Dr. M.A. Ansari consisting of Mahatma Gandhi, Seth Chhotani, the first president of the Khilāfat Committee, Mawlānā Thānā'-u'llah Amritsari, Mawlānā Abu-'l-kalām Āzād, Mufti Kifāyat-u'llah, Mawlānā Ḥasrat Mohānī, Syud Hasan, Editor of *Independent*, Allahabad, Mawlānā 'Abd-u'l-Bārī of Firangī Maḥal, Ḥakīm Ajmal Khān, Dr. Saif-u'd-dīn Kitchlew, Mawlānā Mohamed Ali, Mawlānā 'Abd-u'l-Mājid Badāyūnī, Saiyid Zuhūr Aḥmad, Secretary, Muslim League, Mawlānā Fakhīr Ilahābādī, Mawlānā Saiyid Sulaimān Nadwī, Aghā Muḥammad Aṣhrāf Qizilbāsh, the Rājā of Maḥmūdābād, Pandit Moti Lal Nehru and Mr. M. A. Jinnah. The last two were not able to reach in time but both of them telegraphed their full concurrence with the aims of the delegation which demanded that it was necessary for the sake of making the caliphate effective that the integrity of Turkey should not be affected adversely.⁷² The names of the members of the delegation have been mentioned to show its representative character. Hindus and Muslims, Shī'ahs and Sunnīs, Congressites and non-Congressites, extremists and moderates were all represented, so that it could be claimed justly that the deputationists were voicing the sentiments of all the inhabitants of the Subcontinent. The Governor-General's reply was not encouraging. On this several Muslim leaders issued a joint warning that if the terms of the Peace treaty violated Muslim sentiment and religious conviction, too great a burden would be imposed upon Muslim loyalty to the British throne. They demanded that the entire Arab Peninsula as defined by the Islamic law as Jazīrat-u'l-'Arab and the holy shrines of Hejaz must remain under the effective control of the Caliph. They also reminded the British Prime Minister of the promise contained in the statement he had made in the Parliament to the effect that the British were not fighting to deprive the Turks of their rich lands in Asia Minor and Thrace.⁷³

Another Khilafat Conference was now held at Bombay to appoint a delegation for going to England and to record their confidence in it. The deputation left for England in the beginning of March 1920. It consisted of Mawlānā Mohamed Ali, Maw-

⁷² Saiyid Rā'is Aḥmad Ja'frī, '*Alī Birādrān*', op. cit., pp. 633-634.

⁷³ Ibid., p. 635.

lānā Saiyid Sulaimān Nadwī, Abu-'l-Qāsim, Syud Husain and Ḥasan Muḥammed Ḥayāt. Shoaib Qureshi and 'Abd-u'r-Raḥmān Ṣiddīqī were already in England and joined the deputation there. Mawlānā Mohamed Ali was the leader and Ḥasan Muḥammad Ḥayāt was the secretary. The deputation met Lloyd George who told bluntly that Turkey could not expect a better treatment than the defeated Christian countries.⁷⁴ How could the deputation's pleadings and arguments cut any ice with Lloyd George, or, for that matter, with any European statesman when simultaneously the Arabs were demanding large chunks of the carcass of the defeated Turkish Empire? How could the Allies believe that Islamic law decreed the institution of the caliphate and its control upon Jazīrat-u'l-'Arab when Muslims themselves had rebelled against the caliph and violated the sanctity of the holy land? The deputation, therefore, returned empty handed. When the news of the British Prime Minister's disappointing reply reached India, a black day was observed in all important cities and towns.

The details of the terms dictated to Turkey in the Treaty of Sevres created great disappointment among the Muslims, even though after Lloyd George's reply they had expected them to be harsh, because what the Allies decided at Sevres was the complete dismemberment not only of the Ottoman Empire but the Turkish homeland itself. When the terms were communicated to the Turkish Government it refused to sign them, but it was forced into accepting and signing the treaty, which "liquidated the Ottoman Empire and virtually abolished Turkish sovereignty."⁷⁵ The Allies had overreached themselves. The Treaty was torn into pieces within three years by the Turkish resistance movement led by Mustafa Kemal Pasha, the Atatürk, and the Muslims of the Subcontinent shook the very foundations of the British Empire in South Asia. These terms were published in India on 14 May 1920. The Governor-General was aware that they would cause grave discontent among the Muslims, therefore, he issued a message to the Muslims expressing his sympathy and

⁷⁴ Ibid., pp. 635, 636.

⁷⁵ Columbia Encyclopedia, (New York, 1950), article on "Treaty of Sevres".

counselling restraint and peace, but they could not take such advice too seriously.⁷⁶

As a matter of fact, even the report of Lloyd George's reply to the Mohamed Ali delegation had caused so much resentment that many Muslims decided to migrate from the Subcontinent to Afghanistan and thus began the ill-advised Hījrat Movement. The leading spirit of the movement was a young firebrand Ghulām Muḥammad 'Azīz from Amritsar, who had witnessed the humiliation of the people in his native city when Martial Law was imposed after the disturbances in connection with the protest against the Rowlatt Act.⁷⁷ The name of this young man was abbreviated by himself later when he went to Afghanistan, into 'Azīz Hindī. His restless spirit did not find the programmes drawn up by the older leaders sufficiently dynamic for his way of thinking. He met most of them but was not convinced that their techniques would achieve much success.⁷⁸ He sought an interview with Mawlānā Faḍl-i-Ilāhī of Wazirabad who was the local contact and organizer of the work relating to the activities of the Mujāhid Camp in the Tribal Area. He had heard of him through a common friend who introduced him to the Mawlānā.⁷⁹ He explained the aims and objects of the Jihād Movement and perhaps told him that if it could attract a much larger number of recruits and muster sufficient resources, the time was ripe for striking a blow upon the British power. He was deeply influenced by what Mawlānā Faḍl-i-Ilāhī told him and began to advocate a mass migration of Muslims to Afghanistan. The first large public meeting on record in which he canvassed for *hijrat*—migration—was one organized by the Anjuman Hīmāyat-u'l-Islam, a non-political body, which greatly embarrassed the officers of the Anjuman, but which created great enthusiasm among the audience.⁸⁰ In the beginning of April 1920, Mawlānā Ḥasrat Mohānī convened a meeting of the workers of the Khilafat Movement in Delhi which attracted a number of delegates. The

⁷⁶ Saiyid Ra'īs Aḥmad Ja'fī, *'Alī Birādrān*, op. cit., p. 636.

⁷⁷ 'Azīz Hindī, Memoir "An Kahī Kahānī" in Saiyid Ra'īs Aḥmad Ja'fī, *Awraq-i-gumgashah*, op. cit., p. 759.

⁷⁸ Ibid., pp. 763-764.

⁷⁹ Ibid., pp. 767-768.

⁸⁰ Ibid., pp. 768-769.

purpose of the conference was revealed later which was to press for the transfer of the central office and headquarters of the All India Khilafat Committee from Bombay to Delhi.⁸¹ 'Aziz Hindī was not interested in the move, but he tried unsuccessfully to utilize the platform of the conference for speaking on *hijrat*. He was, however, promised permission to speak in the public meeting to be held at night.⁸² He got an opportunity when the hour was very late, yet he was able to hold the audience who applauded his pleading for *hijrat*.⁸³

The question of *hijrat* soon engaged the attention of the ulema. Mawlānā 'Abd-u'l-Bārī gave a ruling that in case some one felt that he could not discharge his religious duties freely under a non-Muslim government, he should migrate to a Muslim country. In certain instances it was even incumbent to do so. The *fatwā* was hedged in with many conditions and its language was too technical and involved for a layman to understand easily. Several ulema disagreed with him.⁸⁴ 'Aziz Hindī sent him a telegram requesting a clear injunction. Thereupon the Mawlānā sent a reply reiterating that *hijrat* was permissible in case a person felt that he could not perform his religious duties while he lived under an alien non-Muslim government.⁸⁵

This encouraged 'Aziz Hindī to open an office in Fatḥpūrī Mosque building and to organize a movement in right earnest.⁸⁶ He was not encouraged by the senior leaders like Dr. M. A. Anṣārī and Ḥakīm Ajmal Khān but that did not deter him.⁸⁷ His enthusiasm was boundless and could not be controlled. Mawlānā Mohamed Ali had once called him a 'dangerous fanatic'⁸⁸ but the temper of the people was such that extreme proposals caught their imagination. During this time Khān 'Abd-u'l-Ghaffār Khān, the future Red Shirt leader, met 'Aziz Hindī and

⁸¹ Ibid., pp. 757-758.

⁸² Ibid., pp. 777-778.

⁸³ Ibid., pp. 779-780.

⁸⁴ Ibid., pp. 139-154.

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 781.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 782.

⁸⁷ Ibid., pp. 782-783.

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 761.

pointed out that the *hijrat* could not take place without the permission of the Afghan Government. He said he himself would go there to secure the permission. He did go to Afghanistan and lived there for about a month, but the Afghan government did not attach much importance to him. He came back to Charsadda while 'Aziz Hindī was in Afghanistan.⁸⁹ The difficulty of securing permission was resolved by the Afghan government itself. At the request of Mawlānā 'Ārif Haswī, who had been supporting 'Aziz Hindī, the Afghan Consul General came out with an announcement that the government of his country had every sympathy for the movement and would welcome all who migrated to it. He said that every migrant would get about three acres of land for cultivation and financial help to set himself up in any part of Afghanistan selected by the government for the purpose and that the *muhājirs* (migrants) would not be permitted to indulge in politics that ran counter to Afghan policies.⁹⁰ On this 'Aziz Hindī issued large posters mentioning the Afghan conditions and saying that no one who did not possess sufficient resources to pay for his journey and a little extra for additional expenses would be permitted to go.

Some twenty thousand persons sold their lands, their properties, even their household goods at throw away prices and migrated to Afghanistan.⁹¹ Among the more notable persons was Jān Muḥammad Junejo, a wealthy land owner of Sind, who was the leader of the *Muhājirs* from his province. He died in Afghanistan.⁹² Communications between Peshawar and Kabul were by no means easy.⁹³ Amīr Ḥabīb-u'llah Khān had been opposed to the idea of good roads in his country because he was afraid both of Russia and Great Britain and did not want to give easy access to the armies of either.⁹⁴ There was no motor transport available to ordinary travellers between the two cities and the only available vehicles, tongas, were expensive.⁹⁵ The area chosen

⁸⁹ Ibid., pp. 780, 781, 810.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 784.

⁹¹ Bamford, op. cit., pp. 158, 159.

⁹² Ibid., p. 169.

⁹³ 'Aziz Hindī, op. cit., pp. 788, 789.

⁹⁴ Ibid., pp. 808, 809.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 787.

for the rehabilitation of these migrants was near Jabal-u's-Sirāj where a camp was established.⁹⁶ Even the transport from the camp to the lands was too expensive for the Afghan Government to afford.⁹⁷ A few thousand people who had their own resources did settle down on land.⁹⁸ A brigade was raised out of able bodied men,⁹⁹ but employment otherwise was scarce. Only a few persons with special skills were absorbed. Therefore return trek towards India started and most of the migrants came back broken hearted and financially ruined. Some made their way to Russian Turkistan and were treated by the Russians with kindness, though the local authorities were harsh in their attitude. Several of these became dedicated communists and even Russian agents. The first communist workers in the Subcontinent were Russian trained Muslim *muhājirs*, ostensibly returning home.¹⁰⁰ After 'Azīz Hindī left for Afghanistan, Mawlānā Abu-'l-kalām Āzād took the organization of the *hijrat* in his hands and appointed representatives in various places.¹⁰¹ When the *muhājirs* started coming back, the movement collapsed in no time. A side effect was that the migrants introduced new and necessary skills, established schools and dispensaries and acted as a leaven to modernize Afghan economy and society.¹⁰² The Hijrat Movement was but a small episode in the struggle of the Muslims of the Subcontinent against British policies relating to the Muslim world, and though it stands witness before the bar of History regarding the sincerity and the depth of Muslim sentiment regarding Turkey, it served no other purpose and created grave hardships for many Muslim families.

The Mohamed Ali deputation came back from Europe in October 1920.¹⁰³ Mawlānā Mohamed Ali and Mahatma Gandhi toured the entire Subcontinent to give a direction to the agitation that was fast developing. Khilafat Committees were established

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 818.

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 821.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 827.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., pp. 831-833.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 765.

¹⁰² Ibid., pp. 887-889.

¹⁰³ Saiyid Ra'is Aḥmad Ja'fri, 'Ali Birādrān, op. cit., p. 636.

in every nook and corner, and no small town or large village was left without one. Such a mighty organization was built up from scratch that all observers were surprised. A programme of non-cooperation with the Government was drawn up. It has been claimed by some Indian Muslims that it was drawn up by Mawlānā Abu'l-kalām Āzād and that it was based upon the *Sharia'h*. This he is stated to have done "in January 1920 in Calcutta while presiding over a provincial conference."¹⁰⁴ This is not borne out by facts. The Calcutta Conference passed a resolution on 6 September 1920 saying, "This session of the Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind proclaims that in view of the facts that the European powers have been manifestly unjust in their treaty with Turkey and have trampled upon Islamic sentiments, and that the British ministers have clearly gone back on their promises and have shown religious animosity towards Islam in uprooting the Caliph of the Muslims by depriving the Caliphate of its power, it has become incumbent upon the Muslims as followers of Islam to non-cooperate with the enemies of Islam."¹⁰⁵ It may be mentioned that the word used for non-cooperation is *tark-i-muwā'āt*, because very soon there was to be a strong controversy about the real import of the term. There can be little doubt that non-cooperation both in its general concept and details was the brain child of Mahatma Gandhi. "The All India Khilafat Conference held in Delhi in November 1919 had resolved to withdraw cooperation from Government under Gandhi's advice—a decision which was reaffirmed by Muslim meetings in Calcutta and elsewhere as well as by the Madras Khilafat Conference on 17-4-1920...."¹⁰⁶ This puts the record straight and makes it amply clear who was the author of the scheme.

The movement was properly inaugurated on 1 August 1920. The details of the programme had been carefully drawn up. The people were asked to surrender all the titles and honorary offices conferred by the government and to refuse to attend official and semi-official functions organized by the government; it recommended the gradual withdrawal of students from institu-

¹⁰⁴ I.H. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Sub-continent* op. cit., p. 276 f.n. quoting Manglori.

¹⁰⁵ Saiyid Ra'īs Aḥmad Ja'fī, *Awraq-i-gumgashṭah*, op. cit., p. 222.

¹⁰⁶ Sitaramayya, op. cit., v. i, p. 198.

tions maintained or aided by the government, and the boycott of British courts, of legislative councils, of elections to these councils and of foreign goods. It advocated refusal to enlist for service in British occupied Iraq. The resolution was adopted by a special session of the Indian National Congress.¹⁰⁷ A *fatwā* was drawn up on the same lines as the Congress resolution and was signed by a large number of ulema.¹⁰⁸

The theologians who signed this document made one great mistake. Instead of basing their ruling upon the circumstances existing at that time, they declared the boycotts as permanently incumbent. They forgot that political situations change making new adjustments necessary with every turn in the circumstances. If they had ruled that it was necessary to non-cooperate with the British because they had displayed hostility to the interests of Islam, their dictum would have carried more weights, but a permanent boycott of the institutions mentioned in the *fatwā* was a different matter. That is the reason why the Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind found it difficult to withdraw the *fatwā*, even though this was openly suggested to them.¹⁰⁹ Later they were forced to suspend it. If the *fatwā* had been taken literally and followed faithfully, the Muslims would have become permanent non-cooperators. A more reasonable attitude was adopted by Mawlānā Abu'l-kalām Āzād who, in his presidential address to the Provincial Khilafat Conference of Bengal held at Calcutta on 28-29 February, 1920, limited himself to saying that affection for and cooperation with those non-Muslims who are at war with Muslims is prohibited.¹¹⁰ The bulk of the people, even most of those who did non-cooperate, took non-cooperation to be a political instrument and not a permanent way of life. With the suspension of the boycotts by Mahātmā Gāndhī, practically all

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 202.

¹⁰⁸ For the text see Ra'īs Aḥmad Ju'frī, *Awraq-i-gumgashṭah*, pp. 208-224.

¹⁰⁹ One of the signatories was Mawlānā Maẓhar-u'd-dīn, the owner and editor of *Al-Amān* of Delhi. In 1924 the newspaper published an editorial saying that the *fatwā* was badly drafted.

¹¹⁰ Abu'l-kalām 'Āzād, *Mas'alah-i-khilāfat wa jazirah-i-'Arab*, (Calcutta, 1920), pp. 141-145. The address printed in this form is the most convincing case put forward in favour of the defence of the Caliphate being a religious duty and played a tremendous role in making the Khilafat Movement popular among the intelligentsia.

who were in a position to do so, resumed their previous vocations and forgot the *fatwā*.

When it was issued, two powerful voices were raised questioning its legal and religious soundness. Mawlānā Aḥmad Riḍā Khān of Bareilly wrote a long rejoinder¹¹¹ and Mawlānā Aḥraf 'Alī Thānawī's school did the same.¹¹² There were two main points of attack. Firstly they argued that *muwālāt* is not the same as *mu'āmilāt*, the former means friendship and affection and the latter are dealings, transactions, cooperation and other relations, and whereas friendship and affection for all opponents of Islam are prohibited, transactions are a different matter altogether.

The other point was that if it was wrong to have *muwālāt* for the British, the same should have been true about the Hindus, with whom the leaders of the Khilafat Movement were so friendly that they had become the followers of Hindu leaders and accepted their guidance. A Hindu leader, Svāmī Śharaddhānanda, who later became the most outstanding organizer of the Shuddhi Movement, was taken in procession to the Jāmi' Masjid, Delhi where he was put on the pulpit to make a speech. This was considered highly objectionable by those Muslim theologians who objected to the stand taken by the authors of the *muttafaqah fatwā*. The real difference of opinion was in fact regarding the extent of cooperation with the Hindus. There was a triangle of interests in the Subcontinent, the Muslims, the Hindus and the British. The question really was to what extent and in what manner should the Muslims cooperate with the other two and in this differences of opinion were bound to arise. The schools of Thāna Bhawan and Bareilly, though by no means enamoured of the British, were highly suspicious of Hindu intentions and greatly disliked the fact that Muslim leadership should make

¹¹¹ Mawlānā Aḥmad Riḍā Khān, *Hālāt-i-dā'irah par do ḡurūrī fatwe*, (Bareilly, n.d.) reproduced in Ra'is Aḥmad Ja'fī, *Awraq-i-gumgashṭah* op.cit., pp. 225-305. Also, see Muḥammad Mas'ūd Aḥmad, *Fāḍil Bareilwī awr Tark-i-muwālāt*, (Lahore, 1971).

¹¹² *Mas'alah-i-tark-i-muwālāt aur fatwā* (Aligarh, 1339 A.H.). The *fatwā* was issued on behalf of Mawlānā Aḥraf 'Alī Thānawī's *khānqah* and signed by Mawlānā Zafar Aḥmad 'Uṭhmānī. Also, *Śirāt-u'l-mustaḡim, fatwā-i-muttafaqah*, signed by Mawlānā Aḥraf 'Alī and other ulema, reproduced in Ra'is Aḥmad Ja'fī, *Awraq-i-gumgashṭah*, op. cit., pp. 307-338.

itself completely subservient to Mahatma Gandhi and the Indian National Congress. They were even more alarmed by the fact that Muslim theologians should search out verses of the Qur'ān and sayings of the Prophet for the purpose of supporting Mahatma Gandhi's dicta and Indian National Congress resolutions.

However, public sentiment was so anti-British, that the other point of view did not get so much publicity as the *muttafaqah fatwā* of the Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind. It would have been better if the appeal had been made simply on the basis of the need to save the Caliphate and Turkey from destruction at the hands of European imperialists. In the situation in which the Muslims were placed in the Subcontinent, it was inevitable that sometimes their struggle would be against the British and sometimes against the Hindus. In some instances the Muslims could find tacit or open support of one of the two remaining parties against the other, sometimes they would have to fight lone battles. It should not have been a matter of rebuke to seek such alliance with either of the parties as was demanded by the circumstances of the situation. The instincts of the community did direct it into such alliances, but if the position had been clearly understood there would have been less dissensions and accusations and counter accusations and more realistic appreciation of the positions taken up by different leaders on various occasions. There does seem to have existed some such understanding among the different schools of thought among the Hindus, therefore, we find more tolerance of inter-group differences amongst them. The most spectacular demonstrations of Hindu-Muslim unity during the Non-cooperation Movement did not create much of a rift between its apostle Mahatma Gandhi and Pandit Madan Mohan Mālviya, who could not brook any diminution of Hindu dominance in Indian affairs. Nor during the utmost extremism of Congress anti-British politics, did the Congress and the liberal leaders exchange the kind of invectives which were common in intra-Muslim controversies.

Despite the opposition of some powerful and learned ulema, the stand taken up by the supporters of Non-cooperation found overwhelming support. Hardly any one examined the reasoning behind the pro-Non-cooperation *fatwā*. The general feeling was

that the British and their allies were out to destroy Islam as a force in international affairs, hence they were the enemies of Islam, therefore, non-cooperation against them must be right; whether the legal arguments advanced in its favour were sound or otherwise, was a minor matter. The Muslims supported the movement with rare abandon. Despite their poverty and backwardness, they made tremendous sacrifices. Proportionately more of them threw away titles, honours and honorary offices, lucrative practices as lawyers and profitable trade in foreign goods. Educationally they had lagged far behind the Hindus and yet many parents withdrew their children from Government and State aided schools and colleges and more Muslim young men gave up prospects of a comfortable life by coming out of educational institutions and joining the ranks of Khilafat and Congress workers and volunteers. More Muslim State aided and recognized educational institutions were under assault and could be saved by their trustees and managers with difficulty and after earning considerable opprobrium and unpopularity. Even the cherished Aligarh, centre of Muslim educational enterprise in the Subcontinent, was virtually under siege for some time. The Muslims, in their effort to destroy Aligarh, established the most successful non-cooperating educational institution, the Jāmi'ah-i-Milliyah-i-Islāmiyah that was later shifted to Delhi. Of course now it finds no cause for non-cooperating with the Indian government. When the movement gathered volume and civil disobedience became a plank in the platform, Muslims were foremost in filling the jails.

The Ali Brothers never made a secret of the fact that non-violence was not an article of faith with them as it was with Mahatma Gandhi and some Hindus. They truly said that Islam did permit violence and fighting in some circumstances, but they explained that as a matter of policy they would abide by non-violence. However, some of their statements perhaps could be construed as advocating violence against the British under certain circumstances. In an interview with Lord Reading, the viceroy, Mahatma Gandhi was told that some statements made by them created the impression that they advocated violence. Mahatma Gandhi thereupon persuaded the Ali Brothers to issue a clear

statement that they did not advocate violence and if any of their speeches conveyed the impression that they did, that was not their intention.¹¹³ They also expressed regret at the heat that had crept into some of their utterances. Mahatma Gandhi, it seems, had been trapped by the wily viceroy, because as soon as the statement was published, the Government inspired newspapers came out with the news that the Ali Brothers had apologised. Mahatma Gandhi protested to the viceroy on the interpretation put on the statement of Ali Brothers, who had in view his own countrymen like Pandit Madan Mohan Mālviya and Sir Tej Bahādur Sapru and not the Government. During those days an apology tendered to the Government in any form meant political death, but people just could not believe that the Ali Brothers of all people, were capable of tendering an apology to the Government or resiling from any position taken up by them on a public issue. Besides, the fact that the Ali Brothers had not been advocating violence was known to every one. When this strategy failed to work, the government ordered their prosecution for a speech made in a Khilafat Conference at Karachi in support of a resolution asking Muslim soldiers not to fight against their brother Muslims in other countries in any war waged by Great Britain. The trial was held in Khāliq dīnā Hall in Karachi and though the charge of conspiracy could not be proved, the accused were convicted on the speeches they had delivered and sentenced to two years' imprisonment.¹¹⁴ Mawlānā Ḥusain Aḥmad, Pīr Ghulām Mujaddid and Mawlānā Nithār Aḥmad were also convicted along with them.

Despite all efforts made by Mahatma Gandhi and other leaders, both Muslim and non-Muslim, violence was slowly creeping into the movement. At last it erupted in a spectacular manner in Lahore in February 1922. A Congress procession chased twenty-one policemen and a sub-inspector into the police station and set fire to it.¹¹⁵ The inmates, all Indians, were burnt to death. Mahatma Gandhi had been receiving reports of minor outbreaks for some time. Now he felt that the movement was getting

¹¹³ Sitaramayya, op. cit., v. i, pp. 213, 214, 222.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., p. 222.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p. 235.

out of control. Therefore, a meeting of the Congress Working Committee was convened at Bardoli on 12 February 1922. A resolution was adopted at Mahatma Gandhi's instance suspending mass civil disobedience and adopting a programme of constructive work.¹¹⁶ The excitement had reached the boiling point, now it began to subside. The Government then felt that it was no longer unsafe to take action against Mahatma Gandhi. He was, therefore, arrested on 13 March 1922 and was sentenced to imprisonment for six years after a trial.¹¹⁷ Action was taken against other leaders as well, and with them safely lodged in jails, the movement lost its vigour. As we shall see later, the brief Hindu-Muslim honeymoon also came to an end.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 236.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 222.

CHAPTER XI

Disenchantment

The incarceration of the leaders was not the only reason for the collapse of the Khilafat Movement. It had become fairly obvious to intelligent observers that agitation by the Muslims of the Subcontinent was not likely to deflect the Allies from the path they had chosen regarding the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. Indeed the British were hard at work to persuade the Hindus that the pan-Islamic overtones of the movement were a danger signal for the India of the future, the free India for which alone the Hindus were fighting, because they had no interest in the fate of Turkey or of the holy shrines of Islam. It would be recalled that Mahatma Gandhi had found it necessary to persuade the Ali Brothers to issue a statement to the effect that they did not advocate the use of violence and that they regretted the occasional heat in their speeches. When official circles had acclaimed this statement as an apology, Mahatma Gandhi had protested to the viceroy against such use having been made of the statement, because when the Ali Brothers had issued it, they certainly did not have the government in view but had their countrymen, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and Pandit Madan Mohan

Malviyya in mind.¹

It should be remembered that the interview between Lord Reading and Mahatma Gandhi had been arranged through the good offices of these two Hindu gentlemen, who obviously were alarmed at the likelihood of the outbreak of violence. The Hindus upto that time did not want violence, only partly for the reason that violence would give the British an excellent opportunity to crush it. Mahatma Gandhi made a moral issue of non-violence, but this view was not shared by most of his followers, to whom non-violence was in fact just a good policy. Its excellence also consisted in another consideration. Already the Muslims had demonstrated much more enthusiasm in the prosecution of the programmes of Non-cooperation and mass civil disobedience, but if it came to fighting, whatever might have been the ultimate result, the Muslims would have given a better account of themselves. And if by some chance the British had given way, the Muslims would at least become the senior partners in the business. According to Hindu calculations, this, combined with the presence of a large Muslim population extending from the Panjab to the Atlantic, posed a positive danger to the Hindus. The complaint against the Ali Brothers was only a ruse to find an opportunity of briefing the Mahatma on their own thinking. Of course the arguments were not valid because of the chronic weakness of the Muslim states in general and of those countries in particular which were the neighbours of the Subcontinent. But the suggestion that they posed a danger to India was used with great dexterity to isolate the Muslims of the Subcontinent from the Hindus and other communities.

So far as Hindu-Muslim cooperation was concerned the British were quite certain that it would not last for long. It was hoped by the British that it would fall apart because of its own internal dynamics. A British writer says about Lord Reading that "he divined the essential differences of their aims and the temporary nature of their union and of the enthusiasm of the component parties. His policy was to watch and wait for the

¹ See *supra*, chapter X.

inherent disharmonies and illusions of the parties to reveal themselves and do his work for him.”² This diagnosis was correct, but Lord Reading was not the man to wait for the apple to fall into his lap. The government machinery was at work all the time. Even before the Non-cooperation Movement started and some Muslim leaders made efforts for the release of the Ali Brothers from Chhindwara, it was alleged by Government circles that Mawlānā Mohamed Ali had written a letter to the Amir of Afghanistan urging him to attack India and that his brother Mawlānā Shaukat Ali had written a seditious letter to Mawlānā ‘Abd-u’l-Bārī. It was said that the Amir had sent the letter written by Mawlānā Mohamed Ali to the Indian government. Both the brothers requested inspection of the letters attributed to them because they denied the authorship of any such epistles and, therefore, concluded that they must have been forged. The letters were never shown to them, nor, for that matter, to any other politician. It was quite obvious that the Government itself was not satisfied that the letters, if they existed at all, were genuine, otherwise their purpose would have been better served by publishing them. The motive in spreading the canard was, in all probability, to impress upon the Hindus the desirability of siding with the Allies, otherwise they would be running the risk of helping the Muslims in establishing their rule with the help of Afghanistan, which would have the backing of the Central Powers and Turkey as well as the Muslims of the Subcontinent themselves. A Government committee which had been sent to examine the case for the detention of the Ali Brothers and to question them at Chhindwara denied any knowledge of the charge when the Ali Brothers repeated the allegations regarding the letters. And yet Government quarters went on making the insinuation because there were many Hindus willing to believe it.

It would be recalled that even Mawlānā ‘Ubaid-u’llah Sindhi, from his contacts with Raja Mahendra Pratāp, had concluded that he was there only to keep the Hindu communal leaders in India informed if any alliance developed between Afghanistan and other Powers which made the invasion of India probable from

² Smith, *Oxford History of India*, op. cit., p, 792.

the North-West.³ Pan-Islam was not only a bogey for the British and other European imperialists but it also filled the Hindu communalists with grave apprehensions. The British knew it and exploited the Muslim support of the Khilafat for the purpose of sowing suspicions in the minds of the Hindus. Even when the Turks had been defeated and Germany had been crushed, Hindu leadership did not give up its fear of a possible alliance between the Muslims of the Subcontinent and some foreign Muslim powers to the detriment of India. What the viceroy had probably impressed upon Mahatma Gandhi in the interview arranged by Sir Tej Bahādur Sapra and Pandit Madan Mohan Malviya was that the rising political consciousness of the Muslims which was so deeply pan-Islam oriented was in itself a danger and that the Ali Brothers through their violent speeches were creating emotions that could only result in a general violent uprising of the Muslims and invite intervention by a Muslim country. Of course Mahatma Gandhi was too shrewd a politician not to know that no Muslim country at that time was strong enough for attacking India, yet if the Muslims did create disorder in the Subcontinent, it would be detrimental to Hindu interests. Lord Reading's arguments were quite obviously reinforced by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapra and Pandit Madan Mohan Malviya, therefore, Mahatma Gandhi being a good Hindu, as he was, must have felt perturbed and thought it necessary to get a clear enunciation by the Ali Brothers of adherence to non-violence. This, Mahatma Gandhi must have hoped, would arrest any tendency of violent action that might have been creeping into the minds of the Muslim masses. From his point of view, such hopes must have been belied by the outbreak of violence among the Moplahs.

They are a community of Muslims who have been living in Malabar since the dawn of Islamic history. During the heyday of Arab commerce in the Indian Ocean, a community of Arab traders settled down in that part of India and married Nair women.⁴ As long as the Arabs were able to control the traffic

³ See supra, Chapter IX.

⁴ Edgar Thurston, *Castes and Tribes of Southern India*, (Madras, 1909), pp. 459 ff; Tara Chand, *The Influence of Islam on Indian Culture* (Allahabad 1946), p. 35.

on the high seas, the Moplahs were rich and prosperous, but their economic position began to decline with the loss of the sea-borne trade and the decline of the Muslim power. They gradually sank into being a community of peasants and a few petty shopkeepers.⁵ They were enthusiastic Muslims and took a keen interest in the Khilafat Movement. The government tried to suppress their activities and arrested a large number of their political leaders. In particular, the local officials manhandled and humiliated their ulema and *imāms* of mosques who are called *thangals* in their language.⁶ This irritated them and they broke into open rebellion. The real story of the rebellion and its causes is not known, because the Moplahs got a very bad press. One suspects mischief of some agents provocateurs in the entire business, because not only the rebellion itself but also the turn it took seems to be tailor-made to suit the policies of the Indian Government. To the simple Moplah folk, it seemed an excellent opportunity to establish their own government, even though they had only clubs and swords for arms with a sprinkling of a few shot guns, so few indeed that they could be left out of counting.⁷ Then they turned against their immediate oppressors, the Hindu landlords, money lenders and petty functionaries of the Government. Compared to later disorders in the Subcontinent, carnage was insignificant, because any one who so desired escaped simply by saying that he would become a Muslim.

Government retribution was very severe; "thousands of Moplahs were butchered and their houses and crops were burnt to ashes."⁸ Many Hindus acted as spies. When the insurrection had been brought under control, a large number of arrests were made and many were transported. A hundred men were thrust into a small goods wagon, seventy of these died of suffocation.⁹ The Government skilfully publicized the Moplah excesses against the Hindus; the bait was swallowed by the Hindu press which un-animously and vociferously condemned the Moplahs. Only

⁵ *History of Freedom Movement*, op. cit., v. iii, part i, p. 231.

⁶ Sitaramayya, op. cit., v. i, p. 220.

⁷ Ibid.,

⁸ Ibid, p. 247.

⁹ Mohammad Noman, *Muslim India* (Allahabad, 1942), p. 207.

Mahatma Gandhi kept cool and did not join the chorus.¹⁰ The Muslims did not condone the Moplah excesses, but they did protest against the harshness of British measures and the ghastly tragedy of the goods wagon. Besides they could not be silent witnesses to the misery of the Moplah widows and orphans and funds were raised to ameliorate their pitiable condition. This was not liked by the Hindus, who, in their fury were as desirous of vengeance as the British of punishing the rebels and teaching them a lesson they should never forget. The Moplah rebellion confirmed Hindu fears and provided the first nail in the coffin of Hindu-Muslim amity after the honeymoon of Non-cooperation. The Moplah insurrection took place in August 1921 and Chauri Chaura in the beginning of February 1922. That made up Mahatma Gandhi's mind for him and, as we have noted earlier, he suspended the movement.

If the Hindu reaction to the Moplah disturbance had blown over, much damage would not have been done to the possibilities of Hindu-Muslim cooperation in the field of politics so far as the achievement of freedom was concerned ; even though the amity of the Non-cooperation days perhaps would have been difficult to restore. But it seems that Hindu politicians had made up their minds to get rid of Muslim participation in anti-British activities. Soon after the leaders were safely lodged in jail, two Hindu movements were launched with great vigour. These were Shuddhi and Sangathan. The former had the objective of converting Muslims to Hinduism and the latter intended to organize the Hindus for the purpose of giving the Muslims a fight so that they could be, as it were, put in their proper place. The basic notion was that India was a Hindu country and all 'extraneous' elements that divided it into different communities should be eliminated. From being a multi-national, multi-cultural and multi-religious people, the Indians were to be converted into a uni-national, uni-cultural and uni-religious entity.

This was to be achieved by the conversion of all who followed a foreign religion to the local religion, which was assumed to be Hinduism. The foreign religions were Christianity, Islam,

¹⁰ *History of Freedom Movement*, opp. cit., v, iii, part i, p. 232.

Zoroastrianism and Judaism. The followers of the last two were so few that in the opinion of the organizers of *shuddhi* and *sangathan*, they posed no problem. The Christians also did not matter in the political field. The Muslims, however, were too numerous to be ignored. Besides they had ruled the Subcontinent for several centuries and the Hindus felt that they should get even with them. Both the movements were, therefore, mainly directed against the Muslims. Hindusim, historically speaking, has been a non-proselytizing faith in its various forms. The converted individual had no place in Hindu society; he still has none; but groups could be absorbed as sub-castes. This was the method used for assimilating all foreigners who came to live in the Hindu milieu of the Subcontinent. The main grouse against the Muslims has been their refusal to succumb to the processes adopted by Hinduism in all its efforts to absorb them. Har Dayal, once connected with terrorist activities against the British and organizer of anti-British plots in Germany where he lived during World War I lamented during this period that "twenty per cent Islam cannot be digested by any country. Any country that has swallowed this stone of twenty per cent Islam has always been troubled with stomach aches".¹¹ Islam in this context does not refer to Islamic teachings or principles, but to the Muslim population that Har Dayal reckoned to be a fifth of the total population of the Subcontinent. Therefore, this "hard stone of twenty per cent" was to be made digestible for the Hindu stomach.

There were two methods of achieving this. Either this hard stone was to be turned into a part of the digester himself by conversion, or be softened and pulverised by fascist methods. The first was *shuddhi* or conversion, the other was *sangathan*, the binding together of the Hindu community into a fascist organization, which, after coming to power, could reduce the Muslims into a helpless crowd. Because the Muslims would not willingly assimilate themselves with Hindusim by the slow process of acculturation which they had resisted throughout the centuries, the more direct method of proselytization had to be used. This was the idea of the founder of the Arya Samaj, Svāmī Dayānada Sarasvatī, who adopted the idea of conversion from missionary religions

¹¹ *Al-Jami'at*, Delhi, 26 March, 1925 quoting *Tej*, Delhi.

like Islam and Christianity. As non-Hindus were *yāvanas* (aliens) and as such *malichha* (unclean), they had to be made clean (*shuddha*). This process was *shuddhi*. The Arya Samajists were not too successful in converting Muslims and they had come to realize that it was difficult to gain converts from amongst the Muslims through arguments or persuasion and if one or two individuals did get converted, it was difficult to find for them a place in Hindu society.

Therefore, the plans were changed. Now those sectors of the Muslim population which were ignorant and still occupied a kind of half-way house between Islam and Hinduism were to be persuaded to come back to the fold through social pressure and mass contact. A massive effort, therefore, was organized among the Malkānā Rajputs, who lived mostly in the Western part of the (then) United Provinces and eastern parts of Rajputana. The chief organizer of this action was Svāmī Shradhdhānanda, who had taken active part in the Non-cooperation movement, was gaoled and significantly released before the expiry of his term.¹² There is nothing intrinsically wrong with one religion trying to steal the sheep of another but when the motives are blatantly political, missionary effort becomes a different matter and cannot fail to cause irritation to the community out of which mass conversions are attempted. A leading Arya Samajist newspaper, the *Pratāp* of Lahore wrote editorially, "In this country, the government is based upon numbers ... *shuddhi* has become a matter of life and death for the Hindus... If their (the Muslims') number increases, only God knows what will happen. It is true that *shuddhi* should be for religious purposes alone, but the Hindus have been led by other considerations as well."¹³ The Prince of Amethi declared, "when all Muslims become Hindus through *shuddhi*, no power can stand in the way of our freedom."¹⁴ Obviously the freedom of India meant only

¹² Qāḍī Muḥammad 'Abd-u'l-Ghaffār, *Hayāt-i-Ajmal*, (Aligarh, 1950, p. 283. Svāmī Shradhdhānanda, it may be mentioned was taken in a procession in the heyday of the Khilafat Movement to the Jāmi' Masjid in Delhi and asked to address the Muslims from the pulpit, a performance which was strongly criticized by Mawlānā Aḥmad Riḍā Khān of Bareilly, Mawlānā Aḥmad Riḍā Khān, *Ḥālāt-i-dā'irah par do fatwe*, op. cit., p. 265.

¹³ *Pratāp*, Lahore, 10 January, 1927.

¹⁴ *Tej*, Delhi, 20 March, 1926.

DISENCHANTMENT

Hindu raj to the speaker. The intention was not to leave a single Muslim in the Subcontinent.¹⁵ No other non-Hindu community was the target of so much adverse attention. The conversion had to be done at any cost, the idea of coercion was ever present in the Hindu mind. That was the reason why *shuddhī* and *sangathan* were launched simultaneously. As early as 1860, an Arya Samajist writer had incited the Hindus to fight against the Muslims in the following words, "... if there were any worth in them (the Hindus), they would have fought and demolished the mosques. ... They bear all persecution without retaliation, as if they were (lifeless like) idols..."¹⁶ Dr. Moonje the main organizer of the *Sangathan* Movement, explained its objectives quite clearly in his presidential address to the third session of the Oudh Hindu Mahasabha at Ayodhya in the following words: "Just as England belongs to the English, France to the French, and Germany to the Germans, India belongs to the Hindus... If the Hindus get organized, they can humble the English and their stooges, the Muslims ... the Hindus henceforth (begin to) create their own world, which will prosper through *shuddhī* and *sangathan*."¹⁷ He had said quite clearly a few days earlier, "You will not be able to convert the Muslims, until you have strength in your bodies."¹⁸ Another spokesman of the movement writes, "The most important need of today is Arya or Hindu *sangathan*... There should be no contacts or relations with the Muslims... There will come a day when all the Muslims and aborigines will become Arya (Samajist) through this movement."¹⁹

Har Dayal occupied an important position in the nationalist movement of India. At one time he was one of the foremost

¹⁵ A poet wrote the following verses:

کام شدھی کا کبھی بند نہ ہونے پائے بھاگ یہ وقت یہ قوموں کو ملا کرتے ہیں
ہندوؤں تم میں ہے مگر جذبہ ایمان باقی رہ نہ جائے کوئی دنیا میں مسلمان باقی

(The work of *shuddhī* must not stop,
Nations find such opportunities through good luck alone,
Hindus! If you have any vestiges of faith left in you,
Not a single Muslim should be left in the world),
ibid., 13 January, 1927.

¹⁶ Kanhaiyā Lāl Alakhdhārī, *Shrī Svāmī Dayānanda Sarasvatī ke jīvan par janāb Munshī Kanhaiyā Lāl kī rā'i* (Meerut, 1860), pp. 4, 5.

¹⁷ *Zamīndār*, Lahore, 24 April, 1927.

¹⁸ *Paighām-i-Sulh*, Lahore, 6 April, 1927.

¹⁹ Lala Dhanpat Rā'i in *Prakāsh*, Lahore, 26 April 1925.

leaders of the underground terrorist activities.²⁰ This is clear from the fact that the terrorists had planned to crown him the emperor of India.²¹ He was in close contact with the Ghadr Party which had its headquarters in the United States of America with its agents in Europe, Japan, Malaya, Burma, Afghanistan and the Subcontinent.²² He was the political philosopher of Hindu extremism. His articles were widely published during this period. He expounded his views openly and fearlessly. When he was permitted to return to England from Germany where he had set up his headquarters during World War I, he made a point of meeting Hindu students from the Subcontinent to influence their thinking. This work of contacting Hindu students and influencing them lasted for about two decades. It was this terrorist, revolutionary and political philosopher who preached the gospel of an exclusively Hindu state for India. He said in one of his articles that "the purpose of Hindu *sangathan* is to establish a strong, powerful, united and wide awake political party in India which will continuously strive for achieving the ideal of a free Hindu state... There are some people who quite unnecessarily want to include in the Indian national movement the half Arab, half Irani Muslims... The Indian Muslims today are merely an irrelevance. Their only future is gradually to be absorbed into Hinduism through *shuddhi*. The principles of politics show me no other way..."²³

According to this Hindu seer the Eldorado of a Hindu state could not be achieved without a total elimination of Islam from the Subcontinent. He argued that "so long as the Panjab and India have not been totally cleansed of foreign religions, we shall not be able to sleep well... Any Hindu who does not believe in this ideal is an unworthy son of the Motherland; he has no spirit in him; he lacks understanding. Every true Hindu should aspire to cleanse his country of Islam and Christianity... Two nations cannot live together in the Panjab or in India. Either all of you accept Islam or convert all the Muslims to Hinduism through

²⁰ *Sedition Committee Report*, op. cit., p. 144.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 224.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 144.

²³ *Tej*, Krishna number 1924, *Al-Amān*, Delhi, 30 August 1926.

shuddhi.”²⁴ He knew that a few Muslims would be too stubborn to turn Hindus, but in an independent India, they would be given no choice. He declared his intentions clearly when he said, “When through the strength gained by Hindu *sangathan*, the time comes for independence, we shall proclaim our policy regarding the Christians and the Muslims. At that time no mutual understanding will be necessary. The Hindu Mahasabha will merely declare its decision laying down the rights and duties of the Muslims and Christians in the new Hindu State.”²⁵ In another statement he was more explicit. “They should”, he declared, “adopt Hindu names; they must give up names of Arab and Iranian origin; they must observe Hindu festivals; they must revere the Hindu heroes of the epics; they must dress like the Hindus; they must observe the Hindu customs; they must give up calling themselves Muslims. If they desire to follow their religious beliefs, they could be given the permission to worship in their own manner. They must however, call themselves Muḥammadi Hindus.”²⁶

Even this was liberal compared to what Svāmī Satya Deva had in his mind. He said in a speech at Saugor, “When we are strong, we shall put the following conditions before the Muslims: Do not hold the *Qur’an* to be a revealed book; do not recognize Muḥammad as the Prophet of God; give up all connections with Arabia; read Kabīr and Tulsī Dāsa instead of Sa’dī and Rūmī; give up the observance of Muslim festivals and begin to observe Hindu festivals instead; observe all the festivals connected with Rāma, Kṛishṇa and other gods.”²⁷ Later, however, it was laid down that conversion would not bestow a free entry to Hinduism, for Har Dayal declared that after the Hindus come to power, they would just announce the conditions on which the Muslims and the Christians would be converted to Hinduism.²⁸ In his search for the safety of the Hindus, Har Dayal came to the conclusion that it would not suffice to eradicate Islam from the

²⁴ *Al-Jamī‘at*, Delhi, 26 March, 1925 quoting *Tej*, Delhi.

²⁵ *Milāp*, Lahore, 25 May, 1925.

²⁶ Quoted in *History of Freedom Movement*, op. cit., v. iii, part i, p. 261.

²⁷ *Al-Wakīl*, Amritsar, 9 December, 1925.

²⁸ *Milāp*, Lahore, 25 May, 1925.

Subcontinent alone. "Afghanistan and the hilly regions of the Frontier were formerly part of India but are at present under the domination of Islam. Just as there is Hindu religion in Nepal, so there must be Hindu institutions in Afghanistan and the Frontier territory, otherwise it is useless to win Swaraj... if Hindus want to protect themselves, they must conquer Afghanistan and the frontiers and convert all the mountain tribes."²⁹

An apology is certainly due for including so many quotations in this discussion, but then a bare assertion that the founders, promoters and philosophers of the two movements held these views would have sounded totally incredible. So much reliance has been placed upon Har Dayal's statements because he was no ordinary man. He was long remembered in St. Stephen's College of Delhi as one of the most talented, brilliant and thoughtful graduates that that distinguished institution had produced... He was for long the uncrowned king of the terrorists dedicated to the cause of Indian independence. He lived practically throughout his life in exile and comparative poverty. His name commanded great respect in his community which reckoned him as one of its most distinguished sons and a patriot possessing depth of feeling and great foresight. If some did not applaud him for reasons of expediency, it does not mean that they did not agree with his views. And the number of those who did applaud him was overwhelming. When he came out with his thoughts on the future of India and the duties of the Hindus in regard to the building up of the greatness of India as an exclusively Hindu country, he touched sympathetic chords in Hindu hearts.

He did represent the views of the majority, because no sooner were the twin movements started than the Hindu-Muslim alliance became a story of the past and riots broke out in practically all the main cities of the North. The Hindu press took up the propagation of the programme in right earnest, which consisted of the boycott of Muslim tradesmen and finding Hindu substitutes for even humble Muslims who earned a meagre living through an occupation or a trade. Muslim vendors, pedlars, stall keepers,

²⁹ M.R.T., *Nationalism in Conflict in India* (Bombay, 1942), pp. 2, 3 quoting Har Dayal.

barbers and craftsmen faced boycott because a vituperative campaign was carried on continuously against them. Every Muslim was painted as a bully, a kidnapper, a criminal or dishonest with serious consequences for the economic life of the community.³⁰ The Hindus were described as meek and peaceful. Even personal friendships, already rare, were affected and there was no difference in the attitudes of the educated and the illiterate.³¹ Communal disorders were deliberately provoked for finding an outlet for the fanaticism of persons who were being trained every day openly by the Hindu Mahāsabhā. The Rāshtriya Svem Seva Sangha came into existence in 1926 and worked underground, so much so, that its existence was not discovered by the somnolent Muslims until the eve of the partition of the Subcontinent.³²

All kinds of lies were put into circulation to create hatred against the Muslims. For instance it was seriously asserted by Hindu newspapers that Muslims and Christians were increasing so rapidly that "one day there will be found no Hindu in India. And, alas, that day is not too far away. In four hundred and sixty years, not a single Hindu will exist. Hindustan will become Muslimsthan and Christianisthan. Aryavarta will be under the rule of non-Aryan religions."³³ The emotionally excited Hindu, especially the less educated who came out into the streets, could not understand the absurdity of such statements. A jewel of history and anthropology was given out by a leader in Bombay in all seriousness: "There were no sweepers before the Muslims entered this land. As Muslim women observed seclusion, the Muslims needed sweepers. Therefore, they turned others into sweepers. I have come to know with certainty that the people of all castes were made sweepers. Many of them were Brahmins originally, some were Rajputs and there were men of other castes. It is obvious that the Muslims forced them to become sweepers and to do such menial work".³⁴ Another perennial source of

³⁰ *History of Freedom Movement*, op. cit., v. iii, part i, pp. 263, 265.

³¹ For a case study see C.H. Philips and Mary Doreen Wainright (Editors), *The Partition of India*, (London 1970), pp. 360-368.

³² For details see J.A. Curran, *Militant Hinduism in Indian Politics* (New York, 1951) and R.S.S. in the Panjab (Lahore, 1948).

³³ *Pratāp*, Lahore, 20 August, 1927.

³⁴ *Tej*, Delhi, 5 May, 1924.

mischief was that the Muslims ate beef. The cow is a sacred animal and its protection was a religious duty for the Hindus. Before Independence more Muslims were killed for this reason than any other.

The onslaught through *Shuddhi* and *Sangathan* was so violent and sudden that the Muslims were completely taken aback. They were puzzled because their leaders were in jail and those who were out, emphatically preached unity with the Hindus. They could not make up their mind whether they should still hold fast to the ideas propagated during the Non-cooperation Movement, or to turn away from the Hindu alliance and take steps for their defence against a danger which was palpable and immediate because the riots were causing damage to Muslim lives and property and the economic boycotts were affecting their livelihood. The Muslims were a poor community and the hardships were real. The leadership, such as had been left outside the jails, was confused. No real leadership came from the ulema at this juncture. Those groups which had been active in the anti-British movements still felt that if they joined the fray, they would be playing into the hands of the British. The man who stood up boldly at that juncture was Mawlānā Mazhar-u'd-dīn, editor of *Al-Amān*, an Urdu newspaper published twice a week from Delhi. In a public meeting organized by the local Congress workers, he thundered, "We can ally ourselves with snakes and scorpions, but not with people who are out to destroy our faith". Lālā Desh Bandhū Gupta, a disciple of Svāmī Shradhānanda and editor of *Tej*, joined issue and declared that the Hindus could not forsake their right of converting others to their faith. And the same was true regarding ringing bells in temples at the time of call to prayers in adjoining mosques. The meeting ended in discordant notes and it soon became impossible to hold joint Hindu and Muslim public meetings of any size.³⁵ The *Al-Amān*, almost alone in the beginning, raised its voice against all Hindu excesses. At last Ghulam Bhik Nairang of Ambala, a Muslim worker who had organized a Muslim school, founded the Jami'at-i-Tabligh for the purpose of countering the *Shuddhi* Movement. The Jami'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind also organized mission-

³⁵ The author was present in the meeting.

ary activities among the Malkānās and Mawlānā Muḥammad 'Irfān did good field work.³⁶ Dr. Saif-u'd-dīn Kitchlew founded the Tanẓīm Movement among the Muslims to organize them for self-defence against the *sangathan* activities. It became fashionable among Congress circles, even among Muslim Congressmen, to group *tabligh* and *tanẓīm* together with *shuddhī* and *sangathan*, though there was no comparison. The Muslim movements were purely defensive whereas the originators of *shuddhī* and *sangathan* had intended both the movements to be aggressive. The Jamī'at-i-ulamā'-i-Hind showed little interest in *tanẓīm*, one sector that remained almost scrupulously unconcerned was the Aḥrār group of ulema in the Panjab. Their loyalty to the Indian National Congress was much too deep to be ruffled by ugly demonstrations of Hindu intentions.

In the beginning, perhaps, it was not unreasonable to hope that the Hindu nationalist leaders would make common cause with those Muslims who had stood aloof from the communal confrontation. Indeed that was the expectation of Mawlānā Mohamed Ali when he was released in the end of 1925. He was elected president of the All India National Congress and true to his previous commitments and present responsibilities as the head of the premier political organization that claimed to speak for the whole of the Subcontinent and all its communities, he refused to be drawn into any of the Muslim organizations. Mawlānā Mohamed Ali had hoped that Mahatma Gandhi, who had been released at the same time, four years before completing his term for reasons of health, would throw his weight against the movements launched by his community, but he did nothing of the sort, either then or later, as we shall see. It seems that for quite some time, the Muslim nationalist leaders led by Mawlānā Mohamed Ali were the only Indian politicians desirous of restoring the Hindu-Muslim amity of the 1919-1921 days.

We shall revert to the domestic situation shortly. It is necessary to deal with the situation that was developing in Turkey and peninsular Arabia. Kemal Atatürk had raised the flag of libera-

³⁶ Mawlānā Muḥammad 'Irfān was attached to the Jamī'at-i-ulamā'-i-Hind at that time. Later he was picked up by Mawlānā Mohamed Ali and was attached to the Khilafat Committee.

tion after the unjust Treaty of Sevres. The Turks had come to realize that the restoration of the Ottoman Empire was impossible but they could not reconcile themselves to the destruction of their homeland. They drove the Greeks and the Allies from their lands and abolished the monarchy because it had come to be a hindrance in their progress. In view of the sentiment of the Muslims of the World they kept for a while the caliphate shorn of all political authority, but such an institution was meaningless and could not satisfy anyone, whereas it could possibly endanger their republican polity, therefore, they abolished it in 1924. Mawlānā 'Abd-u'l Bārī of Firangī Maḥal was able to assess the situation much before the abolition of the caliphate, and expressed the view in a letter to Seth Chhotāni, the treasurer of the Khilafat Committee that it would be desirable to work for some kind of a rapprochement between the Sharif of Mecca and the Turks. He could see that the Non-cooperation Movement was dying. The Muslims had failed in forcing or persuading the British and the Allies to change their policies. Civil disobedience was likely to become suicidal. The non-cooperators and the cooperators should be persuaded to make common cause for helping the Turks in other ways. "An opportunity has arisen" he wrote, "to bring round the Sharif of Mecca and Amīr Faiṣal. Their relations with the Turks should be made pleasant...I have exchanged views with the Sharif on the subject and I hope to bring about a settlement".³⁷

The situation, however, was too fluid. Very soon King Ibn Sa'ūd was encouraged by the British to attack Hejaz, for Sharif Ḥusain was getting unpopular in White Hall because of his insistent reminders regarding the lavish promises that the British had made to him and his family. By the *haj* season of 1925, the conflict had developed to a point that the Indian Government tried to stop intending *hajj*s from undertaking the journey. The Muslims of the Subcontinent were divided in their sympathies mostly on sectarian lines. The Ahl-i-Ḥadīth and those close to them supported Ibn Sa'ūd. The ulema of the Bareilly School supported Sharif Ḥusain.³⁸ Mawlānā Mohamed Ali supported

³⁷ Bamford, *ib. cit.*, pp. 204, 205.

³⁸ Ra'īs Aḥmad Jā'fī, *Sirat-i-Muḥammad 'Alī*. (Delhi, 1932), pp. 382-389

Ibn Sa'ūd, not for any sectarian reasons, but because he had hoped that the Najdīs would not bring the Hejaz under monarchical system. He found his spiritual preceptor, Mawlānā 'Abd-u'l-Bārī, his fellow prisoner in his last incarceration, Mawlānā Nithār Aḥmad of Kanpur and his old fellow worker, Mawlana 'Abd-u'l-Mājid in the other camp. They organized the Khuddām-u 'l-Ḥaramain; old workers like Mawlānā Ḥasrat Mohāni, and Mushir Ḥusain Qidwā'i also were amongst its organizers.³⁹

However, Mawlānā Mohamed Ali remained active despite opposition, but when King Ibn Sa'ūd assumed royal authority over the Hejaz, he did not approve of the action and openly criticized the King, who had made himself further unpopular by the excesses of his followers in demolishing parts of historical monuments of religious importance. On pressure from the Subcontinent and other Muslim countries, Ibn Sa'ūd, at last, consented to convene a conference to which a deputation, under the leadership of Mawlānā Saiyid Sulaimān Nadwī, was sent by the Khilafat Committee. Mawlānā Mohamed Ali expressed the opinion strongly that the Hejaz should have a democratic government in keeping with the early traditions of Islam which did not approve of monarchy and because the holy shrines and buildings were of great importance for the entire Muslim world, their upkeep and administration should be entrusted to a body representative of all the Muslims. This proposal was not acceptable to Sultan Ibn Sa'ūd for obvious reasons. The deputationists also found that the reports about the Sa'ūdī tampering with the sacred monuments were correct.⁴⁰

The resentment caused in the Subcontinent by these developments could not gather momentum for two reasons. The community was exhausted after the mass movement of the early twenties and was still faced with problems of immediate concern. Then the sectarian support to Ibn Sa'ūd from certain quarters in all his actions divided the community. With the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of Kemalist Turkey as a purely nationalist state which administered the coup de grace

³⁹ Ibid., pp. 395-396.

⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 397-401.

to the caliphate, the Khilafat Movement had little appeal left for the Muslims of the Subcontinent. The endeavours to turn it into an instrument of internal constructive organization more or less on the lines tried earlier with great success by Dādḥā Miyān in Bengal did not appeal to the Muslims of the Subcontinent. The kind of effort needed for building up an internal system of those proportions was not forthcoming, it was beyond the resources of the leaders of the Khilafat Committee who could work up an agitation, given the presence of emotional issues, but were not equipped for a constructive and painstaking work of such enormous proportions, Dādḥā Miyān's community was small and limited to a small area.

Under these circumstances, it was difficult enough for the Khilafat Committee to remain an effective organization; but another blow was dealt to its prestige. The funds of the committee were not deposited in a bank, as most of them fell under the category of official or semi-official institutions. Some foreign banks were British with whom the Committee could not have transactions except where it was absolutely essential to deal with them. Therefore all the money was kept with the Treasurer, Seth Chhotānī, who put them into his business. There was no question of defalcation or falsification of the books. Seth Chhotānī's business depended a good deal upon Government contracts, which were no longer forthcoming, because of his political affiliations. Therefore, the business ran into difficulties and it was discovered that the balance in his custody was not fully available. There was an uproar and a public scandal, even though Seth Chhotānī pledged his property which did not cover all the amount. All this was certainly irregular, but it was exploited to a much greater degree by the opponents of the movement than perhaps was justified. In any case public confidence was shaken and financial support was badly affected.⁴¹ The organization continued to exist but it lost its influence. It could, perhaps, have remained the focal body of the pro-Congress nationalist Muslims, but they also were drawn away because of differences with the Ali Brothers which was a corollary of the latter's alienation from the All India National Congress. The Muslim League again began to emerge as the main

⁴¹ Ibid., pp. 428-430.

spokesman of the Muslims.

When Mawlānā Mohamed Ali was elected president of the All India National Congress, he was earnest in his loyalty to the organization and its policies as they had developed during the Non-cooperation Movement.⁴² For instance he did not look upon the programme of the Swaraj Party with favour. He was shocked that Pandit Moti Lal Nehru had started chamber practice which could not be reconciled with the Congress decision of the boycott of the British law courts.⁴³ He was identified with those congressmen, who came to be called No-changers, yet as President of the Congress he dealt with the Swarajists in a statesman-like manner which did not please Mahatma Gandhi who would have liked Mawlānā Mohamed Ali to have adopted a harsher attitude against them.⁴⁴ As the Mahatma was away in prison when Mawlānā Mohamed Ali had to negotiate with the Swarajists, he had to be wary because he alone could not take the responsibility of breaking the Congress by driving away the Swarajists who counted among themselves men of eminence and undoubted loyalty to the cause of emancipation from British rule. The Swarajists were convinced that their policy was right and they would not have obeyed any mandate to the contrary.⁴⁵ The Aḥrār group of ulema and many Panjab Khilafatists also were keen that the Khilafat Committee too should follow the Swarajists and permit its members to contest the elections, but Mawlānā Mohamed Ali firmly refused to countenance such a move.⁴⁶ He shamed the Aḥrār ulema by asking them how they could transgress a *fatwā* to which they had affixed their signatures.

However, more serious differences were looming upon the political horizon, so far as the Congress and many Muslim leaders and ulema were concerned. Mawlānā Mohamed Ali and many of his associates had rightly expected their Hindu colleagues in the Congress to join hands with them against the forces that were out to destroy the Hindu-Muslim unity. Mawlānā Mohamed Ali

⁴² Ibid., p. 354.

⁴³ Ibid., pp. 350-352.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 352.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 351.

⁴⁶ Ibid., pp. 352-353.

had condemned the organisation of *Tabligh* and *Tanzim* by his fellow Muslims⁴⁷ and he expected men like Mahatma Gandhi and Pandit Moti Lāl Nehru likewise to speak out against *Shuddhi* and *Sangathan*, but they did nothing of the sort. Indeed they refused to court unpopularity among the Hindus by uttering a word against the extremist Hindu speeches or actions.⁴⁸ On the contrary Mahatma Gandhi insisted that Pandit Madan Mohan Mālviya and Svāmi Shradhdhānanda were sincere patriots and on one occasion he even went to the extent of saying that the latter was a friend of the Muslims.⁴⁹ Those Muslims who had any regard for the future of Islam and the Muslims in the Subcontinent and were not suffering from the delusion that the British held the monopoly of enmity against both were shocked beyond words.

Mawlānā Mohamed Ali was not indifferent to the fate of Islam in the Subcontinent, therefore, he could not shut his eyes to what was happening around him. He did not cease to believe that it was absolutely essential to win freedom for India or that the British interests demanded the subjugation of the Muslims on a global scale,⁵⁰ yet he also knew that what was happening in the Subcontinent was of grave importance. When he saw how Hindu congressmen were behaving, he could reach only two possible conclusions. Either they lacked guts to stand up against their coreligionists or they intended to weaken the Muslims in the Subcontinent to an extent that they should cease to matter in its affairs. How could he believe that Mahatma Gandhi lacked courage to oppose what the Hindus were doing when the same Mahatma had been annoyed with him that he had not driven the Swarajists out of the Congress? The Muslims of the Subcontinent were the largest, the most sensitive, the most enthusiastic and the most awakened people in the Muslim World, then how could their elimination from the political field help to destroy the British machinations against the world of Islam? How could it be assumed that a liberated India totally under Hindu hegemony would not play the same role in the Muslim world as the British had hither-

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 356.

⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 416-418.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 368.

to done to safeguard their possession of the Subcontinent or make common cause with them to prevent any repetition of the history of Muslim-Hindu relations of the days of the Muslim expansion?

Mawlānā Mohamed Ali, therefore, was on the horns of a dilemma. He could ignore neither the Hindu animosity nor the British hostility towards Islam. The difficulty with his people was that almost all of them were able to see the significance of only one of the two. They were not able to examine all the complexities of the situation in which they were placed. Whichever of the two sides of the triangle seemed to press them down heavily assumed greater importance with most of the people and the leadership which upheld that feeling came to possess greater influence. Mawlānā Mohamed Ali tried to keep both the wings together and, as it generally happens under such circumstances, he began to lose his hold on either. When he presided over the annual session of the Congress at Cocanada, despite the Hindu sponsorship of anti-Muslim movements, he advised his community "You have no alternative better than non-cooperation with the foreigner and cooperation with your neighbours..."⁵¹

This advice was not liked by many sections of the Muslim community. Mahatma Gandhi was released in 1924. The situation was already bad and communal riots had become common all over the Subcontinent. That did not move the Congress leadership, but there was one in Kohat, where the Hindus were a small minority; that stirred it. As it was the Hindu community that had suffered, Mahatma Gandhi was deeply moved. He undertook a fast of twenty-one days "to expiate his own guilt."⁵² The reason given by the Mahatma for his fast was very intriguing. No one cared to interpret it. The Hindu press was too wise to do so, and the Muslims too obtuse to understand as to which guilt was to be expiated. What could it be but to bring the Muslims into the politics of non-cooperation, that gave them confidence and strength? This sin was being expiated in the streets by the Hindu community through *sangathan* and riots and now a

⁵¹ Congress Presidential address (Madras, 1934), second series, *Mohamed Ali's Presidential Address*, p. 666.

⁵² Sitaramayya, op. cit., v. i, p. 276.

contrite Mahatma was to do it spiritually through a fast. The fast created a stir in the nationalist circles and a unity conference was hastily summoned in Delhi which achieved little besides drawing up a list of fundamental rights or issues that were often used as pretexts for provoking riots like cow slaughter and playing music in front of mosques at the time of prayers.⁵³ If the decisions of the unity conference had been taken seriously, perhaps there could have been some amelioration in the law and order situation, but they remained dead letters.

The other results of the Kohat riots were not so harmless. The Congress appointed a two men committee consisting of Mahatma Gandhi and Mawlānā Shaukat Ali to inquire into the causes and the happenings. Their report was not unanimous; the former put all the blame upon the Muslims and the latter said that there had been provocation from the side of the Hindus.⁵⁴ This brought the Hindu press out in severe condemnation of Mawlānā Shaukat Ali. Therefore Mawlānā Mohamed Ali made a statement in a session of the Panjab Khilafat Conference that was sensible and could have proved useful if it had been taken in the right spirit. He suggested that it would be better if the leaders limited themselves to condemning the excesses of their own coreligionists. He simultaneously said that he did condemn the Muslims of Kohat to the extent that they were guilty.⁵⁵ A little later, in 1925, on the occasion of the Kanpur session of the Congress, Mawlānā Mohamed Ali and Mawlānā Abu-'l-kalām Āzād sought an interview with Mahatma Gandhi and requested him to come out openly in favour of the restoration of inter-communal harmony, but his response was not encouraging.⁵⁶ On the other hand, soon after this disappointing interview, he made a statement in Calcutta which gives a true indication of the working of his mind at this time. He said, "...I simply nowadays...content myself by saying that some day or other we Hindus and Muslims will have to come together, if we want the deliverance of our country. And if it is to be our lot that, before we can come together, we shed one an-

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ *The Tribune*, Lahore, 29 March 1925, *The Comrade*, Delhi, 10 April 1925.

⁵⁵ *The Comrade*, Delhi, 1 May 1925.

⁵⁶ Ra'is Ahmad Ja'fari, *Sirat-i-Muhammad 'Ali*, op. cit., p. 469.

other's blood, then I say, the sooner we do so, the better it is for us."⁵⁷ Mahatma Gandhi was not expressing an academic opinion. Coming from a person in his position, it was almost open incitement to the Hindus to continue with their anti-Muslim activities. He wrote in his *Harijan* that an average Muslim was a bully and a Hindu a coward. He counselled the Hindus to shed their cowardice. This is precisely what the organizers of the *Sangathan* Movement had been saying all this time. There was no difference between the basic philosophies of the uncrowned king of the Congress and the leading lights of the Hindu Mahasabha.

If the Hindu leaders, either because of their own leanings or under the pressure of their community, had become supporters of *Shuddhi* and *Sangathan* either actively or passively, how long could Mawlānā Mohamed Ali keep the Muslims on the side of Hindu-Muslim unity? Therefore, he had to clarify the issues. Hence he summoned a meeting of the Khilafat Committee at Simla in 1926, in which the members showed some impatience with the policy of conciliation that had been followed hitherto, because they felt Hindu excesses were becoming intolerable. Mawlānā Mohamed Ali again preached cooperation with the Hindus and was able to carry the committee with him. The Hindu Mahasabha leader Dr. Moonje was in Simla and Dr. Mukhtār Aḥmad Anṣārī and Shoaib Qureshi were sent as emissaries to him on behalf of the Khilafat Committee to persuade him once again to tread the path of Hindu-Muslim unity, but such missions are seldom successful and this one proved no exception.⁵⁸

A bigger meeting of the organization was necessary, therefore a special session of the Khilafat Conference was held at Delhi in May 1926. Ḥakīm Ajmal Khān was the chairman of the Reception Committee and Mawlānā Saiyid Sulaimān Nadwī was the president. Mawlānā Abu-'l-kalām Āzād also participated. The addresses of the chairman of the Reception Committee and Mawlānā Saiyid Sulaimān Nadwī were moderate and dignified. Nothing else could be expected from a man like Ḥakīm Ajmal Khān, who was known for his moderation and equanimity, and an academi-

⁵⁷ Sitaramayya, op. cit., v. i, p. 298.

⁵⁸ Ra'is Aḥmad Ja'fri, *Sirat-i-Muḥammad 'Alī*, op. cit., p. 375.

cian like Mawlānā Saiyid Sulaimān Nadwī, And yet they could not help an analysis of the situation which involved some criticism of the Hindu nationalist leaders.⁵⁹ The Hindu press raised such a storm against the Khilafat Committee and its office bearers as if they had been guilty of treason against national interests,⁶⁰ In reply to all this and in sharp contrast to the advice of the great preacher of the doctrine of non-violence to his people, Mawlānā Mohamed Ali, who had never concealed the fact that he did not believe in non-violence as a creed, advised his community at this juncture not to retaliate in the face of any provocation. "If they raise their hands, you bow your heads," said he, "if they flourish a knife, you bare your chest."⁶¹ This, however, was a counsel of perfection, particularly when the Hindu leaders did not show any spirit of compromise, accommodation or detachment from the communal activities of their people. Mawlānā Mohamed Ali was later to say in anguish, "we who worked for ten years through thick and thin with Gandhiji pressed action upon him, but the desire of retaining Hindu popularity for himself and for Pandit Moti Lal Nehru prevented a settlement."⁶²

It had been known for some time that the British Government intended to appoint a commission for the question of examining the quantum of further political concessions to India. When Simon Commission was appointed in 1927, there was great resentment because all the members were British. Political parties, therefore, became active deciding their attitude so that they could, either directly or indirectly, inform the Commission of their views and demands. Mawlānā Mohamed Ali was extremely anxious that the Muslims should formulate their demands and, if possible, get the Hindus to accept them. He secured the cooperation of Mohammad Ali Jinnah and the results of their endeavours were incorporated in the "Delhi proposals" which were formulated on 20 March 1927. The main features of these proposals were the separation of Sind from Bombay Presidency, the proposal to raise the North-West Frontier Province to the status of other provinces, the

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid., pp. 419-241.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 420.

⁶² *Indian Round Table Conference*, Minorities Committee, Documents Minutes, meetings 1-6, p.4.

reservation of seats in accordance with population, so that the Muslim majorities in Bengal and Panjab were not adversely affected and joint electorates.⁶³ These proposals were not acceptable to many Muslim politicians, for instance, the United Provinces Muslim League did not accord its approval to the proposal of joint electorates in its meeting held at Meerut in October 1937.⁶⁴ Indeed the Muslim League itself split into two factions, one in favour of the proposals with Mohammad Ali Jinnah as its leader and the other opposed to joint electorates under the leadership of Sir Mohammad Shafi of Lahore.⁶⁵ Mawālānā Mohamed Ali, however, was indefatigable in his efforts and he got Delhi proposals accepted by the All India Congress Committee.⁶⁶ They were also approved in the Congress in the Madras session.⁶⁷ Even Pandit Madan Mohan Malviya extended his support. Despite all this the Hindu Mahasabha with the encouragement and connivance of some Congress leaders succeeded in creating widespread opposition to the Delhi proposals among the Hindus.⁶⁸

However, something had to be done about the future constitution and the problem could not be shelved for all time to come. Lord Birkenhead, the British Secretary of State for India accused the Indians of criticizing any measure adopted by the British in connection with constitutional progress in India and said that the Indian politician themselves could not succeed in producing a workable constitution.⁶⁹ To meet this challenge an All Parties Conference met in Delhi⁷⁰ and because all the differences could not be resolved in a conference, a committee was appointed under the chairmanship of Pandit Moti Lal Nehru for recommending the principles on which the future constitution of India should be based.⁷¹ Its report was discussed in another conference at Luck-

⁶³ Sir Muḥammad Yāmīn Khān, op. cit., v. i, p. 281.

⁶⁴ Ibid., pp. 282-284.

⁶⁵ Ibid., pp. 285-286.

⁶⁶ Rai's Aḥmad Ja'fī, *Sīrat-i-Muḥammad 'Alī'* op. cit., p. 445.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 447.

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 450.

⁶⁹ Hector Bolitho, *Jinnah, Creator of Pakistan* (New York, 1955), p. 93.

⁷⁰ *History of Freedom Movement*, op. cit., v. iii, part. ii, p. 281.

⁷¹ All Parties Conference, 1928, *Report of the Committee* appointed by the conference to determine the principles of the constitution of India.

now in August and referred back for revision.⁷² The revised version,⁷³ like the original, failed to satisfy the bulk of Muslim opinion and Mawlānā Mohamed Ali summoned an All Parties Muslim Conference which met under the chairmanship of Aga Khan IV at Delhi on 1 January 1929.⁷⁴ Mawlānā Mohamed Ali had invited the Nationalist Muslim leaders like Dr. Mukhtār Aḥmad Anṣārī and Mawlānā Abu-'l-kalām Āzād, but none agreed to attend. The conference nevertheless was a success and it was able to put the Muslim point of view forcefully and well.⁷⁵ The nationalist Muslims were isolated from the community. Mufti Kifāyat-u'llah supported the resolution adopted by the conference on behalf of the Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind, called the conference fully representative of the Muslim opinion and declared that no one could claim in future that the Nehru Report had the support of the Muslims.⁷⁶

This was the last occasion when Mawlānā Mohamed Ali had the support of the Jamī'at. All this space has been devoted in this chapter to the activities of Mawlānā Mohamed Ali because the Jamī'at had been guided upto this point entirely by him. He was the leader of the ulema who followed this Oxford educated layman with implicit faith. Except for a brief deviation in connection with preventive methods against the *shuddhi* of the Malkānā Rajputs during Mohamed Ali's incarceration, the Jamī'at had followed his lead implicitly. But it should be remembered that Mawlānā Mohamed Ali had all this time been in the Congress camp. His differences with the Congress leaders now began to come out in the open. The refusal of Muslim congressmen to attend a conference called for the purpose of determining the Muslim attitude towards the future constitution of India was significant, because it could not be argued from any point of view that the purpose for which the conference was called was not a legitimate exercise for such a large community as the Muslims. The difference between

⁷² I. H. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Sub-continent*, op. cit., p. 288.

⁷³ The revised proposals are contained in All Parties Conference, 1928, *Supplementary Report of the Committee*, pp. 31-51.

⁷⁴ R. Coupland, *The Indian Problem*, op. cit., part i, p. 96.

⁷⁵ Ra'is Aḥmad Ja'fī, *Sirat-i-Muḥammad 'Alī*, op. cit., pp. 485, 486.

⁷⁶ For text of the resolution, vide *Ibid.*, pp. 487-491.

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the Congress Muslims and the rest of the community whose representatives had gathered at Delhi was a fundamental one: should the Muslims continue to ponder on their problems and determine their attitudes independently or leave their fate entirely in the hands of the Congress, which would be guided in Muslim affairs only by the views of its own Muslim members who need not be unanimous on any question? In other words, were the Muslims to continue as a community in some form, or get fully absorbed into the monolithic "Indian nation" so far as their political interests were concerned? The Muslims did not believe that there did at all exist a monolithic reality called the Indian nation. There was the great Hindu community or nation, as some would call it, by no means monolithic, but capable of thinking and acting together under capable and imaginative leadership and it wanted to be "the nation" speaking for the entire Subcontinent through the Indian National Congress willing at best to tolerate other communities and groups but certainly not ready to permit them to share power in their own right.

This fundamental difference between the attitudes of the Muslims as displayed through the thinking of the various Muslim political organizations on the one hand, and splinter groups like the Ahrārs, the Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind, the Mu'mins and a few individuals who labelled themselves as 'nationalists' on the other hand, came on the surface as the bulk of Muslim opinion drifted away from the Congress. Simultaneously the attitude of all Hindu political bodies led by the Indian National Congress became more and more manifest as issues began to clarify.

So long as Mawlānā Mohamed Ali had not come into conflict with the Congress, the "nationalist ulema" were content to let the Jamī'at-i-'ulamā' follow him, but when the rupture came, the Ahrār and Mawlānā Abu-'l-kalām Āzad became active.⁷⁷ They found an opportunity when Mawlānā Mohamed Ali's name was suggested for the presidentship of the organization. Very cleverly they exploited the prejudice of the ulema against laymen with a modern education and, even though Mawlana Mohamed Ali had long ago adopted the dress and fashions of hair and beard pre-

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 493.

valent among the ulema, the trick worked and his followers could not muster sufficient support. If his name had not been bandied about and some one else been quietly proposed and elected, there would have been no serious repercussions, but to slight a man of Mawlānā Mohamed Ali's standing, love for Islam, insight into the fundamentals and the mission of Islam in the world, whom the Jamī'at had followed from the day of its birth, was unforgivable.⁷⁸ Indeed it was Mawlānā Mohamed Ali's preceptor Mawlānā 'Abd-u'l-Bāri of Firangi Maḥal under his inspiration, who had laid the foundation of the organization.⁷⁹ The Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind of Delhi now fell into the hands of forces that gradually brought it into direct confrontation with the vast majority of the community and its instincts and historical urges. It indeed cut itself asunder from the only moorings that could have saved it from drifting. It set its sails to winds, the direction of which it did not know, on a sea that was uncharted so far as the knowledge of its leaders of meagre foresight and even less political experience and understanding was concerned.

All ulema were not taken in by the blandishments of the Indian National Congress and its Muslim devotees. A group of them led by Mawlānā Nithār Aḥmad of Kanpur and Mawlānā 'Abd-u'l-Mājid Badā'uni had taken note of Hindu intentions and supported Dr. Kitchlew's *Tanztm* Movement.⁸⁰ They and others who did not see eye to eye with the Congress-minded ulema, broke away and founded the parallel organization of Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind, Kanpur. The new organization attracted a fairly large number of leading ulema, who unanimously elected Mawlānā Mohamed Ali as their president.⁸¹ His address was a remarkable and lucid exposition of the role that the ulema had played in the history of Islam and the expectations that the community legitimately had from them in the Subcontinent.⁸²

⁷⁸ Ra'is Aḥmad Ja'fī, *'Alī Birādarān*, op. cit., p. 558, quoting Mawlānā Mohammed Ali's letter to Mawlānā Shaukat 'Alī. The Aḥrār Mawlānā Mawlānā Ḥabīb-u'r-Raḥmān of Ludhiana had said in a public speech that all who opposed the Nehru Report were *khābiṭh* (devilishly evil),

⁷⁹ Ra'is Aḥmad Ja'fī, *Sirat-i-Muḥammad' Ali*, op. cit., p. 511.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 353.

⁸¹ Ibid., pp. 515, 516.

⁸² Quoted in full in Ra'is Aḥmad Ja'fī, *Awraq-i-gum-gashitah*, pp. 577-597.

Almost straight from the conference of the ulema, Mawlānā Mohamed Ali went to Lahore where the Khilafat Conference and the Congress were holding their sessions in December 1929. He sought an interview with Mahatma Gandhi who was now thinking of launching his civil disobedience movement. Mawlānā Mohamed Ali pleaded for a Congress-Muslim agreement so that both the communities should combine their resources and wage an irresistible struggle against foreign domination, but Mahatma Gandhi was not in a mood to listen. He said that he had decided to launch his movement and if the Muslims so desired they could join *unconditionally*.⁸³ Dr. Mukhtar Ahmad Anṣārī had counselled Mahatma Gandhi earlier to secure the cooperation of the Muslims by arriving at some understanding with them and had been told at the instance of Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru that "India could not wait for the Muslims."⁸⁴ The movement was launched and Muslims generally held aloof.⁸⁵ The only exception were a handful of Congress minded Muslims. Mufti Kifāyat-u'llah of the Delhi Jamī'at-i-ulamā'-i-Hind was imprisoned along with Mahatma Gandhi and the Congress Working Committee.⁸⁶ It would be remembered that earlier when the Jamā'at had not jettisoned Mawlānā Mohamed Ali's leadership, he had supported the resolution of the All Parties Muslim Conference condemning the Nehru Report. And that resolution instead of unconditional surrender demanded definite safeguards for the Muslims. Mawlānā Abu'l-kalām Āzād also was arrested.⁸⁷ Of course this was expected.

Mawlānā Mohamed Ali had been in poor health for several years.⁸⁸ He had been suffering from diabetes, but his life was so strenuous, his time taken up by public affairs so disproportionate,

⁸³ Ra'is Ahmad Ja'fri, *Sirat-i-Muhammad 'Ali*, op. cit., pp. 518, 519.

⁸⁴ I.H. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community of Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent*, op. cit., p. 289.

⁸⁵ This is borne out by the fact that in contrast with the Non-cooperation Movement, when the Muslims filled the jails far in excess of the proportion of their population, this time very few Muslims courted arrest. A Hindu friend remarked to the author of this treatise, "The leaders may not concede this, but all of us are feeling what a difference the non-participation of the Muslims has made to the movement."

⁸⁶ Sir Muhammad Yamin Khan, op. cit., p.v.i., p. 442.

⁸⁷ *ibid.*, p. 342.

⁸⁸ Ra'is Ahmad Ja'fri, *Sirat-i-Muhammad 'Ali*, op. cit., pp. 460-463.

his emotional involvement in Islam and the welfare of Muslims so intense, that he knew no physical rest or mental solace. The restlessness of his spirit was matched by his incessant physical exertion and mental tumult. He was so innocent of the arts of simulation and dissimulation that he could never hide his feelings or intentions and, therefore, in spite of his undoubted qualities of leadership, he was not a politician in the accepted sense of the term, because he would always do what appealed to him as right and would oppose, in good conscience, even his close friends much to their annoyance which sometimes turned into anger, pique or even sustained hostility. The complexity of his loyalties was not only the basic cause of his final unpopularity in the Congress circles but also in the Hindu community as a whole. His patriotism became suspect in these circles because of his anxiety to ensure a place for the Muslims in the Indian sun when the clouds of foreign domination dispersed,⁸⁹ but he was ardently desirous that British rule should end.⁹⁰ Indeed many misunderstandings arose because he did not want to see any postponement of freedom. It was his conviction that Hindu-Muslim amity was essential for the achievement of independence and he first felt puzzled and then indignant that his colleagues in the Congress would not raise their little finger to arrest the growth of communal hostility.⁹¹

He was too shrewd not to grasp the meaning of what was happening. The Indian National Congress was not so national after all. The game was to eliminate Muslim influence, an influence that had not been built up through any chicanery or deceit, or because of any favour shown by the Hindu leadership or British administration, but by solid effort and sacrifice. The reason why Mahatma Gandhi and Jawahar Lal Nehru brushed aside all suggestions of Muslim cooperation at an institutional or organizational level, when launching the civil disobedience movement of 1929 was plain to all⁹² but those who were incapable of analyzing Hindu motives at that juncture or those who deliberately shut their eyes for the purpose of present or future profit. What option

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 478.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 492.

⁹¹ Ibid., pp. 417, 418.

⁹² Ibid., pp. 518, 519.

was left to honest men with any understanding but to leave the Congress in disgust? Mawlānā Mohamed Ali's pan-Islamism was only a useful stick in the hands of the Hindus as well as the British to beat him with and to sow distrust and suspicion against the Muslims in the minds of the ignorant or hysterical non-Muslim population. Could Mahatma Gandhi seriously believe that the weak and disunited Muslim states would be so foolhardy as to undertake an invasion of India? And could the able and well educated internationalist, Jawahar Lal Nehru, be so ignorant about the real strength of the Balkanized Muslim world that he would consider it a source of danger to India? And could British statesmen, and Lord Reading in particular, after having destroyed the Ottoman Empire and planted in its place mandates and satellites galore really take the accusation seriously that Mawlānā Mohamed Ali could succeed in stirring trouble for the British Indian Empire in Afghanistan, Iran or the Middle East and put the safety of the Subcontinent in jeopardy? The reason was that the awakening of the Muslims to a sense of their own strength did not suit either the Hindus who wanted to revive the traditions of pre-Muslim India or the British who wanted to keep them on the lead.

The truth of the matter was that any stick was good enough to beat this independent and fearless leader of the Muslims. He was never inclined to create a vested interest in opinions held and propagated by him at any particular time. His convictions were deep and sincere, his emotional attachment to them overwhelming, but he was pragmatic in the matter of measures and programmes to safeguard the stakes created by those convictions. His supreme loyalty was to his God and therefore to his faith and, as a corollary, to the interests of the Muslims in the world and also in the Subcontinent. If the occasion demanded, he was willing to sacrifice all that had been built up in the way of his own popularity, leadership and influence. He did not shrink from facing issues squarely, from the consequences of intellectual honesty and from the logic of events and developments. For many a vested interest in political leadership, he was the *enfant terrible* of politics, because his questions were straight, searching and awkward, and because he could be indifferent to the impact of his

word and deed upon his own influence, he could have no consideration for the selfish or hypocritical motives of others. Such a devoted and selfless leader is an asset to any people, a leader who served but asked for nothing in return. A life so precious and valuable was now coming to an end. He knew this but did not care.⁹³ He worked and worked, spent the last milligram of his energy in the service of his people, defying his doctors' orders and courting a certain death.⁹⁴ He died in London on 4 January 1931.⁹⁵ And with him came to an end a chapter of the history of the Muslims of the Subcontinent. And so did an exciting chapter in the history of their ulema.

⁹³ When he went to Europe for treatment in 1928, his condition was so bad that he taught a few Muslims how to conduct a funeral service, so that he might not be buried without one. *Ibid.*, pp. 462, 463. The author of this treatise met him in a social function in Delhi, the next day he was leaving for Simla. He was taken so ill on reaching Simla that he had to enter a hospital. It was from Simla that he went to London to attend the Round Table Conference. This author, seeing him so pulled down, inquired after his health. He replied without a trace of feeling or self pity, "Ishtiaq, I am dying by inches." Actually life was ebbing out of him much more rapidly than he thought.

⁹⁴ When he said in his famous speech in the Conference that he would not go back to a slave country, he knew that death was near and that he would die soon.

⁹⁵ He had never thought that it was a tremendous sacrifice to court death in the way of God. He wrote:

جان دی، دی ہوئی اسی کی تھی حق تو یہ ہے کہ حق ادا نہ ہوا

(What if I gave my life? It had been given by Him: The truth is that I have not been able to serve Him as was His due).

For the date of his death, Saiyid Sulaimān Nadwī, *Yād-i-raftagān*, (Karachi, 1955), p. 154.

CHAPTER XII

Tangled Strands and Loose Ends

The revolt of the Jami'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind against Mawlānā Mohamed Ali's leadership was in fact a continuation of the recession of the Aḥrār and a few others in the Panjab from the Khilāfat Committee.¹ The leaders of the Panjab group were Mawlānā Zafar 'Alī Khān (the Editor of the *Zamīndār*), Mawlānā 'Atā-u'llah Shāh Bukhārī, Mawlānā Ḥabīb-u'r-Raḥmān Ludhiānawī and Mawlānā Saiyid Muḥammad Dā'ud Ghaznawī.² It has already been mentioned how the ulema of Ludhiana had issued a *fatwā* in favour of the Muslims joining the Indian National Congress when Sir Syed Ahmed Khan had advised the Muslims to keep away from it.³ It has also been mentioned how Mawlānā Abu-'l-kalām Āzād had preached in his *Al-Hilāl* that

¹ It was Mawlānā Ḥabīb-u'r-Raḥmān Ludhiānawī who had made a violent speech in a session of the Jami'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind against the opponents of Nehru Report in which he attacked Mawlānā Mohamed Ali. He had called the supporters of the Report *ṭaiyyib* (pure and good) and the opponents *khabiṭh* (unclean and evil), Rā'is Ahmad Ja'fī, '*Alī Brādarān*, op. cit., p. 558. Also Ashraf 'Atā, *Kuchh shikastah dāstānen kuchh parīshān tadhīkire*, (Lahore, 1966), p. 48.

² Ibid., pp. 48, 56.

³ Ḥusain Ahmad, op. cit., v. ii, p. 71.

the Muslims should not seek any safeguards and join the Congress unconditionally. Thus there was an identity of views between the Panjab group of ulema brought up in the Ludhiana tradition and Mawlānā Abu-'l-kalām Āzād.⁴

Even during the Khilafat Movement when the policies of the Ali Brothers and Mawlānā Abu-'l-kalām Āzād converged, there was not much warmth between them, because their temperaments and characters were so different. The Ali Brothers were extroverts, their spontaneity and bonhomie exuding all over from their very presence;⁵ but the Mawlānā was an introvert, reserved and withdrawn. It was not difficult to win the affection of either of the two brothers but no one ever got too near Mawlānā Abu-'l-kalām Āzād's heart. The lives of the Ali Brothers were like open books, there were no secrets even in their private lives, but Mawlānā Abu-'l-kalām Āzād had his secrets and took care that they were not pried into. Indeed, the Ali Brothers and Mawlānā Abu-'l-kalām Āzād did not seem to be denizens of the same world. Mawlānā Abu-'l-kalām Āzād was a doctrinaire in the philosophy of Indian nationalism. The best course for the Muslims to follow, in his opinion, was that they should merge themselves with the Indian nation, being content with only such safeguards as the majority community might vouchsafe them regarding personal law and religion. Even cultural autonomy should not be asked for; the culture of the Muslims could live and prosper on the basis of its own excellence. It would be unjust to accuse Mawlānā Abu-'l-kalām Āzād of indifference to the fate of the Muslim community. His philosophy in a nutshell was that the community would prosper by losing itself; if it did not make conscious efforts to preserve itself, it would invite no hostility and no attack; it had only to let the majority forget that it existed to ensure a continued and unchallenged existence for itself.

It is necessary to understand this philosophy if the policies of a large sector of ulema in the Subcontinent is to be understood. Of course, this was not the entire rationale of their policies which, more and more, would now run against the thinking, sentiment

⁴ Supra, chapter IX, pp.227,228.

⁵ Ashraf 'Aṭā, op. cit., p. 56.

and attitudes of the community, creating such a divergence that there would arise rebels from the ranks of the ulema themselves to counter their moves and try to bring some rapport again between the people and the class that had formerly come to be looked upon as the custodian of its faith and ideology. Mawlānā Mohamed Ali was a well educated intellectual and an informed journalist. Mawlānā Abu-'l-kalām Āzād, at that time, did not know English or any other European language. All literature on the history of diplomacy, on the problems of social, linguistic or religious minorities, on comparative political institutions and even on current affairs was practically a sealed book for him except such portions of it as found their way into Arabic, Persian or Urdu translations, adaptations or casual references. Mawlānā Mohamed Ali was emotional but sound, and yet, because of his great ability and fund of information, not available to the ulema, he created hostility and jealousy in their minds. Their inferiority complex tended more and more to find expression in aggressive self assertion, and what they lacked in argument, some of them sought to make up with immoderate language.

This is not true of Mawlānā Abu-'l-kalām Āzād who was too sophisticated to indulge in invective. He did not care to answer personal attacks made by his opponents in the heat of controversy or even out of spite or irritation at his views. Precisely for his sobriety and unruffled temper, he created a wrong impression of profundity in his views, which were lapped up by men of little learning, even less understanding and vociferous bad manners. There were many in the ranks of the politically active ulema who were urbane, balanced and learned, but their learning was highly specialized and it could not make up for the grave deficiencies in their knowledge of a world that was, even then, changing rapidly, nor could it endow them with the ability to arrive at sound conclusions regarding political issues. Being themselves handicapped so severely, they could have steered their course reasonably well if they had a good mariner to guide them through uncharted seas of ever changing challenges. This mariner they had possessed in Mawlānā Mohamed Ali, but him they preferred to throw overboard, for reasons stated below.

It may be incorrect to think that Mawlānā Abu-'l-kalām

Āzād was jealous of the influence that Mawlānā Mohamed Ali had come to wield in Muslim politics, but he could well have felt that he had preached through his journal, *Al-Hilāl*, an unconditional alliance with the Hindus, and when circumstances had brought it about, his thunder had been stolen by Mawlānā Mohamed Ali, who most certainly had much greater charisma than Mawlānā Abu-'l-kalām Āzād could ever hope to possess. So when Mawlānā Mohamed Ali more or less renounced the policy of unquestioning loyalty to all that the Congress did, there was an excellent opportunity to put him in his place. It was easy enough to do so because any deviation from the line chalked out by the Congress could be interpreted to the gullible Muslim masses and even more credulous ulema as a betrayal of national interests and conspiracy with the British. Indeed, even if all personal factors are ruled out and dismissed as unworthy of a man of Mawlānā Abu-'l-kalām Āzād's eminence, the fact remains that the boats of doctrinaire philosophy and pragmatic realism and good sense had to drift apart and those riding the two would sort themselves out and get into those boats that suited their temperaments and inclinations. However, it is on record that the Panjab revolt came about under Mawlānā Abu-'l-kalām Āzād's inspiration, if not, at his instigation. For, first the Lahore group revolted and "sought guidance from Mawlānā Abu-'l-kalām Āzād"⁶ and its most active and vociferous member, Mawlānā Ḥabīb-u'r-Raḥmān Ludhiānawī, went to the session of the Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind purposely to foul it up for Mawlānā Mohamed Ali. The Jamī'at itself was inclined to go the same way for reasons of previous history and associations.

The Deoband School of ulema was brought up in a strong tradition of anti-British feeling, because that was the primary purpose of its founders, as has been mentioned earlier. Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan went to Hejaz and established contacts with the Turks. When Sharif Ḥusain rebelled and the Turks were driven out from Hejaz, he was arrested and kept in Malta as a prisoner of war. When, after the conclusion of the war, he was

⁶ He arrived on 8 June 1920 (Ḥusain Aḥmad, op. cit., v. ii, p. 235) and died on 30 November 1920 (ibid., p. 267). Regarding his poor health, vide ibid., p. 288.

released, he came to India and was received with great enthusiasm. He was in poor health and died less than six months after.⁷ He was definitely anxious to see the end of British rule in the Subcontinent.⁸ He also held that British policies had been hostile to the independence of Muslim peoples every where.⁹ His action in going to Hejaz and sending Mawlānā 'Ubaid-u'llah Sindhī to Afghanistan shows that he was no friend of British imperialism. He expressed his views fearlessly and without ambiguity. Yet his language was dignified and his opinions balanced. He was a revolutionary but not a fire-eater. His loyalty to Islam was too deep to permit him to play with its fate and his affection for the Muslims of the Subcontinent too sincere to allow him to gamble with their future. Unlike Mawlānā Abu-'l-kalām Āzād and others of his way of thinking, he was not in favour of an unconditional surrender to the Hindus. Indeed he tried to curb this kind of extremism in thinking and policies based upon it. "I consider the unity between these two peoples", he asserted in his concluding address as the President of the Delhi session of the Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind held in 1920, "very useful and productive of good results... but if this understanding and goodwill are to be lasting and beneficial, we have also to understand fully the limits that must be imposed upon the alliance. And the limits that must not be corroded are the ones prescribed by God. There should be no interference in the religious affairs of one party by another, nor should there be any attempt on the part of one to injure the interests or feelings of the others. I must regretfully say that the practice is still contrary to this principle in many spheres. Many people transgress the limits of their faith to express feelings of unity, but in the avenues of economic activity and in government departments they still try to injure the interests of the other party."¹⁰ A man, who knew that even small injustices can upset political alliances and warned leaders of their consequences, obviously did not believe in unconditional surrender by the Muslims to a Hindu dominated Congress. This political state-

⁷ Ibid., p. 260.

⁸ Ibid., p. 259.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 260, 261.

¹⁰ The address was read out on his behalf on 9 Rabi' I (21 November) and he died on 18 Rabi' I (30 November) only nine days later. Ibid.

ment was his last¹¹ and, therefore, can be considered to be his political testament. Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan's character does not emerge from it as that of a reckless person who, in the heat of the moment, would not take a sane view of a situation as it existed or as it was likely to develop.

His political associate, Mawlānā 'Ubaid-u'llah Sindhī was a different kind of a person. He also was motivated by a burning desire for liberating Islam from subjugation to the British. He, according to some, was responsible for bringing Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan into the field of political activity but in fact it was he who had been inspired by Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan;¹² in any case the latter deputed Mawlānā 'Ubaid-u'llah Sindhī to go to Afghanistan.¹³ Then he was exposed to international diplomacy, intrigue and politics. The Afghans impressed upon him that a Muslim rebellion could not succeed in the Subcontinent without the active cooperation of the Hindus.¹⁴ It seems that he was either unaware of the logic of Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan's thinking or was so overwhelmed by the views of the Afghan government that he did not explain it to them.¹⁵ Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan's idea seems simply to have been to persuade the Afghans to make common cause with the Turks and the Central Powers and with their help to invade the Subcontinent, on which the tribes would rebel and then all the Muslims would

¹¹ The statement that Mawlānā 'Ubaid-u'llah Sindhī influenced Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan is based on British intelligence reports and occurs in *Sedition Committee Report*, op. cit., also in Bamford, op. cit., p. 124.

¹² Husain Ahmad, op. cit., vi. ii, p. 141. The correction comes from Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan himself. Who could know better?

¹³ Ibid., pp. 141-142.

¹⁴ The Amīr emphasized the need of Hindu-Muslim unity (Ibid., p. 177). The Mawlānā had to submit a written statement before his interview with the Amīr and that statement was liked, (ibid., p. 152), at least partly because the Mawlānā had presented himself as an *Indian* Muslim and not as a Muslim. This, he says, he had done under the advice of Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan, who, it is claimed, had not given Mawlānā Sindhī any instructions about his line of action in Afghanistan or even what he was supposed to do (ibid., p. 142). Therefore it is difficult to say whether Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan's advice that Mawlānā 'Ubaid-u'llah Sindhī was to introduce himself as an *Indian* Muslim had any significance beyond the idea that he would be able to convey the sentiments of the *Indian* Muslims and the possible use that could be made of those sentiments.

¹⁵ Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan's views are crystallized in *Ghālib-nāmah*, ibid., p. 244. It speaks of a rising of the Muslims of the world and appeals to the Muslims of the Subcontinent to do the same.

either rise, as they did in 1857, or at least turn willing collaborators. Amīr Ḥabīb-u'llah Khān was in secret contact with the British and was following policies inspired by them. Mawlānā 'Ubaid-u'llah Sindhī was no match for the shrewd Afghan ruler in diplomatic skill and was easily put on the wrong scent. It was necessary for the Afghan monarch to be circumspect in his dealings with the Mawlānā, because the Pathan tribes were itching for a war with the British, being convinced that this was a time for a *jihād* and the British had cleverly propagated the view that they should wait for the Afghan ruler to give them a lead, which the British knew would never come because Amīr Ḥabīb-u'llah Khān had given them a positive understanding.¹⁶ Mawlānā 'Ubaid-u'llah Sindhī proudly asserts that he discovered that he would have been ignored as a Muslim and was respected as an Indian, therefore, he began to talk and work in the later capacity. This was the result of a most subtle move of the Afghan monarch, because if the Mawlānā spoke the language of Islam, there was danger of his winning the sympathy of some of the Amīr's subjects and practically the entire tribal area.¹⁷

The theologian was completely bamboozled, set himself up as an Indian nationalist, organized a Congress Committee for which he obtained affiliation with the Indian National Congress through the good offices of Dr. Mukhtār Aḥmad Anṣārī.¹⁸ He swallowed hook, line and sinker and became totally ineffective. He did this even though he had come to know that Raja Mahendra Pratāp was Pandit Malviya's watch dog in Kabul to give him advance warning of any likelihood of an invasion by the Afghans.¹⁹ Mawlānā 'Ubaid-u'llah Sindhī was caught in his own trap, a trap that he had tried to set up at the instance and suggestion of the quarry itself. He must have known all the time that he could not, whether sitting in Kabul or working in Deoband or Delhi, stir a rebellion in the Subcontinent. And this was known to Kabul. Therefore, when the tide began to turn, his potentiality

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 172.

¹⁷ Pan-Islamic activities and the movement for the unity of the world Muslims were disliked by the Amīr and this was impressed upon Mawlānā 'Ubaid-u'llah Sindhī who now took care not to speak of them, *ibid.*, p. 240, f.n.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 177.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 159.

for harm was completely neutralized. In the meanwhile he had become very friendly with the communists and finding Kabul cold towards himself, he went to Moscow²⁰ which also found his gullibility a fertile ground for implanting some communistic ideas and a good deal of admiration for Lenin and his measures. The fate of the Muslim states and peoples of Central Asia and elsewhere in the Soviet Union did not bother him and he remained totally indifferent to the working of Russian communism as an imperialist expansionist in areas where Islam had prospered as a great intellectual, spiritual and political force. It is rather strange that he should be concerned only with the fate of India, which perhaps, was the result of the good brain washing he had received in Afghanistan to take his mind completely away from any traces of pan-Islamism.

Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan had been working for the defence of the *Khilāfat* and the Turks with whom the sole relation with the Muslims of the Subcontinent was that of Islam. Mawlānā 'Ubaid-u'llah Sindhi became an Indian nationalist and came to care little for the fate of Muslim peoples. From Moscow he went to Turkey and despite the Kemalist attitude towards Islam, he became an admirer of Kemalism.²¹ This was due to his earlier acceptance of nationalism in preference to Islam as the most cogent factor in building up states. The Kemalists were nationalists and must have further strengthened the Mawlānā's adherence to the principle of nationalism. He produced a manifesto of a party that he intended to organize, the Sarva-rājya party of the Indian National Congress.²² This manifesto was sent to leading persons in the Subcontinent but it did not escape the vigilance of British-Indian intelligence.²³ It laid down as its goal complete independence with a federal form of government in which the rights of minorities would be guaranteed and the federating units would enjoy maximum autonomy, the federal subjects being only

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 177, 178.

²¹ 'Ubaid-u'llah Sindhi, *Shāh Wali-u'llah awr un kī siyāsī taḥrīk*, op. cit., pp. 163-167.

²² *Sarva* (Sanskrit) means all, *sarva rājya* means government belonging to or even run by all. An outline of the manifesto is given in Muḥammad Sarwar, *Mawlānā 'Ubaid-u'llah Sindhi*, (Lahore 1967), pp. 452-461.

²³ Ibid., p. 462.

defence, foreign affairs and foreign trade. The economy was to be socialist with full nationalization of public utilities and agricultural lands. Nationalized factories would be run by committees of workers and internal trade would be in the hands of co-operatives. Private property would be permitted within a prescribed ceiling and extra property would be nationalized.²⁴ The federal government would be secular. The federating units would be organized on the basis of language, mores and culture. They would have the right of having a state religion.²⁵ Such units would be permitted to unite in sub-federations.²⁶ Then the Mawlānā went to Arabia and he accepted the basis of Arab nationalism and blamed the Turks for trying to rule over the Arab countries against their will.²⁷

All this would show that the Mawlānā was a total convert to the ideas of nationalism and socialism. The programme that he chalked out for his still-born *Sarva-rājya* party bears the unmistakable stamp of the philosophy of Moscow communism. He was against Mahatma Gandhi's injection of religion into the politics of the Subcontinent and condemned Gandhism in strong terms.²⁸ Accepting Lenin's idea of nationalities in broad outline he denied that the peoples of the Subcontinent formed one nation and he wanted India of the future to be a multi-national country, with a secular and neutral federal government.²⁹ He also provided for the existence of several or two Muslim and Hindu sub-states united under a central federation of the nature described above.³⁰ He did not like them to be totally independent, because he did not want "to Balkanize" the Subcontinent.³¹ But, then, if there was to be one India embracing all the entities, some ideological or moral link had to be discovered to keep the components from falling apart. He must have been told that the Soviet Union despite the racial, linguistic and cultural fissures was kept to-

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 453, 458-459.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 459.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 456, 457.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 264, 265.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 420-423.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 424, 425.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 456, 457.

³¹ *Sindhi*, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

gether by communism. He rejected communism because it established a polity on the strength of the proletariat alone whereas the Mawlānā's basic philosophy was *sarva-rājya*.³² Hence he hit upon the idea of *waḥdat-u'l-wujūd* (monsim) as a likely binding force for the Subcontinent.³³ The Mawlānā was extremely serious about Europeanization, without which no progress was possible in his view.³⁴ So far as the Muslims were concerned, he was certain that the Arabic script stood in the way of their literacy. Therefore he would adopt the Latin script.³⁵ And he was aware of the opposition that would be offered by the conservative sectors of the society,³⁶ but he was not squeamish about his intentions. He would suppress all dissent forcibly and ruthlessly.³⁷ He would in fact liquidate all opposition. After all, he wanted to bring about a revolution and revolutions are not expected to be considerate to their opponents.

His scheme is not without merit on paper; it is an outline for some kind of an Utopia in the Subcontinent, and like all Utopias it has its drawbacks. It ignores some of the glaring realities. If the kind of federation that he had in view could be established, where was the sanction that the central government would keep within its constitutional limits? Mawlānā 'Ubaid-u'llah Sindhī perhaps did not know that "the independent sovereign soviet socialist republics" of the Soviet Union had all the rights under the sun including the right to secede, but no real power to exercise any right except on the sufferance of Russia. Where was the guarantee, or how could it be provided, that even if all the republics or units in the Subcontinent, had an equal share in the central authority and its sustaining organ, the army,³⁸ the majority consisting of the Hindus would not coalesce and constitute itself the real power of the federation? And this majority was a cultural

³² Ibid., p. 456. He rejected communism because it did not recognize the spiritual needs of man, Muḥammad Sarwar, *Mawlānā 'Ubaid-u'llah Sindhī*, op. cit., p. 256.

³³ Ibid., pp. 433, 434.

³⁴ Sindhī, op. cit., pp. 163-167.

³⁵ Ibid., pp. 166-167.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 165.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ This was part of the manifesto of the proposed Sarva-rājya party, Muḥammad Sarwar, *Mawlānā 'Ubaid-u'llah Sindhī*, op. cit., p. 459.

and religious entity. What Mahatma Gandhi had done to the Congress by infusing Hinduism into its thinking was bound to happen to the federation. And the naivete of thinking that whereas the faith of Islam that demands allegiance to the idea of a world community of Islam and seeks to invest it with political authority failed to hold the Turks and the Arabs together, the philosophic concept of monism would provide the necessary cementing factor to hold the Muslims and the Hindus in equal partnership in one state was really surprising in a man of erudition who had given thought to political matters.

Indeed he came fairly close to the idea of Pakistan when he laid it down that units possessing a common culture and way of life could form sub-federations and a sub-federation could even have its own state religion, but he did not advocate an independent Muslim federation for fear of "Balkanization"³⁹—an idea that must have been planted in his mind by the Russians, partly to explain their own subjugation of other nations and partly because Mawlānā 'Ubaid-u'llah Sindhi's thoughts regarding securing maximum possible power for the Muslims of the Subcontinent must have come within their cognition. And the Russians have been averse to the proximity of really sovereign Muslim states to their own Muslim dominions. It is, however, ridiculous to think that the division of the Subcontinent or the vast Russian Empire into states as large and as populous as France or Spain would be their "Balkanization". It is also fallacious to hold that progress is impossible without the kind of Europeanization that the Mawlānā had in mind. A visit to Japan would have corrected the Mawlānā's thinking in this regard. He does not seem to have been at all aware of the complexities arising from the change of a script. The Soviet Union has done it deliberately in the Muslim states to cut them off from their neighbours speaking the same or closely allied languages. The intention was also to cut them off from their rich religious heritage, because all the religious literature was in the Arabic script and now only the specialist has access to it. And that kind of specialisation is not encouraged. The Turks have done it voluntarily. The complications of the Arabic script because of its system of joining several letters into

³⁹ Ibid., p. 425.

one have been exaggerated by its enemies. The Turks have cut themselves off from all their literary heritage because they have neither the resources nor the patience to transcribe all their literary treasures.

The Mawlānā did not realize that merely bright ideas—specially those that have not been tried out—do not bring about revolutions even if they are intrinsically sound. The Mawlānā liked to think that he was a revolutionary. Prolonged exile and association with revolutionaries do not necessarily make a revolutionary of a man. Revolutions need well thought out techniques and plans. Mawlānā 'Ubaid-u'llah Sindhi evolved neither. Nor, for that matter, did he have a single associate or co-worker to canvass support among probable supporters. He was not taken seriously by any significant political group in the Subcontinent; he found neither acceptance, nor did he provoke any opposition. He was respected for his sincerity that had taken him to different countries with the belief that he was doing important work and also for his deep study of *Shāh Wali-u'llah*. Otherwise he was treated like what he was—an eccentric visionary.⁴⁰

We have seen how the moment differences grew up between Mawlānā Mohamed Ali and the Congress, the group of ulema who later organized the *Majlis-i-Ahrār-i-Islam*, pounced upon him and sought to finish him as a political leader. They followed the lead of the Indian National Congress in matters of all India importance, but they had to justify their existence by launching some movements of their own, or supporting movements in which the Congress was interested and could not intervene openly. One of these was the movement for better administration and some political reforms in Kashmir. The Hindu Maharaja was exploiting the people so mercilessly that nowhere people were so poor or depressed throughout the Subcontinent. Their case was taken up by the Qadiānīs who started an agitation for drawing attention to the gross misrule in Kashmir. As the Qadiānīs generally kept away from political unrest and agitation and generally based their policies on cooperation with the British, the Congress leadership

⁴⁰ Husain Ahmad, *op. cit.*, devotes a good deal of space to him but omits all references to his scheme. Mawlānā Husain Ahmad was the leading light of the *Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind* during the Pakistan Movement, *vide infra*.

suspected that the British were at the back. The Congress did not want a British backed agitation to succeed at the popular level because of its likely repurcussion on the attitude of the Kashmiris towards the Congress. At this stage, unlike the future actions of Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru before independence in the context of the plight of the Kashmiri people, the Congress did not consider it advisable to interfere, because the extremist section of the Hindu community would not have liked any action that might injure the interests of the Hindu raja. And, of course, the Qadiānis could not be permitted to build up an influence in the State. Hence the Aḥrār were asked to take up the issue. It was a Godsend for them, because they were feeling that their popularity was on the wane and Kashmir would be a good issue to gain some popularity. The Aḥrār were able to send a large number of people to jail but they could not gain any foothold for future activities inside the State.⁴¹ The Qadiāni effort was strongly opposed by the Aḥrār and that also failed. The only party that succeeded much beyond its expectations was the Indian National Congress which deservedly achieved its triple objectives. The Qadiānis were eliminated from the struggle, the British were rendered neutral or even hostile to the movement because they could not like an Aḥrār victory, and thus the Maharaja did not lose support of the Paramount Power. And the Congress was not involved. It is not suggested that the Indian National Congress adopted this policy through any of its organs, because that would have made the action public, but such measures were adopted by the top leadership through Mawḷānā Abu'l-kalām Āzād.

There was a group of Muslim politicians who did not believe in the feasibility of the Non-cooperation Movement. At the root of this conviction was the distrust of Hindu intentions. Some of those who cooperated with the British no doubt did so because of selfish reasons, but it would be a mistake to think that all of them were mere self-seekers without any public feeling. Indeed there were several men of conviction and public spirit among them. They went to the legislatures and acted as watch dogs for Muslim interests in education and the services. The Congress extended

⁴¹ For the enthusiasm of the people, the involvement of the Qadiānis and the methods of agitation employed, see Ashraf 'Aṭā, op. cit., pp. 127-141.

tolerance to the Hindu leaders who were active as legislators and did not impede them in their efforts to secure many necessary facilities for Indians in general and their own community in particular.

The bane of Muslim politics has been inter-group intolerance. Popular groups have long been in the habit of character assassination of all those who have differed with them. If anybody acted indifferently or in opposition to a group which for some reason or the other had the ear of the public, then it was taken for granted that his bonafides must be doubtful. During the Non-cooperation Movement Pandit Madan Mohan Malviya and, soon after its collapse, Svāmī Shradhdhānanda lost neither the confidence nor the respect of the most ardent congressmen including Mahatma Gandhi. It is true that Hindu leadership never extended the same courtesy to its Muslim opponents and even men like Mawlānā Mohammed Ali were maligned, but it ever remained considerate to Hindu politicians with policies differing from its own. The Muslims, however, behaved in almost a savage manner towards their Muslim opponents. For this reason the affairs of the community suffered and it was not able to utilize fully the services of its various workers.

The Ahrār came to loggerheads with a man of rare ability and insight. Mian (Later, Sir) Fazli Husain was a Congressman to start with, but he turned away from it⁴² because he could not find much scope for serving his province through it. The Panjab had a predominantly agricultural economy, but the peasants were poor and in the clutches of the Hindu Banias, who not only controlled trade and commerce but were also becoming landlords by purchasing properties pledged as securities for loans. Indeed if the process were not stopped, the Panjab would become a land of Bania traders, shopkeepers, landlords, with such a stranglehold on the economy of the Province that the rural community would sink into the lowest depth of poverty without any hope of recovery except through a rebellion or revolution. The cities were little better, because trade and commerce were in the hands of the same community which knew all

⁴² For a biography vide Azim Husain, *Fazl-i-Husain*, (Lajore, 1946).

the skills of the exploitation of the underdog. And because of its wealth and influence, education was its preserve which gave it a practical monopoly of the services and the professions. The prosperity brought about by the construction of one of the best and the largest systems of irrigation in the world irrigating highly cultivable and productive land was, because of this continuous exploitation, being frittered away so far as the toiling masses were concerned and wealth and power were being concentrated in the hands of a single caste of the Hindus.

This situation looked intolerable to Sir Fazli Husain and he started setting the Panjab house in order. He forged an alliance with a vigorous rural community of the Hindus—the Jats, who were led in the provincial legislature and outside by Choudhri (Later Sir) Chhotu Ram. They organized the Unionist Party, which was loyal to the British government, because otherwise it could not implement its programme of getting the rural population its due and restricting the scope of the activities of the Banias. They divided the people into the categories of agriculturists and non-agriculturists, prohibited any acquisition of agricultural land by non-agriculturists either through purchase or for the recovery of loans and reserved seats for Muslims and the inhabitants of the rural areas in the services and educational institutions. The Muslims of the Panjab were put on the path of progress through the foresight of Mian Sir Fazli Husain who had found them almost as depressed as the Muslims of Bengal and Sind, who remained backward because they did not produce a leader of Mian Sir Fazli Husain's devotion, foresight, ability, determination and character. He knew what he was doing and that what he was doing was just and good; therefore he bowed neither before opposition, nor calumny. Of these two commodities, which have been in abundant supply in the politics of the Subcontinent, he received more than his share.

The Ahrār had neither the imagination nor the capacity to assess a situation properly. They had an obsession, but no understanding. The obsession was that anyone, who cooperated with the British in any venture, must be a knave without scruples, because foreign domination was evil. With this obsession being their sole

asset held with the tenacity of unquestioning faith, they developed a rigidity that they mistook for single minded sincerity, which warped their judgment and sterilized their thinking. Therefore, they played every time into the hands of their enemies. If they had consulted the arch priest of the Indian National Congress itself, they would have stood corrected so far as Sir Fazli Husain was concerned. Mahatma Gandhi once said to Dr. Zakir Husain, at that time Principal of Jāmi'ah-i-Milliyah-i-Islāmiyah of Delhi and later President of the Indian Union, "After I had been released from the jail in 1924 or 1925, I went to the Panjab. At that time the Hindus and the Sikhs were carrying on a bitter campaign of hostile propaganda against Sir Fazli Husain. He met me on that occasion. I was greatly impressed with what he told me and to a certain extent I was convinced... After that I met some other Muslim leaders who headed some popular parties and mentioned Sir Fazli Husain saying that he looked to me to be a most useful person and we should seek his assistance in the solution of Hindu-Muslim problems... but none of them agreed with me and dismissed my opinion with a laugh." ⁴³ The Mahatma did not change his opinion of Sir Fazli Husain even subsequently.⁴⁴

Sir Fazli Husain was succeeded by Sir Sikandar Ḥayāt Khān in the Panjab. He followed the same policies as his predecessor and because Sir Fazli Husain's sound policies pursued with wisdom had created good Muslim personnel, Sir Sikandar Ḥayāt Khān was able to extend Muslim influence in the services.⁴⁵ But the Aḥrār opposition to him was even more bitter and determined.⁴⁶ The long history of British rule and continued hostility to Muslim interests had made the Muslim masses deeply anti-British and because they were uneducated, emotional and gullible, the Aḥrār and their like, were able to exploit their feelings. As they themselves thought in the same manner, they could be led by their nose by the Congress minded Aḥrār into fruitless exercises. The Hindu-Muslim ill feeling increased with the growth of

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Aḥraf, 'Aḥā, op. cit., pp. 18, 19.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 15.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 16.

competition between the two communities in the Panjab which brought the antagonism in their interests into high relief and began to cut the ground under the feet of the Aḥrār. Indeed the opposition had existed all the time among the better educated sectors, which the Aḥrār had been able to counter in the beginning but later it got the better of them because it was based on concrete grounds and not merely emotion. The Unionist popularity also wore off when, with the death of Sir Sikandar Ḥayāt Khān, it ceased to possess the same degree of distinguished leadership. Besides it foolishly thought it proper to come into conflict with the Muslim League which had been gaining ground because its appeal was based upon ideological as well as material grounds. Gradually the Unionist Party lost all influence among the Muslims and the justification for its existence disappeared with the rise of totally new and pressing issues.

In 1935 the city of Lahore witnessed a remarkable demonstration of Muslim courage and tenacity. A mosque had been converted into a *gurdwāra* by the Sikhs. Both the communities called it *Shahidganj*. Mawlānā Zafar 'Alī Khān, proprietor and editor of the well known Urdu daily *Zamīndār*, started an agitation for the recovery of the mosque. It may be mentioned here that Mawlānā Zafar 'Alī Khān had sided with the Aḥrār in their approval of the Nehru Report and had opposed Mawlānā Mohamed Ali's stand on it.⁴⁷ Indeed the *Zamīndār* and its editor both turned so hostile to Mawlānā Mohamed Ali that their criticism transgressed the limits of differences on public issues and took the colour of personal vendetta. Thus there was cooperation between Mawlānā Zafar 'Alī Khān and the Aḥrār in practically all their movements. The British found themselves in a difficult position, because if the principle that a mosque converted into a *gurdwāra* by the Sikhs during their rule should be restored to the Muslims, were accepted, some other *gurdwāras* also would have to be taken away from the Sikhs. Besides, the British themselves had occupied some mosques and were using them for profane purposes. And then the Muslims during the period of their dominance had converted some Hindu temples into mosques and if once places of worship were restored to the communities to whom they had originally

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 56.

belonged, there would be no end of trouble. The agitation reached the boiling point when the Muslims decided to march on Shahīd-ganj. There was considerable commotion in the city on 7 and 8 July 1937 when thousands of Muslims came out in the streets and despite police firing did not desist. European troops were called out and their firing also had little effect. At last the authorities threatened to strafe the demonstrators and even Muslim houses from the air. At this the Muslim moderates persuaded Mawlānā Zafar 'Alī Khān to stop the agitation which he did. It is an excellent testimony to his influence upon the people at that time that he was obeyed.⁴⁸ The agitation collapsed quickly and Shahīd-ganj remained a *gurdwāra*.⁴⁹ The Government of Pakistan has not disturbed the Sikh possession or tried to reconvert the building into a mosque. The incident, however, shows how ill advised were some of the movements launched by the Aḥrār and their associates.

About the same time a new movement captured the imagination of the Muslim community. A brilliant mathematician and a modern trained scholar, 'Allāmah 'Ināyat-u'llah Maṣḥrīqī, like many other Muslims, had been brooding for some time over the plight of his community. He examined the current conceptions of Islam and reached the conclusion that the Muslims had suffered because they had accepted a quietist interpretation of a faith that demanded dynamism, communal action and discipline. He put his ideas in a voluminous book, *Tadhkirah*, which was written in a rather difficult and involved style, but no one questioned the fact that it was deeply thoughtful as well as thought provoking.⁵⁰ It also invited a good deal of criticism both from the ulema and those educated in modern discipline. The former were annoyed because the 'Allāmah had gone against some of their widely held interpretations and the latter because they felt that the 'Allāmah had taken rather a narrow view of religion in general and Islam in particular. The scales of reference had been mostly adopted from the values developed by the affluent, materialistic and empire building and empire conscious society of the West.

⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 241-247.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 9.

⁵⁰ 'Ināyat-u'llah Maṣḥrīqī, *Tadhkirah* (Amritsar, 1924).

Thoughtful Muslims were not willing to concede that the *sum-mum bonum* of human effort was affluence or power, though their importance could not be denied.

However, it was not 'Allāmah Mashriqī's philosophy that proved to be the most potent factor in his movement. He organized a volunteer corps, called the Khāksārs (the humble people). They wore military dress, carried spades on their shoulders like guns, marched in military formation, were properly drilled and created the illusion of marching troops when they moved in formation. The 'Allāmah said that the volunteers were enrolled for social work, that the spade was the symbol of and also an instrument for manual work and they did clean up dirty localities and repaired unmetalled roads and streets in villages and poor localities. They were organized to do rough menial work that others left undone. However, it was generally believed that the 'Allāmah was preparing a disciplined body of able bodied young men which could be converted into a fighting force with minimum training. That was the main appeal, though it was never mentioned publicly.

The movement may be said to have started in 1924 but began to gather momentum in 1937.⁵¹ A large number of Muslim young men joined and a fair percentage of these were semi-educated or even illiterate, though the higher posts were all held by men of reasonably good education. From the day the first band marched out in a street, it created both enthusiasm and misgivings. In the beginning the general Muslim attitude was of sympathy and even support, but the non-Muslims were highly suspicious. The difference between the Khāksārs and the *Rashtrya Svm Seva Sangha* illustrates the contrast between the Muslim and the Hindu temperaments. The former worked in the open, there was no secret about them; the latter was organized in 1926 and remained under ground for about two decades. The Khāksār organization came to grief because of poor leadership. The 'Allāmah proved to be a poor politician; he came into conflict with the Government when he was not prepared for it. He courted

⁵¹ The constitution of the movement was drawn up in that year, Dr. Sir Ziauddin's speech in the Central Legislative Assembly on 23 September 1942, Sir Muḥammad Yamin Khān, op. cit., v. ii, p. 866.

arrest in Lucknow and came out after tendering an apology and no effort to explain it away could redeem his prestige as a redoubtable leader. That was the beginning of the decline of the movement.

However, it was still strong enough in 1940 to come into clash with the Panjab Government in Lahore,⁵² which resulted in the death of many Khāksārs and yet more sustaining heavy injuries on 19 March. Public sympathy, as it always happens in such circumstances, was entirely on the side of the Khāksārs and the chief minister Sir Sikandar Hayāt Khān had incurred unpopularity to an extent that there was some danger to his life.⁵³ Anti-League elements tried to exploit the situation by saying that the holding of the annual session on the morrow of such a grave tragedy was an act of grave callousness and there was serious danger of crowds trying to break up the session. The Qā'id-i-A'zam went and visited the injured in the hospital.⁵⁴ Ignoring all advice to the contrary, he addressed a public meeting in which he expressed sympathy with the sufferers and promised to take the matter up in the League. Thousands had congregated and many informed persons had anticipated rowdiness and even serious violence, but nothing untoward happened and the crowd heard the Qā'id-i-A'zam in pin drop silence. The League passed a resolution expressing its sorrow on the tragic happenings and demanding the appointment of an independent and impartial inquiry committee, the members of which should command public confidence and the withdrawal by all provincial governments of the orders declaring the Khāksār organization illegal.⁵⁵

'Allāmah 'Ināyat-u'llah Mashriqī's immaturity was again demonstrated in 1942, when he was persuaded by some congressmen at Madras, where he happened to be at that time, to issue instructions to his followers to make all attempts to stop the Qā'id-i-A'zam from trying to partition the Subcontinent and to

⁵² The clash was brought about by Aḥrārs through intricate machinations; *ibid.*, p. 867.

⁵³ Matlubul Hasan Saiyid, *Mohammad Ali Jinnah*, (Lahore 1962), p. 326.

⁵⁴ Hector Bolitho, *Jinnah, Creator of Pakistan*, (New York, 1957), p. 128.

⁵⁵ Matlubul Hasan Saiyid, *op. cit.*, pp. 326-328.

make him realize the importance of its unity.⁵⁶ The response was limited to his more fanatical followers, but among them it was intense. The Qā'id-i-A'ẓam started getting a large number of letters and telegrams from Khāksārs, mostly threatening to kill him. A few days later a young Khāksār, Rafīq Šābir Mazangwī, tried to assassinate the future founder of Pakistan, but the blow was warded off by him and the assailant was handed over to the police.⁵⁷ In the beginning the ulema were opposed to the Khāksārs and the Jami'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind even passed a resolution condemning the views expressed by 'Allāmah 'Ināyat-u'llah Maṣṭurī in his book, but when he turned against the Muslim League and the demand for a separate homeland for the Muslims, he was admired a good deal by the pro-Congress ulema who forgot his views which they had considered objectionable. Indeed during the elections of 1945, the nationalist Muslims, the Jami'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind of Delhi and the Khāksārs worked hand in hand.⁵⁸

There were many Muslims who had constantly ignored the directions of the Khilāfat Committee and sought election to the the provincial and central legislatures. Setting aside, its own *fatwā* which, as would be recalled, was not tied to the political circumstances during the Khilāfat Movement and had based the boycott of the legislatures on factors that could not change so long as British rule lasted, the Jami'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind of Delhi not only supported but actually worked for the election of persons in its good books. One of these was one Muḥammad Aḥmad Kāẓimī, who was known as the representative of the Jami'at in the Central Assembly. He practised law in Saharanpur. His father was Saiyid Ṭufail Aḥmad Manglorī, the author of *Musal-mānon kā rawṣhan mustaqbil*, a work that has been referred to in this book. He was a sub-registrar and an assistant secretary of the All India Muslim Educational Conference.⁵⁹ He was very close to the Jami'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind, Delhi and the pro-Congress group of the Deoband ulema. His book reflects the same romantic-

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 383.

⁵⁷ Hector Bolitho, op. cit., 144-145.

⁵⁸ Sir Muḥammad Yāmīn Khān, op. cit., v. ii, p. 1052.

⁵⁹ Ibid., v. i, p. 557.

ism and cheap optimism about the future of the Muslims in India that was the characteristic of the pro-Congress Deoband uelma. Sir Muḥammad Yāmīn Khān introduced a resolution on 30 March, 1944 for the protection of the mosques in New Delhi; the Government opposed it because many mosques were treated as Government property and were closed to the Muslims and consequently the resolution was lost. The surprising fact is that Muḥammad Aḥmad Kāzīmī, the representative of the Deoband ulema did not vote in its favour.⁶⁰ Indeed the pattern of his voting on all important issues was unsatisfactory from the point of view of the prevailing Muslim sentiment. For instance when the question of the large scale sabotage, destruction, rioting and violence in connection with Mahatma Gandhi's 'Do or Die Movement' came up for discussion, Muḥammad Aḥmad Kāzīmī took up the attitude that the Congress was not responsible at all and that its enemies were responsible for all that happened.⁶¹

Mawlānā Abu'l-kalām Āzād had persuaded the pro-Congress ulema that their interests would be better safeguarded under a united India and that they should repose full confidence in Indian nationalism. However, they should make efforts to secure for themselves the control of Muslim personal law by getting a guarantee from the Indian National Congress that the Muslim personal law would be administered by *qāḍīs* and that they would be appointed from amongst the ulema. These so-called custodians of Shāh Walī-u'llah's philosophy forgot that the Marathas had all the time respected Muslim personal law and had left its administration in the hands of the *qāḍīs* who were appointed from amongst ulema, yet he had considered Maratha rule oppressive and unbearable bondage. Ever since the revolt against Mawlānā Mohamed Ali, it was continuously dinned into the ears of the ulema belonging to the Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind, Delhi that they should concentrate all their efforts on securing this great boon. Indeed since the day the Aḥrār and their friends in the Panjab supported the Nehru Report, this was the main carrot to persuade the Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind, Delhi to support the recommendations of that document. Muftī Kifāyat-u'llah had

⁶⁰ Ibid., v. ii, p. 978.

⁶¹ Ibid., v. ii, p. 860.

originally supported the Muslim conference resolution against the Nehru Report but Abu-'l-kalām Āzād gradually succeeded in bringing the Delhi Jami'at round to change its stand completely on the assurance that he would get the Congress to endorse the demand for the transfer of the administration of the Muslim personal law to the ulema. He was never able to do that; the best he succeeded in doing was to get a letter from Pandit Moti Lal Nehru to the effect that he thought the Congress could see no objection to accepting it. Having drawn a blank from the Congress at last, the Jami'at turned to its "representative" in the Assembly to take up the matter. Hence he introduced a bill providing for the appointment of *qādis* and making it compulsory for all Muslim marriages to be registered with them. The bill did not secure sufficient support; only five voted for it; hence it was rejected.⁶² That was the last that the matter was raised in the Indian legislature.

Khān 'Abd-u'l-Ghaffār Khān had been in touch with Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan and Mawlānā 'Ubaid-u'llah Sindhī when they were planning action against the British during World War I.⁶³ Subsequently, when the Hijrat Movement was organized in Delhi, he had shown interest and had even migrated to Afghanistan, but he came back disappointed, because he was not given any encouragement by the Afghan Government.⁶⁴ Subsequently he organized the Red Shirt Movement, which is not relevant to the topic of this book. He became a staunch congressman and was called the Frontier Gandhi. He was strongly opposed to the Pakistan Movement and many ulema of his province, partly because of his influence and partly because of the influence of Deoband, were active against the Muslim League and its policies. It is not known whether he had any hand in the hostile attitude of Afghanistan when Pakistan came into existence. It is, however, known that some ulema who were Afghan nationals and should not have meddled with the affairs of the Muslims of the Sub-continent preached openly against the demand for Pakistan. Two

⁶² Ibid., p. 1003.

⁶³ Ḥusain Aḥmad, *Naqsh-i-ḥayāt*, op. cit., v. ii, p. 199.

⁶⁴ Rā'is Aḥmad Ja'fī, *Ayṛāq-i-gum-gashṭah*, op. cit., pp. 780, 781, 810.

of them, for instance, lived in a mosque near Khyber Pass at the corner of the University Road on the Timārpūr side in Delhi. One of them was somewhat of a quietist and the other was a good preacher. He did not miss a single Friday without inveighing against the Pakistan movement. The quietist was respected more for his piety and all his influence was exercised on the side of the Congress. When riots broke out in September 1947, the mosque was attacked and both the *mawlawīs* took shelter in the Afghan embassy.⁶⁵

Mawlānā Abu-'l-A'ālā Mawdūdī's writings played an important role in moulding the opinions of religious minded sections. He was born on 25 September 1903 at Aurangabad in Nizam's dominions.⁶⁶ He belonged to a Delhi family. His father was a lawyer, who, after practising in Meerut, went to Aurangabad and built up a modest practice.⁶⁷ The young Abu-'l-A'ālā's education did not follow any orthodox pattern because he was sent neither to a Western type of institution nor to a religious seminary. That does not mean that his education was neglected, yet, despite his undoubted intelligence and capacity, there were quite a few lacunae in it at the earlier stages. However, both his modesty and his understanding of what a sound education should have done for him came to his rescue and he applied himself with singular perseverance to the achievement of a well rounded intellectual equipment for playing a significant role in life. The seemingly bizarre pattern of his education soon became integrated under the motivation of his disciplined and well directioned mind and, instead of being a source of weakness, actually became an asset because his mind was free from the shackles of traditional modes of thinking. His thoughts could run into new channels instead of following the course set down by age long grooves. He learnt Arabic, Persian, English⁶⁸ and his mastery over Urdu prose was remarkable even at a time when he had not written so much. The knowledge of the three Muslim languages opened to him the treasure houses of all Islamic thought. Though privately pur-

⁶⁵ This information is based upon the personal knowledge of the author who lived on the University Road in those days.

⁶⁶ Abu-'l-Āfāq, *Mawlānā Abu-'l-A'ālā Mawdūdī*, (Lahore, 1971), p. 49.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 48.

⁶⁸ Ibid., pp. 55-56, 59-60, 64

sued, his study of English gave him sufficient competence to be able to read English books and even to translate them into Urdu or use them for culling materials for his articles.

At quite an early stage in life, he adopted journalism for his profession, but it was less a means of earning his livelihood than an opportunity for the expression of his opinions and convictions on matters of public importance. He was appointed editor of a newspaper "*Muslim*" at the young age of eighteen.⁶⁹ *The Muslim* was published by the Jamī'at-i-ulamā'-i-Hind from Delhi. This was the time when the Jamī'at had not chosen a path for itself away from the main current of Indian Muslim feelings. *The Muslim* ceased publication in 1923. These years were utilized by Mawlānā Abu-'l-A'la Mawdūdī for removing the deficiencies in his education and he studied Arabic literature, *tafsīr*, *ḥadīth*, *fiqh*, logic and philosophy from different teachers.⁷⁰ Delhi was still a stronghold of the Islamic disciplines and the Mawlānā's time seems to have been well spent. In 1924 the Jamī'at again started a newspaper, the weekly *Al-Jamī'at* and Mawlānā Abu-'l-A'la Mawdūdī was entrusted with the editorship.⁷¹ He had an offer from Mawlānā Mohamed Ali as well but he preferred *Al-Jamī'at* because he did not like to work in a subordinate capacity in the *Hamdard* despite its reputation, whereas he had independent charge of *Al-Jamī'at*.⁷² He believed in sober and responsible journalism and truly treated it as a learned profession. Some of his articles had solid academic worth. He left *Al-Jamī'at* in 1928 because he declined to adopt cheap methods of increasing the circulation of the paper.⁷³

Even during the time he was editing *Al-Jamī'at*, he was engaged in writing books;⁷⁴ now he devoted himself fully to it. He earned his livelihood by translating the last two parts of a difficult book on Philosophy in Arabic *Al-ḥikmat-u'l-mut'āliyātī-fi 'l-asfār-i'l-'aqliyah* into Urdu for the Osmania University of

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 78.

⁷⁰ Ibid., pp. 78-79.

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 79.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid., pp. 82, 83.

⁷⁴ Ibid., pp. 89, ff.

Hyderabad.⁷⁵ This is not the place to mention all the works of this extremely prolific author; today he has a large number of books, pamphlets and articles to his credit, all of good academic value. He needed a standard periodical for the propagation of his thoughts. He acquired the monthly *Tarjumān-u'l-Qur'ān* in 1931 from Mawlānā Abū Muḥammad Muṣliḥ who had been running it for a few months to spread the message of the Qur'ān from Hyderabad (Deccan).⁷⁶ Since then this journal has been the mainstay of his movement, which indeed had its beginning in his writings in the *Tarjumān-u'l-Qur'ān*.⁷⁷ The new editor of the journal was quite clear in his mind about the purpose that it had to serve. During the first few years, it was printed on the last page in bold letters, "The sole purpose of the journal is to proclaim the Word of God and to invite men to supreme effort in the way of Allah. It's special scope is to comment from the point of view of the Qur'ān upon the thought, the ideas and the principles of the culture and civilization that are spreading in the world to explain the principles advanced by the *Qur'ān* and the *Sunnah* in the context of contemporary philosophy, science, politics, economics, culture and sociology and to formulate the application of the principles of the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah* to the conditions of the present age."⁷⁸ This journal invites the Muslim *Ummah* to a new life." Despite the excellence of the articles, and perhaps because of it, the list of subscribers remained small, the reason being that the number of serious readers in the community was limited. Its worth, however, was recognized and two contemporaries, *Al-Jamī'at* and the *Šidq* of Lucknow, (the latter was edited by Mawlānā 'Abd-u'l-Majid Daryābādī) appealed to their readers to help the *Tarjumān-u'l-Qur'ān*, which, in their view was propagating the teachings of Islam effectively.⁷⁹ There was no immediate response but Mawlānā Abū-'l-A'la Mawḍūdī persevered and gradually the number of the subscribers increased.⁸⁰ At no time was he tempted to lower the standard,

⁷⁵ Ibid., pp. 85, 86.

⁷⁶ Ibid., pp. 105, 111.

⁷⁷ Ibid., pp. 116-117.

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 113.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 115.

⁸⁰ Ibid., pp. 115, 116.

to make it "popular" or to knock at any door for financial aid. Even in those early days the *Tarjumān-u'l-Qur'ān* published series of articles which have later been published as books of considerable merit.

Upto 1937, Mawlānā Mawdūdī was respected as a thoughtful and well informed writer on Islamic subjects. He did not get involved in any political controversy because he saw no occasion for such involvement. The elections of 1937 resulted in massive majorities for the Indian National Congress in all the Hindu majority areas. That was not perturbing in itself, but the Congress leaders displayed a total lack of realization of the fact that India was not a uninational state. They began to apply those principles of democratic parliamentary government that could be valid only in countries inhabited by a single people. This brought to the forefront the question of nationalism. If India was inhabited by a single nation—the question of any real sharing of power by one community with another did not arise. All that any group or community could demand was that there would be no legal discrimination against its members and that they would be treated with justice. In actual practice even this was not done because there were many instances of discrimination and injustice so far as the Muslims were concerned.⁸¹ The Muslims were frustrated and began to feel that their fears about their future in a Hindu dominated India were not baseless.

When the Muslim fears were openly expressed and the Muslim League, under the leadership of the Qā'id-i-A'zam, took up the question of Muslim rights and demanded a settlement of the Hindu-Muslim issues with the Congress, it did not respond seriously. The Congress had built up great prestige for itself as the main organization fighting for the freedom of the Subcontinent and it had also amassed large resources in men and money, because the Hindus were richer, had trained a veritable army of political workers and had built up a great political machine that was active and vigilant. On the other hand the Muslims were disorganized with no political organization worth the name, had

⁸¹ I. H. Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, op. cit., e.g., pp.108. 109,

precious little in the shape of resources and no full time political workers. Those who had been trained during the Khilafat Movement had dispersed, some going back to the professions and callings they had come from and others frittering away their talent, energies and resources in fruitless isolated movements of momentary importance or with ill conceived goals and thoughtless techniques.

A community so helplessly situated could not demand anything as an equal from the mighty Congress. Therefore, it decided to bypass Muslim leadership and launch a clever movement of contacting the Muslim masses directly to wean them away from the leadership that sought to protect them from the fate of becoming totally dependent on the sweet will of the Hindu majority for their rights, even for their continued existence. This strategy—called Muslim Mass Contact Movement—was organized with great finesse by Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru who employed Muslims for the task. First of all he declared in his presidential address to All India National Convention that “it had been a mistake to waste time in negotiations with communal leaders and that future efforts should be concentrated upon the common people.” The old idea of two communities should be discarded because it was outdated and no longer valid. Common economic interests should, in his opinion, be the basis of all future political activity.⁸² This was the philosophy of the Congress mass contact programme.

It was decided that the Muslim masses should be approached by workers to be recruited from the Muslim community, therefore a department of Islamics was established for the purpose and it was placed under a well known communist Dr. Kānwar Muḥammad Ashraf.⁸³ This was, very strangely, welcomed gleefully by the mouthpiece of the Jamī‘at-i-‘ulama’-i-Hind, *Al-Jamī‘at*.⁸⁴ Then there emanated a flood of literature all belittling the importance of Islamic culture and even Islamic doctrines, repeating *ad nauseam*, that the real and basic division of the exploiter and the exploited had existed between Muslim and

⁸² Saiyid Abu’l-A’lā Mawdūdī, *Taḥrik-i-āzādī-i-Hind awr Musalmān*, (Lahore 1964), v. i, p. 213.

⁸³ Ibid., p. 223.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

Muslim as well and therefore the exploited Muslims should join hands with the exploited Hindus and forget the fact that they were any different.⁸⁵ This was dangerous for two reasons. In the first place this was a movement to subvert the faith of the Muslim masses and to convert them to Marxism. The other reason was that the effort was directed towards the total disintegration of the Muslim community in the Subcontinent. What Hindu movements like Bhakti in the earlier days and *Shuddhī* and *Sangathan* more recently had not been able to accomplish, Muslim Mass Contact Movement sought to achieve through persons with Muslim names but believers in philosophies hostile to Islam. Even if there had been no effort to approach the masses through the subversion of their faith and the attempt had been made to alienate the Muslim masses from their own leaders and bring them into the fold of Hindu politics under the garb of Indian nationalism, the move would have been sinister, because the Muslim effort has always been to preserve the political entity of the Muslims apart from their social and religious existence. But the aim was wider, as has been mentioned earlier. The attack was comprehensive. It was proclaimed loudly that "Islamic culture and civilization had no substance per se."⁸⁶ Indeed, the Muslims of the Subcontinent, it was asserted, had never possessed a common culture.⁸⁷ "The poor, the indigent and slaves have no religion and no culture. Their biggest religion is a piece of bread and their biggest culture is a torn shirt."⁸⁸ "The communal struggle will change into class war."⁸⁹ The queer fact about this propaganda was that it was carried on through the official organ of the Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind, *Al-Jamī'at* and the greatest supporter of the Congress ulema, the *Madīnah* of Bijnor.⁹⁰

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 232.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 228.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 230 quoting K.M. Ashraf in *Al-Jamī'at*.

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 235 quoting *Madīnah*, Bijnor, 13 December 1937 (Article by Manzar Ridwī, a member of Congress Secretariat).

⁸⁹ Saiyid Abu-'l-A'lā Mawdūdī, *Tahrik-i-āzādī-i-Hind awr Musalmān*, op. cit., p. 236, quoting one Munshī Ahmad Dīn in *Madīnah* dated 13 December 1937.

⁹⁰ Saiyid Abu-'l-A'lā Mawdūdī, *Tahrik-i-āzādī-i-Hind awr Musalmān*, op. cit., p. 231. The *Madīnah* was a great advocate of Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind's policies and is approvingly and extensively quoted by pro-Congress ulema in their books on the part played by ulema in the Congress movement. It surpassed *Al-Jamī'at* in its partisanship.

Mawlānā Abu-'l-A'lā Mawdūdī's comments had the nationalist ulema in view, when he wrote, "You raised hell on Shraddhā-nanda's Shuddhī Movement: Jawahar Lal Nehru's Shuddhī movement you are swallowing with relish like sherbet."⁹¹ His analysis was that the attack was three pronged. The Muslim idea that they were a separate community was the first target because, so long as they felt that the followers of Islam form an entity, they would refuse to be absorbed into the "Indian nation", hence they were being told that the Muslims did not form a community.⁹² Then, because they possessed a separate culture which marked them out as a separate people, the Congress propagandists belittled the importance of Muslim culture and told them they had no separate culture.⁹³ And the third attack was upon the Muslim society to break it up into mutually hostile classes and groups.⁹⁴ He pointed out that the Indian National Congress was not a communist organization and that it frowned upon the infiltration of the communists and admonished them not to carry out their activities within its ranks, but they encouraged them to work among the Muslims.⁹⁵ When the Muslim masses disintegrate into mere individuals and begin progressively to discard their culture and cut themselves off from the Muslim middle classes to join the non-Muslims of their own class, the process of their shuddhī would have started and they would be assimilated into Hindu society as a lump of salt is slowly dissolved if placed in water.⁹⁶ And he reminds those Muslims who persevere in resisting the pattern of the new society, of two statements made by Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru saying that "those political or cultural institutions that stand in the way of the proposed change should be obliterated,"⁹⁷ and that "when the majority decides to change the social order, it is not necessary that it should consult the minority. On the other hand, effective pressure should be exercised upon it and even compulsion and coercion should be used.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid., pp. 237, 238.

⁹³ Ibid., p. 238.

⁹⁴ Ibid., pp. 238-240.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 244.

⁹⁶ Ibid., pp. 244, 245.

⁹⁷ Ibid. The quotations are in Urdu and the references are not available, hence they have been retranslated.

Democratic government means in fact that the majority should control the minority through threats and fear."⁹⁸

Dr. Syed Mahmud a Muslim congressman of Bihar came out with the suggestion that the word Hindi should be used for all the inhabitants of the Subcontinent and they should stop calling themselves by their communal affiliations.⁹⁹ The same 'Nationalist' Muslim leader was on record saying, "our professions and mores should be identical."¹⁰⁰ He went even further and praised those who had made efforts to create a new religious system suiting all the peoples of the Subcontinent for the creation of a united Indian nation.¹⁰¹ The Hindus and the 'Nationalist' Muslims were very fond of pointing out the trivial differences in the cultures of the Muslims living in different parts of the Subcontinent and arguing that there was no such thing as an Indo-Muslim culture. They also pointed out the doctrinal schisms in Islam, but they did not have the courage to say that the existence of a united Indian nationhood was a myth.

Mawlānā Abu-'l-A'la Mawdūdī exposed the fallacy in such arguments quite convincingly. He wrote, "(the trouble with these persons is that) they consider manifestations of a civilization to be culture itself... In fact culture is that way of thinking, that ideology and those criteria, which determine the choice of a goal from among many which attract a substantial section of humanity. Under the influence of the chosen goal, a people adopts one of the different ways of life. Civilization is another name for a way of life and a culture springs from the (chosen) civilization."¹⁰² From this it follows that contingent differences in the manifestations because of the changes in environment and time do not change the basic harmony and unity of a culture. After a careful

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid., pp. 221, 222.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ *Jāmi'ah*, Delhi, October 1936.

¹⁰² Saiyid Abu-'l-A'la Mawdūdī, *Taḥrik-i-āzādī-i-Hind awr Musalmān*, op. cit., pp. 226, 227. The word 'Nationalist' is confusing in this context. These persons did not believe in Muslim nationalism. They adhered to the idea of a united Indian nationalism and called themselves nationalists as opposed to others who fought for the rights of the Muslims, whom they and the Hindus branded as communalists.

analysis of all the issues involved and the policies pursued by the Indian National Congress, Mawlānā Abu'l-A'ālā Mawdūdī reached the conclusion that the Muslims and the Congress movement had no interests in common. "Our death is its life, its death is our life. Not only is there no common ground between its principles, objects and methods of work and ours, but in fact they are totally opposed. The difference is of such magnitude that they and we do not converge on any point, the differences (in its aims and goals and ours) are like the difference in the cardinal points of the East and the West, one cannot go in one direction without turning one's back on the other."¹⁰³

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. 450.

CHAPTER XIII

The March And The Stragglers

The story of the Pakistan Movement has to be read elsewhere. Here we are concerned only with the role that the ulema played in it. Mawlānā Abu-'l-A'lā Mawdūdī's careful analysis of the policies of the Indian National Congress opened many eyes. It did not win him too many adherents and followers, but it did serve the purpose of turning sincere and intelligent Muslims away from the Congress, who mostly swelled the ranks of the Muslim League as followers of the Qā'id-i-A'zam. We shall have to revert to Mawlānā Mawdūdī's attitude towards the Pakistan Movement later. Here it is necessary to try to understand the psychology, the activities and the utterances of the men who controlled the Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind of Delhi during this fateful period.¹ Ever since the establishment of the Seminary in Deoband, the ulema of that school had participated fully in all the movements that concerned the well-being of the Muslim community in the Sub-

¹ For the Pakistan Movement, I. H. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan*, Subcontinent op. cit; I. H. Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, (Second, edition, Karachi, 1971), For the activities of the Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind Ziya-ul-Hasan Faruqi, *The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan*, (Bombay, 1963), pp. 110-120.

continent, but when the time of the most crucial decisions came, some of them, who, because of the positions they occupied, had a tremendous responsibility, were found wanting in acumen and understanding. A few of them had selfish reasons as well, but many were misled by their incapacity to study the problems facing the community in depth. This shortcoming in men who claimed scholarship as well as insight into contemporary politics was reprehensible enough, but whatever credit may be given to some for sincerity, it gets clouded by many of their actions and general behaviour.

In this connection it is necessary to discuss the character, background and psychology of one who was, at least ostensibly, the leader of the Congress ulema who opposed Pakistan. Mawlānā Abu-'l-kalām Āzād was easily identified by the Muslims as a Congress leader. It was understood that he had thrown in his lot completely with the Congress. The position of the Congress minded ulema of the Deoband school who ruled the Delhi Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind roost was different. They had changed their policies several times and were not totally identified with the Congress in the popular mind. Mawlānā Abu-'l-kalām Āzād, by the time the Pakistan Movement came to muster wide support, was looked upon as a politician; the Deoband congressites were still considered to be theologians. Mawlānā Ḥusain Aḥmad was the leader of the group. He was pious and learned in *Ḥadīth* and was respected both as a scholar and a man of piety.² He was born at Bangar Mau in the district of Unao in modern Uttar Pradesh.³ His father was the Headmaster of the Urdu Middle School there.⁴ Their family home was in Tānda, and for that reason, many people thought that the Mawlānā's ancestors were weavers. But he was in possession of a genealogy proving him to be a Saiyid.⁵ After receiving education in Tānda, he spent seven years (1892-1898) at Deoband and finished the major part of the courses there.⁶ His father then migrated to Medina and Ḥusain Aḥmad

² Hifẓ-u'r-Raḥmān Seohārawī in his introduction to Ḥusain Aḥmad, *Naqqh-i-ḥāyāt*, v. i, (Delhi, 1953), p. 2 pays high tributes to his piety and learning.

³ Ibid., p. 9.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid., p. 16; genealogy is on p. 9 (ibid).

⁶ Ibid., pp. 44-47.

accompanied him before graduation.⁷ He was in Medina upto 1908 except for a longish visit to Gangoh for mystic training.⁸ Then he came back to Deoband for continuing his education in *Hadith* and completed his graduation.⁹ He was also appointed on the teaching staff.¹⁰ He went to Hejaz in 1913 and was still there when World War I broke out.¹¹ All these voyages were made for personal reasons and no political motives were involved. Indeed upto now the Mawlānā had shown no interest in politics. Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan took Mawlānā Ḥusain Aḥmad into confidence only a short time before Sharif Ḥusain's rebellion and explained to him the nature of his mission.¹² This was, the Mawlānā records himself, his first introduction to politics.¹³ Soon after, however, Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan's political activities abroad, came to a halt, because when the Sharif seized power, except for refusing to sign a *maḥḍar* against the 'Turks, he was able to do nothing. He was later arrested, handed over to the British and then transported to Malta.¹⁴ In India Mawlānās Maḥmūd Ḥasan and Ḥusain Aḥmad were together for a very short while. After reaching Bombay the former lived for less than six months¹⁵ and during this time the latter had to be away on several occasions.¹⁶

This would show that Mawlānā Ḥusain Aḥmad was inexperienced in politics and could not have learnt much from his preceptor. He was game for any set of politicians who wanted to further their own point of view and needed the cover of a man who had

⁷ Ibid., p. 49.

⁸ Ibid., p. 65.

⁹ Ibid., p. 122.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 129.

¹² Ibid., pp. 115, 116. Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan reached Jeddah in October 1915 because he left for Mecca on 7 October 1915 (ibid., p. 277), performed first *haj* on 19 October 1915 (ibid., p. 231), second *haj* on 8 October 1916 (ibid.), was asked to sign *maḥḍar* on 28 October 1916 (ibid., p. 232) and was arrested in December 1916 reaching Jeddah on 21 December 1916 (ibid., p. 233).

¹³ Ibid., pp. 215, 216.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 233. Mawlānā Ḥusain Aḥmed was with him at Malta, but obviously there could be no political activity.

¹⁵ He reached Bombay on 8 June and died on 3 November 1920 (ibid., pp. 235, 267).

¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 249-252.

a reputation for learning, sincerity and piety. Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan had affection and regard for him, but the available record does not bear out any claim that Mawlānā Ḥusain Aḥmad was his successor in any sense of the word. We have noticed how Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan frowned upon any tendency on the part of the Muslims to ignore their separate entity and mores.¹⁷ Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan had most certainly confidence in Mawlānā Ḥusain Aḥmad's competence as a scholar of *Ḥadīth*.¹⁸ but there is no evidence to the effect that he considered him to be a good political strategist. The cloistered life of a Deoband theologian did not expose him to the realities of domestic or international politics. Even Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan and Mawlānā 'Ubaid-u'llah Sindhī had displayed a political naivete that would not have brought any credit to a beginner in the study of international affairs. The former was not able to assess the situation in the Hejaz even a few days before Sharif Ḥusain's revolt, the latter had played first into the hands of the Afghan authorities, and then succumbed to Russian and Turkish propaganda. Even the Arab nationalists proved too subtle for him.¹⁹ It is significant that Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan, and, for that matter, Mawlānā 'Ubaid-u'llah Sindhī as well, did not think it politic to take Mawlānā Ḥusain Aḥmad into confidence regarding their intentions and activities until they could hide them no longer, because they were meeting personages involved in high politics. It is also significant that the qualities of his leadership and his greatness as a scholar and a mystic did not find much mention until his services were needed to carry out a campaign against the general sentiment of the Muslims.

There can be little doubt that Mawlānā Ḥusain Aḥmad sincerely, held that the British had inflicted grave injuries on the Islamic world, on the Muslims of the Subcontinent and on other peoples whom they had either subjugated or sought to subjugate. He had culled a good many details of these excesses from several books and had them on his finger tips so that he could recite them even

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 260-261.

¹⁸ Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan wanted him as a collaborator in a projected work on *Ḥadīth*. Ibid., pp. 250, 251; also his nomination for Calcutta, (Ibid., p. 263).

¹⁹ Vide supra.

without reference to notes.²⁰ And the more he talked about the misdeeds of British imperialism, the more he got emotionally involved in the theme. But he and his associates of Deoband, unlike Hindu congressmen, did not take any cognizance of the change in the world situation and the diminution in British authority and influence—and of course, what was more pertinent to the situation in the Subcontinent, the complete destruction of their will to stick to India. Nor was he aware of the international pressures on the United Kingdom. He was oblivious of the role that the United States of America was playing in the world and the polarization of power between the Soviet Union and the United States, so that the global interests of the Americans could not tolerate the continuance of the British Empire in the Subcontinent. He did not seem to know that the World War II was not a mere repetition of World War I. Now the old argument was no longer valid that the most prized British possession was India and that its defence demanded the subjugation of the Muslim West Asia and Egypt. He did not understand the significance of Israel or the importance of the deposits of oil in Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf.

All this exposes the weakness of the type of mind that a long tradition of *taqlid* had created. Had he not been in the company of the Shaiikh-u'l-Hind Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan, whose political activities had drawn the applause of the Muslims of the Subcontinent and even the leaders educated in the Western tradition? And had Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan not correctly diagnosed the basic cause of British hostility towards the Muslim lands as British domination of India? And what the Shaiikh-u'l-Hind, his preceptor, had said must be true and valid even three decades after the events on which his opinions were based and more than two decades and a half after his death. Therefore, the British hold on the Subcontinent was the basic obstacle in the way of the resurgence of Islam, even though—and this, in fairness to him, he never realized—the British themselves were packing up. Did any one say that

²⁰ The facts have been recited in Husain Ahmad, op. cit., v. i, pp. 133-336. Also his presidential address to Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind (Delhi faction), Saharanpur, 4 May, 1945. Regarding his facility in reciting misdeeds of the British, vide Ra'is Ahmad Ja'fri, *Did wa Shunīd*, (Lahore, 1948), p. 115.

the British were packing up and their continued hold upon India was not the problem even of today, much less of tomorrow? How could such a preposterous statement be taken to be true? This also must be some ruse of Perfidious Albion. And those who wanted that there should be some reliable guarantee of the protection of the Muslims were really the agents of the British and were working to prolong their rule. The complex deliberately created by the Indian National Congress and its agents that all who were opposed to the Congress were the stooges of the British held the gullible Mawlānā Ḥusain Aḥmad in its vice. And all the newspapers close to the ulema, in particular *Al-Jamī'at*, Delhi and *Madīnah*, Bijnor, had opened their columns to the writings of communists, paid Congress workers and others who were propounding theories destructive of Islamic entity and culture, a brief reference to which has been made in the last chapter.²¹ One of these theories was that the Muslims living in 'India', meaning the Subcontinent, were part of the monolithic 'Indian Nation' and should seek consequential adjustments which, according to these advocates of suicide by the Muslim nation of the Subcontinent, meant the seeking of complete identification of the Muslims with the way of life and mores of the majority.²² And this was generally accompanied by false assurances that the doctrine of Islam "would shine as brightly" as ever in the new dispensation.²³ Some claimed that this would even open the doors of the conversion of the Hindus to Islam. This romantic nonsense was firmly believed to be gospel truth by the circles close to the Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind. Mawlānā Ḥusain Aḥmad accepted the doctrine of Indian nationalism with all enthusiasm. And he started preaching it in mosques. It is not known when he started doing so, but one occasion was when he preached in the Jangalwālī Mosque of Delhi near Bārā Hindu Rao, which brought a sharp rebuke from Dr. Muhammad Iqbal. As his famous lines have become an important part of our history, no apology is necessary

²¹ Supra, chapter XII, pp. 334, 337.

²² *Jāmi'ah*, Delhi, October 1936. Article by Dr. Syed Mahmud.

²³ Article by Manẓar Ridwī, in *Madīnah*, 13 December 1937.

for including a translation in this discussion.²⁴

“Ḥasan²⁵ (rose) from Basrah, Bilāl²⁶ from Abyssinia, Ṣuḥaib²⁷ from Rome,

Deoband produced Ḥusain Aḥmad²⁸, what monstrosity is this? He chanted from the pulpit that nations are created by countries, What an ignoramus regarding the position of Muḥammad!²⁹ Take thyself to Muḥammad, because he is the totality of Faith, And if thou dost not reach him, all (thy knowledge) is Bu Lahabism.³⁰

However, he had not always been like that. He participated in the Calcutta Session of the Khilafat Conference in December 1928 and spoke against the Nehru Report. “There was a good deal in his speech against the British”, records an eye witness, “but I remember very well, he spoke much more sharply and bitterly against the Hindus and their perversity and antagonism (towards the Muslims)... After listening to that speech nobody

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حسن ز بصره ، بلال از حبش ، صهیب از روم
ز دیو بند حسین احمد ، این چه بو العجیبی است
سرود بر سر مقبر که ملت از وطن است
چه بے خبر ز مقام محمد عربی است
بمصطفی برسان خویش را که دین همه اوست
اگر باو نرسیدی ، تمام بو لہبی است
عجم هنوز نداند رموز دین ورنہ

The first line has an alternative:

(‘Ajam still does not understand the secrets of the Faith, otherwise’). For general reactions of the people see Choudhri Ḥabib Aḥmad, *Taḥrik-i-Pakistan awr Nationalist ‘ulamā* (Lahore 1966), pp. 264 ff.

²⁵ The famous sufi Ḥasan Baṣrī; for a note on him, vide Felix M. Pareja *Islamologia*, Tomo II (Madrid 1952-1954) pp. 641-642.

²⁶ The Negro, Bilāl, companion of the Prophet, whose call to prayers (*aḡḡhān*) was greatly appreciated by the Prophet and the Muslims. He occupies an honoured place among the great men of Islam.

²⁷ Ṣuḥaib, a Roman, a companion of the Prophet and known for his eloquence.

²⁸ Deoband which had been founded to propagate the ideals of Shāh Walī-u’llah was not expected to produce an Indian Nationalist.

²⁹ The Prophet built up a community of believers in Islam without distinction of race, colour or place of origin or domicile.

³⁰ BU Lahab literally means ‘Father of Fire; a most determined unbeliever, and opponent of Islam, who persecuted the Prophet.

could ever imagine that one day the Mawlānā would carry the flag of united (Indian) nationalism on his weak shoulders.”³¹ From what has been said above, it would be apparent that the metamorphosis was complete and total, but what brought it about? The influences that had turned the Jamī‘at-i-‘ulamā’-i-Hind, Delhi, against Mawlānā Moḥamed Ali were continuously at work in a subtle manner. Some ulema were too naive to understand the moves, others too weak and yet others too colourless to withstand the intrigues of the Indian National Congress and their agents. But, for quite some time they did not succeed. When Ramsay MacDonald, the British prime minister announced his famous ‘Communal Award’, the Indian National Congress including Mawlānā Abu-‘l-kalām Āzād advocated its rejection, but the Delhi Jamī‘at not only accepted it but demanded additional safeguards. Mawlānā Abu-‘l-kalām Āzād was all the time assiduously working to divert the ulema from the advocacy of Muslim rights to identification with the Congress stand. He persuaded them to concentrate upon the protection of Muslim personal law and demand the appointment of *qāḍīs*. At last he succeeded in his efforts and the working committee of the Jamī‘at passed a resolution to the effect that joint electorates could be accepted under certain conditions. These conditions were never accepted by the Congress, but the resolution was extensively exploited for its own purposes by it.

When the Qā‘id-i-A‘zam came back at the end of 1934,³² after having spent five years in England, he was quite clear in his mind about the attitude to be adopted regarding the proposals contained in the Report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee. He did not like the proposed set up at the centre, but even though he was not fully satisfied with it, he did not propose to oppose it and was in favour of participation in the elections for the provincial legislatures. His views were endorsed by the Muslim League Executive and later he succeeded in manoeuvring the Central Legislative Assembly into passing a resolution on the same lines.³³

³¹ Ra‘is Aḥmad Ja‘fri, *Did wa shunīd*, op. cit., pp. 115, 116.

³² Sir Muḥammad Yāmin Khān, op. cit., v. i, p. 564. Mr. Mohammad Ali Jinnah was called Qā‘id-i-A‘zam much later. The title is used at this stage for the sake of convenience.

³³ Ibid., p. 567.

Mr. Abdul Matin Chowdhury, Secretary of the Independent Party in the Central Legislature, which was led by the Qā'id-i-A'zam, met the General Secretary of the Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind (Delhi) and gave a message saying that the Qā'id-i-A'zam had decided to live in India and was desirous of converting the Muslim League into a popular organization and freeing it from the hold of the vested interests.³⁴ He requested that the Jamī'at should help him in this undertaking, so that the Muslims might fight the elections to the provincial legislatures to be held under the Government of India Act 1935 from a common platform. The President and the Secretary showed their willingness to meet the Qā'id-i-A'zam. A meeting was, therefore, arranged and the two office bearers of the Jamī'at met him at his residence, and because they were already convinced that only the Qā'id-i-A'zam was capable of leading the Muslims at that juncture, it did not prove difficult to arrive at an understanding. The Jamī'at leaders advised the Qā'id-i-A'zam to try to gain the support of all the groups which had constituted the Muslim Unity Board.³⁵ A meeting was, therefore, held at the residence of Mawlānā Shaukat Ali which was attended by some members of the Unity Board and the representatives of Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind (Delhi). It was decided in principle to set up a joint Parliamentary Board and the representatives of the various bodies were asked to get the resolution ratified by their respective bodies.

A session of the All India Muslim League was summoned at Bombay on 11, 12 April 1936³⁶ to which some persons who did not belong to the League were also invited. The General Secretary and some members of the Jamī'at attended this meeting. A resolution was passed regarding the Government of India Act 1935 on the same lines as the Resolution of the Central Assembly on the Report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee. It was decided to set up a central Parliamentary Board under the chairmanship of the Qā'id-i-A'zam who was authorized to nominate the members. Both the motions were supported by the representatives of

³⁴ The reactions of the members of the parties which were opposed to the Congress were bitter, *ibid.*, pp. 631-632.

³⁵ For the Muslim Unity Board vide, *ibid.*, p. 553. It had a few **Khilafatists** and some members of the All Parties Muslim Conference.

³⁶ Saīyid Ḥasan Riyāḍ, *Pakistan nāguzīr thā* (Karachi, 1967), pp. 183-184

the Jamī'at. Soon after, the Qā'id-i-A'zam toured the whole of the Subcontinent and met the members of the different Muslim parties. Thereupon the personnel of the Parliamentary Board was announced. Apart from Muslim Leaguers, members of the Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind, the Majlis-i-Aḥrār and the Muslim Conference were included. Some Muslim nationalists who were directly connected with the All India National Congress were also its members in their individual capacities. One of the most controversial and noteworthy of these was Chaudhri Khaliq-u'z-zaman.³⁷ The nominees of this Parliamentary Board did not achieve outstanding success because they had to compete with better organized groups and well entrenched independents. But in the United Provinces they put up a better show capturing 26 out of 54 Muslim seats.³⁸

When the Muslim League Parliamentary Board was established, a secret understanding was arrived at, through the intermediacy of the Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind, with the Congress High Command that the Congress and the League would work together in the provincial legislatures and form coalition ministries in which the Muslim League would get representation in proportion to their population. In the United Provinces the League was to get two ministerships. It was for the purpose of ensuring cooperation that the Congress and League manifestoes were made fully compatible with each other; both laid equal emphasis upon the goal of making the Subcontinent a free and welfare state. The representatives of the Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind had participated fully in drawing up the League manifesto and, while it was being drafted, they were in continuous contact with Congress leaders. The League manifesto had used the same kind of language in connection with securing freedom from the British, the well-being of the masses and general welfare legislation as was customary for the Congress to use. Indeed the language used by the League was even more emphatic.³⁹

³⁷ Sir Muḥammad Yāmin Khān, *op. cit.*, p. 639, called him "a wolf in sheep's clothing." The Jamī'at representative was Mawlānā Ḥusain Aḥmad, *ibid.*, p. 635. Also Abdul Waheed Khan, *India Wins Freedom: The Other Side*, (Karachi, 1961), pp. 72, 73.

³⁸ I. H. Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

³⁹ It created consternation among Muslim landlords, Sir Muḥammad Yāmin Khān, *op. cit.*, v. i, p. 637. Regarding the League and Congress manifestoes, vide, R. Coupland, *The Indian Problem* (New York, 1944), Part II, pp. 13-14.

It was, therefore, reasonably expected that the road to Congress-League cooperation was now clear and that some satisfactory solution would also be found of the Hindu-Muslim problems. But when the results of the elections came out and the Congress saw that it had secured massive majorities in four provinces including the United Provinces and that Congress ministries could be formed in two others, it changed its mind and threw overboard all the promises it had made to the League through the Jamī'at. It decided to ignore the Muslims and cold-shoulder the Muslim leadership.⁴⁰ At this critical juncture some members of the Jamī'at played a most disgraceful role which had far reaching results. This was the time when there had emerged two groups within the Jamī'at itself. Two *mawlawīs* of the United Provinces, Mawlānā Ḥifẓ-u'r-Raḥmān Seohārawī and Mawlānā Bashīr Aḥmad, in league with Mawlānā Ḥusain Aḥmad, worked to oust two office-bearers of the Jamī'at, Mufti Kifāyat-u'llah, the president, and Mawlānā Aḥmad Sa'id, the secretary, because they were somewhat less amenable to Congress pressure. After strengthening their own position, they started intrigues to create closer links with the Congress and to sabotage Muslim interests and carry out Congress instructions in all matters relating to the Muslims. It may be mentioned that Mawlānā Ḥifẓ-u'r-Raḥmān Seohārawī was related to Ḥāfiẓ Muḥammad Ibrāhīm of Nagina, who had been elected to the provincial legislature. Mawlānā Bashīr Aḥmad was generally known as Mawlāwī Bhattā, because he ran a brick kiln. The two intrigued with Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru and Mawlānā Abu-'l-kalām Āzād and carried letters for them from Mawlānā Ḥusain Aḥmad as well, which shows that he also was a party to all that was happening. They produced Ḥāfiẓ Muḥammad Ibrāhīm before the Congress leaders. He showed his willingness to join the Congress if he was made a minister. Chowdhry Khaliquzzaman was still carrying on negotiations with the Congress, which now being in a position to get a Muslim Leaguer to sign the Congress pledge, stiffened its attitude and laid down conditions that could not be accepted by any self respecting political body. Mawlānā Abu-'l-kalām Āzād communicated to Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman the terms on which the Muslim League could enter the government. The Muslim League members should cease to act

⁴⁰ I. H. Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, op. cit., pp. 89-91.

as a separate group in the legislature, they should merge themselves completely with the Congress party and accept the discipline of the Congress Working Committee and the Muslim League Parliamentary Board should be dissolved and no candidate be put on the League ticket for any by election.⁴¹

The Congress now came out in its true colours. Mawlānā Abu-'l-kalām Āzād, who had played an important role in the negotiations with the League did not seem to have felt any pangs of conscience at the deceit perpetrated through its stooges in the Jamī'at. Of course, Hāfiẓ Muḥammad Ibrāhīm joined the cabinet after forsaking the League and Mawlāwī Bhatta's kilns worked to their full capacity and prospered on Government contracts, Mawlānā Hifẓ-u'r-Raḥman Seohārawī later became a member of the Indian Parliament. Mufti Kifāyat-u'llah was too circumspect to stand up to either the intrigue or the betrayal. Mawlānā Aḥmad Sa'id was too colourless to care any way. That learning and piety did not impel the leading lights of the Jamī'at to expose a fraud is a sad commentary on the deterioration of the character of the guardians of the Faith. Deceit and fraud seldom succeed in the final reckoning. This incident was the beginning of the expansion of the influence and the power of the Muslim League and the Jamī'at began to lose prestige among the religious minded masses. Gradually it found itself arrayed fully not only against the Muslim League but also the solid majority of the Muslims who began to see the issues more clearly as the result of the Qā'id-i-A'ẓam's continuous, logical and incisive analysis of the various stands taken up by the Congress. Soon after, the Nationalist Muslims and the Jamī'at lost all importance in the politics of Muslim India. The Herculean blow administered by Iqbal through his short poem on Mawlānā Ḥusain Aḥmad completely crushed him and 'tomes' could not have accomplished what six short lines of the great poet did. Mawlānā Ḥusain Aḥmad did try to get out of what he had said and he produced a long rigma-role in defence of his pronouncements. The essence of his argument was that it is incumbent upon all the inhabitants "to ward

⁴¹ Ibid., pp. 88-91. The story of the intrigue of Mawlānā Abu-'l-kalām and some ulema to sabotage Congress League understanding is partly related in Abdul Waheed Khan, op. cit., pp. 88-90. Also vide Chowdhary Khaliqzaman, *Pathways to Pakistan*, (Lahore, 1961), pp. 157-158. The entire story was known to all those who were close to the Jamī'at circles.

off by common effort any calamity striking the country" and that it was in this limited context that he had said that all those who lived in the Subcontinent formed a nation. The Jamī'at, he argued, "abhorred" the complete integration of the Muslims with the Hindus.⁴² This statement was made in June 1940 in the Jaunpur session of the Jamī'at which was presided over by Mawlānā Ḥusain Aḥmad himself.⁴³

It would be noted that he had published a treatise under the title "*Mutaḥḥidah qawmiyat awr Islam*" (United nationalism and Islam) in early 1939 which was much less guarded in its tone and argument than the statement quoted above. It received a full dress rebuttal from Mawlānā Abu-'l-A'ḷā Mawdūdī. It is strange, therefore, that it was claimed that all the ulema had accepted the truth of Mawlānā Ḥusain Aḥmad's arguments as valid and that "not a single authoritative or reliable scholar had countered it."⁴⁴ This was a common trick with the Jamī'at group of ulema: they dismissed all ulema who opposed them as unworthy of notice and they got more and more enmeshed within the cocoon of their own opinions and prejudices, because they refused to listen to any criticism or let a breath of fresh air enter their closed minds. In fact Mawlānā Mawdūdī's rejoinder⁴⁵ was so logical, authoritative, polite and devastating that it was beyond the capacity of any supporter of a united nationhood to counter. Mawlānā Mawdūdī pointed out that Mawlānā Ḥusain Aḥmad had been carried away by his hatred of the British and had twisted history and facts. Are nations really created by political boundaries? If they are, why are ethnical, cultural and religious conflicts endemic in many states including the European countries? Mawlānā Ḥusain Aḥmad had indulged in wilful distortions of the Arabic dictionary and even the meaning of the verses of the Qur'ān. He had no business to use a well known word like 'nation' in any sense except the one internationally assigned to it. The Muslims and the Jews of Medina did not form a single nation even after the Prophet had brought about an alliance between them for a short

⁴² Muḥammad Miẓān, '*Ulamā-i-ḥaqq*, (Delhi, 1365 A. H.) v. ii, p. 138.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 130.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 137.

⁴⁵ Saiyid Abu-'l-A'ḷā Mawdūdī, '*Taḥrīk-i-āzādī-i-Hind awr Musalmān*, op. cit., pp. 304-325.

while after his migration from Mecca to that city. The guarantee of fundamental rights and the assurance to safeguard Muslim personal law did not ensure continued immunity from non-Muslim influences and corrosion of Muslim entity and culture. Mawlānā Mawdūdī then exposed Mawlānā Ḥusain Aḥmad's ignorance of the real meaning of legal terms like personal law and fundamental rights and their scope and working in a modern state.

Mawlānā Mawdūdī's superior scholarship, his telling arguments, his cold logic and his knowledge of modern concepts in political science and law made it impossible for the Jamī'at group to answer his contentions. In fact Muftī Kifāyat-u'llah who was a *faqīh* (a jurist) and, therefore, more cognizant of the demands of logic and academic debate, advised his colleagues against any attempt to continue the discussion, because he opined that Mawlānā Mawdūdī was in the right and there was no point in attempting to defend the indefensible.⁴⁶ His advice was adopted; and yet the reading public among the Muslims could not forget what Mawlānā Mawdūdī had said. His criticism was dismissed by Jamī'at ulema as coming from a man of no consequence, a point of view that could command respect only among the followers of Mawlānā Ḥusain Aḥmad who would not even read any opinion adverse to their teacher and spiritual guide. It must be remembered that an aura of sainthood had been deliberately built up by Jamī'at propagandists around him and little miracles were assigned to him,⁴⁷ perhaps to save his reputation suffering from continuous criticism from those who did not agree with him.⁴⁸ Mawlānā Mawdūdī had abstained from any personal reflections, beyond pointing out the academic distortions and fallacies in his writings, but others were not so generous. For instance, there was a riot in

⁴⁶ This is based upon personal knowledge of the author. The opinion was expressed by Muftī Kifāyat-u'llah in a conversation with Mawlānā Aḥmad Sa'id.

⁴⁷ Saiyid Muḥammad Miyān, '*Ulamā'-i-ḥaqq*, op. cit., v. ii, e.g., pp. 354-361.

⁴⁸ There were grave misgivings about his bonafides, e.g., Mawlānā Shaukat 'Alī stated on the floor of the Central Legislative Assembly that he had in his possession a letter from Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru in which he had spoken of Congress financial help to Mawlānā Ḥusain Aḥmad, a statement he had made earlier during the elections, Sir Muḥammad Yāmin Khān, op. cit., v. i, p. 686; Another allegation of the same nature occurs in *ibid.*, v. ii, pp. 1042, 1043, and in Abdul Waheed Khan, op. cit., p. 92.

Tānda,⁴⁹ Mawlānā Ḥusain Aḥmad's ancestral home town, where the Muslims had been maltreated by the Hindus and to whose complaints the Congress government turned a deaf ear. He visited Tānda and whitewashed the entire episode so blatantly that it created great resentment against him.

The conduct of the Congress ulema in connection with Muslim complaints added to their unpopularity and compromised their reputation. "Recently", says the Pirpur Report, "just after a communal outbreak had occurred in Pilibhit, Seth Damodar Das, accompanied by two Mawlānās, visited the locality and issued a statement throwing the responsibility for the trouble on the Muslim League, which on inquiry proved to be unfounded. This fact throws some light on the use which is made of some of these learned theologians and also why so much importance is given to them."⁵⁰ The Congress ulema reacted sharply and in their usual, illogical manner. The *Madīnah* of Bijnor which was more loyal to the Congress ulema than the Congress ulema themselves commented, "If it is true that in eight or nine provinces of India, their life, property and honour are being violated, and yet the Muslims have remained silent as if nothing has happened, we should understand that either the organization that claims to be the sole representative of the Muslims is a liar and all the stories of excesses and persecution are false or that the teeming Muslim millions living from Kashmir to Madras have lost all sense of honour and self respect."⁵¹ The newspaper ignored the resentment that prevailed against Congress governments in all the minority provinces. It echoed the usual Congress propaganda that the charges were trumped up for inviting British intervention.⁵² And yet the fact of persecution and the riots could not be concealed, therefore, separate electorates and British machinations were blamed for their occurrence.⁵³ Of course it did not suit the government to annoy the Congress, and the *Madīnah* which smelt the

⁴⁹ The riot is mentioned in *Pirpur Report* (dated 15 November 1938) (Bureau of National Reconstruction reprint n.d.), p. 42, but details have not been given. The Muslim press in Urdu not under the influence of the Congress criticized Mawlānā Ḥusain Aḥmad strongly.

⁵⁰ *Pirpur Report*, op. cit., p. 8.

⁵¹ The *Madīnah*, Bijnor, 28 September, 1939.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Saiyid Muḥammad Miyān, '*Ulamā'-i-ḥaqq*, op. cit., p. 102.

British rat in all that the League did, was happy that it had not succeeded in its efforts. The Governors who had failed in their constitutional duty imposed by the Government of India Act 1935 and the Instrument of Instructions attached thereto could not plead guilty without condemning themselves.⁵⁴ And they were supported by the British owned and edited *Statesman* whose views also were quoted approvingly by the *Madinah*,⁵⁵ one of the very few Muslim newspapers that supported the Congress ulema. Its writings of this period provide an excellent study in prose inspired by frustration.

As the Congress ulema grew more and more unpopular, their writings became more and more vituperative. They questioned the motives of the League leaders in whose activities they could see nothing but intrigue with the British against national emancipation. The main target of their abuse was the Qā'id-i-A'zam. Some of the *mawlawīs* drew special pleasure in distorting his name 'Jinnah', an Arabic word, into Jinā⁵⁶ and when this failed to irritate him or his followers, they assigned to him all kinds of insulting sobriquets like Kāfir-i-A'zam (the great unbeliever).⁵⁷ When this also did not quench their smouldering resentment, they started writing abusive paragraphs. It was strange to see that so-called theologians and scholars and their supporters should so forget the bounds of decency. To give only one example, when the Qā'id-i-A'zam refused to take Mawlānā Abū'l-kalām Āzād seriously as the true representative of the Congress and to negotiate with him on fundamental questions, the *mawlawīs* were greatly excited. The occasion arose when in 1940, the Mawlānā sent a telegram as president of the Congress to the Qā'id-i-A'zam "in confidence" inquiring whether he would be agreeable to the formation of coalition ministries at the centre and the provinces.

⁵⁴ I. H. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent*, op. cit., p. 293, discusses this point in somewhat greater detail.

⁵⁵ The *Madinah*, op. cit., 28 September, 1939.

⁵⁶ The Ahrār ulema, specially Mawlānās 'Atā-u'llah Shāh Bukhārī and Ḥabīb-u'r-Rahmān Ludhiānawī were strangers to balanced language. They seldom mentioned the Qā'id-i-A'zam by his correct name. The Jami'at-i-ulamā' also used it, e.g. its Secretary, Mawlānā Ahmad Sa'id's statement on the League's attitude towards World War II published in *Madinah*, op. cit., 5 November, 1939.

⁵⁷ This was invented by the Ahrār leader, Mazhar 'Alī Azhar,

The Qā'id-i-A'ẓam sent a telegram saying that he could not repose any confidence in the Mawlānā, nor was he prepared to negotiate with him through correspondence or any other manner. He added, "The Congress has made you its president merely as a show boy,"⁵⁸ The Qā'id-i-A'ẓam was forced to adopt that attitude for two reasons. The negotiations for the formation of a coalition ministry in the United Provinces had been carried on with the Mawlānā and he had sabotaged them by getting Hāfiẓ Muḥammad Ibrāhīm to sign the Congress pledge and thus, by frustrating the fulfilment of an understanding to which he had been a party, he had betrayed the trust reposed in him by the League.⁵⁹ And now a Muslim president of the Congress was utilized to propagate the idea of a united Indian nation which could not be accepted by the Muslim League. Besides, it was a fact that Muslim members of the Congress exercised no real influence in that body. Hence its Muslim president was a device to hoodwink the world as if the Muslims were real partners in Congress policies. The Qā'id-i-A'ẓam had to use a telling phrase to bring home to the people the real position. The comment of *Madīnah* on this was so outrageously vulgar that it defies description. "If God has not endowed the Qā'id-i-A'ẓam with natural civility and, if through long association with Anglo-Indians and Christians, he has handed over not only his daughter but also his manners to strangers, it is at least the duty of the Muslims to call him to account."⁶⁰ It may be explained that the Qā'id-i-A'ẓam's daughter had married a non-Muslim at which he had severed all relations with her and neither saw her nor corresponded with her during the rest of his life. Such abusive language became the hallmark of the speeches and writings of this group.

It became so blind in its opposition to the Muslim League and its leaders that it felt obliged to oppose every move, every action, every statement and every resolution in vituperative language; little realizing that its extremism was losing for it any influence that it had possessed earlier. Demonstrations were held wherever their leaders went to show that their policies were causing deep

⁵⁸ Saiyid Muḥammad Miyān, *'Ulamā'-i-ḥaqq*, op. cit., v. ii, pp. 141, 142.

⁵⁹ Abdul Waheed Khan, op. cit., pp. 88-90.

⁶⁰ *Madīnah*, op. cit., 17 July, 1940.

resentment among the Muslim masses.⁶¹ The Jamī'at leaders never realized that their own deeds had inflamed the people and they continuously blamed the Muslim League for inspiring the demonstrations.⁶² It is true that the demonstrators consisted of people who supported the League but the demonstrations were spontaneous and unplanned. The Congress ulema repeated the Hindu slander *ad nauseam* that Pakistan was the brain child of the British,⁶³ closing their eyes to the statements of British ministers and politicians in the United Kingdom and British officials in the Subcontinent, the intrigues of the Cabinet Mission with the Congress and the repeated betrayal of the Muslim League objectives by the British.⁶⁴ The lead was in the hands of the Congress, Mawlānā Abu-'l-kalām Āzād held it for his organization and the Jamī'at, ignorant of the real issues and the world forces at work which made the departure of the British imminent, followed tamely like the faithful pet it had trained itself into being. It supported Pakhtunistan, because the Congress supported it to weaken Pakistan;⁶⁵ it opposed referendum in Sylhet⁶⁶ and Mawlānā Ḥusain Aḥmad worked assiduously against Sylhet joining Pakistan. This inveterate hostility towards an emerging Muslim country by men and organizations which had supported Turkey so enthusiastically in her hour of travail in World War I can be explained only as peeve for having lost the game. Pakistan had come into existence despite their opposition, hence it must not prosper. Iqbal's lament at the tragedy that Deoband should give birth to men like Mawlānā Ḥusain Aḥmad was fully justified.

All ulema did not see eye to eye with the aggressive group in the Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind which had seized power under the leadership of Mawlānā Ḥifẓ-u'r-Raḥmān Seohārawī. Even in the Jamī'at there were some moderates, but they did not have proper leadership and were not able to assert themselves. Those ulema

⁶¹ e.g., Saiyid Muḥammad Miyān, '*Ulamā'-i-ḥaqq*' op. cit., v. ii, pp. 350, ff.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ e.g., *Madīnah*, 21 August, 1946.

⁶⁴ The truth dawned at last, e.g., Saiyid Muḥammad Miyān, '*Ulamā'-i-ḥaqq*', op. cit., p. 387, but the accusation that the Muslim League was an agent of the British was still not abandoned.

⁶⁵ Ibid., pp. 624.625.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 625,

who had broken away and formed the rival organization of the Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind, Kanpur were mostly opposed to the policy of identifying themselves with the Congress. One of these Mawlānā Maẓhar-u'd-dīn, proprietor and editor of *Al-Amān*, Delhi, was a doughty champion of all Muslim causes. He was one of the very few who first raised their voice against *Shuddhī* and *Sangathan*. It was in a public meeting organized by the Congress in Delhi that he had courageously said that the Muslims could never make friends with people who were active in subverting the faith of their ignorant brethren. His newspaper had written against all anti-Muslim moves of the Hindus. He had been one of the leaders of the move to establish the rival Jamī'at of Kanpur. He had supported the Muslim League when it entered the field of popular politics. He was a graduate of Deoband and had been actively associated in the beginning with the Delhi Jamī'at. The intolerance of the Congress ulema resulted in his murder in 1938. It was well known that the assassin had received his inspiration from a bookseller close to the Jamī'at circles. The assassin had said at the time of the crime, "why have you worked against the ulema of Islam? Now taste the retribution." Whether the intention was actual assassination or merely terrorization is difficult to say, but this tragic incident was at par with the attempt on the Qā'id-i-A'ẓam's life in Bombay. So much abuse was heaped upon Mawlānā Maẓhar-u'd-dīn by some Congress ulema and their associates that the assassin, if not actually hired, was filled with fanatical hatred and killed a man who had shown the courage to oppose all whose activities he considered detrimental to the interests of the Muslims. His courage did not fail him at the last moment, because, with blood gushing from his body, he pursued the assassin for a few steps, fell down and died.⁶⁷

A thoughtful theologian of fame, Mawlānā Shabbīr Aḥmad 'Uṭhmānī, whose learning commanded respect and who had been one of the leading professors of Deoband, felt greatly concerned at the rift between the Muslim League and the Jamī'at. He, therefore, arranged a meeting between Mufti Kifāyat-u'llah, at that time president of the Jamī'at and the Qā'id-i-A'ẓam in

⁶⁷ These facts have been narrated by the author from personal recollection. They were known to all informed residents of Delhi at that time.

March 1940. The Qā'id-i-A'ẓam suggested that the members of the Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind should resign from membership of the Congress and join the Muslim League. Muftī Kifāyat-u'llah accepted this and demanded that the Muslim League should put up a definite demand based upon independence before the British and, in case it was rejected, the League should undertake aggressive action. This, according to the report published by the *Madīnah* was not acceptable to the Qā'id-i-A'ẓam.⁶⁸ In fact the report does not seem to be accurate. Soon after, the Muslim League was to adopt the famous Pakistan Resolution, hence there was no real hindrance in assuring the Muftī that there would be a definite demand based upon independence. The question of aggressive action was a matter of strategy that had to be changed from time to time. Actually the Muftī was not in a position to deliver the goods because the Jamī'at was slipping fast into the hands of the extremist Congressite elements.

There were other groups of ulema who were not enamoured of the idea of placing their destinies in the hands of the Hindus. Mawlānā Ashraf 'Alī Thānawī had great influence among the followers of the Deoband School. He was respected for his learning and piety and was recognized as a sufi of great accomplishment. Such well-known scholars as Mawlānā Saiyid Sulaimān Nadwī were among his disciples. His *khānqāh* provided spiritual training of a high order.⁶⁹ He had opposed the Non-cooperation Movement because he was opposed to Muslims placing themselves under the guidance of the Hindu leaders. Besides he held that there could be no real cooperation between the Hindus and the Muslims because of long standing animosity between the two.⁷⁰ When the British left, the government would pass into the hands of the Hindus, which would pose much greater danger to Islam as they would try to exterminate it.⁷¹ His differences with Deoband on the question of Hindu Muslim unity became so pronounced that

⁶⁸ *Madīnah*, op. cit., 13 March, 1940.

⁶⁹ For first hand impressions, vide Rā'is Aḥmad Ja'fī, *Did wa shunīd* op. cit., pp. 185-193.

⁷⁰ He was born on 5 Rabi' I, 1280 A.H. (20 August 1863); regarding his attitude on cooperation with Hindus, vide Ashraf 'Alī Thānawī *Al-īfādāt-u'l-yomiyah*, (Thānā Bhawan, n.d.), v. i, pp. 87-88; also *ibid.*, v. iv pp. 329-30

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

he resigned from its management.⁷² When the Muslim League solicited his support, he put a number of questions in writing and after satisfying himself, he came out openly in its favour.⁷³ He continued his opposition to the Congress.⁷⁴ When he died on 20 July 1943 the Council of the All India Muslim League recorded a resolution of grief and condolence in its next meeting on 14 November 1943.⁷⁵

There were many other Deobandi ulema who supported the movement for Pakistan. Only a few leading ones can be mentioned here. Of these the most prominent was Mawlānā Shabbir Aḥmad 'Uḥmānī, who has already been referred to for his effort to bring about an understanding between the Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind and the Muslim League.⁷⁶ He had participated in the Khilafat Movement, but he was opposed to extravagant acts against the teachings of Islam in demonstrations of unity with the Hindus. He played an important role in organizing the Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Islam of which he was the first president. As usual the spokesmen of the Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind misrepresented the move. Its leading apologist writes, "There always has been a body of *mawlawīs* and *pirzādahs* in India which is opposed to the ulema of Deoband. They have not been interested at all in politics, nor do they possess any political sensitivity, nor do they possess an organization. But at this time the League needed them for opposing the Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind and the League organization was a boon for them for the purpose of opposing the ulema of Deoband and those who shared their opinions, therefore, they met in

⁷² Ibid., v. i, p. 328, also, 'Abd-u'l-Majid Daryābādī, *Ḥakīm-u'l-unmat*, (Lucknow, 1950), p. 473.

⁷³ Ashraf 'Alī Thānawī, *Malfūzāt-i-Ashrafiyah*, (Thānā Bhawan, n.d.), pp. 64-66.

⁷⁴ Ashraf 'Alī Thānawī, *Al-ifādāt-u'l-yomīyāh*, op. cit., v. v., p. 90.

⁷⁵ 'Aziz-u'l-Hasan Majdhūb, *Ashraf-u's-sawānīh*, (Lahore 1365 A.H.) p. 89. When he died, he had eight hundred books, pamphlets, etc., to his credit, Saiyid Sulaimān Nadwī, *Yād-i-raftagān*, op. cit., p. 285. For general information also see, Ghulām Muḥammad Chaudhārī, *Hayāt-i-Ashraf*, (Karachi, n.d.); Aḥmad Sa'id, *Jidd-wa-jahd-i-āzādī awr Mawlānā Ashraf 'Alī Thānawī*, (Rawalpindi, 1972). Munshi Muḥammad Shafī, *Ifādāt-i-Ashrafiyah dar masā'il-i-siyāsīyah*, (Deoband 1364 A.H.); Qāḍī Muḥammad 'Isā, *Kamālāt-i-Ashrafiyah*, (Allahabad, 1354 A.H.).

⁷⁶ Vide supra, pp. 357-58. -

Calcutta under the leadership of a well-known⁷⁷ *mawlānā* and the Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Islam came into existence. Those few individuals who had always been opposed to the freedom movement and were now teachers in government *madrasahs* or pensioners and a gentleman who had come to believe the Pakistan movement to be an Islamic movement and because of his special relationship with the Nizam of Hyderabad, a number of the pensioners of the state and political beggars had become his trusted associates, joined the Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Islam."⁷⁸ In fact there was a large number of eminent ulema whose sincerity could not be doubted who profoundly disagreed with the policies of the Congress and its supporters among the ulema. The number of ulema who supported the Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind was small and the majority of the ulema of the Subcontinent were outside its fold. As its spokesmen themselves admitted, the membership was limited almost entirely to the followers of the Deoband school of thought. They have always formed a minority among the Muslims of the Subcontinent. And not all the Deobandis were with the Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind. And as it happens too often, a small coterie was active and quite often formulated the policies. Sometimes the hands of the top leadership were forced, for instance the deal between Ḥafīz Muḥammad Ibrāhīm and the Congress was brought about without the knowledge of the President and the Secretary. Therefore, those who organized the Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Islam could not be dismissed merely as a body of men of no consequence and even less sincerity. They were theologians of learning and conviction.

Mawlānā Shabbīr Aḥmad 'Uṭhmānī's reputation as a scholar was well established and he had already gained fame as a convincing and powerful speaker and writer before he became interested in the Muslim League.⁷⁹ His reputation as a scholar of *Ḥadīth* was mainly based upon his incomplete work *Fatḥ-u'l-mulham* which is the first commentary from the Ḥanafī point of

⁷⁷ The term used is شهر آفاق which has been used in a bad sense and a translation more in accord with the spirit of the original would have been "notorious". The reference is to Mawlānā Āzād Subḥānī.

⁷⁸ Saiyid Muḥammad Miyān, 'Ulamā'-i-ḥaqq, op. cit., v. ii, pp. 335-336.

⁷⁹ Saiyid Sulaimān Nadwī, Yād-i-rafiṭagān, op. cit., pp. 435-449.

view on *Muslim*, one of the recognized collections of *ḥadīth*.⁸⁰ His relations with Hyderabad which earned him a gibe in the above quotation, were based partly upon his reputation as a theologian and partly because he went to the state when it was under the pressure of Arya Samajist agitators from outside. At that time he was able to build up the morale of the local population and was publicly thanked by the Nizam's government for his activities.⁸¹ But he had not gone to Hyderabad to curry favour with the Nizam. He preached a sermon in the famous Makki mosque of Hyderabad after Friday prayers in the presence of the ruler which went against some of his well-known and strongly held convictions. This created quite a sensation in the state and enhanced the Mawlānā's reputation as a fearless preacher of erudition.⁸² He was not able to go to Calcutta at the inaugural session of the Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Islam because of illness but he sent a message that was couched in moderate, conciliatory and logical language.⁸³ He countered the arguments advanced by the Congressite ulema in favour of a united Indian nation. When Mawlānā Ḥusain Aḥmad ruled that it was forbidden for the Muslims to join the Muslim League, he demolished the ruling with academic and legal arguments. He emphasised that the Muslims were not bound to follow blindly whatever the ulema said. He presided over a Muslim League Conference at Meerut in 1945, where he said in his address that the forthcoming elections were of great importance as they would decide the future of the Muslims in the Subcontinent. He held that the British and the Congress were equally opposed to the establishment of Pakistan and, therefore, those who propagated that the League was an ally of the British and wanted to impede the progress towards independence were either dupes of Hindu propaganda or bent upon sabotaging Muslim efforts for freedom. The results of accepting the theory of united nationhood would be as disastrous as Akbar's Dīn-i-Ilāhī. He quoted Hindu authors to prove that Pakistan would be economically viable. He worked for Pakistan in the referendum in the North-West Frontier Province. He was

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 448.

⁸² Ibid., pp. 448-449.

⁸³ Ibid., p. 450.

a member of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan and ceaselessly worked for giving its constitution an Islamic bias. He had been in poor health for quite some time and died on 13 December 1949.⁸⁴

Mawlānā Zafar Aḥmad Thānawī⁸⁵ held the same views during the Khilafat Movement as Mawlānā Aṣḥraf 'Alī Thānawī. Like him he endorsed the efforts of the Muslim League for the establishment of Pakistan. He was one of those who founded the Jami'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Islam. He held that participation in the Congress movement was tantamount to opposing Pakistan and, therefore, un-Islamic.⁸⁶ He worked against Mawlānā Ḥusain Aḥmad and his followers in Nawabzadah Liaquat Ali Khan's election from Muzaffarnagar, the Congress candidate being Muḥammad Aḥmad Kāẓimī who was defeated. He held that Pakistan was necessary for the preservation of Islamic values and the Muslims in the Subcontinent and, therefore, it was a religious duty to support the movement for its achievement.⁸⁷ Sylhet was a stronghold of the Congress ulema and Mawlānā Ḥusain Aḥmad's influence in the area seemed to be unchallengeable. Mawlānā Zafar Aḥmad Thānawī went there and turned the tide in a single mammoth meeting attended by more than a hundred thousand persons at the shrine of Shāh Jalāl. However, he did not rest on his oars and worked incessantly right upto the completion of the polls. He unfurled the Pakistan flag in Dacca on 14 August 1947 in the official ceremony held on the occasion, at the request of Khwajah Nazimuddin, at that time chief minister of East Bengal.

Mufti Muḥammad Shafi', whose erudition in Islamic jurisprudence was recognized in all academic and theological circles, was the chief *mufti* of Deoband. He shunned politics and devoted himself entirely to his discipline. He felt drawn to the movement for Pakistan and joined Mawlānā Shabbir Aḥmad 'Uṭhmānī in the effort to counter the moves of the Congress ulema. He also held that opposition to the Pakistan Movement was against

⁸⁴ *Dawn*, Karachi, *Jang*, Karachi, *Anjām*, Karachi of the same and following dates.

⁸⁵ He was born at Deoband on 28 January, 1893.

⁸⁶ *Asr-i-jadīd*, Calcutta, 8 March, 1946.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 22 January, 1946.

Islam and detrimental to its vital interests. He upheld the two nations theory. He worked with Mawlānā Shabbir Aḥmad 'Uṭhmānī in the referendum in the North-West Frontier and was assiduous in his efforts to get provisions included in the constitution that would give it an Islamic character. No one, not even the most bigoted Congressite theologians, could deny the eminence of these men.

Some ulema of East Pakistan deserve special mention. Mawlānā Akram Khān was the editor and proprietor of the Bengali newspaper *Āzād*, which played an important role in creating pro-League feelings in the Bengali reading Muslim public. Mawlānā Akram Khān was a good speaker and capable of carrying an audience with him. He was a member of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. As parochial feelings began to increase, he became less and less influential and his newspaper *Āzād* was run by his son who, either from conviction or necessity, had to bow before the rising tide of Bengali nationalism. Mawlānā Akram Khān's last days were spent in disappointment and frustration because he was a good Muslim and a supporter of Pakistan. Another theologian was Mawlānā 'Abd-u'llah-i'l-Bāqī, a pious and learned scholar, who also was a member of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, having worked for it enthusiastically and sincerely.⁸⁸

We now turn to another school of Muslim ulema, the Ahl-i-Sunnat. The most eminent theologian of this school was Mawlānā Aḥmad Riḍā Khān of Bareilly. Brief mention has already been made to his insistence that there should be no political alliance between the Muslims and the Hindus. He was born at Bareilly on 14 June 1856.⁸⁹ He was a jurist of eminence, his intellect was penetrating and his rulings commanded respect. The poet Sir Muḥammad Iqbal wrote about him that "the Mawlānā's rulings bear witness to his intelligence, his intellectual calibre, the quality of his creative thinking, his juristic competence and the profundity of his theological learning... if there had been no extremism in his temperament, he would have been Imām Abū Ḥanīfah

⁸⁸ It has not been possible to get much material about these two stalwarts from Bengal because of lack of communications for quite some time.

⁸⁹ Qāḍī 'Abd-u'n-Nabī Kawkab and Ḥakīm Muḥammad Mūsā Amritsari, *Maqālāt-i-Yom-i-Riḍā*, (Lahore, 1968), p. 27.

of his times."⁹⁰ The extremism to which 'Allāmah Iqbāl has alluded refers to Mawlānā Aḥmad Riḍā Khān's attitude towards some leaders of the Deoband school and his action in holding them outside the pale of Islam. As the occasion arose on certain statements made by some leading ulema of the Deoband school regarding the delicate question of the attributes of God and these statements were of a highly controversial nature, the provocation was as extreme as the response. It would have been better to treat the whole matter as an exercise in metaphysical apologetics, one side advancing certain theories about the knowledge and omnipotence of God and the other holding those views as antagonistic to Islam, but unfortunately the differences percolated down to people who did not understand the issues.⁹¹ This, however, does not detract from his position as an erudite scholar. The number of books, and tracts written by him number about a thousand.⁹² He wielded greater influence upon his followers than any other theologian of the Subcontinent among his contemporaries. In the beginning of the Khilafat Movement, Ali Brothers went to him canvassing him to affix his signatures on the *fatwā* regarding Non-cooperation. He is reported to have replied, "Mawlānā, our politics are different. You support Hindu-Muslim unity. I oppose it." When he saw that they were annoyed, he said "Mawlānā, I am not opposed to political freedom, but I am opposed to Hindu-Muslim unity."⁹³

The reason for this opposition was that the supporters of unity had indulged in excesses which cannot be approved by any theologian.⁹⁴ Mawlānā Aḥmad Riḍā Khān also objected to some of the statements and actions of Mawlānā 'Abd-u'l-Bārī of Firangī Maḥal, who responded handsomely in the following words, "I have committed many sins, some consciously and some unconsciously, I repent of them. I have made statements in writing

⁹⁰ Muḥammad Ma'sūd Aḥmad, *Fāḍil Barelwī awr Tark-i-muwālāt*, (Lahore, 1971), p. 16.

⁹¹ Qāḍī 'Abd-u'n-Nabī Kawkab and Ḥakīm Muḥammad Mūsā Amritsari, op. cit., pp. 5-23 discusses this question in detail and with moderation.

⁹² Ibid., p. 29.

⁹³ Muḥammad Ma'sūd Aḥmad, op. cit., p. 45.

⁹⁴ Ghulām Mu'in-u'd-dīn Na'īmī, *Tadhkirah al-ma'rūf ba ḥayāt-i-Ṣadr-u'l-afāḍil*, (Lahore, n.d.), second edition, p. 101.

as well as verbally and have also acted in manners which I do not hold to be sinful, but Mawlāwī Aḥmad Riḍā Khān holds them as aberrations from Islam or misguided or sinful. I repent of them all and actions similar to them for which I hold no rulings from my preceptors, solely trusting the judgment of Mawlāwī Aḥmad Riḍā Khān."⁹⁵ This statement he got published. The efforts to dissuade Muslims from accepting Hindu leadership were continued. Mawlānā Saiyid Sulaimān Aṣṣhraf attended a conference organized by the Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind in Bareilly in March 1921 and made a speech in which he criticised Mawlānā Abu'l-kalām Āzād for his inclination towards the Hindus and he had to concede that it was as wrong to have *muwālāt* with the Hindus as with the British.⁹⁶ Similarly Mawlānā Mohamed Ali was persuaded to repent of his pro-Hindu activities only three months before his death by Mawlānā Na'im-u'd-din of Moradabad.⁹⁷ Mawlānā Shaukat Ali did the same a few months later.⁹⁸ This would show that the ulema of the Bareilly school were opposed to the Muslims accepting the leadership of the Congress because they were convinced that it would lead to the Muslims gradually losing their identity and accepting Hindu ideas and mores.⁹⁹ When the Hindus started the Shuddhī Movement these ulema organized a body called Riḍā'-i-Muṣṭafa under which several of their members worked among the Malkānā Rajputs with considerable success.¹⁰⁰

The leadership of the Barelwi group of ulema passed into the hands of Mawlānā Muḥammad Na'im-u'd-dīn of Moradabad. He, unlike the ulema of Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind, was convinced early, some time in 1938 or 1939, that the British would not be able to retain their hold on the Subcontinent for long. To him the question as to who would inherit the power was crucial. He reached the conclusion that the Muslim majority provinces should be constituted into a separate state.¹⁰¹ Therefore when

⁹⁵ Ibid., pp. 171, 172.

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 167.

⁹⁷ Ibid., pp. 172, 173.

⁹⁸ Ibid., pp. 173, 174.

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 164.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., pp. 178-180.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 183.

the Pakistan Resolution was passed, the ulema belonging to this school of thought, who had supported the Muslim League even earlier in its struggle against the Congress, decided to work for the establishment of Pakistan. The network of their own organization was made wider and every branch busied itself in propagating the necessity of Pakistan. Mawlānā Na'im-u'd-dīn himself toured the entire Subcontinent in the north and delivered speeches in practically all the major towns and even in some small ones.¹⁰² The organization was given a new constitution and a new name; from All India Sunni Conference it became "Jamhūriyah-i-Islāmiyah."¹⁰³ The body was so pledged to Pakistan that Mawlānā Na'im-u'd-dīn said, in a letter addressed to Mawlānā Abu-'l-Ḥasanāt, the organizer of the Panjab branch, "Jamhūriyah-i-Islāmiyah can, in no circumstances, give up the demand for Pakistan whether Mr. Jinnah himself remains its supporter or not. Our purpose is not served with Cabinet Mission proposals."¹⁰⁴ A big conference was held on 27-30 April 1946 at Benares which was attended by about five thousand ulema and the various aspects of the necessity of Pakistan were explained to the delegates and others.¹⁰⁵ When these ulema went back to their places, the publicity for Pakistan received considerable impetus. Mawlānā Na'im-u'd-dīn explained the attitude of his group of ulema in the following words, "We did not think it proper for ulema to come on the platform of the Muslim League, but we countered the activities of the opponents of the Muslim League enthusiastically and this was not to oblige the League. Our attitude was always governed by the dictates of Islam. At no time did we trust non-Muslims: now that the League took a step in the direction of the propagation of the ordinances of Islam, we opposed the opponents of the Muslim League for the glory of Islam."¹⁰⁶

Some other non-Deobandi ulema deserve special mention. One of these was Mawlānā Āzād Subḥānī who supported the cause of Pakistan throughout. Mawlānā Abu-'l-kalām Āzād used to lead the main congregation of the 'Id prayers in Calcutta. The Muslims

¹⁰² Ibid., pp. 183, 184.

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. 186.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 189.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 181.

of that city were more and more annoyed with his pro-Congress activities and at last removed him. Their choice fell upon Mawlānā Āzād Subhānī whose learning and services were well known. He was so self-effacing that there is little material available regarding his biography. It is, however, well known to those who were witnesses to the exciting events of the last half a century that he took a leading part in the agitation against the demolition of a part of the mosque in Machhli Bazar of Kanpur. He was also fully active in the Khilafat and Non-cooperation movements. He was also an enthusiastic supporter of the Muslim League after it became a live organization. He was an excellent public speaker, his ideas were balanced and logical and his language chaste and limpid; indeed he was one of the finest public speakers in Urdu that this Subcontinent has produced. Mawlānā 'Abd-u'l-Hāmid Badāyūnī started taking interest in public affairs when he still was very young. He was a zealous worker in the Khilafat Movement and associated himself with the League when it came into conflict with the Congress. He migrated to Pakistan on its establishment and was one of the founders of the Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Pakistan in close cooperation with the followers of Mawlānā Na'im-u'd-dīn. Mawlānā Aḥmad 'Alī of Lahore, Mawlānā Jamāl Miyān of Firangi Maḥal, Mawlānā Thana'-u'llah Amritsari of the Ahl-i-Hadīth school and the Shī'ah ulema Mawlānā Ibn Ḥasan Jārchavī and Hāfiẓ Kifāyat Ḥusain worked enthusiastically for Pakistan.

Mawlānā Abu-'l-A'lā Mawdūdī's contribution in convincing the Muslim intelligentsia that the concept of united nationalism was suicidal for the Muslims has been mentioned. The logical corollary of this stand appeared to many the acceptance of Pakistan as the sole goal of the Muslims of the Subcontinent; but Mawlānā Mawdūdī's reaction was more complex and needs a somewhat detailed discussion in the context of this book and the controversy that it has created in contemporary politics. He had opposed the idea of united nationhood because he was convinced that the Muslims would be drawn away from Islam if they agreed to merge themselves in the Indian milieu. He was interested more in Islam than in Muslims: because Muslims were Muslims not because they belonged to a communal or a national

entity but because they believed in Islam. The first priority, therefore, in his mind was that Muslim loyalty to Islam should be strengthened. This could be done only by a body of Muslims who did sincerely believe in Islam and did not pay only lip service to it. And mere belief was ineffective unless it led to individual and social and corporate action. Such a body did not exist and had to be created. It could be brought into existence by presenting Islam as a dynamic movement and not merely as an institutionalized and traditional religion. Hence he founded the Jamā'at-i-Islāmī. He did not oppose the Muslim League, but he felt that it had accommodated within its fold heterogeneous elements, consisting of communists, secularists, Muslim nationalists, believers in Islam and non-believers, practising Muslims and those who did believe but their belief seldom expressed itself in practice or action. How could such a body, he argued, bring about the kind of Islamic renaissance that he thought should be the goal of all Muslim effort in this age when the beliefs of all religions and Islam in particular were under assault. Islam was under pressure from foreign influences as well as internal ills. Even well established Muslim nations had betrayed strong tendencies to stray away from Islam. Therefore Muslim nationalism was not enough, the struggle should be given another dimension as well. When asked to cooperate with the League he replied, "Please do not think that I do not want to participate in this work because of any differences, my difficulty is that I do not see how I can participate because partial remedies do not appeal to my mind and I have never been interested in patch work."¹⁰⁷

The logic of this stand was unexceptionable, but it failed to take cognizance of the circumstances in which the Muslims were placed. They were struggling against time. The British were in a hurry to leave and there just was not the time available for reforming the Muslims, purging the Muslim League of non-believers and winning freedom. Besides the League was fighting on two fronts already, against the Hindus and against the British and both of these parties were far superior in strength and resources to it. The League leadership needed all those with

¹⁰⁷ Saiyid Abu'l-A'lā Mawdūdī, *Tahrīk-i-āzādī-i-Hind awr Musalman*, op. cit., pp. 22-23.

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were willing to make common cause with it and could purge none.

The other difficulty before Mawlānā Mawdūdī was the fact that Pakistan undoubtedly was a partial solution, because it could secure neither security nor possibilities of development on Islamic lines for the Muslims who would necessarily be left behind in India. Besides, the question as to what would happen to Islam in India was a matter of vital importance to him. Therefore, it could only be expected that he would seek some solution for saving the totality of Islam in the Subcontinent and not only a part of it. He, therefore, came out with three alternatives, in which a sovereign Pakistan was not included. The first was the creation of an autonomous Muslims nation within an undivided India. He conceived a political set up for the Subcontinent as a federation of autonomous religious communities, each one possessing the fullest control over its education, religious affairs and social institutions. It was to be recognized as a sovereign body and endowed with the authority to enforce Islamic ordinances and to prevent transgression against them. The Federal centre was to be based upon the principle of equal sharing of authority by all the federating units.¹⁰⁸ If this could not be secured, the second alternative was the creation of autonomous states on the basis of culture with a period of twenty-five years for the migration of the people of one culture to the province of its choice from another. This would ensure the concentration of Muslim population, in certain areas where the Islamic way of life and Muslim culture would be secure.¹⁰⁹ The third alternative was a confederation between two federations, one of Muslim majority provinces and the other of Hindu majority provinces and the confederation was to be entrusted with defence, communications and trade relations among other matters of common interest.¹¹⁰ It would be noticed that all the three alternatives rely for their success upon constitutional provisions, safeguards and guarantees but, all of these can be violated and set aside by an authority sufficiently strong to enforce its will. The federation and also the kind of

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., pp. 475-481.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., pp. 481-482.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 482-484.

confederation suggested by Mawlānā Mawdūdī would have possessed the main instrument of coercion—the armed forces. It is strange that the Mawlānā had realized the inadequacy of fundamental rights in protecting the basic material interests of a member of a minority community in face of persecution by a powerful majority,¹¹¹ but he did not attach due weight to the probability—and, if common historical experience of minorities living under constitutional guarantees with intolerant majorities is a guide, as it should be—almost the certainty of the failure of constitutional arrangements in providing the freedom to the Muslims and protection to Islam that Mawlānā Mawdūdī sought within the framework of a common Indian entity. It is true that merely political liberation could not secure the supremacy of Islam, but the lack of it would have inhibited even its possibility, though, of course, religious and ideological doctrines have been successfully preached by subject peoples. But that was not what the Mawlānā had in view, otherwise he would not have striven for finding a political solution of the problem at all. All schemes of autonomy, federation and confederation had received thoughtful consideration by others but the verdict had been that there was no alternative to Pakistan.

¹¹¹ Ibid., pp. 289-298.

CHAPTER XIV

Epilogue

The story has now been told. It has been, on the whole, an exciting tale of men inspired by their faith to deeds of valour and supreme courage. There have passed before our eyes men of different times, coming from different social strata, exposed to different kinds of tyranny, persecution or subjugation, all determined to uphold the values that they considered supreme and valid, and fighting for their preservation against great odds.

Among them are men to whom recorded history has been unkind, because the recorders were hostile for one reason or another. For instance we are struck with the spirit of Shaikh 'Abd-u'n-Nabî, Akbar's *Şadr-u's-şudûr*, who had perhaps his faults, but who would not carry out the emperor's implied orders that the Shaikh should give a verdict in accordance with the monarch's wishes; who lost his high office because he would not bend; who faced exile and ultimately did not quail in face of Akbar's violence and defiantly said, "why do you not hit me with a dagger?" He was imprisoned, beaten to death, his corpse was thrown into a public square and almost cried out for a decent

burial. All because he had a conscience which would not let him say or do things that he believed to be wrong. And men, theologians and others, learned and not so learned, have been duped by hostile writings because they have not stopped to probe into his deeds, much less into his motives and the manifestations of his great, uncompromising will in the face of the desire, annoyance and then anger of one of the mightiest men of history, But 'Abd-u'n-Nabī must have known that he was unpopular with his own fellow theologians and had incurred the anger of the monarch, therefore, he could hope neither for justice nor for sympathy, and yet he would not compromise and, in the final reckoning, stands out as a martyr, the effulgence of whose martyrdom has not been able to break through the clouds of prejudice. He was a man who had sacrificed all that he had—and he had much, power, office, influence and wealth—including his life, without ever hoping for success or even a reputation that should have been his by right.

Then there are men whose services have been acknowledged by posterity. For example, the great Mujaddid, writing letters to whomever he could influence, patiently pointing out the injuries inflicted upon the body politic of Islam, organizing pro-Islam elements in the Government, patiently enduring incarceration but utilizing it to his advantage, gaining the respect of the monarch whose mind had been poisoned against him, and emerging at last successful, he and his followers once again bringing the polity on the rails of orthodoxy. Or the great Shāh Walī-u'llah, the scholar, mystic, philosopher and thinker, who created a tradition that endured for three centuries and is still not dead, patiently sorting out all the issues and evolving methods of stopping further political, religious and social decay. Or his son and successor Shāh 'Abd-u'l-'Azīz, who worked for decades and decades, and did succeed in bringing about a moral and spiritual fervour of great dimensions, which found an expression in the great Jihad Movement which will ever bear testimony to the capacity of its promoters for underground as well as overt political action. And Saiyid Ahmad Shahid, whose ill-fed, ill-clad, ill-armed warriors were able, despite the treachery of their allies and hosts, to hold their own against well trained troops led by a Napoleonic veteran of

Ventura's experience. And when he realized that defeat was imminent, he rushed with his sword in hand and earned a martyr's death. Many of his companions did the same and those who survived did not count the odds against themselves and carried on an unequal struggle, which would have looked meaningless except to those whose iron souls were concerned with the endeavour and not with victory, who laboured for an ideal and not for any prize. And who can stand in front of such dedication without awe and reverence?

We move on to the great struggle of 1857 and feel amazed at the spectacle of a community that had faced disaster after disaster for a century and a half throwing up leaders who, judged by any human standards, were great. Men like Khān Bahādur Khān, Bakht Khān, 'Aẓīm-u'llah Khān and Prince Fīrūz Shāh are not born every day. They were the products of a system of education that was beginning to get sterile, but, after all, if the quality of its products is any index, it was more capable of producing men of worth than the travesty that passes for education in Pakistan today. Then there is the brave queen, Hadrat Maḥal, who remained secluded and yet who belied her past of pampered palace life and inscribed her name on the pages of history through her determination to avenge the grievances of her people and vindicate the honour of the dynasty that had been unjustly deprived of its heritage. She went on fighting even when all hopes of a victory had faded and chose exile in Nepal among strangers rather than any compromise with the usurper. And among the galaxy of those who led the revolt, none shines so brilliantly as the mysterious mystic scholar, Mawlānā Aḥmad-u'llah Shāh, who stands forth as one of the greatest organizers of an underground net work of rebellion right under the nose of the alien rulers, and, despite lack of any previous military training or experience, as a master strategist, a good general and a brave soldier—one whose reputation was not sullied by any hostile propaganda because even his enemies recognized his greatness and could not withhold their tributes of praise. There were other theologians, not so well known, but for Hāji Imdād-u'llah and his colleagues of Thānā Bhawan who took Shāmli and stood siege in their home town and, when all was lost, escaped to other places.

Mawlānā Ḥajī Imdād-u'llah set up a centre at Mecca and kept alive the hostility to British rule among the theological circles of the Subcontinent.

Can anyone but the most indifferent to the history of the Muslims in the Subcontinent forget the seemingly humble bookseller of Patna, Pir 'Alī, who must have been reasonably well educated, as had to be all booksellers in those days? He was the local organizer of the movement in Bihar. When arrested he refused to buy his life by betraying his colleagues. When last moment efforts were made to pry out his secrets he spurned the offer of a pardon by saying, "There are times when it is best to lose one's life." He said this, giving out the final decision of his heart and soul and walked to the gallows with calm dignity. Not a muscle of his placid face twitched. No sign of nervousness betrayed the slightest trace of internal conflict in his soul. His peace of mind did not leave him in his face to face meeting with the Angel of Death. Only an exaltation of tremendous intensification can bestow such strength.

Among the fighters were many men who will ever remain anonymous because which history can keep alive the names of thousands and to what purpose? And, yet, though unknown individually their collective efforts speak of a spiritual fervour that defies analysis. Known as *ghāzīs* and at places as *jihādīs*, they were the toughest fighters that the British troops faced during the entire war. They came from their homes, armed, clad and provided in accordance with their means which, more often, were meagre. Some of them even sold their possessions. They left their homes, their wives and children, quite often knowing they would never return. They fought with such abandon that their adversaries thought they had come to get killed. They inflicted heavy losses on trained British forces, but ultimately the result was ever the same, martyrdom. We have an intimate picture of the *jihādīs* who had congregated in the Jāmi' Masjid of Delhi. They had little to eat, having no money to buy food. If some one brought them a little food, they ate it, but it was never enough to satisfy their gnawing hunger. They prayed for the greater part of the night, and immediately after morning prayers, donned their arms and sallied forth to fight, or perhaps, it would be more correct to say, in

search of martyrdom. As victory was not theirs, no *jihāds* or *ghāzls* ever returned home. The sceptic, never having tasted the intoxication of fervour, would call it mass suicide.

The Rebellion of 1857 was a great failure and it brought no political dividends. Men who laid their lives did not achieve the end of British rule, mainly because vested interest or calculating selfishness or even cowardice did not permit the vast majority to join in the mighty effort for liberation. But did the blood of the martyrs all flow in vain? Did the corpses lying blood-stained on numerous battle-fields or hanging from trees all over the affected area gain nothing? The British Empire of the Subcontinent, it is true, was not uprooted, it continued to exist and even to prosper, yet there is little doubt that it was shaken to its very roots. Before 1857 the rulers had thought that they could do anything and pretty well get away with it. Because an internally divided, multinational, passive population, that, having been tired of anarchy created by its own misdeeds, had helped an alien people to establish their rule over itself and even volunteered to expand it over other peoples, had borne all kinds of exploitation and deprivation without a murmur, the rulers had begun to think that its apathy was boundless. They had come to feel that it could be persuaded or tempted or even coerced gradually to change its religion and forget its past; that all that was required was firmness and perseverance and the toiling masses of India would toil and toil to make their masters great and wealthy and would never whisper a complaint. The complacency was rudely destroyed by the Rebellion and the British were awakened to the realization that even the placid and inactive Indians could not be pushed too far. It was the abandon and fervour of the Muslims in particular that impressed the British not only with the absolute necessity of religious neutrality but also with the compelling need of not injuring the religious feelings of the people. And this was no mean success, because even though by itself it did not mitigate either the humiliation or the rigours of subjection, yet it did cease to hurt the Muslims in their most sensitive spot. Aligarh was possible only after 1857, before the bloodshed of the Rebellion the British could not have felt its necessity. Without encouragement from the rulers, who had come to realize the width of the

chasm yawning between them and the Muslims, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan's efforts could not have borne fruit.

The tremendous fervour and dedication shown by the ulema and those who were influenced by them deserves some analysis. Merely a theoretical knowledge of Islam, however deep and profound, would not create that spiritual exaltation that fears neither death nor persecution, that makes even the highest sacrifice its own reward, that knows no pettiness, no selfishness, no regard for all that is considered valuable or important by the worldly wise. The richness of character, the depth of feeling, the abandon in the service of a cause does not come merely by academic training. Indeed the academic mind is not seldom haunted by doubt and skepticism is its attribute, a skepticism that renders positive action difficult, if not impossible. This was realized at an early stage and it became usual for ulema to take some mystic training and many of them became eminent and accomplished sufis. It was this dimension in the training of ulema and even many common men that gave them the qualities of devotion and denial of self. Purposeful prayer was the mainstay of their calibre: they did understand the significance of the Quranic verse, 'Seek support with patience and prayer.' The Muslims must give serious thought to the question why there was so much devotion and sincerity in a vital sector of their society then and why it is so scarce today. They must find an answer to the pressing question why there has been such a decline in sustained effort for any cause, however crucial its success might be for their very existence.

There is always an internal dialectics involved in all developments and the introduction of an Anglo-Indian version of modern education was no exception. Aligarh did produce a rich crop of subordinate government officials and others who had been brain washed effectively into thinking that the future of the Muslim community in the Subcontinent was eternally tied up with the pleasure of the rulers, but it could not help producing its rebels as well who neither believed in nor cherished the tutelage of the British. The leader of these at a disturbed juncture of history was the Oxford educated Mawlānā Mohamed Ali. He was not a theo-

logian; the word *mawālnā* was a mere honorific bestowed upon him by the Muslims out of love and respect for him which he had earned through his unbounded faith in Islam. His devotion to its cause was unsurpassed; he worked tirelessly to serve its interests. Throughout the Khilafat Movement he was "the friend, philosopher and guide" of the Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind and indeed it is impossible to think of it without him. That is the reason why it has been necessary mainly to talk about his activities and policies while writing about the participation of the ulema in the Khilafat Movement. There was no intention to include him or his brother Mawlānā Shaukat Ali among the theologians. Even Mawlānā Mohamed Ali was not able to break the rigidity of the ulema with his advice and identification with them. His own convictions, predilections and loyalties led him into adopting for his dress the flowing robes of Arabia and he wore a full beard. His understanding of Islam was excellent. His advice was accepted so long as it conformed to the tradition of anti-British feelings held by the ulema during the long period of confrontation between the ulema and the Government. As soon as Mawlānā Mohamed Ali turned away from the Congress, some staunch supporters of that organization started a rebellion against him and forced his supporters into the formation of a rival Jamī'at.

This development needs a little probing. How did it come to pass that a body of ulema who were expected to be conservative in the matter of cooperating with a non-Muslim majority entered, albeit slowly, into the closest alliance with it? The training of the ulema instilled habits of unquestioning adherence to positions arrived at initially by predecessors held in esteem for their learning and piety. The founders of the Deoband school had started with the desire of resisting British pressure. They were inclined to be suspicious of any idea or move that could even remotely be construed to have possibly been inspired by the British. This grew into an obsession. So long as the Muslims were, because of their education, influence and resources the major partners in anti-British moves, the participation of others was appreciated because it created no problems. But the balance of power shifted during the five decades following the Rebellion of 1857 in favour of the Hindus. The ulema never seem to have grasped this fact.

nor did they seem to have understood the significance of numbers in states where governments come to power through elections. They did not realize that majorities can be as tyrannical as alien rulers; indeed the tyranny of a native majority can be much more devastating, specifically when it is an ethnic, linguistic or religious majority which cannot be converted into a minority through any election. Generally speaking they showed indifference to safeguards and constitutional arrangements intended to protect the minority from persecution and exploitation. Their attitudes were complex. There was a group which reposed its trust completely in the goodwill of the Hindus. Others thought that the Muslims were too powerful to be persecuted or exploited by the Hindus.

This feeling was based on an unrealistic assessment of the strength of the Hindus as a community. Besides, it never entered their calculations that a majority in possession of all the resources of the state was a leviathan, not just a community. Mawlānā 'Ubaid-u'llah Sindhi's half baked ideas on nationalism were taken on trust and not subjected to scientific scrutiny. Earlier the Shaiḡh-u'l-Hind, Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan had apportioned all the blame to the British for the break up of the Ottoman Empire. Even when the international setting changed completely, the ulema kept the dicta of the Shaiḡh-u'l-Hind as the yard stick with which to measure all political issues and problems. This study, it is hoped, has revealed a gradual deterioration in the decision making capacity of the ulema. When the canvas was small, the survey was not too bad. The only flaw that one can find in Shāh Walī-u'llah's assessment of the situation confronting him was that he did not attach any importance to the emergence of the British as the major factor in the political framework of the Subcontinent of his days. This was a serious omission indeed, but upto that time the potentialities of British interference were not so clear. We possess now a hind sight which was not available to Shāh Walī-u'llah, but there is no excuse for the attitude of the Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind after World War II for holding the same view of the internal situation as they had after World War I. They were oblivious of all the changes that had taken place during the period of the second great armageddon. Once a situation had been defined for them by their eminent predecessors it must hold good for all time to

come. How could the British, they argued, really decide to lose control of the Subcontinent, therefore they must be in search of ways and means of staying on. Their unsophisticated minds saw the entire political activity in the Subcontinent as a simple matter of conflict between an imperialist power and those who opposed it. They could not conceive of any other complexity. And the British would try to secure their communications. For this purpose they would seek to enslave the Middle Eastern countries as they had done earlier. Therefore, to save Islam in the Middle East the British must be ousted from the Subcontinent. As this could be achieved, in accordance with their thinking, only through unstinted cooperation with the Hindus, every sacrifice must be made for the sake of that cooperation. If the interests of the hundred million Muslims of the Subcontinent had to be sacrificed, that sacrifice was worth it.

It never occurred to those stalwarts of a united Indian nationhood that ways and means could be found to safeguard the interests of the Muslims and yet to oust the British. All insistence upon a settlement with the Hindus regarding Muslim rights was in fact a step in that direction, because when the British were strongly entrenched, no fissures should have been permitted in the common front against them. But the Congress did not realize that efforts to steam-roller Muslim demands and yet to forge a common front could not succeed. But the Jamī'at group of ulema looked with suspicion upon any conflict with the Congress regarding Muslim rights. Initially the Jamī'at supported Mawlānā Mohamed Ali in his opposition to the Nehru Report but it recanted under pressure from its extremists and preferred to discard Mawlānā Mohamed Ali's leadership. Later they did the same to the Qā'id-i-A'zam. They cooperated with him so long as they felt that his policies coincided with those of the Congress, but they reneged when they saw that he was not willing to merge his party with the Congress. This time the betrayal was shabby and dishonourable, because the understanding with the Congress had been arrived at secretly without the Muslim League or even the office-bearers of the Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind itself having been informed. And quite obviously, as has been explained at the proper place, personal interests and selfish motives were involved.

The surprising fact in the entire unsavoury affair is that the officers and the various leaders of the Jamī'at not only did not protest but endorsed what had happened and fell into line. Gradually the insurgents got possession of the organization and converted it into a propaganda platform for the Congress.

Even more amazing was the false confidence that was built up among the leaders of the Jamī'at regarding their own strength and influence. They started with the assumption that their influence was so great that the League could achieve nothing in opposition to them. This confidence was built initially on two considerations. The first was the general idea that the Muslim masses looked upon the ulema as the custodians of the interests of Islam and the Muslim nation and if the ulema told them that their policies were conceived in the interests of both, they would be believed in preference to the Muslim League because its leadership came mostly from the middle classes who had received Western type of education and also because the ulema of the Jamī'at group had adopted all methods of character assassination. How could the people, argued the Jamī'at leaders, "have any faith in those men whom we have depicted in such lurid colours?" And they thought that the test had come in the bye-election of Hāfiz Muḥammad Ibrāhīm, who had resigned his seat after changing his party.

But his ulema supporters forgot that Hāfiz Muḥammad Ibrāhīm was a minister and, therefore overt and covert influences could be brought into play. Besides the League had had no time yet to reorganize itself. This last factor they had ignored in their assessment of the respective appeals of their canvassing and the canvassing of the Muslim League in the future. The League's meagre success in the elections of the United Provinces had owed much to the support extended to it by the Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind. It had, however, forgotten that its backing had cost the Muslim League the support of those reasonably well organized and influential groups that attached great importance to the safeguards and constitutional arrangements for the protection of the minority rights of the Muslims, in particular, separate electorates. And finally it ignored the historical urges which guid-

ed the Muslims in the direction of a separate destiny for themselves. Another gross miscalculation about their own strength was betrayed in their own discussions and when they tried to allay misgivings about their policies in the minds of others by telling them. "Rest assured, the Congress cannot go against us after coming into power. If it does, we will put the Congress right," or their repeated appeals to the vanity of the unthinking Muslims "What, are you afraid of the Hindus?" This miscalculation was exposed soon after independence. The Jamī'at was forced to wind up its political activities and this it had to do merely in deference to the wishes of Congress leaders at a time when it was the only Muslim organization trying to look after the Muslims in Northern India. It made another attempt in 1972 to convert itself into a Parliamentary Party and was stopped from doing so by its Congress bosses who worked openly against the Jamī'at's intention in its ranks. There is still no tendency to assess its past in terms of realism as the writings of its publicists show. The argument now is that the Jamī'at is weak because the Muslim community in India is weaker as the result of the creation of Pakistan.

The Jamī'at's earlier calculation that it would make the Muslim League ineffective by its hostile propaganda was also unrealistic. The leadership of the Muslim community had passed out of the hands of the ulema after the Rebellion of 1857. In the Rebellion as well there was a kind of division between the ulema and the non-ulema, Except for the most exceptional qualities of Mawlānā Aḥmad-u'llah Shāh, because he was mystic, preacher, organizer, general and statesman rolled into one, none from the ranks of the ulema displayed all those capacities that were brought into play by men like Shāhzādah Firūz Shāh, Khān Bahādur Khān, 'Azīm-u'llah Khān and General Bakht Khān. But the period following 1857 saw a great deterioration in the capacity of the ulema for independent political action. They retired more and more into their own shells confining themselves to their mosques, their *madrasahs* and their *khānqāhs*. One is struck by their sacrifice in this withdrawal from life; one even admires the traditions of academic freedom and organization of their seminaries which they guarded with jealousy and single-minded devotion; but all this was traditional and not original; the ulema conserved a good

deal of what they had inherited but they never thought of going beyond conservation even into the field of seeking relevance in a changing world; and consequently they lost contact with the currents and cross currents of public life in general and politics in particular. They stood aloof, except for the issuance of a *fatwā* supporting the entry of the Muslims into the Congress, when Sir Syed Ahmed Khan opposed it. But that was more like the expression of an academic opinion and resulted in no political or public activity. The result was that right until 1914, they kept themselves secluded. As life does not stand still and, however slow might be the pace, developments continuously come to the forefront demanding immediate and practical responses, new leadership did develop.

It was in 1914 that the ulema began to stir again and the beginning was made by Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan of Deoband and his colleague and disciple Mawlānā 'Ubaid-u'llah Sindhi. However, while they were away, Mawlānās Mohamed Ali and Shaukat Ali, under the inspiration of Mawlānā 'Abd-u'l-Bārī of Firangī Maḥal, decided to bring the ulema into politics. This is how the ulema began to participate in the Khilafat Movement and the Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind was founded. From the beginning it was dominated by the Deobandi group, because that group had a tradition of anti-British and even pro-Congress feelings. But their participation in politics was of a secondary nature. They were not policy makers, the leadership was not in their hands. Not a single decision of the Congress, the Khilafat Committee or even of the Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind itself originated with the ulema. They were camp followers, not leaders. They, in fact, had no capacity for leadership. But that was not so important; they did not have even the sense of choosing their guides properly. And yet, they thought that they had all the wisdom in the world. They gradually separated themselves from the community because they were not able to read its mind. Those who were capable of understanding what the real urges of the people were naturally came to the forefront. The ulema clung to an idea that ran counter to their own ideals and turned them against their own history. The idea was of identification with the Hindus for the purpose of turning out the British. There were not many who

sought safety in British protection, but there were quite a few who felt nervous about a future dominated by the Hindus. The British were bad enough but the Hindus had been worse. The British had taken away all the plums and had permitted no one to share them, but the Hindus had practically snatched the bread basket. The Muslims could not be content with living upon crumbs alone. And when you have only crumbs, you think more of bread than plums.

Besides, it was not a matter of bread alone. There had been cultural antagonism for centuries. With Hindu revivalism it came to the forefront. The Muslims had been afraid of cultural annihilation by absorption into Hindu mores. The ulema had worked hard in the past to prevent a cultural merger of the Muslims with the Hindus, because they had correctly assessed the outcome of such an eventuality. It would mean the end of Islam and of the Muslim community in the Subcontinent. The absorbing capacity of Hinduism has been demonstrated over the centuries in its dealings with many communities that had settled down in the Subcontinent. None of them had totally escaped the fate of absorption into Hinduism. The Muslims were conscious of the danger and had built up protective walls around their distinctive entity. The ulema had taken a leading part in putting up these defences. Now these very ulema were being gradually drawn into the tentacles of the great Hindu leviathan. The process started with their decision to scuttle Mawlānā Mohamed Ali's leadership. From then, they started upon a voyage of no return. They did get an opportunity when they decided to cooperate with the Muslim League, but they betrayed the League and, once again, embarked upon their perilous voyage. At last they reversed their old role of guarding the separate entity of the Muslims and became vociferous advocates of a common nationhood with the Hindus. If they had any reservations in their minds, they laid little emphasis upon them. The Muslim community was wiser than the ostensible defenders of its faith, culture and existence. It rejected their advice and followed others who were more realistic, more wide awake, better informed and more in line with the history of the community. It is one of the ironies of history that the leading scholar of Deoband and the president of the Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-

Hind had to be admonished by the poet philosopher Iqbal who was not a theologian but whose understanding of Islam was deeper and more dynamic. Iqbal was indeed—if one may use the word without serious violence to its usage—the epitome of the new force in Islam. This was the modern believer who had, understood the meaning of Islami in the context of its philosophy rather than of its jurisprudence, who had sought to find its relevance to his environment and had been successful to a remarkable degree in his quest, and who had refused to treat Islam as an exercise in scholasticism and had endeavoured to derive practical guidance from it. The community, turned to those educated in the modern tradition for counsel rather than to the ulema who did not understand the new world that had emerged while they were sleeping.

Thus the ulema were left high and dry and were angry with the new leadership mostly out of jealousy because the people listened to it and had no use for the ulema who had gradually come to sing a tune that was completely out of harmony with the feelings of the community. They had been tutored by their Congress mentors that they were on the right path because the views of the ulema served the interests of the mentors. Being strongly prejudiced in favour of their own borrowed opinions, they refused to concede that any one who opposed them could be sincere. Therefore, instead of making an honest effort to understand the opposite point of view they indulged in mud slinging and questioning the motives of recognized leaders of Muslim opinion. If they were opposed to the Congress, they must be in the pay of the British. In any case they must be subservient to the alien government whose interests they were unjustly serving. All this was the result of pettiness, prejudice and lack of proportion. If Mawlānā Mohamed Ali had foreseen the ultimate results of bringing the ulema into politics, he would not have taken them out of their traditional preoccupations.

This should not be taken to mean that theological studies, scholasticism, jurisprudence, exegesis of the Qur'ān, *Hādith* and allied disciplines should be scuttled: indeed, because of the rapidly changing world of today, they have assumed great im-

portance and call for the application of well trained minds. The modern student of these disciplines has to combine a high degree of competence in social sciences with a penetrating insight into the discipline that he seeks to recast or bring upto date. He will find the task so colossal and so absorbing that he will have little time left for anything else. Even the doctors of the traditional contents of theological sciences, who on the whole will have a lighter task than the one we have assigned to the kind of modern scholar that we would like to emerge, cannot afford the time for political activity. Mawlānā Husain Aḥmad was a scholar of *Hadīth*, but he had to neglect both teaching and scholarship when he became absorbed in politics. Life today has become so complex that the politician must work hard to cultivate the expertise that his calling demands. He has to understand the social, economic and educational problems of his country and the impact of international forces upon its internal affairs as well as external relations. Politics can no longer tolerate ignorance or even dilettantism. It is, therefore, difficult to see how the ulema can now play a fruitful and effective role in politics without a complete reorientation of their education and not produce results similar to those produced by the Jamī'at-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind.

As has been mentioned in the previous chapter, that there were ulema outside the Jamī'at who played a more positive role in the Pakistan Movement. Some of them came from Deoband itself, thus redeeming some of its wasted reputation. These were men with a more robust common sense and a greater understanding of the history of the community. They had a sharper perception of the forces at work in the Subcontinent and the reduction in the importance of the United Kingdom as a world power. Mawlānā Ashraf 'Alī Thānawī had earlier broken his relations with Deoband because of, *inter alia*, the political policies of some of its leading lights. He remained in the old tradition of the ulema of the Subcontinent who were vigilant against the incursion of Hindu influence into Islam and the life of the Muslims. And the same is true of the other schools of thought among ulema who supported the struggle of the Muslims for a separate homeland where they can work out their destiny. Indeed the final justification of Pakistan will be the effort the Muslims are able to make for this purpose.

An enlightened body of ulema can render great service in building up this endeavour. Indeed the production of such ulema must have a high priority in the minds of those who are committed to the ideal of a true renaissance of Islam in Pakistan.

Select Chronology

(Only leading dates have been given)

- 1556 Akbar's accession
- 1560 Bairam Khān dismissed
- 1564 Birth of the Mujaddid-i-alf-i-thānī
- 1565 Shaikh 'Abd-u'n-Nabī appointed *Ṣadr-u'ṣ-ṣudūr*
- 1574 Abu'l-Faḍl presented
- 1575 'Ibādatkhānah completed
- 1579 Akbar reads *khutbah* in Friday prayers (26 June)
Maḥḍar signed
- 1580 Shaikh 'Abd-u'n-Nabī dismissed
Makhdūm-u'l-mulk and Shaikh 'Abd-u'n-Nabī expelled to
the Hejaz
Arrival of First Jesuit Mission
- 1582 Makhdūm-u'l-mulk returns and is murdered at Akbar's
behest
Shaikh 'Abd-u'n-Nabī returns and is executed
- 1590 Arrival of Second Jesuit Mission
- 1605 Akbar's death, Jahāngīr's accession
- 1626 Death of the Mujaddid-i-alf-i-thānī
- 1627 Jahāngīr's death
- 1628 Shāhjahān's accession

- 1659 Accession of 'Ālamgir I
 1679 Reimposition of *jiziyah*
 1703 Birth of Shāh Walī-u'llah
 1707 Death of 'Ālamgir I
 Accession of Bahādur Shāh I
 1712 Accession of Jahāndār Shāh
 1713 Accession of Farrukh Siyar
 1719 Accession of Rafī'-u'd-dawlah
 Accession of Rafī'-u'd-darajāt (Shāh Jahān II)
 Accession of Muḥammad Shāh
 1739 Nādir Shāh's invasion
 1748 Accession of Aḥmad Shāh
 Death of Nizām-u'l-mulk Āṣaf Jah I
 1754 Accession of 'Ālamgir II
 1757 Battle of Plassey
 1759 Accession of Shāh 'Ālam II
 1761 Battle of Panipat
 Najib-u'd-dawlah appointed *amīr-u'l-umara'*
 1762 Death of Shāh Walī-u'llah
 1764 Battle of Baksar
 1765 Grant of *Ditwānt* to East India Company
 1770 Death of Najib-u'd-dawlah
 1772 Shāh 'Ālam II returns to Delhi
 Najaf Khān appointed *amīr-u'l-umara'*
 1782 Najaf Khān dies
 1786 Birth of Saiyid Aḥmad Shahīd
 1788 Shāh 'Ālam II blinded
 1792 Ranjit Singh becomes head of Shukerchakia Misl
 1799 Ranjit Singh becomes ruler of Lahore
 1806 Accession of Akbar II
 1818-19 Sikh Conquest of Multan and Kashmir
 1831 Battle of Bālākot
 Death of Saiyid Aḥmad Shahīd
 1834 Peshawar annexed by Ranjit Singh
 1837 Burnes leads mission to Kabul
 Accession of Bahādur Shāh II
 1839 Death of Ranjit Singh
 First Afghan War begins
 1842 First Afghan War ends

- 1843 British annex Sind
- 1845-46 First Sikh War
- 1848-49 Second Sikh War
- 1849 Annexation of Panjab
- 1857-58 The Great Rebellion
- 1857 Deposition of Bahādur Shāh II
- 1863 Ambela Campaign
- 1867 Qā'id-i-A'ẓam's birth
- 1873 Birth of 'Allāmah Muḥammad Iqbāl
- 1875 Foundation of M.A.O. College, Aligarh
- 1878 Birth of Mawlānā Moḥamed Ali
- 1878-80 Second Afghan War
- 1880 'Abd-u'r-Raḥmān becomes Amīr of Kabul
- 1885 First meeting of Indian National Congress
- 1901 Ḥabīb-u'llah Khān becomes Amīr of Kabul
- 1905 Partition of Bengal
- 1906 Foundation of All India Muslim League
- 1908 Anglo-Russian Convention
- 1909 Minto-Morley Reforms
- 1914 Outbreak of World War I
Mahatma Gandhi returns from South Africa
- 1916 Lucknow Pact
- 1918 End of World War I
- 1919 Massacre of Jallīānwālā Bāgh
Amānullah Khān becomes ruler of Afghanistan
Government of India Act 1919
- 1920-22 Khilafat Movement
- 1921 Moplah Rebellion
- 1928 Simon Commission
Nehru Committee Report
- 1929 Nādir Shāh becomes King of Afghanistan
Sarda Act passed
- 1930-31 First Civil Disobedience Movement
- 1930-32 Round Table Conference
- 1930 Mawlānā Moḥamed Ali's death
- 1931 Gandhi-Irwin Pact
- 1932 Second Civil Disobedience Movement
- 1935 Government of India Act 1935
- 1937 Congress Ministries take office

- 1938 Death of 'Allāmah Muḥammad Iqbāl
- 1939 Congress Ministries resign
Muslim Day of Deliverance
- 1940 Lahore Resolution on Pakistan
- 1942 Cripps Mission
- 1945-46 General Elections
- 1946 Cabinet Mission
- 1947 Establishment of Pakistan

Glossary

' <i>ādil</i>	just.
' <i>adl</i>	justice.
<i>ahl-i-ḥadīth</i>	originally the jurists who laid greater emphasis upon <i>ḥadīth</i> (see below) than upon the interpretations of other jurists; in later days, in the Subcontinent, the school which does not bind itself to any of the recognized schools of jurisprudence and believes in independent interpretation; the school is commonly called <i>ghair muqallid</i> (see below), plural of <i>ḥurr</i> , a free man, freedom loving: a name adopted by a school of pro-Congress Muslim politicians in the Subcontinent.
<i>aḥrār</i>	
<i>ākhund</i>	a teacher. The title of a religious leader of Swat who took a leading part in organizing resistance to British troops in Ambela Campaign.
' <i>alam</i>	a standard, a flag.
' <i>ālim</i>	literally, a learned man, generally used for a doctor of Islamic law.
' <i>allāmah</i>	a highly learned man.
<i>āmīn</i>	amen.

<i>āmin bi'l-jahr</i>	the word <i>āmin</i> (see above) is uttered after the <i>sūrat-u'l-fātiḥah</i> , (see below). The Ḥanafis utter it inaudibly. When uttered audibly, it is <i>bi'l-jahr</i> , meaning audibly.
<i>amīr</i> <i>amīr-u'l-mu'mīnīn</i>	a person holding authority, a ruler, a noble. generally translated as the Commander of the Faithful—the Caliph.
<i>amīr-u'l-umarā'</i>	the chief noble, in later days of the Mughul Empire, the <i>amīr-u'l-umarā'</i> was practically the regent.
<i>bid'at</i>	literally, innovation; an accretion to pristine religious doctrine or practice.
<i>bid'att</i>	one who believes or indulges in <i>bid'at</i> (see above).
<i>bismi'llah</i>	in the name of Allah, the full version being <i>bismi'llah-i'r-Raḥmān-i'r-Raḥīm</i> , meaning 'in the name of Allah, the most Compassionate and the most Merciful.' It occurs in the Qur'ān in the beginning of almost every <i>sūrah</i> (see below).
<i>chapāṭī</i>	unleavened bread of wheat flour or meal resembling a <i>tortilla</i> .
<i>dār-u'l-ḥarb</i>	literally a land of war, in Islamic law a land where Islam is under constraint.
<i>dār-u'l-Islam</i>	literally a land of Islam, in Islamic law where Islam is sovereign and free.
<i>dhimmi</i>	a non-Muslim under the protection of a Muslim state.
<i>faqīh</i> <i>faqīr</i>	a person learned in <i>fiqh</i> (see below). literally a poor man, but generally used for a person who voluntarily leads a life of poverty to save the time, he would otherwise have spent in earning money, for spending it in spiritual pursuits.
<i>farā'id</i> <i>farā'idī</i>	plural of <i>fard</i> (see below). a Muslim sect of Bengal which insists upon the performance of <i>farā'id</i> (see above).
<i>fard</i>	whatever is obligatory for a Muslim under the <i>Shari'ah</i> (see below).

<i>fātiḥah</i>	literally, opening; it is used for the <i>sūrat-u'l-fātiḥah</i> (see below) which forms an essential part of Muslim prayers. It is also recited when praying for God's mercy on the soul of the dead. In later days an elaborate ceremony developed for this purpose. Special days were prescribed for it. The ceremony also came to be associated with offering respect to saints.
<i>fatwā</i>	a ruling by a jurist on the legality or otherwise of an action.
<i>fiqh</i>	literally the exercise of one's intelligence to understand a matter, used for Islamic jurisprudence.
<i>ghaibūbat</i>	literally disappearance or absence, a doctrine which believed in the miraculous disappearance of Saiyid Aḥmad <u>Shahīd</u> and refused to believe that he had been killed.
<i>ghair muqallid</i>	one who does not follow the opinions of others, used for the <i>ahl-i-ḥadīth</i> (see above) sect of the Muslims in the Subcontinent.
<i>ghairu taqlid</i>	non-conformity with tradition; refusal to bind oneself to the interpretation of any recognized school of jurisprudence.
<i>ghāzī</i>	a participant in <i>jihād</i> (see below), a fighter in the cause of Islam.
<i>gurū</i>	literally a teacher, a Hindu or Sikh spiritual preceptor.
<i>ḥadīth</i>	tradition or traditions of the Prophet.
<i>ḥāfiẓ</i>	a person who knows the Qur'ān by heart.
<i>Ḥanafī</i>	a person who follows the School of Imām Abū Ḥanīfah in jurisprudence.
<i>hijrat</i>	a migration from persecution to safety.
<i>hijrī</i>	the Muslim lunar calendar beginning with the migration of the Prophet from Mecca to Medina.
<i>ḥizb-u'llah</i>	literally the Party of God, intended name for an army proposed to be organized to fight against the Allies in World War II.

<i>ḥuffāz</i>	plural of <i>ḥāfiẓ</i> (see above).
<i>‘ibādatkhānah</i>	literally a place of worship, the name of a hall built by Akbar for holding discussions on religious matters.
<i>ibāḥatiyah</i>	a sect which did not believe in the prohibition of actions generally held to be forbidden in Islam.
<i>ijmā’</i>	consensus, universal acceptance of a ruling.
<i>ijtihād</i>	the application of the human mind to the verses of the Qur’ān and <i>ḥadīth</i> for applying them to particular situations or problems.
<i>ijtihādu muqayyad</i>	when <i>ijtihād</i> (see above) is limited by the rulings of a recognized school of jurisprudence.
<i>ijtihādu muṭlaq</i>	when <i>ijtihād</i> (see above) is not limited by the rulings of previous jurists.
<i>imām</i>	a leader, a person whose eminence is recognized in any field, a person who leads congregational prayers.
<i>imām-i-‘ādil</i>	a ruler who governs with justice and in accordance with the <i>Shari‘ah</i> (see below).
<i>imārat</i>	the office of an <i>amīr</i> (see above).
<i>imārat-i-shari‘ah</i>	an organization under a theologian which at one time it was proposed to set up in the Subcontinent for the enforcement of the Muslim personal law.
<i>Ithnā ‘asharī</i>	a sect of the <i>Shi‘ahs</i> which believes in the apostolic succession of twelve <i>imāms</i> , each one divinely ordained.
<i>jamā‘at</i>	a body, a group, a congregation for prayers.
<i>Jāmi‘ masjid</i>	generally the main mosque in a city where Friday prayers are held.
<i>Jamī‘at</i>	an association.
<i>jazīrat-u’l-‘Arab</i>	The Arabian Peninsula.
<i>jihād</i>	literally the utmost effort, a war in the cause of Islam.
<i>jihādī</i>	applied to private men who took up arms to fight against the British.

<i>jizyah</i>	The poll tax levied from able bodied non-Muslim subjects of a Muslim state in lieu of military service. Those who were not capable of fighting because of age and infirmity or were not sufficiently well off to pay, or volunteered to fight, women and children and anchorites, priests and religious teachers were exempt.
<i>khāksār</i>	literally, like dust—humble. A member of the <i>Khāksār</i> organization established by 'Allāmah 'Ināyat-u'llah Mashrīqī.
<i>khālifah</i>	Caliph, the head of the Muslim commonwealth. Also a person holding authority from a spiritual preceptor to train others.
<i>Khārījī</i>	A sect in Islam which held extreme views in politics as well as religion, outside the pale of Sunnism (see below) as well as Shi'ism (see below).
<i>khaṭīb</i>	a person attached to large mosques whose function is to deliver sermons.
<i>khilāfat</i>	Caliphate, also, the authority held from a spiritual preceptor to train others.
<i>khuṭbah</i>	a formal sermon.
<i>mahātma</i>	literally "great soul"—a Hindu saint.
<i>maḥḍar</i>	a document drawn up by an assembly, also a similar document vesting Akbar with authority superior to that of a <i>mujtahid</i> (see below).
<i>mahdawī</i>	a believer in Saiyid Muḥammad of Jaunpur, who claimed to be a Mahdī (see below)
<i>mahdī</i>	Many Muslims hold the belief that a leader inspired by God will arise towards the end of the World who will restore Islam to its pristine purity and establish its authority over the entire world.
<i>majlis</i>	an assembly, an organization, a body.
<i>majlis-u'l-'ulamā'</i>	an assembly of ulema.
<i>malichha</i>	unclean, applied to all non-Hindus by the Hindus.

<i>manqūl</i>	traditional, based upon some authority.
<i>ma'qūl</i>	rational, based in reason.
<i>masjid</i>	a mosque.
<i>masnad</i>	literally a support, used for the seat of a noble or ruler of less than regal status, a seat of authority less than a throne.
<i>mawlānā</i>	literally, our lord, generally used as an honorific for ulema of eminence.
<i>mawlawī</i>	my lord, an honorific used for ulema.
<i>Mazdaki</i>	the followers of Mazdak who lived in Iran under the Sassanids and preached extreme communism including the sharing of women.
<i>milād</i>	the celebration of the Prophet's birth, which some hold to be a <i>bid'at</i> .
<i>millat</i>	literally a nation, generally applied to the World Muslim Community. The Ottomans used it for non-Muslim communities living in their empire. European writers on the Ottoman Empire generally refer to it as <i>millet</i> .
<i>mi'rāj</i>	the ascension of the Prophet.
<i>misl</i>	a unit of the Sikh confederacy, a <i>misl</i> was autonomous in its internal organization and discipline.
<i>mufassir</i>	an exegete of the Qur'ān.
<i>muftī</i>	a jurisconsult, a person entitled to give a legal ruling based upon <i>Shari'ah</i> (see below).
<i>muftī-i-kul</i>	<i>muftī</i> for the entire realm.
<i>muḥaddith</i>	a scholar of <i>ḥadīth</i> (see below). Plurals <i>muḥaddithūn</i> (nominative) and <i>muḥaddithīn</i> (objective).
<i>muhājir</i>	a person who performs <i>hijrat</i> (see above), a migrant.
<i>muḥarram</i>	the first month of the Muslim lunar calendar, the month in which the tragedy of Karbala took place in which Husain, the grandson of the Prophet was martyred. The anniversary is celebrated every year with processions and other ceremonies.

<i>muhtamim</i>	manager, executive h and.
<i>mujaddid</i>	a person who restores Islamic doctrines to their pristine purity.
<i>mujaddid-i-alf-i-thānī</i>	the <i>mujaddid</i> of the second millennium of the Hijri (see above) era, the title of Sh aikh Aḥmad of Sarhind.
<i>mujāhid</i>	a participant in <i>jihād</i> (see above); a fighter of Islam, plurals <i>mujāhidūn</i> (nominative) and <i>mujāhidīn</i> (objective).
<i>ṣullā</i>	a theologian, a scholar, formerly an honorific applied to eminent scholars, now degraded to denote a person who is not so learned and is attached to a mosque.
<i>mu'min</i>	a believer, Muslim weavers call themselves mu'mins. They started this practice to distinguish themselves from Hindu weavers. The Momin conference, a pro-Congress organization, represented Muslim weavers.
<i>muqallid</i>	one who puts himself under the discipline of a recognized school of Islamic jurisprudence and accepts its rulings.
<i>murtid</i>	a disciple of a sufi.
<i>mutawallī</i>	a custodian, a trustee.
<i>muwahḥid</i>	a monotheist, a term (wrongly) applied to a believer in monism.
<i>muwālāt</i>	friendship.
<i>nā'ib</i>	an assistant, a deputy.
<i>nechari</i>	a term applied to Sir Syed Ahmed Khan and his school of thought because of his emphasis that religion cannot and does not contradict nature, hence exegesis should take full cognizance of the discoveries of natural science.
<i>pandit</i>	a Brahmin learned in Sanskrit and Hindu religious lore.
<i>pir</i>	literally an old man, a spiritual preceptor.
<i>qāḍī</i>	a judge.
<i>qāḍī-u'l-quḍāt</i>	the chief judge of the realm.
<i>Qā'id-i-A'zam</i>	literally 'the greatest leader', a title by which

Qur'ān
raf'u yadain

rangīlā
ṣadr-u'ṣ-ṣudūr

ṣalāt
sangathan

satyagrah
Shāfi'i

shāh
shahr āshūb

shāhizādah
shaiikh

shaiikh-u'l-ḥaram

shaiikh-u'l-Hind

shaiikh-u'l-Islam

Mr. Mohammad Ali Jinnah was known after his becoming the greatest leader of the movement for Pakistan.

the Koran.

raising of the two hands while changing some postures in the course of *ṣalāt* (see below).
gay, sensual.

the head of the Department of Religious Affairs for the entire realm in the Muslim empire of the Subcontinent.

Muslim formal prayers, service.

literally binding together, Hindu fascist movement.

Hindu passive resistance for a just cause.
The founder of one of the four recognized schools of jurisprudence known after his name, a follower of that school.

literally, monarch, used for sufis.

shahr = city; *āshūb* = disturbances; *shahr-āshūb*, therefore, means a state of anarchy or general disturbance in a city or an area; a poem bemoaning the decay of or a breakdown of law and order in an area of a community.

prince.

literally an old man; a chief, a learned theologian: a spiritual preceptor.

the chief theologian attached to the sanctuary at Mecca.

an honorific use for Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan after his arrival in the Subcontinent from Malta, literally the chief (theologian) of India.

the head of the Department of Religious Affairs in the Ottoman Empire; in the Muslim Empire of the Subcontinent the title was bestowed on some universally respected theologians without the assignment of any formal duties.

<i>shaikh-u'l-kabir</i>	the great preceptor, generally applied to Ibn-u'l-'Arabī.
<i>shams-u'l-'ulamā'</i>	literally, the sun of the ulema, a title bestowed by the British on prominent scholars of Persian or Arabic.
<i>shari'ah</i>	the Islamic law derived from the Qur'ān and the <i>ḥadīth</i> (see above).
<i>sharif</i>	literally, noble, the title of the chief executive of Mecca under the Ottomans.
<i>Shi'ah</i>	the members of a sect in Islam which believes in the apostolic succession of the <i>imāms</i> after the Prophet. They consider 'Alī as the rightful caliph and consider the first three caliphs to have been usurpers. They hold that the hereditary succession being ordained by God cannot be disturbed by nomination or election.
<i>shuddha</i>	pure, clean.
<i>shuddhi</i>	literally cleansing, conversion or reconversion to Hinduism.
<i>silsilah</i>	literally a chain, a sufi order.
<i>sunnah</i>	what the Prophet said or taught and the way he acted in normal or extraordinary circumstances; <i>sunnah</i> includes <i>ḥadīth</i> (see above).
<i>Sunni</i>	short form of <i>ahl-u's-sunnati-wa'l-jamā'at</i> , the orthodox section of Islam.
<i>sūrat-u'l-fātiḥah</i>	the opening chapter of the Qur'ān which is repeated in every <i>ṣalāt</i> (see above).
<i>taqlīd</i>	following a recognized school of jurisprudence.
<i>ṭarīqah</i>	literally a path, sufi discipline.
<i>tark-i-muwālāt</i>	literally giving up friendship, applied to Non-cooperation during the Khilafat Movement.
<i>tark-i-ta'āwun</i>	Non-cooperation.
<i>taṣawwuf</i>	the way of the sufis, mysticism.
<i>tawassul fi'd-du'ā</i>	seeking intercession in prayers.
<i>tawāzun</i>	equilibrium.

<i>tawhīd</i>	monotheism, wrongly applied sometimes to monism.
<i>ta'ziyah</i>	literally mourning, applied in the Sub-continent to a model of the mausoleum of Ḥusain, the grandson of the Prophet. The models seek little resemblance with the original and are mostly, almost invariably, structures of bamboo and paper.
<i>Tūrān</i>	Central Asia.
<i>turbat</i>	Literally a grave, the model of a grave made of bamboo and paper during Muḥarram. It is supposed to represent the grave of Ḥusain, the grandson of the Prophet.
<i>'ubūdiyyat</i>	the state of being a servant of God, having placed oneself completely at His service and achieving complete surrender to His will.
<i>ustād</i>	a teacher.
<i>Vāmamārgī</i>	a follower of the "left path", a worshipper of the principle of creation among the Hirdus. The sect looks upon organized sexual orgies as the highest form of worship.
<i>waḥdat-u'l-wujūd</i>	monism.
<i>waḥdat-u' <u>sh-shuhūd</u></i>	the realization that monism is not a reality and is only a sensation created by deep mystic ecstasy.
<i>wahhābī</i>	a follower of Abd-u'l-Wahhāb of Najd. Wrongly applied to the school of Ṣādiqpur and the <i>Ahl-i-Ḥadīth</i> sect of the Sub-continent.
<i>waḥī</i>	revelation.
<i>wakīl</i>	an agent, sometimes a regent.
<i>wakīl-i-muṭlaq</i>	a regent with absolute authority, a vicerent.
<i>wāli</i>	a governor, a viceroy, a ruler who is not legally independent.
<i>Zaidī</i>	a sub-sect of the <u>Shi'</u> ahs, somewhat closer to the Sunnis than others.
<i>zakāt</i>	a tax prescribed by Islam on property and capital of certain categories for benevolent purposes.

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